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 TOP  >  Public Security Intelligence Agency >  The Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations (issued in January 2006) >  2. Focal Issues of International Public Security in 2005

2. Focal Issues of International Public Security in 2005

1. North Korean Government and Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan)

(1) The nuclear issue of North Korea shows further complication after Joint Statement.
- After the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, used by the country for negotiating leverage, North Korea makes every effort to delay its nuclear arms abandonment by prolonged negotiation and to gain economic assistance.
- China evaluates the Joint Statement as a great achievement. It tries to strengthen the provisions of this Statement, to maintain the framework of the Talks, and to keep the Kim Jong Il regime stable, in an expectation that the Talks will not be concluded in the near future.
- South Korea positively responds to the Talks, putting forth “important proposals”
- Russia focused on maintaining the framework for the Talks in cooperation with China and Korea.

<North Korea employed a brinkmanship strategy, declaring "possession of nuclear weapons" and suggesting further nuclear armament, but agreed to the proposals of China and South Korea to resume the Talks.>

North Korea strongly opposed the remarks made by the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who labeled North Korea "an outpost of tyranny" (January). On February 10, North Korea formally declared that it "possesses nuclear weapons" in a statement by the Foreign Ministry and expressed "indefinite suspension of attendance" to the Six-Party Talks. Even afterwards, North Korea suggested reinforcement of nuclear weapons capabilities by insisting that "a further increase in nuclear weapons is quite natural for self-defense" (March, Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry), stopping the operation of Yongbyon's 5,000-kilowatt reactors using graphite moderator (the end of March), and starting "to take out 8,000 spent fuel rods" (May, Spokesman of the Foreign Ministry).

China considered these moves by North Korea to be threatening to the framework of the Six-Party Talks and actively promoted coordination of diplomacy with related countries. The head of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee Wang Jiarui visited North Korea (February) and handed a message from President Hu Jintao addressed to the General Secretary Kim Jong Il. The message was to the effect that "Resolving the nuclear issue through the Six-Party Talks is profitable to both China and North Korea" and strongly recommended an early return to the Six-Party Talks. As for the United States, Hu Jintao emphasized to Condoleezza Rice, who visited China in March, on an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks, saying that "China is making efforts for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and protection of peace and security, and wishes to draw each related country back to an early resumption of the Six-Party Talks.”

South Korea held vice-ministerial level talks in May after the lapse of ten months. Taking advantage of the resumption of North-South exchanges that had been stagnant, South Korea' s Unification Minister Chung Dong Young visited North Korea in June and, in the talks with Kim Jong Il, explained about an "important proposal" which included support of a 2 million-kilowatt electric power plant and construction of related facilities including power transmission. Thus, China requested North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks, to which Kim Jong Il responded that, "North Korea can participate in the Six-Party Talks in July if it is certain that the United States will show us respect”

Under such efforts by each country, both the United States and North Korea repeated from May their contact made through the offices of the United Nations in New York toward the resumption of the Talks, and agreed in their contact in July to hold in late July the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks.

<The first Joint Statement was adopted by the fourth round of Six-Party Talks. North Korea "promised" to abandon its nuclear arms, but insisted, "Provision of light-water reactor is a condition.">

In the fourth round of Six-Party Talks held about one year after the last session (The first session was held from July 26 to August 7, and the second session was from 13 to 19 of September.), in addition to the talks by all the parties, bilateral talks were held actively. North Korea, unlike in the past three rounds, refrained from extreme anti-U.S. diatribe and showed a practical attitude. In the talks, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan requested North Korea' s "verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and nuclear development plans", but North Korea continued to deny the presence of a uranium enrichment program, and insisted on their right for "peaceful use of nuclear energy", and requested provision of a light-water reactor, so the talks were adjourned and did not proceed smoothly. Finally, thanks to the effort of the presiding state of China, the United States agreed to include "the issue of light-water reactor provision" in the document, and the first Joint Statement since the start of the Six-Party Talks in August 2003 was adopted.

Outline of the Joint Statement
- The DPRK is committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards.
- The United States affirmed that it has no intention to attack the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.
- The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss, at an appropriate time, the subject of the provision of a light water reactor to the DPRK.
- The DPRK and the U.S. promised to respect mutual sovereignties and peaceful co-existence, and to take the measures for normalization of relations between the two countries according to their respective policies.
- The DPRK and Japan promised, based on war reparations and the solution on the pending issues, to take the measures for normalization of relations between the two countries in accordance with the Pyongyang Declaration.
- The parties promised to promote economic cooperation in the areas of energy, trade, and investment and expressed intentions of energy support for the DPRK.
- The parties agreed to take orchestrated measures based on the principle of "promise for promise, action for action.”

North Korea reiterated the day following the closing of the Six-Party Talks that “The Joint Statement reflects our consistent and repeatedly stated stance.” At the same time, however, North Korea announced that it "would return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and accept verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) only after a light-water reactor is provided", and repeated this assertion afterwards. It seems that North Korea assessed the confirmation by the United States in the Statement that it did not have an intention to attack North Korea militarily to be the most important diplomatic result of the Six-Party Talks and also as a de facto guarantee of security by the U.S., It therefore seems that North Korea intends to conduct the negotiations with a further hardened stance, using the “light-water reactor condition” as a bargaining card.

Having eagerly worked as the presiding state to make the Joint Statement, China evaluated the adoption as "the most important diplomatic result.”

South Korea stated that "the 'important proposal' played a significant role" for the Joint Statement and that "it is the victory of Korea's diplomacy", and also expressed its intention to play an important role in resolving North Korea's nuclear issue (September, Unification Minister Chung Dong Young).

Russia stated that "Russia's opinion is reflected" in the Joint Statement and expressed its intention to provide a light-water reactor to North Korea on the condition that North Korea return to the NPT.

<There was no substantial progress in the fifth round of Six-Party Talks after the visit to North Korea by Hu Jintao.>

After the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks was announced, Hu Jintao visited North Korea from October 28 to 30 for the first time after his inauguration. In his talk with Kim Jong Il, Hu Jintao highly evaluated the leadership of the Korean Workers' Party that keeps its position as the single ruling party, and proposed, for the development of two countries' relationship under new circumstances, 1) to promote economic and trade cooperation, and 2) to protect common interests through the two countries' positive alliance and cooperation. He also expressed his wish, regarding nuclear issue, to "cooperate with each other, put overall target proposed in the Joint Statement into practice and to develop relationships further.” In response, Kim Jong Il clarified he would "participate in the fifth round of Six-Party Talks as stated in the Joint Statement.” Thus, Hu Jintao's visit to North Korea positioned the development of friendly relationship with North Korea as a "strategic policy", and it is considered that there is China's intention to start extending real support and economic advancement to North Korea by taking advantage of the North Korea' s "promise" to abandon nuclear arms and the "security" gained from the United States in the Joint Statement.

In its first session of the fifth round of Six-Party Talks (from 9 to 11th of November), North Korea persisted in its stance of making the provision of a light-water reactor its condition for nuclear arms abandonment and requested the United States to lift its economic sanctions against North Korea. So there was no substantial progress to realize nuclear arms abandonment, and just a Chairman's Statement was announced to reconfirm each country's intention to fulfill the terms of the Joint Statement. China showed its attitude of emphasizing the importance of maintaining the framework of the Six-Party Talks by expressing that "the talks this time should be considered to have positively progressed.”

Outline of the Chairman's Statement for the Fifth Round of Six-Party Talks
- The parties discussed practically and constructively the methods to implement the Joint Statement and presented various proposals.
- The parties reconfirmed the implementation of the Joint Statement based on the "promise for promise, action for action" principle, to realize denuclearization of Korean Peninsula at an early stage in a verifiable status to protect peace and security of Korean Peninsula.
- The parties emphasized their wish to deepen trust in each other, to implement the Joint Statement in a comprehensive manner, and to achieve balanced gains and a "win-win situation" (mutual victory).
- The parties agreed to decide concrete plans, measures, and procedures respectively to implement the joint statement based on this spirit.
- The parties decided to resume the Six-Party Talks at the earliest stage possible.

North Korea explained the reasons why they continued insisting on the light-water reactor, saying that "it will be the basis on which to build a trusting relationship with the United States" and "it is in order to satisfy our energy needs.” It seems, however, that they also aim to secure the opportunity to develop nuclear weapons as well as to delay nuclear arms abandonment with due consideration to the military that was negative on nuclear arms abandonment.

<It is very likely North Korea will try to further delay nuclear arms abandonment. There is also a concern that North Korea may try to survive as a nation with nuclear capabilities.>

It seems that North Korea will keep an aggressive attitude regarding requests to the United States for the provision of a light-water reactor using the Joint Statement as a strong negotiation tactic with the backing of China. North Korea also will complicate and prolong the future negotiations and aim to become rich and strong. Furthermore, there also is a concern that North Korea may try to survive as a nation with nuclear capabilities like India and Pakistan.

China may take the position to recommend nuclear abandonment to North Korea as the state presiding over the Six-Party Talks. At the same time, however, China may place its top priority on the stability of Kim Jong Il regime out of considerations to its various national interests. It, then, likely will try to strengthen the provisions of the Joint Statement and also to maintain the framework of the Six-Party Talks, as well as to improve the political and economic ties with North Korea, without pushing the country toward nuclear arms abandonment too pressingly.

South Korea is likely to repeat its claim to be an interested party on the nuclear issue, to its role as a mediator between North Korea and the United States, and to promote its diplomatic approach to the related parties of the Talks.

Russia looks likely to collaborate with the presiding state China in the future and participate in the talks with a view to the maintenance of the framework of the Six-Party Talks and its economic benefit such as the construction of a Russian light-water reactor and supply of energy.

(2) Governments of Japan and North Korea resume talks while the two countries disagree on the authenticity of the alleged remains of an abduction victim
- North Korea persists in its assertions that "Japan's examination of the remains is fabricated." and "The issue of abduction of Japanese nationals has already been settled.”
- North Korea maintained an aggressive attitude in the Six-Party Talks after the lapse of one year and put the top priority to requesting "war reparations.”
- The issue of abduction called for international attention due to efforts by the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea.

<North Korea declares Japan' s examination of the remains of Ms Megumi Yokota fabricated>

North Korea claimed that the result of the examination of the "remains" of Ms Megumi Yokota that had been announced by Japanese government in December 2004 was a "fabrication" and kept its stance that "the issue of abduction of Japanese nationals has already been settled.” In January, North Korea informed the Japanese government via a memorandum of the Korean Central News Agency (dated January 24) and requested the return of the "remains." It also demanded that the Japanese government conduct an inquiry into the examination and hold those in charge responsible for “fabrication.” Later, North Korea repeated the same assertion in the "Notice" (dated April 13) to the Japanese government and in other documents based on the column in English science magazine that questioned the validity of the results of the examination on the "remains.” Furthermore, immediately before the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks, North Korea held assemblies to criticize Japan throughout the country for the first time after four years (from middle to end July).

<North Korea demands war reparation while pressed on the abduction issue>

At the beginning of the year, North Korea announced "declaration" through a Foreign Ministry spokesman to request early fulfillment of "the war reparations issue", and insisted that "Compared to the unhappiness and pain Japan caused on the people of North Korea, that of the abduction is less than one ten-millionth." (January 17), and repeated the same assertion through various media. In addition, North Korea released the "Report on Remains of Korean Victims of Forcible Drafting Issued" (dated May 27, "the DPRK Measure Committee for Demanding Compensation to Comfort Women for the Japanese Army and the Victims of Forcible Drafting") and insisted that "Japanese government should thoroughly and comprehensively probe the truth behind the issue of the remains of Korean victims and should make a formal apology and compensation to the victims and their bereaved families." Furthermore, the "International Council for Solidarity to Demand Japan' s War Reparations" led by the North Korean government, after the inauguration conference (September 2003, Shanghai) and the second Seoul conference (May, 2004), held a Tokyo conference (May, Special conference) and a third Pyongyang conference (September), and appealed against the "injustice" of the Japanese government's attitude towards the issue of the "war reparations.” Such movement is considered to be aimed at trivializing the issue of abduction, gaining a lot of "compensation", and forming an international anti-Japan alliance. In addition, through Chongryon, North Korea has tried to interact with Japanese people in politics, mass media, and pro-North Korean groups, invited these people, trumpeted their own assertions on the pending issues including "war reparations" between North Korea and Japan, and tried to get their support, and thus further enhanced their approach to every sector in Japan.

<Governmental talks resume in the wake of Six-Party Talks>

In the Japan-DPRK talks held after the second session of the fourth round of Six-Party Talks (September), North Korea changed its attitude of "neglecting Japan" and agreed to resume bilateral talks that had been discontinued. However, in the bilateral talks held for the first time after about one year (November 3 and 4, Beijing), North Korea did not provide new information on the issue of the abduction and just stated their own opinion about the "remains" that are said to be those of Ms. Megumi Yokota and of Mr. Kaoru Matsuki, and again requested the Japanese government to sincerely resolve the issue of "war reparations" and did not greatly change their attitude toward Japan.

Regarding the issue of abductions by North Korea, as a result of the efforts of the Association of the Families of Victims Kidnapped by North Korea among others, criticism of North Korea has spilled over into the international arena: the suspected abduction of a Thai national mentioned in the book written by Mr. Charles R. Jenkins surfaced (October), and a resolution to criticize human rights conditions in North Korea mentioning the issue of abduction passed for the first time in the Third Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (November).

<North Korea has strengthened moves aimed at diplomatic normalization with Japan during Koizumi administration.>

North Korea has expectations for Prime Minister Koizumi, who has visited North Korea twice, had talks with Kim Jong Il, and signed the "Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration" to normalize the diplomatic relationship between North Korea and Japan. It also is trying to construct an irreversible road map to normalization during the Prime Minister's term of office by approaching people of political, economic, and media worlds through Chongryong.

During the process, North Korea may maintain its stance towards Japan that "the issue of abduction of Japanese nationals has already been resolved", and repeatedly request "war reparations”. However, North Korea may take some measure or the other to resolve the issue of abduction after realizing the stance of the Japanese government and current Japanese public opinion.

(3) North Korea seeks for stability by tightening control, winning support from China and South Korea, and advancing diplomacy
- North Korea makes efforts to stabilize the Kim Jong Il regime with the results of Six-Party Talks, by strengthening its economic relationship with China and South Korea, with increased control over its people, and with restoration of the food rationing system.
- A grand celebration was held for the 60th anniversary of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP), projecting the image of a solid regime internally and externally.
- In the future, the factors for "stability" and those for "instability" will clash.

<Great efforts made to tighten the system by the results of Six-Party Talks and enhancement of information control.>

After the introduction of the "Economic Reform" (July, 2002) in North Korea, the factors for instability of the regime were revealed, which included increasing dissatisfaction over the regime, a widened disparity in wealth, an increase in the tendency of mammonism, lack of discipline, and inflow of external information. As a result, various factors that had traditionally supported the regime including the power of Kim Jong Il, "economic equality" among the citizens, strong controlling power of the military and public security authorities, and strict information control, are coming apart.

Under the circumstances, North Korea tried to recover the power of Kim Jong Il by emphasizing that North Korea achieved a great diplomatic success of obtaining real "security" from the United States by the adoption of the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks. At the same time, they made efforts to stop destabilization of the Kim Jong Il regime by increasing economic exchanges with China and South Korea and through economic reconstruction expected by increase in overseas support.

In addition, North Korea was nervous about inflow of information from foreign countries and treated it as a "scheme to diffuse thought and culture as an attempt to overthrow the government" and severely restricted the people's contact with foreign countries by strengthening the control on defectors and smugglings by dispatching security officials from Pyongyang to the cities near the border with China and by greatly reducing international telephone lines of domestic trading companies (March). In addition, they advised international organizations and NGOs in the country to leave the country and tightened rules for foreigners' entry at the border with China (September), thereby making the control on foreigners stricter and strengthening their control.

<The nation was mobilized for agricultural works. Enhancement of social order was attempted by the restoration of food rationing system.>

In North Korea, people were called to support agricultural villages throughout the year, with the New Year joint editorial stressing the necessity of "national mobilization and concentration" on the agricultural sector. Especially during the periods of planting (May and June) and harvesting rice (September and October), a "national mobilization order" was announced and not only students and the military but also executives and the families of the members of Party and governmental organizations had to support the labor effort. During this time, the North Korean media repeatedly appealed for the spirit of "collectivism" with loyalty to the country and Kim Jong Il and tried to restrain the trend of individualism including mammonism.

In addition, based on the recovering food production and food assistance from South Korea, North Korea increased the quantity of rationed food and prohibited the selling and buying of grains at markets, and thus started to restore the food rationing system (October) that had collapsed earlier. For the rationing, the recipients are limited to the laborers who came to the working places, and it seems that the government tries to promote the return of middle and lower class laborers who left their work due to their hard living caused by the jump in prices after the "economic reform" and to restore the national control through working places.

<The 60th anniversary of the KWP was celebrated and the image of a strong regime was projected.>

For the 60th anniversary of the Korean Workers' Party (October 10), in addition to the National Meeting attended by several tens of thousands of people and the Artistic Performance “Arirang”, the mass calisthenics 100,000 people performed, and a military parade and torchlight marching were also held, so a grand celebration was carried out by mobilizing a lot of citizens. At these ceremonies, Kim Jong Il attended along with Vice Premier Wu Yi of China and the Presidential Representative in the Far East Konstantin Pulikovskii in order to project internally and externally the image of stability of the regime with the background of domestic solidarity and a close relationship with both China and Russia. Construction plants for the large-scale Baekma-Cheolsan Irrigation Work (Pyongan-bukto) (September) and Taean Friendship Glass Factory made by China's grant aid (October) were completed and these were portrayed for propaganda purposes as economic "achievements".

Although there was no concrete move regarding the issue of the successor of Kim Jong Il, it attracted attention that the statement that "the issue of the successor was effectively resolved" (the Rodong Sinmun newspaper on October 4) appeared in the press comment about the 60th anniversary of the Party.

<In the future, the factors for "stability" and those for "instability" will clash.>

North Korea may attempt to strengthen the regime through recovery and enhancement of the methods for social control by expansion of economic assistance and investments from China and South Korea and restoration of the food rationing system by the improvement of food production.

On the other hand, expansion of economic exchanges with China and South Korea may cause further inflow of information from foreign countries and expansion of mammonism and disparity of wealth. In addition, the basis for food rationing is not necessarily stable, so disparity of rationed quantities or another discontinuation of the system may amplify the people's dissatisfaction. The clash between these contrary factors for "stability" and "instability" may continue and attention should be paid to future developments.

(4) China and North Korea become even closer with Hu Jintao' s visit to North Korea
- In addition to Hu Jintao's visit to North Korea, the exchange of VIPs has become active.
- Chinese investments in North Korea in mining and harbor industries may shift into full swing and the amount of trade is continuing to increase.
- In parallel with Chinese investment, North Korea will strengthen its approach to South Korea and Russia to invite investments.

<North Korea and China agreed to enhance their relationship through exchanges of VIPs.>

North Korea and China, following 2004, positively exchanged VIPs of Parties and governments, and, in addition to their close discussions on Six-Party Talks concerning the issue of nuclear in North Korea (mentioned above), agreed to strengthen the economic relationship between the two countries.

In particular, regarding economic exchanges, Premier Pak Pong Ju from North Korea held talks with the head of the Chinese government Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao in China (March) and signed an agreement encouraging and protecting investment and an agreement on cooperation in environmental protection. Moreover, Pak Pong Ju visited plants and companies in Beijing, Shanghai, Anshan, and Shenyang and inspected the operations. General Secretary Kim Jong Il attended with visiting Vice Premier Wu Yi the completion ceremony of the Taean Friendship Glass Factory (October) made by China's grant aid and repeated gratitude for China's support.

At the end of October, Hu Jintao visited North Korea for the first time after inauguration and held a summit with Kim Jong Il and both agreed 1) to further promote high ranking officers' exchanges, 2) to expand the area of exchange and to deepen the content of cooperation, 3) to further promote economic and trade cooperation, and 4) to protect common interests by positive cooperation. Hu Jintao showed interest in encouraging investment cooperation between the companies of China and North Korea in the meeting with the President of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yong Nam, who replied that "Based on the principle of mutual benefit, we will take strong measures." and agreed on further expansion of economic and trade cooperation.

<Chinese investments in North Korea may be active and the amount of trade is at a record high.>

North Korea had tried to encourage Chinese investments since the previous year by frequently holding various business meetings and exhibitions in Pyongyang and China, and in 2005, was reported (October) to have signed an agreement with a Chinese company on the investment project for mining and development of the Musan Mining Complex (Hamgyong Bukto) and construction of related roads. In addition, regarding the development of the "Rajin-Sunbong Economic Free Trade Zone" which had been stagnant from the middle of the 1990s, the discussion between local governments of both countries is reported to have progressed (September) regarding the constructions of Rajin Port and the route to connect the port and China. Thus, active moves by North Korea and China regarding the investment in mines and infrastructure in North Korea were observed.

The amount of trade between the two countries had been increasing since 2000, and the total amount from January to October in 2005 was about 1.33 billion dollars, a 30% increase from the same period in 2004, and the annual amount was above the record high level of the past. The breakdown of imports into North Korea shows that mineral fuels like crude oil and grains occupy the top items and that of exports shows that, in addition to fishery products that had been the main conventional trade item, iron ore and smokeless coal are occupying a large proportion, so this shows that North Korea is selling marine and underground resources and buying energy and food. In addition, the import of meat and machinery has increased, which reflects the emergence of a wealthy class following the "economic reforms" and that North Korea is making efforts to renew its outdated industrial facilities.

<In addition to strengthening the approach toward the Chinese economy, North Korea may make a similar approach toward South Korea and Russia.>

It seems that, as the reason for North Korea's effort to strengthen its relationship with China, North Korea is dependent on the foreign currency gained by exporting resources and support of foreign countries due to its outdated industrial infrastructure and lagging technological development, and that North Korea aims at strengthening its negotiation ability against the United States on the nuclear issue by taking advantage of its relationship with China. It also seems that China wishes to use North Korea as an economic hinterland to proceed with their policy to promote the economy of the three provinces in North East China that Hu Jintao administration emphasizes, and in addition, enhance China's influence in the Korean Peninsula by strengthening its economic relationship with North Korea.

It is expected that North Korea may continue for the time being to approach China taking advantage of such intentions by China to enforce its economic base. At the same time, North Korea may strengthen its approach to other countries to avoid too much dependence on China with a view to promoting investments by South Korea and Russia and of improving its relationship with Japan. The increasing economic exchanges of North Korea with its neighboring countries will have considerable influence on the nuclear issue and the relationship between North Korea and Japan.

(5) North Korea tries to create a sense of progress in the relationship with the South
- North Korea promotes the notion of “One Korea” and shows a welcoming mood to attract South Korea.
- South Korea has reinforced its appeasement policy toward North Korea.

<North Korea positively advanced North-South exchanges, and gained food support and economic cooperation from South Korea.>

North Korea had canceled governmental exchanges with South Korea due to opposition to the fact that the South Korean government has accepted a large number of North Korean defectors via Vietnam (July 2004). Based on the attitude of the Roh Moo-hyun administration to keep its appeasement policy toward North Korea and repeated requests to resume talks, as well as taking the opportunity of North-South Korean vice-ministerial talks in May and taking advantage of "the fifth anniversary of North-South Joint Declaration" (June 15) and "the 60th anniversary of the release from Japanese colonization" (August 15) as good chances to attract South Korea, North Korea actively engaged in exchanges with South Korea by emphasizing "one Korean nation.”

During the Grand National Reunification Festival (Pyongyang) held during "the fifth anniversary of the North-South Joint Declaration", talks between Kim Jong Il and South Korean Unification Minister Chung Dong Young were set without advance notice and produced friendly mood by giving a pleasant surprise. In the "8.15 Grand National Festival for Independence, Peace and Reunification" (Seoul) held during "the 60th anniversary of the liberation from Japanese colonization", North Korea sent a delegation headed by Vice Chairman Kim Ki Nam (Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party) of the Peaceful National Unification Committee who visited Hyeon Chung Memorial Pavilion where the war dead from the Korean War are buried. He was the first North Korean delegate to visit the place, and thus this was an appeal for "appeasement and reconciliation" of North and South Korea. In addition, in the course of these ceremonies, South Korea was advised to act jointly on the issue of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and the issues against Japan regarding Takeshima and its historical perceptions. These efforts were noted as an intention to make South Korea step away from the United States and Japan by promoting anti-U.S. and anti-Japanese feeling on such issues in South Korea.

In parallel with these ceremonies, North Korea held ministerial and vice-ministerial talks in succession and extracted aid from South Korea amounting to 500,000 tons of food (a 100,000 ton increase from the previous year), 350,000 tons of fertilizer (a 50,000 ton increase) and construction of a railway network.

North-South vice-ministerial level talks (May, Kaesong)
The 15th North-South ministerial level talks (June, Seoul)
The 10th meeting of the North-South Committee for the Promotion of Economic Cooperation (July, Seoul)
The 3rd military working meeting (July, Panmunjom)
The 4th military working meeting (July, Panmunjom)
1st Agricultural Meeting (August, Kaesong)
6th Red Cross talks (August, Mount Kumgang)
16th North-South ministerial level talks (September, Pyongyang)
The 11th meeting of the North-South Committee for the Promotion of Economic Cooperation (October, Kaesong)

<South Korea positively advanced support for North Korea.>

Regarding economic support to North Korea, with the policy "to promote the cooperation between North and South in parallel with the solution of nuclear issue in North Korea" (April, Unification Minister Chung Dong Young), South Korea decided, in addition to food assistance, to greatly expand the South and North Exchange Cooperative Fund in the future and made a multi-year plan for the first time (October) to give support of 500 billion yen in coming five years for mining, light, and marine industries.

In addition, there were several pro North Korean developments in South Korea: the expression stating North Korea as the "main enemy" was deleted (February) from its defense white paper; visits to North Korea were allowed for the members of organizations friendly to the enemy such as the Pan-National Alliance for the Country' s Reunification (Pomminryon) (July, October); and Justice Minister Chun Jung-bae issued an order for the first time in the country' s history of constitutional politics (October) to prevent the arrest of Professor Kang Jeong-goo who was allegedly violating National Security Law by repeating a statement admiring North Korea. In South Korea, taking advantage of the Professor's statement, a large anti-U.S. meeting was held (September) to request removal of the "statue of General MacArthur" in Chemulpo (Jinsen). In addition, anti-Japanese meetings and demonstrations were held whenever the issues such as Takeshima and Yasukuni came up.

Regarding these situations in South Korea, North Korea repeatedly encouraged anti-U.S. and anti-Japanese movements saying that "anti-U.S. momentum is increasing in every class in South Korean society" and "the rage of our race against the reactionary Japan has reached the limit", and in addition, tried to support Roh Moo-hyun' s administration by criticizing the Grand National Party, the opposition party of South Korea that opposes President Roh Moo-hyun's appeasement policy toward North Korea, as the "party of anti-unification traitors.”

<The relationship between North Korea and South Korea seems to develop further in political and economic levels in the future.>

North Korea seems to be making every possible effort to further strengthen the relationship with South Korea during the current Roh Moo-hyun administration due to end in February 2008. For the time being, the effort for various exchanges will be enhanced by appeals for "one Korean nation" aimed at getting support from South Korea on food, energy, construction of infrastructure and understanding and sympathy on the nuclear issue. It is expected that, in the process, North Korea may call for joint action on the issue of U.S. troops stationed in South Korea and that of Takeshima and influence South Korea in the directions of "pro-North, anti-U.S., and anti-Japan.”

In South Korea, the Roh Moo-hyun administration may try, in view of the next Presidential election in 2007, to weaken the conservative camp through "war reparations" and positively develop various exchanges with North Korea.

Therefore, political and economic relationships between North Korea and South Korea will be further strengthened in the future although there will be many twists and turns on nuclear and other issues.

(6) Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) attempts to recover and strengthen its leadership.
- On the occasion of its 50th anniversary, Chongryon made efforts to mobilize Korean residents in Japan and strengthened ideological education for young activists.
- Based on the activated exchanges between North and South Korea, Chongryon positively promoted approaches for exchanges with South Korea and with the Korean Residents Union in Japan.

<Chongryon promoted various activities, taking the 50th anniversary as a "good opportunity to demonstrate a commanding presence”>

While its power and activities have become smaller, Chongryon recognized that the factors were the withdrawal of activists and members from the membership of the organization caused by Kim Jong Il's acknowledgement of abduction of Japanese nationals (September 2002), decreased loyalty to Kim Jong Il and to Chongryon due to the generational change, and decreased race consciousness among Korean residents in Japan, and Chongryon made efforts to overcome these problems.

In practice, to make the 50th anniversary (May 25) the occasion for Korean residents in Japan to get together and spur activity, the entire organization of Chongryon worked on the "eight-month campaign" the main themes of which were "educational activities on the Korean race" and "mutual support among the Korean people" from October 2004 to the date of the anniversary. Chongryon made special efforts in the areas of recruitment of students for Korean schools in Japan, life counseling and establishment of welfare institutions for the handicapped for Korean residents in Japan. The anniversary itself was considered to be "the best opportunity to demonstrate the influence of Chongryon as the only center of leadership for the activities of Koreans resident in Japan", and the central and local headquarters hosted a variety of celebration activities that included anniversary conventions, the "Grand Celebration of Korean Compatriots in Japan" held by mobilizing many activists and members, celebration parties for Japanese people in various fields, performance of folk dancing and sports events, and tried to raise the morale of activists and members.

<Chongryon emphasized loyalty to General Secretary Kim Jong Il and hard work in Chongryon activities.>

Chongryon felt a sense of crisis about the decreasing loyalty of activists towards Kim Jong Il and Chongryon, and emphasized ideological education for activists in order to maintain the organization's "revolutionary character.” Chongryon intensified ideological education for young activists stating that "The state of education of the new generation activists is so serious that it may influence the destiny of Korean residents' activities.”

Among these ideological educations, Chongryon tried to recover the trust of activists on North Korea by reaffirming North Korea's "being a nation with nuclear capabilities" and by explaining the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks as "the victory of independent diplomacy of the Republic (North Korea).” In particular, concentrated training was given to the executive activists to cram in the "revolutionary military spirit" from February to March, because 2005 is the 10th anniversary for its "military first" policy (implying that the military plays the most important role in the government regime).

North Korea, in concert with these Chongryon activities, summoned to North Korea about 160 young activists, that is three times as many as the previous year, and gave lectures by the professors of Kim Il Sung University on the books written by Kim Jong Il and on the "military first policy", had them inspect various places such as the troops of the Korean People's Army and held exchanges with workers and students of North Korea, and asked for their further loyalty toward Kim Jong Il and enhancement of Chongryon's activities. Among the young activists who participated in the tour, some reinforced their commitment to North Korea after returning to Japan and some became positive about the activities of Chongryon being aware of their responsibility as activists. In addition, North Korea repeatedly instructed various groups visiting North Korea to stress within the organization repeatedly the validity of North Korea's foreign policy on the nuclear issue and the relationship with Japan.

<Chongryon intensified its activity to penetrate into the Korean Residents Union in Japan.>

On the occasion of activated exchanges between North and South Korea on the opportunities of "the fifth anniversary of the North-South Joint Declaration" (June 15) and "the 60th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland" (August 15), Chongryon actively worked on the exchanges with South Korea and the Korean Residents Union in Japan. Concerning South Korea, Chongryon dispatched delegates to the joint ceremonies of South and North Korea held in June in North Korea and in August in South Korea and made exchanges with participants from South Korea. For both of the anniversaries, Chongryon proposed to the regional organizations of the Korean Residents Union in Japan to jointly host anniversary meetings and lectures and, as a result, could realize anniversary meetings, was able to have executives of the Union visit North Korea, and was able to make an agreement to continue exchanges.

<Chongryon continues to make efforts to expand its power and to enhance ideology towards the 21st Congress of Chongryon.>

To demonstrate the presence of the organization in the 21st Congress to be held in 2007, Chongryon may promote loyal young activists to executive status and further intensify its power and ideological education. On the other hand, depending on the fate of the North Korean nuclear issue and abduction of Japanese nationals, there are the possibilities that withdrawal of the activists and members from the membership of the organization will accelerate or that the internal groups requesting Chongryon's "democratization and reform" will become active again. In addition, its financial difficulties may become more serious by the severe stance on collection of loans by the Resolution and Collection Corporation. These factors may influence Chongryon's course in the future.

2. China

(1) Hu Jintao administration makes efforts to enhance the systems in all phases of domestic policy, diplomacy, economy, and military.
- Protest activities by farmers are a potential threat for political stability.
- There is a sense of crisis in the Communist Party and the Party struggles to "strengthen its governance capability.”

<To strengthen the foundation of the Hu Jintao administration, ex-members of the Communist Youth League of China are appointed one by one.>

The third session of the 10th National People' s Congress (held in March) selected the head of the Chinese government and General Secretary Hu Jintao as a replacement for Jiang Zemin as Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the State. (He took the post of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China in September 2004.) As a result, the former head of Chinese government Jiang Zemin retired from all the major posts and Hu Jintao took the posts of the head of the Party, State, and Military.

As for personnel affairs of major posts at local governments and offices of the Party, from the autumn of 2004, the appointments to executives of the people who were the members of the Communist Youth League of China which is the parent organization for Hu Jintao have stood out and this attracts attention as a move towards strengthening of the foundation for Hu Jintao administration.

<The efforts to modernize the armament have been further strengthened.>

The Chinese People's Liberation Army promoted reduction of the military force by 200,000 by the end of 2005 and at the same time worked on the enhancement of military power by modernizing the military by adopting high-tech weapons and equipment, training personnel to handle it, and making the chain of command efficient. Regarding this movement, the United States and the neighboring countries expressed their concerns. In addition, a training exercise was held with Russia for the first time in its history (August), and it seems that China wanted to restrain the United States and to introduce high-tech equipment from Russia behind this background.

Regarding the "New theory to build up the military" that the head of the government and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission Hu Jintao showed for the first time in September, the learning activity was carried out in the military and it is noted as a move towards gaining control of the military.

<The construction of a balanced society is positioned as a main theme for the policy, but the factor of economic instability has become apparent.>

The National People's Congress set a goal of curtailing the growth of GDP in 2005 at 8% and the inflation rate at 4%. According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, until the third quarter of 2005 (from January to September), the growth of GDP was 9.4% and inflation rate was 2.0%, and the figures show that inflation is controlled although high GDP growth rate was kept.

However, many factors for instability have been revealed such as the fears about a burst of economic bubbles in finance and real estate, increases in product stocks and a decline in corporate profits due to excess in supply, and limited energy supply. Regarding unemployment, "employment remains a challenge" was the recognition on the current situation (November, the Labor and Social Security Department). The disparity in income levels between cities and agricultural communities is widening and the correction of the situation is an urgent issue to solve for the Hu Jintao administration that aims at a "balanced society.” In the 5th Plenum of the 16th CPC Central Committee held in October, "the proposals by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on the 11th Five-Year (FYP 2006-2010) National Economic and Social Development Plan" was discussed and adopted, and for constructing a "balanced society", the policies to solve the disparity of wealth among individuals and between regions were worked out, including policies "to decrease the poor population by making a social security system" and "to improve the level of income and the quality of life of the citizens in the cities and agricultural villages.”

<There still are many incidents of farmers protesting in groups.>

In 2005 as well, many group protests happened in various regions of China where farmers or labourers conflicted with the authorities. The number of incidents was 10,000 in 1994 but it drastically increased afterwards. It was 60,000 in 2003 and 74,000 in 2004. The reasons, in addition to widening disparity of wealth, are the corruption of high-ranking officials in the administration and the Party, reckless exploitation and land expropriation by authorities, and further pent-up anger of farmers and labourers against the environmental pollution caused by the companies that local governments invited. Regarding corruption, according to the announcement of the Supreme People's Court of P. R. China, the number of the Party executives who received disciplinary punishment for corruption in 2004 was about 125,000, and among them, 24,000 received criminal punishment. According to the public security department, the number of suspects in corruption or economic crimes who fled overseas was about 500 and the total amount of misappropriation was about 70 billion yuan (October, New China News Agency).

<To remove group protest incidents, severe disciplinary measures were introduced for executives in regional administrations.>

The authorities of the central government judged that most of the direct factors for group protest lie in the failures in duty of the executives of regional administrations such as corruption or refusal to receive petitions, and carried out severe punishments such as removal from office in accordance with the Party's disciplinary system on the executives who provoked protests. On the other hand, the government strengthened the measures to control the Internet and media to prevent unionization and expansion of group protest activities. In "the report on the government activities" announced in the National People' s Congress held in March, Premier Wen Jiabao positioned the prevention of group protest incidents that prevent social stability as the first priority for social stabilization. In May, he revised the "Regulation on Petitions" which made it the duty of the executives of regional administration to take appropriate care of the petitions and prohibited the act of petitioners to surround the buildings of state organizations.

<Due to the sense of crisis regarding the decreased discipline of the Party members, education and training have been enhanced.>

The Hu Jintao administration has, from its start in autumn of 2002, called for "citizen-oriented politics" which emphasizes the importance of protecting people's living, and from the beginning of 2005 emphasized, as the concrete measure, "educational activity to maintain the Party members' revolutionary spirit.”

As its background, there is a sense of crisis on the loss of the Party's "centripetal force" on the people. "The opinion of the Party regarding the educational activity to maintain the Party members' revolutionary spirit" announced nationwide in January stated as its targets 1) to improve Party members' quality, 2) to strengthen the Party's terminal organizations, and 3) to render services for the general public. About this, Hu Jintao warned in the same month that "An administration' s foundation is easily weakened by corruption. If the present condition is allowed to remain, we will lose the people's support for the Party.”

<In the domestic arena, the Hu Jintao administration has many problems to solve.>

The Hu Jintao administration may make every possible effort to secure domestic security aimed at the success of the 17th Congress of the Party scheduled in August 2007 and of Beijing Olympics in 2008, but its future is quite difficult with pollution and accidents in coal mining in addition to disparity of wealth, corruption of executives, and many group protests by farmers.

There is an undeniable possibility of disorder in many regions caused by the people's dissatisfaction about these problems that may be spread by the Internet.

It is often pointed out that there are issues of democracy and human rights connected with China's administration on the basis of the people's dissatisfaction and riots. There is a dilemma that if the administration tries to eradicate serious corruption against which people rebel, it will cause strong resistance of executives in regional administrations and the regional offices of the Party, so Hu Jintao' s regime has to be very cautious about measures to cope with this huge number of problems.

(2) Chinese leaders positively develop diplomacy with the rest of the world.
- China strengthens diplomacy aimed at securing the resources essential for sustainable growth of the economy.
- China increases its confrontation with the United States and seeks to rein in the United States by joint military training with Russia.

<China develops positive diplomacy displaying "international cooperation.”>

China, with various urgent domestic issues and a now-gigantic economy, requires further sustainable economic growth as an absolute condition for the development of the state, and China advocated as well in 2005 "international cooperative diplomacy" and positively developed diplomacy with key countries, neighboring countries, and developing countries to form an external environment advantageous for its economic construction.

Such positive attitude of diplomacy was clearly indicated by the drastic increase in the number of countries Hu Jintao visited, i.e. from seven countries in two visits in 2003 and twelve countries in three visits in 2004 to sixteen countries in six visits in 2005. During the visits, Hu Jintao attended for the first time in two years at a meeting related to the G8 Summit Conference (Gleneagles Summit) in July, and visited the United States in September for the first time since taking office and held talks with President Bush (who visited China in November).

As for Asian diplomacy, Hu Jintao held the first defense and security conference with Vietnam (April) and the Philippines (May) respectively and proposed construction of infrastructure in an international conference on “Advances in Integrated Mekong River Management” (July), and thus attempted to enhance its influence.

For China, securing energy and various resources essential for its sustainable economic growth has become an urgent issue and China therefore actively developed external activities for the purpose. China concentrated its efforts on securing oil and started in July the negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Gulf Cooperation Council (consisting of six countries including Saudi Arabia) that hold 45% of crude oil deposits in the world. Furthermore, China succeeded in purchasing in August and September the oil and gas fields a Canadian petroleum company owned in Kazakhstan and Ecuador.

In parallel with its positive development of diplomatic activities, China tried to remove the image of the so-called "China Threat" by emphasizing China's "peaceful development" with other countries, and its commitment for diplomatic win-win situations.

<China reins in United States' diplomatic stance by strengthening its cooperation with Russia and other countries.>

Though displaying "cooperation" towards the U.S., China strengthened its attitude to restrain the "unipolar world" centered around the United States through cooperation with Russia.

In the joint statement with India announced in April, China stated that "Both of us are determined to solve world-wide issues on a rational multilateral basis", and in the joint statement with Russia announced in July stated that "We should refrain from a stance on a unipolar world" and that "We should not force the model of a social or political system from outside", and thus China restrained the diplomatic stance of the United States indirectly. In August, the first joint military training exercise with Russia was conducted and the journal of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the PLA Daily (issued on August 17) stated that "joint military training is an important measure to threaten and restrain a potential enemy.”

Regarding neighboring socialist countries, Hu Jintao visited North Korea and Vietnam in October for the first time after taking office and confirmed in each top-level meeting the commitment to make efforts for the development of both political Parties and both countries through increasing mutual visits of VIPs and strengthening economic and trade relationships.

<Given tight energy demand and supply in addition to growth in national power, China may seek to promote its national interest more seriously>

Behind the above developments, exists the following situation: recognition of increased "overall national power" (strengths in the areas of the economy, science and technology, national defense, and the combination of a number of different races) as symbolized by the second launch of a manned spaceship (October), recognition that "Diplomatic activity has started a new phase and the international status of our country has further improved." (March, report of National People' s Congress) and that "The developments in both China and the United States are so rapid and so large that some frictions and disputes are unavoidable." (September, Hu Jintao's statement at the summit talks with the United States), and concern over tightness in demand and supply of energy and food due to an increased population and over the closer cooperation between Japan and the United States on security and defense.

China may intensify its tendency to conflict with the United States and Japan and, towards other countries, may strengthen its attitude of putting priority on the national interest with regard to obtaining resources, the economy and trade, and reform of the United Nations. Especially regarding East Asia, China is trying to limit the influence of the United States and Japan and to establish its initiative which can be seen in its attitude such as strong opposition on the issue of Japan's becoming a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, strong criticism on the issue of Japan' s historical perceptions, and cooperation with neighboring countries on these issues.

(3) While declaring the importance of the relationship with Japan, China continues to emphasize the "historical perception" issue and tries to restrain the expansion of Japan's political influence in international society.
- Drive against Japan's becoming a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, with large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations.
- China requested "remorse for past history reflected in actual behavior" with regard to the issue of the Prime Minister's official visit to Yasukuni Shrine, and maintained a severe attitude on the pending issues of Taiwan and resource development in the East China Sea.

<There were large-scale anti-Japan demonstrations in both Beijing and Shanghai, and some of the demonstrators turned into a mob.>

In China, a drive against Japan becoming a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council was seen, kicked off by anti-Japanese demonstrations that occurred in many regions in April. Especially in Beijing and Shanghai, some demonstrators threw stones at the Japanese Embassy and the Japanese Consulate and damaged part of the facilities, turned into a mob and attacked Japanese restaurants in the areas. Chinese security authorities prepared riot police but took no steps to stop actions such as stone throwing. International public opinion criticized China' s behavior for being "against the Vienna Convention.”

<Anti-Japanese demonstrations reined in with concerns about a switch to anti-government movement and criticism by the international community.>

China positioned 2005 as "the 60th anniversary of the victory of war against Japan" and various anniversary ceremonies were scheduled, causing worries about aggravation of anti-Japan demonstrations, but Chinese authorities contained anti-Japanese demonstrations by issuing strict instructions to anti-Japanese groups and universities after the demonstrations in Beijing and Shanghai.

As the background to its stance, aside from the concern that anti-Japanese demonstrations may switch into anti-government movements, there also may be concerns regarding criticism by the international community, influence on the Beijing Olympics, and aggravation of the Japanese public' s feelings toward China.

<China took a severe stance about the issue of historical perception and strengthened its stance of "restraining Japan.”>

The Japanese government requested the Chinese government's "apology" and "compensation for the damage" from the subversive acts on the Japanese Embassy and Consulate after the anti-Japanese demonstration in Shanghai, but China claimed that Japan hurt the feelings of the Chinese people with the issue of historical perception and commented that "We wish the Japanese to acknowledge the fundamental factor for the demonstration." and criticized Japan's attitude.

In May, after the incident, Vice Premier Wu Yi who visited Japan returned to China after one-sidedly canceling a scheduled talk with Prime Minister Koizumi for the reason that "Leaders of Japan one after another made remarks disadvantageous for the improvement of the relationship of Japan and China about the issue of Yasukuni." (Chinese Foreign Ministry).

Also in June, China formally announced its position of opposing Japan's entry as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (G4 draft for a framework resolution on reforming the Security Council) and developed a worldwide opposition campaign.

Furthermore, after the Prime Minister Koizumi' s formal visit to Yasukuni Shrine in October, China not only put off the acceptance of the visit to China by Foreign Minister Machimura scheduled shortly after but also put off summit talks and foreign ministers' talks between China and Japan during the APEC summit meeting in November and further announced a suspension of the trilateral summit meeting between China, Korea, and Japan during the ASEAN + 3 Summit Meeting in December.

<China maintained a severe stance on the pending issues of Taiwan and resource development in the East China Sea.>

China, placed the issue of Taiwan like the issue of historical perception as the principle issue between China and Japan and showed a severe attitude on the issue. Especially regarding the Security Consultative Committee (2+2) that included "peaceful solution of the issue of Taiwan" among the common strategic targets of the United States and Japan in February, China criticized that "Japan and the United States should not comment on issues beyond the realm of Japan and the U.S. security cooperation.” Further, in April, regarding Japan's opinion that Taiwan was included originally in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, China warned that "It is dangerous to make comments challenging areas of China's core interest.”

Concerning the issue of developments in the East China Sea, showing the attitude to maintain discussions with the Japanese government, China has consistently refused "to stop the development near the border between China and Japan" and "to provide data on underground geological structure" that Japan had been requesting. On the contrary, China itself took the behavior of continuing test drilling work and of navigating naval vessels (September) in the sea area.

<In the future, China will mix both soft and hard approaches while watching Japanese political trends.>

China emphasized the policy to "value the relationship with Japan" that was shown in the China-Japan summit talk in Jakarta at the end of April and is working on influencing the political and business leaders, mass media, and private organizations in Japan. At the same time, China requests "actual behavior" with regard to Japan' s attitude on the issues of Yasukuni and Taiwan and suspends summit talks in third countries, and is showing a reluctant attitude to improve the political relationship for the time being.

In addition to its opposition to the issue of Japan's entry as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, after the Liberal Democratic Party's "proposal on constitutional amendment" (August), Chinese government media organizations reported comments in succession such as "growing military power is a condition for growing political power.” Thus, China showed its concern on Japan's "growing political power" and made efforts to restrain its expansion of political influence in the international community.

On the other hand, China clarified its concern that the present cold political relationship may influence the economic relationship, so it is expected that China may develop a policy mixing soft and hard approaches, i.e. "valuing" Japan for its economic growth and simultaneously "restraining" Japan from building up a leadership role in Asia. It is expected to consider its domestic anti-Japanese sentiment while watching Japanese political developments.

(4) China establishes "Anti-secession Law" to restrain Taiwan's independence.
- China established "Anti-secession Law" prescribing the use of force against Taiwan while strengthening the peaceful unification offensive on the occasion of the visit to China by Chairmen of Taiwan's opposition parties.
- Taiwan's Chen Shui-bian administration tries to recover from the political damage using "democracy" as its shield.

<Through the establishment of "Anti-secession Law", China restrains Taiwan's movement towards the "establishment of new constitution.”>

In the third session of the 10th National People' s Congress (held in March), China adopted the "Anti-secession Law" of which the main purpose is "to oppose and restrain the splitting of the state by 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces.” In Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian, who touted "establishment of new Constitution" by national referendum as his policy pledge, won the Presidential election in 2004 for a second term (March) and the possibility of realization of the "legal independence of Taiwan" that China most worried about had become strong. It seems, therefore, that China intended to restrain the movement for the "establishment of new Constitution" by establishing such a Law, with the approaching Beijing Olympics of 2008.

<Legal ground to use force against Taiwan has been made.>

Article 8 of the "Anti-secession Law" lists up the required conditions to use force against Taiwan by the expression of "non-peaceful means" and leaves the discretion on the use to the State Council and the Central Military Commission. In Taiwan, based on the opinion poll by a public research organization in March, over 90% of the people were opposed to the solution of the Taiwan-China issue by "non-peaceful means" and, to appeal its injustice, the Democratic Progressive Party (ruling party) and groups supporting Taiwan's independence held a demonstration parade of a million people (according to a host organization of the event) in Taipei on March 26. The U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated on March 13 that "The 'Anti-secession Law' will clearly increase tensions in the Taiwan Strait.” In this way, China's strong intention to use force against Taiwan has caused concerns in the international community including Japan.

Three conditions under which the Mainland would use force against Taiwan
1) The "Taiwan independence" secessionist forces act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China
2) Major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China occur
3) Possibilities for a peaceful reunification are completely exhausted

<China took measures one after another to expand mutual visits by people and economic exchanges between China and Taiwan.>

On the other hand, as the measures to develop the China-Taiwan relationship, the "Anti-secession Law" also stipulates five items such as to encourage the personnel exchanges and to promote economic exchanges and "three direct links" (of trade, mail and air and shipping services). Based on this, China invited from April to June Lien Chan, Chairman of the National People's Party (Kuomintang), the largest opposition party, James Soong, Chairman of the People First Party, the second opposition party, and Yok Mu-ming, Chairman of the New Party, the third opposition party one after another and the head of Chinese government Hu Jintao (General Secretary of the Communist Party) had talks respectively with them. The visit to China by the Chairman of the National People's Party was the first time since the division of China and Taiwan in 1949, and high-level talks between the National People's Party and Communist Party took place for the first time in the last 60 years since 1945.

On the occasion of the visits by the Chairmen of the opposition parties, China strengthened its peaceful unification offensive by putting forward improvements in benefits for Taiwanese residents by 1) announcing the presentation of pandas to Taiwan (May), 2) simplifying the procedures for Taiwanese to enter into, exit from, and reside in China (July), and 3) increasing the number of fruits to be imported from Taiwan from 12 to 18, of which 15 items are exempt from tariffs (August).

Furthermore, during the celebration ceremony for "the 60th anniversary of the victory of war against Japan" (September), China for the first time acknowledged the role of the National People's Party in the war. China also held for the first time a celebration ceremony for "the 60th anniversary of Japan's retrocession from Taiwan (the end of Japan's ruling)" (October), and thus presented a unified “anti-Japanese” position with Taiwan.

<Chen Shui-bian administration of Taiwan has stance to promote the idea of "establishing new constitution”>

In Taiwan, the National Assembly, a provisional organization that takes final voting to decide on the revision of the Constitution of Republic of China, adopted on June 7 the proposal for partial revision of the Constitution to the effect that the final right to vote for the revision of the Constitution is transferred from the National Assembly to a national referendum. Chen Shui-bian accordingly emphasized on June 25 that "I am sure Taiwan will have a new constitution when I finish my term as President in 2008" and established a Constitutional Reform Office within the Office of the President on August 1.

Furthermore, Chen Shui-bian emphasized "democracy" and "freedom" for Taiwan and stated on August 2 that "only Taiwan's 23 million citizens have the right to choose and decide over the future of Taiwan" and thus showed the attitude of valuing public opinion in Taiwan. He also emphasized on October 10 that "We will revise the constitution in gradual phases and create a political system suitable for democracy and a free society in Taiwan.”

In the future, the relationship between China and Taiwan may become tenser depending on the content of the "new Constitution" the Chen Shui-bian administration aims at, with China having given itself the right to freely interpret the these conditions to use force against Taiwan listed in the "Anti-secession Law".

3. Russia

Russia begins to move toward establishing the framework for a successor to President Vladimir Putin.
- Owing to its stable domestic political situation, Russia strengthened its relationship with China and India while cooperating with the United States and Europe.
- In spite of Putin's visit to Japan, there was no substantial development regarding the Northern Territories issue.

<There is a sign of pursuit for the framework for Putin's successor aiming at the termination of his term.>

In Russia, some events that show weakening of the unifying force of Putin happened at the beginning of the year including many protest demonstrations against the reform of the social security system that the Putin administration conducted (January) and revealed conflicts among key government leaders concerning economic policy. However, because the economy is continuing to grow in spite of the dependency on resource exports thanks to its high production of crude oil, and also because certain achievements have been made regarding anti-terrorist measures such as the sweeping operation against the Chechen militia, Russian domestic political conditions have been more or less stable and the President's approval rating has remained high.

Under the circumstances, views were expressed by parliamentary members expecting the extension of his presidential term. Putin himself, however, repeatedly states that he will "resign from the position of President when the term expires in 2008" and media began to report on observations on the framework for Putin's successor, and thus the movement to find a successor under Putin's strong power base has begun and it is expected that political moves by powerful politicians will become active in the future.

<In diplomacy, Russia strengthened its cooperative relationship with China and India while maintaining its cooperative relationship with the United States and Europe>

Russia opposed the stance of the United States that requested submission of Iran's nuclear issue to the U.N. Security Council, and expressed discomfort with the attitude of European countries that criticized "retrogression of democratization" in the former republics of the Soviet Union. Russia, however, confirmed a continued cooperative relationship with the United States in its summit talks in February and had summit talks continuously (in May, June, September, and November). Regarding Europe, Russia and the EU summit adopted a road map to establish "the four common spaces" including economy and security (May). Thus, Russia made efforts to maintain its cooperative relationship with the United States and Europe.

On the other hand, Russia adopted "joint communique" that prescribes the expansion of cooperation in the field of energy and others during Hu Jintao's visit to Russia (from June 30 to July 3), adopted a "joint statement" that included the request "to the U.S. to clarify the end of the stationing period of the U.S. military in Central Asia" during a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (July), conducted the first-ever joint military exercise (August), and made moves intended to rein in US power like China.

Furthermore, Russia strengthened its relationship with India by confirming to promote trilateral cooperation in the talk between Russian, Chinese, and Indian foreign ministers (June) and practicing a joint military exercise with India (October).

Such moves reflect Russia's diplomatic stance to emphasize the relationship with China and India while maintaining a cooperative relationship with the United States and European countries, and it seems that Russia will continue such a stance in the future.

<Breakthrough for the Northern Territories Issues has not been found.>

The schedule for Putin's visit to Japan was finally settled (November 20 to 22) after the talks between Japanese and Russian foreign ministers (January), the Russian minister's visit to Japan, and the summit talks between Russia and Japan during the G8 Summit Conference (Gleneagles Summit in July). During the preparation for his visit to Japan, however, there were many opinions expressed by members of the Russian government, parliament, and academia about the Northern Territories Issues such as "the occupation of the Northern Territories by the former Soviet military is the product of aggression by Japanese militarism" and that "The fact of the Northern Territories belonging to Russia is the punishment for Japanese aggression.” Putin also stated that "Russian sovereignty over the four islands is defined by international law" (September), and thus showed quite a severe stance on the issue just before his visit to Japan.

In the course of the summit talks held under such conditions, Prime Minister Koizumi requested the confirmation on Tokyo Declaration of 1993 that stipulates that a peace treaty should be concluded after resolving the issue of the Northern Territories, but Putin replied that "I wish to seek a solution acceptable to both countries", aiming at reaching a solution through the return of the two islands Habomai and Shikotan based on the Joint Declaration of 1956. Thus, there is a large gap between the stance of each country on the Northern Territories issue, and the adoption of any political documents was shelved, an unprecedented result in such talks.

In the press conference after the summit, Putin stated that "The non-existence of a peace treaty may be interfering in economic cooperation between Japan and Russia, but we have confirmed that we will do our utmost toward developing economic cooperation." In future, Russia may proactively approach Japan in order to expand cooperation in economic fields while maintaining the stance of using "the Joint Declaration" as the basis for the Northern Territories issue.

4. Middle East and Asia

(1) Terrorist attacks continue while the transition process sets in motion in Iraq
- A transitional government was established and the transition process for a new administration is proceeding.
- There are still many terrorist attacks by militants and foreign extremists

<The draft for a new constitution has been approved and the transition process for the establishment of a new administration has entered the final stage.>

Process toward Establishment of New Administration

In Iraq, targeting to establish a new administration by the end of December, the transitional process prescribed in Transitional Administrative Law progressed from January.

In the election for the temporary national assembly in January (by a direct election with proportional representation system), many Sunni Arab organizations who were the main constituents of the former Hussein administration boycotted the election to protest against the transitional process in which the U.S. was engaged. Therefore, the legitimacy of the transitional process itself was put into question, but the political party of Shiite Arabs and that of Kurds that took up the majority of the temporary national assembly encouraged Sunnis to participate in the interim government by allocating cabinet posts of the interim government to Sunnis and started the interim government (April).

In the drafting of the new constitution in May, Sunnis again showed strong opposition to the contents that recognized the establishment of regional federalism with strong local autonomy and excluded people related to the Baath party that was the ruling party of the former administration from public positions. Consequently, negotiations were made by various domestic factions until immediately before the national referendum (October) and, as a compromise, an article was added which prescribes that discussion should be held about the revision of the new constitution after the new administration has started. As a result, in spite of opinions pointing out the possibility of disapproval of the draft of a new constitution, in the national referendum held in October, the draft unexpectedly received a majority approval. Consequently, the transitional process for the new administration has greatly advanced and it is now in the final stage of having the election for national assembly and starting the new administration by the end of December. The movement of the Sunnis, however, may be a factor for instability in the future.

<Terrorist attacks by militants, among others, aimed at ruining the transitional process intensified.>

Aiming to ruin the transitional process, Islamic extremists consisting of Sunni Iraqis and foreigners who are against the progressing transitional process and anti-U.S. militants such as remnant forces of former Hussein administration carried out bombings and attacks on the coalition forces, Iraqi interim government, security organizations, and Shiite Iraqi citizens on political occasions such as the elections for a temporary national assembly (January), the start of an Iraqi transitional government (April), drafting of a constitution (August) and around the time of "Ashura" (February), an important religious event for Shiites. One Japanese security guard went missing in western Iraq (May) when cars carrying goods to the U.S. military were attacked by militants that identified themselves as "the Ansar al-Sunnah Army.”

Furthermore, Sunni Islamic extremists from Iraq's neighboring countries such as Saudi Arabia and Syria entered Iraq, joined the anti-U.S. militants, and conducted terrorist activities against coalition forces, Iraqi security organizations, and Shiite citizens. In response, the U.S. military and Iraqi security forces have been repeatedly conducting large-scale sweeping operations in Western regions of Iraq but have not been able to completely prevent Islamic extremists from entering Iraq.

In addition, when the conflicts among Sunni, Shiite, and Kurdish forces increased alongside the development of transitional process, militias of the each force attacked opponent militias and civilians. Anti-British sentiment rose among Shiite people in southern Iraq because of the conflict that happened in September in Basra of southern Iraq between a British military troop and the force supporting Muqtada as-Sadr, the Shiite anti-U.S. leader.

In Samawah where the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force is stationed, a running car of the Force got damaged by a bomb (June) and some attacks by rockets were observed near the billet of the Force. The force supporting Muqtada as-Sadr positions the Self-Defense Force as "occupying troops" and is continuing activities requesting the Force's withdrawal from Iraq. However, compared with Baghdad or middle and northern Iraq where many terrorist attacks happen, the security in Samawah is comparatively stable.

(2) Concerns about Iran's nuclear development issue.
- Iran strengthened its tough stance with the start of the new administration and resumed uranium conversion operation.

<Despite pressure from the international community, Iran resumed its uranium conversion operation.>

Since December 2004, Iran had negotiated with Britain, France, and Germany on its nuclear development. Regarding Iran's activity related to uranium concentration which had been one of the pending issues, Iran persisted with the stance that it is a "well-deserved right of our country" but Britain, France, and Germany did not change their stance in insisting on Iran's "permanent abandonment" and negotiations were hard going.

In the Iranian Presidential election in June, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who is said to be a hard-line conservative won, and Iran strengthened its tough stance on the issue of nuclear development so that concerns about a breakdown in negotiations became strong.

At the end of July, Iran announced its resumption of uranium conversion operations (the step prior to uranium concentration). Britain, France, and Germany proposed a plan that "In return of abandoning activities related to uranium concentration, we will allow Iran's nuclear development for civil use with the provision of nuclear fuel from Europe" and called on Iran to exercise restraint. Iran declined the proposal and, after informing International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), resumed uranium conversion operations under the inspection of the IAEA inspector.

<Iran seeks to continue nuclear development, avoiding pressure using a carrot-and-stick policy.>

Due to the resumption of Iran's uranium conversion operations, the IAEA Board of Governors' Meeting in September focused on submission of the nuclear development issue to the U.N. Security Council. The Meeting in November concluded with a request for Iran to compromise based on Russia's new proposal that "Uranium conversion in Iran is permitted on the condition that the operation of uranium concentration is done by Russia." and the discussion on the submission to the U.N. Security Council was postponed.

Against the movement of the submission to the U.N. Security Council, Iran showed objections by suggesting the suspension of its temporary compliance with IAEA's Additional Protocol and a change in its economic relationship with the countries that support the submission to the U.N. Security Council. In the meantime however, Iran made moves that could be designed to alleviate the pressure such as accepting IAEA inspections and accepting to attend the discussions based on Russia's new proposal.

It appears that Iran will continue its nuclear development by taking a carrot-and-stick policy to avoid sanctions.

(3) Middle East peace process still unpredictable even after Israel' s withdrawal from Gaza
- Israel continues unilateral Palestine separation policy.
- Signs of escalation in leadership struggle within Palestine.

<Israel continues unilateral Palestine separation policy in the West Bank>

In November 2004, Palestine Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat, whom the United States and Israel called the "enemy of peace," passed away and Mahmud Abbas, who was said to be a moderate, took the office of PA Chairman as Arafat's successor in January. In February, Israeli-Palestinian summit talks were realized (in Egypt) for the first time in about four and a half years and both agreed to discontinue violence. In September, Israel withdrew from Gaza and Israeli military rule over the region that had continued for thirty-eight years was put to an end.

However, even after the withdrawal, Israel keeps its command of the air and of the sea and is continuing its substantial "Gaza occupation.” In the West Bank, Israel is unilaterally continuing construction of a "separation wall" to segregate the Palestinian residential area. Furthermore, Israel is accelerating the annexation of a huge Israeli settlement in the region to Israeli territory. Palestine is strongly opposed to such moves by Israel and the future of the peace process is still uncertain.

<In Palestine, the maneuvering between Chairman Abbas and "Hamas" became active.>

The Islamic fundamentalist organization "Hamas" in Palestine gained about 65% of legislative seats in the assembly elections of ten autonomous regions in Gaza held in January and, based on its advance in regional elections held in and after December 2004, is aiming at the expansion of power in Gaza after the withdrawal of Israel.

The election for the members of the Palestine Legislative Council (PLC, 132 members) is scheduled in January 2006, and maneuvering between Chairman Abbas and "Hamas" became active with regard to the participation of Hamas in the election. If "Hamas" gets good results in the election, the leadership of "Fatah" that is the parent organization of Chairman Abbas and the main faction of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) may become unstable.

(4) Taliban becomes more active despite the ongoing democratization process in Afghanistan
- The democratization process has been developing with the participation of armed factions in the election.
- The "Taliban" failed to prevent parliamentary elections but intensified its armed struggle.

<Spreading democracy.>

The democratization process in Afghanistan was delayed due to security problems and the delay in zoning of electoral districts but is basically progressing smoothly as seen in the events conducted according to plans such as the Presidential election in October 2004, the Cabinet's inauguration in December 2004, and elections for the House of the People and for provincial assemblies held on September 18, 2005.

President Hamid Karzai removed influential armed factions of ethnic minorities who were from the "Northern Alliance" and also were the ministers in the cabinet of the interim government such as the former Education Minister Yunus Qanooni (Tajik), the former Advisor to the President Rashid Dostam (Uzbek), the former Planning Minister Mohammed Mohaqiq (Hazara), and gave preference to Pushtuns for ministerial positions. The reasons may be that Pushtuns occupy 38% of the population and is the largest ethnic group in the country and there are many Pushtuns with a good educational background who have powerful connections in the international relations arena and are well-informed about international situations.

On the other hand, influential armed factions of ethnic minorities eliminated from the administration did not "resist by force" like before, but stood as candidates in the elections for the House of the People and for provincial assemblies held in September and showed a focus on securing positions and interests as regional representatives.

In the elections for the House of the People and for provincial assemblies, in addition to the influential armed factions with a strong electoral power base and former high-ranking officers of the "Taliban", intellectuals and left-wing people were elected so that a political administration conforming to parliamentary democracy is established instead of the traditional one that focused on races and armed factions.

<Anti-government militias such as the "Taliban" have become active.>

In the meantime, anti-government militias such as the "Taliban" have become active, and there were many terrorist attacks considered by the militia in the southern and eastern parts of the country.

The militia intensified its activity to sabotage the elections for the House of the People and for provincial assemblies that were conducted for the first time under the Karzai administration, and in addition to the attacks on the stationed foreign military, government, and security authorities, they threatened, attacked, and murdered people related to the elections such as candidates. On the day of the elections, however, there was no large-scale terrorist attack, and voting itself was conducted almost as scheduled, though there were incidents intended to sabotage elections in a region. The reason may be that the U.S.-led allied forces, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and Afghanistan security authorities strengthened security measures and had tight security around voting stations so that the "Taliban" and others refrained from carrying out attacks.

After the elections, terrorist attacks by anti-government militias including the "Taliban" resumed again in succession. Suicide bombings against military facilities in Kabul occurred in September, and the largest-ever attack on police cars occurred in Helmand province in the south in October (19 policemen were killed). Thus, the security situation has not improved yet.

Afghanistan has many economic problems, including collapsed domestic industries and dependence on narcotic production and, in security terms, Taliban attacks on the stationed foreign military, government, and security authorities. It is hoped that its democratization process advances despite the many difficulties with the support of the international community in security and economic areas and with a decline in armed factions' influence.

(5) The U.S., China and Russia play a diplomatic tug-of-war in Central Asia.
- The United States, China, and Russia remained in a tug-of-war to secure influence on the region.
- When the possibility of CIS countries' "Democratic Revolution" was pointed out, rioting occurred.

<The United States, China, and Russia played a tug of war to secure their respective presence in Central Asia.>

In the Central Asian region occupying the former Soviet Union, the U.S. military has been stationed from October 2001, and China is actively working on individual countries like Kazakhstan to acquire their abundant natural resources. On the other hand, neighboring countries worry that the region is the nest for international terrorism and there is illegal distribution of narcotics in the region.

Summit Talks of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization consisting of Russia, China, and four countries in Central Asia adopted in July a "joint statement" including the request "to clarify the end of the stationing period of the U.S. military in the region" and the "concept of cooperation in the war on terror.” Background factors included Russia's distrust towards the U.S. that appeared to plan prolonged military stationing, China's dissatisfaction towards the stationing of the U.S. military in Kyrgyz, and Uzbekistan's opposition towards Western countries that criticized its suppression of riots by force (May). To that end, Uzbekistan requested the U.S. "to withdraw the military within 180 days" (July) and the U.S. completed its withdrawal (November). Kyrgyz, however, who cannot help depending on U.S. economic support, agreed not to decide the time limit for the withdrawal of the U.S. military after the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (October), and Tajikistan also showed its intention to accept the stationing of the U.S. military. Thus there were differences in their attitudes. In Central Asia, there are moves to strengthen the security relationship led by Russia as seen in Russia's announcement to strengthen the base where the Russian military is stationed and the "Agreement for Alliance" between Uzbekistan and Russia. In addition, China aims at acquiring natural resources, the United States aims at securing influence in the region, and each country in the region has its own individual intentions, so the complicated situation will continue in Central Asia.

<Large-scale anti-government riots occurred in Kyrgyz and Uzbekistan.>

When the possibility of influence on other countries from "Democratic Revolution" in so-called CIS countries was pointed out, large-scale anti-government rioting occurred in Kyrgyz on the occasion of the parliamentary election (February, March). President Askar Akayev fled the country and resigned (March) and Kurmanbek Bakiyev assumed the presidential office (July) and a peaceful change in administration occurred. There remain, however, many difficulties in solving basic problems including the economic gap between north and south that was a factor for the riot. In Uzbekistan, President Islam Karimov suppressed riots by force (May) and, due to a large number of victims, was criticized by European countries. The country's issues of Islamic extremists and poverty are still unresolved.

5. International Terrorism

(1) Spreading threat of Islamic extremism
- Threat of terrorism by Al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremists is spreading.
- South East Asia faces the continuing risk of terrorist bombings by "Jemaah Islamiya.”

<Threat of terror by Islamic extremists including "Al-Qaeda" is spreading.>

After the simultaneous multiple terrorist attacks in September 2001 that horrified the international community, the global community strengthened collaboration to eradicate terrorism. Leaders and members of Al-Qaeda were arrested one after another, and certain achievements were made in weakening the organizational power of Al-Qaeda and in containing terrorist activities. On the other hand, simultaneous multiple terrorist attacks by bombings causing indiscriminate killing allegedly done by Islamic extremists occurred in Sharm el-Sheikh in the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt (July). In London, Islamic youths apparently influenced by Al-Qaeda committed large-scale terrorist acts, the first of the kind in England (July). Thus, the threat of terror by Islamic extremists seems to be spreading.

In Egypt, although the Islamic group "Jihad" that has repeatedly carried out attacks is said to have weakened thanks to a thorough crackdown by the authorities, concerns that a new base for terrorist activity has been constructed in the country have increased due to the terrorist attacks in 2004 and the large-scale terrorist attack in the Sinai Peninsula in July. In the simultaneous multiple terrorist attacks in London in July, the criminals who executed the suicide bombings were Muslim youths with British nationality and one of them was praising the leaders of Al-Qaeda. This revealed the reality that the idea of Al-Qaeda has deeply penetrated into the minds of some young Muslims in Britain.

As seen in the simultaneous multiple terrorist attacks in Britain, it is considered that Al-Qaeda attempts to incite supporters, gained through various announcements made in satellite TV broadcasts and Internet or jihad videos, to voluntarily commit terrorist acts. It is also expected that Al-Qaeda will continue this tactic in the future to inflame feelings against the U.S. and its allies and to exert ideological influence on Muslims and drive them to commit terrorist acts. In the meantime a large-scale riot rather than a terrorist act occurred in France at the end of October, caused by Muslim immigrants. This stemmed from opposition to the "discrimination" that the second and the third-generations of Muslim immigrants are facing and their resentment about unemployment and poverty. Then, the anger over these issues seems to have been released against the authorities. Such social problems in European countries have become quite serious in recent years and their influence on European security is a worry.

<Terrorist acts by Zarqawi's group and others continue in Iraq.>

In Iraq, security has not improved although the transitional process is progressing, i.e. the election for temporary national assembly (January), inauguration of Iraqi transitional government (April) drafting of a new constitution (August), and a national referendum on the draft (October). In particular, Sunni Islamic extremists such as the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi's "Iraqi Al Qaeda Jihad Organization" and a Sunni militia consisting mainly of the Kurdish people in northern Iraq, "Ansar al-Sunnah Army", committed many heinous terrorist attacks including terrorist bombings and attacks on Shiite Iraqis, the interim government, security organizations, and the U.S. and allied forces or abductions and murders of civilians including foreigners. The "Iraqi Al Qaeda Jihad Organization" seems to be continuing a large-scale terrorist campaign against Shiite civilians in an attempt to cause an Iraqi "civil war" by intensifying the conflict between Sunnis and Shiites.

<String of attacks targeting foreigners occurred in Arab countries and new terror plans were disclosed.>

In May, Cairo faced two terrorist attacks, one of which involved a suicide bombing by Islamic extremists.One of the targets of the attacks was a market frequented by foreign tourists, and the perpetrators included a university student. In Sharm el-Sheikh, where Israel and Palestine once held summit talks and made a peace agreement, large-scale simultaneous multiple terrorist attacks targeting European resort hotels occurred in July and, from the method using car bombs, it was considered to be committed by Islamic extremists influenced by Al-Qaeda. During the investigation, a large amount of explosives was confiscated from the hideout of the people suspected to be involved in the incident. In connection with the September Presidential election, demonstrations to request democratization were carried out by the opposition party and Islamic fundamentalist group "Muslim Brotherhood". There was a fear of terrorist bombings by Islamic extremists triggered by the demonstrations, but no terrorist acts occurred.

In Jordan, a terrorist attack occurred targeting the U.S. vessel "Ashland" anchored at Aqaba port in the southern part of the country in August, and simultaneous multiple bombings targeting European hotels in the capital Amman occurred in November. Regarding the incident in Aqaba, it was suspected that the members of Zarqawi's "Iraqi Al Qaeda Jihad Organization" entered from Iraq with a car loaded with rockets. Jordan' s high-ranking government officials suggested it was very likely that they were committed by the same organization.

Meanwhile, in Saudi Arabia, authorities strengthened their crackdown on a group of Islamic extremists calling themselves the "Al-Qaeda Organization in the Arabian Peninsula" that was developing vigorous activities in 2004. Its major leaders were killed one after another, so a certain amount of damage was inflicted on the capability of extremists. However, a substantial amount of explosives were found and confiscated from extremists' hideouts in Al Harj in the south of the capital in July and in Damman, an eastern state, in September, thereby indicating that extremists in the country are still planning terrorist activities.

While it is pointed out that the threat of terrorist activities by Islamic extremists is spreading, there are actually some phenomena suggesting that operational bases of Islamic extremists have been formed in Egypt and Jordan. There is also a concern in Saudi Arabia that the members of extremist groups from Saudi Arabia who are supposed to be participating in terror activities in Iraq with anti-U.S. militias may return to the country. Thus, there is a concern about new terrorist acts by Islamic extremists targeting Iraq's neighboring countries.

<South East Asia faces continued terrorist threat by "Jemaah Islamiya.”>

In South East Asia, where there was concern about terrorist acts by fugitive members of the international terrorist group "Jemaah Islamiya", suicide bombings occurred in Bali, Indonesia (October) and terrorist bombings occurred in Manila, the Philippines (February). Both are suspected to be related to the group and this suggests there still exists a terror threat by "Jemaah Islamiya" in the region.

In Indonesia, three suicide bombings happened almost at the same time in restaurants in Bali in October, and twenty-three people including four Australians and one Japanese were killed. Because the methods involved suicide bombings that "Jemaah Islamiya" often uses, the authorities in Indonesia pointed out the possibility of the group's involvement. In November, the police found and disclosed the hideout of Azahari Husin, the suspect who was a fugitive leader of "Jemaah Islamiya" and was supposed to have been involved in multiple terrorist incidents, but the suspect died.

In the Philippines, bombings happened in February in three locations in the country including the capital Manila, and twelve people died. The police concluded that it was an incident that hiding members of "Jemaah Islamiya" committed in cooperation with Islamic extremist groups in the country such as "Abu Sayyaf" and arrested several members of these groups.

In southern areas such as Pattani, Yara and Naratiwart of Thailand, terrorist activities by Islamic extremists have intensified and many bombings have occurred targeting Thai government officers and Buddhists. In October, government officers and local citizens were attacked almost at the same time at 69 places in these provinces and a large number of stolen firearms were found.

In South East Asia, members who are still considered to be able to commit terrorist acts such as Noordin Mohamed Top of "Jemaah Islamiya" may commit terrorist incidents while they are fleeing, and the terrorist threat of such groups is still there. In addition, in the southern part of Thailand, separatist campaigns by Muslims are intensifying and there are concerns about further instability if extremist groups such as "Jemaah Islamiya" become involved on their behalf.

(2) Anti-terrorist measures employed by Japan and Western states
- In response to the ongoing terrorist threat, Western states including the U.S., Britain, Germany and France revise anti-terrorism legislation and strengthen financial and personnel resources employed to fight terrorism.
- Recognizing the importance of proactive measures, Japan has implemented the "Proactive Anti-terrorism Action Plan.”

<In response to the ongoing terrorist threat, Western states including the U.S., Britain, Germany and France revise anti-terrorism legislation and strengthen financial and personnel resources employed to fight terrorism>

The U.S. has worked on anti-terrorism legislation in its fight against terrorism. Under U.S. laws, for instance, the government designates foreign terrorist organizations, members of which are restricted in crossing borders, and freezes their assets.It also prohibits supporting activities for such designated organizations (prescribed in Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996), as well as reinforces intelligence activities by the security apparatus including wiretapping (U.S. Patriot Act of 2001). Furthermore, the U.S. seeks to continue to increase its budget and human resources in its fight against terrorism, as well as to take steps to ensure the timely collection of needed intelligence and prompt responses based on this. All this is expected to be done by a unified and coordinated intelligence community under the leadership of the newly established office of Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

Britain has legislated for punishment of designated terrorist organizations and organizations' preparation and support ("Terrorism Act" of 2000), the freezing, seizure and confiscation of terrorists' funds ("Anti-Terrorism Act "of 2001), and orders to restrain the activities of alleged terrorists ("Prevention of Terrorism Act" of 2005). After the simultaneous multiple terrorist attacks in London in July, the government decided the measures of 1) extension of detention periods without indictment and trial for terrorist suspects and 2) punishment for abetting or praising terrorist activities, and made efforts to strengthen anti-terrorist measures. In addition, terrorism-related information was concentrated at the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) consisting of the representatives of various related organizations for effective handling of terrorism and the budget and personnel were increased and strengthened.

Germany has legislated for the following punishments: 1) prohibition and dismissal of groups that are against the constitutional order or associations of foreigners opposed to Germany' s obligations under international law, confiscation of assets of such organizations, punishment for activities supporting such organizations (Association Law), and 2) punishment for establishing and participating in organizations that aim at certain crimes under criminal law such as crimes against humanity or war crimes, and punishment for activities supporting such organizations (Criminal Law). In addition, continuous increases in the budget and personnel relating to anti-terrorist measures were implemented together with the concentration of terrorism-related information at the Gemeinsames Terrorismusabwehrzentrum (GTAZ), or Common Anti-Terror Center, consisting of the representatives of various related organizations for effective handling of terrorism.

In France, legislation was passed against the associations that have the purpose of causing terrorist activities inside or outside the country, for disbanding of such organizations, asset confiscation of disbanded organizations, punishment on the support activities for the dismissed organization (Law to Prohibit Combat Groups, Penal Code) based on Presidential ordinance were legislated. After the bombings in London, the government strengthened its anti-terrorism measures including 1) requirements to set surveillance cameras in nuclear facilities, 2) enhancement of checks on identification on international trains, and 3) maintenance of communication logs at Internet cafes. In addition to the increases in the budget and personnel relating to anti-terrorism measures, the government attempted effective handling of terrorism by the concentration of terrorism-related information at the anti-terrorist coordination unit (UCLAT).

<Recognizing the importance of proactive measures, Japan has implemented the "Action Plan for Prevention of Terrorism.”>

Due to the large number of terrorist attacks around the world starting with the September eleventh terrorist attacks in 2001, and in recognition of the importance of proactive measures, the Japanese government formulated its "Action Plan for Prevention of Terrorism" (Action Plan) in December 2004. The Action Plan lists sixteen items including "strengthening of measures to prevent terrorists from entering Japan" and "strengthening of measures to prevent terrorists from acting freely" as new measures that the government should take as "the proactive anti-terrorism measures to be taken immediately.” The Action Plan further lists three items of "legislation on basic policy regarding the proactive anti-terrorism measures", a "system to designate terrorists and terrorist organizations", and " reinforced control on terrorists' assets" as "the proactive anti-terrorism measures to be continued to be reviewed in the future" and requests each ministry and agency concerned to continue their examinations and make conclusions immediately.

The Public Security Intelligence Agency strengthened, for implementation and promotion of the Action Plan, its intelligence gathering and research activities in order to grasp 1) the movement of international terrorist organizations through close cooperation with foreign organizations, 2) whether or not there are people in Japan who may be related with international terrorist organizations, and if there are, to grasp their movement, and 3) flow of funds and goods in Japan that are suspected to be related to terrorist organizations. In addition, as a member of the related ministries and agencies, the Agency is continuing to examine "legislation on basic policy regarding the proactive anti-terrorism measures", a "system to specify terrorists and terrorist organizations", and "reinforced control on terrorists' assets" in cooperation with other ministries and agencies.


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