Preface

Based on the Subversive Activities Prevention Act and the Act Regarding the Control of Organizations Which Committed Indiscriminate Mass Murder, the Public Security Intelligence Agency (公安調査庁, Koanchosa-cho) conducts control activities targeting such organizations as well as intelligence activities and investigation for control measures, including surveillance of Aum Shinrikyo. As a member of the intelligence community in Japan, the PSIA also collects and analyzes information in and out of the country, including those pertaining to international terrorism and situations in North Korea.

The Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations reviews domestic and international public security situations in 2009 (as of the end of November) and foresees future trends.

It is hoped that this report will be of any help to understand public security situations in Japan and abroad, and will serve to raise interest in the activities and duties of the PSIA.

It should be noted that the months mentioned in this report refer to the year 2009, unless otherwise noted. Also, the titles of individuals mentioned hereafter refer to those the individuals had at the time when this report was written.

The Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations is also available on the PSIA website.

http://www.moj.go.jp/KOUAN/
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I. Overall Review of the Public Security Situation in 2009

1. International Situation

(1) After intensifying its hard-line stance by launching missiles and conducting a nuclear test amid stalled six-party talks, North Korea used a visit by former US president Bill Clinton as an opportunity to step up activities toward realizing US-DPRK talks. At the same time, Pyongyang implemented a series of reconciliatory measures toward South Korea, reversing a hard-line stance that it had followed continuously since the inauguration of South Korean President Lee Myung Bak’s administration. As for its relations with Japan, Pyongyang continued to shelve investigation into the issue of abductions of Japanese citizens even after the administration of the new Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama took power. On the other hand, it demonstrated a stance of closely watching the Hatoyama administration’s North Korea policy while repeatedly demanding that Japan “settle its past.”

Within North Korea, the authority and membership of the National Defense Commission were expanded through the first constitutional revision in 11 years. This move occurred amid reports that a “internal decision” had been reached to make Kim Jong Eun, the third son of North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong Il, the General Secretary’s successor. Moreover, Pyongyang implemented a series of national initiatives to boost production called “the 100-day battle” and “150-day battle,” with the goal of stimulating North Korea’s economy and tightening its society in order to reach the domestic goal of “Opening the Gates to a Strong and Prosperous Nation” by 2012.

(2) In China, which stressed social stability as it marked the 60th anniversary of its founding as a nation, disturbances erupted in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and numerous mass protests took place that were rooted in public discontent. The Hu Jintao administration strove to improve the Communist Party’s cohesion by launching a “mass patriotic education” campaign among other initiatives, and it played up the legitimacy of its administration and appealed for national unity at celebrations marking China’s 60th anniversary. As for Japan, China indicated that it placed importance on its relationship with Japan, saying that it wished to continue developing a strategic and mutually beneficial relationship even after the launch of Japan’s new government. However, it also maintained a tough stance with regard to the Senkaku Islands and other issues. Through summit diplomacy with countries
that possess natural resources, China took pains to stably secure the energy and mineral resources it needs to build its economy.

(3) Russia improved its relationships with the United States and NATO, which had been deteriorating as a result of the conflict in Georgia and the US’s intention to deploy a missile-defense system in East Europe, on one hand, while it also took steps to suppress anti-Russia movements pertaining to perceptions of World War II on the other. In the four northern islands that are claimed by Japan, Russia continued to build infrastructure and made moves to project its sovereignty over the islands, thereby further strengthening its effort to convert the islands to Russian territory. For its part, Russia suggested that it hoped to resolve the issue through the return of two islands to Japan.

(4) As for international terrorism, Islamic extremists engaged in active terrorism throughout the world, as al-Qaeda made a series of announcements calling for a “global jihad” against Israel and the West. In Afghanistan, the Taliban enhanced its attacks against overseas militaries deployed to Afghanistan in order to disrupt presidential election, among others. And in Pakistan, forces supporting the Taliban continued terrorist activities to counter a strategy to root out the Taliban.

2. Domestic Situation

(1) On January 23, the Public Security Examination Commission was convinced that Shoko Asahara still possessed the seemingly absolute influence on the activities of Aum Shinrikyo, and it therefore decided to extend the period of surveillance on the organization (third extension).

Aum Shinrikyo’s mainstream group was even more clearly on a path toward “getting back to Asahara.” For example, it resumed using materials that it had previously recalled for containing dangerous doctrine, and it prepared religious training facilities that Asahara and his leading followers used prior to the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack. At the same time, the mainstream group worked to expand its strength through active recruitment activities that were based on clever deceptions.

On the other hand, the group supporting Fumihiro Joyu presented itself as being “independent of Asahara” by reinforcing its public relations activities, emphasizing
the independence of its teachings, and using the mass media. However, this group was also confirmed as being engaged in activities that continued to be based on Asahara’s trainings.

(2) While clearly showing an anti-authority stance, radical leftist groups engaged in protest movements that targeted important national policies concerning energy and security, including issues that are familiar to the general public, such as the lay judge system. Through such activities, these groups worked to expand their organizations by, for example, strengthening their approaches to laborers and the citizens. Furthermore, radical leftist groups and anti-globalization forces that were led by such groups actively joined hands with overseas organizations with an eye to the APEC Japan 2010 summit.

(3) The Japan Communist Party (JCP) took steps to publicize itself and expand its membership by, among other activities, highlighting its approaches to the United States. By doing so, the JCP sought to establish itself as a party positioned between the two major parties-namely, the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party of Japan-in an attempt to gain victories in the general election. However, the JCP succeeded in capturing only nine seats, which was the same amount it had prior to the election. The JCP responded to individual policies of the Hatoyama government, which was launched in September, in a fair and unbiased manner by positioning itself as a “constructive opposition party.”

(4) Right-wing groups conducted activities that focused on problems involving North Korea. Specifically, they demonstrated against the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) and other organizations to strongly protest missile launches and nuclear testing. Right-wing groups also engaged in propaganda activities in protest of diplomatic and territorial issues involving Russia and China when dignitaries from those countries visited Japan.
II. Focal Issues of External Situations in 2009

1. North Korea and Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan)

(1) Dialogue on the North Korean nuclear issue starts to move forward despite rising tensions resulting from nuclear test

- Stoking the crisis by conducting nuclear and missile launch tests, North Korea sought US-North Korea talks based on its status as a “nuclear power.”
- Although it strongly criticized North Korea’s nuclear test, China took pains to prevent collapse of the six-party talks framework.

North Korea carefully measured the United States’ stance toward it in the days following the inauguration of the Obama administration

As the six-party talks remained stalled over inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities, North Korea stressed to the new administration of US President Barack Obama that it “would not give up its nuclear unless the US abandons its hostile policy” (statement by a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesperson). Furthermore, Pyongyang showed that it was carefully measuring the US administration’s stance toward North Korea, while repeatedly stating its basic positions to US experts on North Korea who were visiting the country. Among these positions, North Korea demanded “recognition as a nuclear power” and “the holding of US-North Korea talks for better relations” (February).

North Korea implemented a series of hard-line measures that included missile launches and a nuclear test

North Korea showed an increasingly tough stance in response to calls from the United States and others for restraint following North Korea’s announcement of a plan to “launch a satellite” (February) and the holding of joint US-South Korea military exercises (March).

In April, North Korea went ahead with a missile launch that was conducted under the guise of a “satellite launch.” It then reacted strongly to the adoption of a statement by the President of the United Nations Security Council denouncing the launch by declaring it would withdraw from the six-party talks and announcing that it would begin reprocessing spent nuclear fuel rods. Furthermore, North Korea reacted to the placement of sanctions on North Korean businesses by UN Security Council Sanctions Committee by stating that “if the sanctions are not lifted, North Korea will not hesitate to conduct nuclear tests or conduct test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles.”

Moreover, in May, North Korea announced that it had “successfully conducted an underground nuclear test,” its second since 2006. When UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which contained additional sanctions against North Korea, was adopted
in response to this test, North Korea reacted strongly by declaring its intention to begin uranium enrichment (June). North Korea also fired a series of medium- and short-range missiles (July).

**Increasingly active steps toward realization of US-North Korea talks through a visit by former US President Bill Clinton and other developments**

While escalating its previously mentioned hard-line stance on the one hand, North Korea showed an increasingly clear desire to have direct dialogue with the United States on the other. Among other developments, this was demonstrated by its insistence that “the United States must directly engage with the DPRK, which has become a magnificent nuclear power.” Later, in response to a visit by the former US President Bill Clinton (August), North Korea demonstrated a strong desire to realize US-North Korea talks by, among other actions, releasing female US journalists that it had been holding since March for illegal entry into North Korea and other charges, and announcing that “General Secretary Kim Jong Il and the former President Clinton met to discuss various issues between North Korea and the United States, and both leaders shared the opinion that problems should be resolved through dialogue.”

Furthermore, North Korea suddenly relaxed its stance toward South Korea (to be mentioned in detail later), and General Secretary Kim Jong Il noted the possibility of Pyongyang’s returning to the six-party talks based on US-North Korea talks and expressed his desire to improve relations with Japan and South Korea to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during the Premier’s visit to North Korea (October). These and other developments suggested that North Korea is giving consideration to the United States, which is stressing a restart of the six-party talks and maintained collaboration with Japan and South Korea.

North Korea later reinforced its efforts toward realization of US-North Korea talks by, among other steps, dispatching Lee Gun, Director General of the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s North America Department to the United States (October) to make contact with Sung Kim, the US Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks. Against this backdrop, the United States announced that it would dispatch Stephen Bosworth (Special Representative for North Korea Policy) to North Korea from December 8 as a special envoy (November)

It appears that the intention to realize US-North Korea talks on top of this conspicuous effort to develop nuclear and missiles to establish as fait accompli its position as a “nuclear power” lies behind this series of actions by North Korea.

**North Korean externally-directed developments in 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jan. 13</th>
<th>Statement by a Foreign Ministry spokesperson: “North Korea will not give up its nuclear unless the US abandons its hostile policy”</th>
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<tr>
<td>Feb. 24</td>
<td>Announcement of plan to “launch a satellite”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar. 9 to 20</td>
<td>Joint US-South Korea military exercises</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 Inauguration of US President Obama’s administration
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 5</td>
<td>Launch of a “satellite” (missile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Adoption of UN Security Council President’s statement denouncing the missile launch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Announcement of withdrawal from six-party talks and restoration of Yongbyon nuclear facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Suggestion of possible nuclear test and test launch of intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 25</td>
<td>Announcement of underground nuclear test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 12</td>
<td>Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1874, which includes sanctions against North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Announcement of intention to weaponize extracted plutonium and begin uranium enrichment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 4</td>
<td>Launch of short- and medium-range missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Foreign Ministry spokesperson says “dialogue toward solution of problems will be outside the six-party talks”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 4</td>
<td>General Secretary Kim Jong Il meets with former US President Bill Clinton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 18</td>
<td>General Secretary Kim Jong Il meets with Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 5</td>
<td>General Secretary Kim Jong Il speaks of the possibility of North Korea’s return to the six-party talks in a meeting with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Lee Gun, Director General of the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s North America Department, is sent to the United States and meets with Sung Kim, the US Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 19</td>
<td>The United States announces that Special Envoy Stephen Bosworth (Special Representative for North Korea Policy) is scheduled to visit North Korea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While criticizing North Korea’s nuclear test, China used alternately severe and soft approaches to get North Korea to return to dialogue.

In recognition of the 60th anniversary of their establishing diplomatic relations, China and North Korea established 2009 as “China-North Korea Friendship Year” and held its opening ceremony in Beijing in March. China intended to reinforce its relationship with North Korea through the events of the friendship year. However, North Korea’s missile launches and nuclear test, which flew in the face of China’s desire for a calm response, frustrated this attempt to strengthen relations and exposed the limits of China’s influence on North Korea to onlookers both at home and abroad.

Regarding the missile launch (April), China showed some understanding of North Korea’s claim that it had “launched a satellite” by saying that “the technologies of rockets and missiles have similarities and differences” (Chinese Foreign Ministry). Nonetheless, it supported the UN Security Council President’s statement condemning North Korea. Furthermore, China reacted severely to North Korea’s nuclear test (May), as China’s Foreign Ministry immediately announced a statement strongly criticizing North Korea and Beijing supported UN Security Council Resolution 1874 in June. On
the other hand, China strove to defuse the situation by repeatedly calling on all countries to react calmly. Among other approaches here, China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Dawei (chairman of the six-party talks) visited all of the member nations of the six-party talks, with the exception of North Korea, in July to reconfirm the “effectiveness” and “need for early resumption” of the six-party talks among them in an effort to prevent the collapse of the six-party talks framework.

**China used a simultaneously tough and moderate approach to North Korea.**

This was demonstrated by its postponing a visit to North Korea (June) by Chen Zhili, Vice-Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, which was planned as an event of the friendship year on one hand, and by its exchanging a document with North Korea for the free supply of fertilizer (June) on the other. Behind this approach appeared to be a desire on China’s part to encourage recalcitrant North Korea to return to dialogue.

**China searched for ways to mend its relationship with North Korea amid increasingly active movement toward US-North Korea talks**

As developments toward realization of US-North Korea talks—which included former US President Bill Clinton’s visit to North Korea-picked up steam, China sought ways of mending its relationship with North Korea. China dispatched a series of officials to North Korea, including Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Dawei (August), State Councilor Dai Bingguo as a special envoy of Chinese President Hu Jintao (September), and Premier Wen Jiabao (October). China also accepted a visit from Choe Thae Bok, Secretary of North Korea’s Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (October).

Particularly noteworthy was the attendance of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao at various events together with General Secretary Kim Jong Il. Among them was a ceremony commemorating the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and North Korea and the opening ceremony for “China-North Korea Friendship Year,” where Premier Wen played up the “traditionally friendly relations” between the two nations. Moreover, Premier Wen was able to save appearances for China as the chair country of the six-party talks by receiving a statement from General Secretary Kim regarding the possibility of North Korea’s returning to the talks during a meeting the General Secretary.

**North Korea pursued negotiations from the position of a “nuclear power.” China worked to denuclearize North Korea through the six-party talks**

For the time being, North Korea appears to be on a track of continuing a simultaneously hard and moderate approach whereby it shows a willingness to engage in dialogue but places advancement of negotiations with the United States as its prime diplomatic concern. In US-North Korea talks, North Korea appears to be seeking “negotiations on reducing nuclear arms” based on its position as a “nuclear power.” While suggesting that it may return to the six-party talks, North Korea is expected to attempt to seek
maximum benefits, including conclusion of the US-DPRK peace treaty that it has long coveted and overseas economic assistance. However, the United States has not altered its position that North Korea must completely denuclearize, and therefore it is anticipated that complications will arise even after US-North Korea talks are realized. It is possible that North Korea will once again harden its stance depending on how these talks transpire.

Because China is wary of North Korea’s approaches to the United States and wishes to maintain its influence over Pyongyang, it is expected to continue sending important officials to North Korea and promoting economic exchange, while at the same time determinedly encouraging North Korea to return to the six-party talks and advance the denuclearization process.

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**Column: North Korea Announces on Uranium Enrichment**

It is reported that North Korea admitted it had a uranium enrichment program to then US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly during his visit to North Korea in October 2002. After this admission, however, North Korea denied the existence of any such program.

In 2009, North Korea officially announced for the first time that it would begin uranium enrichment. This announcement was in response to a UN Security Council President’s statement denouncing its missile launch and a UN Security Council resolution regarding its nuclear test. Since then, North Korea has announced progress in its uranium enrichment in various statements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Announcement</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 14</td>
<td>North Korea will actively study the independent construction of a light-water nuclear power plant (*see note).</td>
<td>Foreign Ministry statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 29</td>
<td>North Korea has decided to construct a light-water nuclear power plant and will begin technical development for independent production of nuclear fuel as a first step.</td>
<td>Statement by a Foreign Ministry spokesperson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 13</td>
<td>North Korea has begun uranium enrichment. It has successfully developed uranium enrichment technologies needed to secure nuclear fuel for the construction of a light-water reactor and has begun testing.</td>
<td>Foreign Ministry statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 3</td>
<td>Uranium enrichment has entered the final stage following successful testing.</td>
<td>Letter by North Korea’s UN ambassador that was addressed to the President of the UN Security Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*A light-water nuclear power plant uses enriched uranium whose content of “uranium 235,” which is approximately 0.7% in natural uranium, has been raised to approximately 3-5% as fuel.*
(2) North Korea works to reinforce its governing structure and stimulate its economy, with an eye to “succession”

- North Korea showed conspicuous signs of preparing for “succession” and expanded the authority and membership of the National Defense Commission.
- North Korea implemented a series of national initiatives to boost production toward becoming a “strong and prosperous nation.”

The National Defense Commission’s authority was expanded to all areas of government amid widening reports of a “internal decision on a successor”

Following reports that North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong Il was suffering from failing health in 2008, there was a series of observations and reports beginning in early 2009 that suggested that General Secretary Kim’s third son, Kim Jong Eun (provisional transliteration of 태배), had been picked internally as the General Secretary’s successor, and that internal preparations that included various instructions and communications as well as propaganda and educational activities regarding this decision were underway. Moreover, repeated North Korean reports of national performances and propaganda featuring palgorum (meaning “stomp”), a song singing the praises of Kim Jong Eun, appeared to back up this appraisal.

During this time, North Korea modified its constitution for the first time in 11 years, the last being in 1998, at the first session of the 12th Supreme People’s Assembly (April 9). This modification established that the Chairman of the National Defense Commission of the DPRK, a position currently occupied by General Secretary Kim Jong Il, would be the “supreme leader of the state,” added “establishment of important national policy” to the duties of the NDC, and expanded the authorities of each from military affairs to all areas of national government. The Assembly also expanded its membership by newly appointing General Secretary Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law, Chang Song Taek (a Department Director in the Workers’ Party of Korea), and others to the Commission.

This series of measures is thought to be intended to establish and reinforce a government structure that is centered on the NDC as part of preparatory work to support the successor.

Continuous implementation of the “100-day battle” and “150-day battle” toward economic stimulation

With an eye to its goal of “Opening the Gates to a Strong and Prosperous Nation” by 2012, which will mark the 100th anniversary of late President Kim Il Sung’s birth, North Korea made a large commitment toward stimulating its economy, which is a major component of the goal. As a step in this direction, General Secretary Kim Jong Il called for expanded production at all production sites from the beginning of the year under the banner of “a revolutionary tidal wave,” a slogan he put forward at the end of December 2008. To achieve this, a national campaign called the “150-day battle” (April 20 to
September 16) was implemented to encourage greater production and reestablish the authority-led management framework for the planned economy. This was followed by the “100-day battle” (September 23 to December 31), a movement to maintain morale and a sense of urgency among the population. As part of these campaigns, North Korea upgraded production facilities at important enterprises and assigned a large number of military personnel to the construction of 100,000 residences in Pyongyang and a hydroelectric power plant in Huichon. North Korean authorities announced that, among other results, the “150-day battle” had brought a “13% increase in industrial production compared to same period in the previous year” (October). However, no dramatic improvement in North Korea’s overall economy was recognized. Rather, it appears that constraints on consumers and expanded mobilizations that took place under the campaigns to increase production hindered private profit-making activities and side businesses that these people had been pursuing to make up for food shortages, and that this in turn led to greater difficulty in maintaining livelihood.

It should be noted that North Korea suddenly implemented a currency redenomination, revaluing 100 won as 1 won, at the end of November. This move suggested a full-scale government effort to strengthen its control over the economy.

**Possibility that preparations for succession to Kim Jong Eun will get underway**

It is anticipated that North Korea will gradually move toward full-scale preparations for succession in order to give Kim Jong Eun the experience, foundation, and authority he will need to be the General Secretary Kim Jong Il’s successor, as it also keeps an eye on General Secretary’s health status and both domestic and international developments.

With regard to its economy, North Korea will celebrate the 65th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea in 2010. Thus, it is also anticipated that North Korea will take steps to stimulate its economy, tighten state control, and establish an environment for succession by, for example, implementing campaigns to increase production using this anniversary as a milestone.
**Palgorum** is a song whose title means “stomp.” It is thought that the “General Kim” that appears in its lyrics refers to Kim Jong Eun (General Secretary Kim Jong Il is a “marshal” but is commonly referred to as “Supreme Commander”), and that “February” is a figurative reference to General Secretary Kim Jong Il, as he was born in February.

There are reports that the song was sung at various performances and gatherings, starting with a fine-arts performance that was attended by General Secretary Kim Jong Il in late February. Schoolchildren were also seen singing it in chorus while going to school. Although some reported that its use in propaganda activities had stopped, the fact that it was performed at a public performance attended by General Secretary Kim Jong Il (October) confirms that its use is continuing.

**Lyrics to Palgorum (first stanza)**

*Stomp stomp stomp stomp stomp footsteps*
*Our General Kim’s footsteps*
*Sprinkling the soul of February*
*Forward stomp stomp stomp*
*One stomp stomp of footstep after footstep*
*The mountains and waters of the entire country rejoice with stomp stomp stomp*
(3) North Korea closely observes Japan’s new government amid stagnating Japan-North Korea relations

- While shelving its investigation into the abduction issue, North Korea strongly criticized Japan’s response to its missile launch and nuclear test.
- North Korea’s stance indicated it was closely observing Japan’s North Korea policy following the inauguration of Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s administration.

North Korea strongly objected to Japan’s response to its missile launch by warning it would “retali ate”

While making no movement in its investigation into the abduction issue, which was to be conducted based on an agreement reached with Japan in 2008, North Korea began a series of denouncements of Japan in early 2009 for reasons that included Japan’s dispatching Maritime Self-Defense Force escort vessels to the coast of Somalia and holding events commemorating “Takeshima Day” in Shimane Prefecture. North Korea later issued even stronger criticisms when Japan announced that it would “order destructive measures” against the North Korean missile (March), saying that “if Japan insists on intercepting [North Korea’s] peaceful satellite, the DPRK will retaliate.” Furthermore, when Japan implemented measures following the missile launch (April) that included a one-year extension of sanction measures against North Korea, North Korea claimed that Japan was being “extremely aggressive and provocative” against it. With regard to discussion in Japan about Japan’s “possession of capability to strike enemy bases,” North Korea also warned that “if Japan attacks the DPRK, the DPRK will deliver an annihilating attack against Japan.”

Moreover, North Korea reacted to Japanese responses to its nuclear test (May), which included a complete ban on exports to North Korea, by asserting that “sanctions against North Korea would be met with forceful countermeasures.” North Korea also declared that Japan’s move to formulate an “Act for Special Measures on Cargo Inspection of North Korean Ships” based on a UN Security Council sanction resolution against North Korea by saying the law was the “apotheosis of hostile policy against North Korea.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Japanese sanction measures against North Korea</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 2006</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ban on North Korean cargo-passenger ship Mangyongbong-92’s calls at Japanese ports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ban in principle on North Korean officials’ entry into Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ban in principle on reentry into Japan of North Korean officials residing in Japan who travel to North Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October 2006</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ban on all North Korea-registered ships to enter Japanese ports ()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ban in principle on North Korean nationals’ entry into Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ban on import of all goods from North Korea ()</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>April 2009</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Extension of period of measures which require Cabinet decisions (marked by  above) from six months to one year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
North Korea showed concern for Japan’s change in government, declaring that “North Korea will respond in accordance with the new administration’s stance”

North Korea responded to Japan’s general election (August) more quickly than has been usual in recent years by reporting that a change in Japan’s government was certain and providing the election’s results on the day following the election. This response demonstrated North Korea’s high interest in Japan’s political situation.

Moreover, North Korea stated that “North Korea must see what kind of policy the Democratic Party of Japan intends to implement in the future” and that “If the new administration makes a bold decision to settle Japan’s past and works to improve relations, North Korea will respond in kind.” Thus, North Korea indicated that it would be carefully watching the Hatoyama administration’s North Korea policy, and that North Korea could change its stance with regard to Japan accordingly. On the other hand, North Korea made it clear that it has not changed its position with regard to the abduction issue, as it restated its view that “the problem has, in fact, been resolved in all areas.” In addition, North Korea repeatedly called for Japan to “settle its past,” saying “There can be no improvement in Japan-North Korea relations unless Japan settles its past,” and “Settlement of its past is Japan’s legal and moral obligation and a historical task.”

**Chongryon issued propaganda regarding the “lawfulness” of North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test and protested Japan’s sanction measures against North Korea**

Chongryon echoed North Korea’s stance vis-à-vis Japan by engaging in propaganda and protest activities directed at various circles in Japan. At the time of the missile launch, Chongryon issued propaganda to the political circle, mass media, and others claiming that “launching satellites is a legitimate right of a sovereign nation.” Likewise, when North Korea conducted a nuclear test, Chongryon emphasized the “lawfulness” of the test by claiming that “The DPRK conducted the nuclear test to protect the nation’s sovereignty and the people’s right to exist.” Chongryon objected strongly to sanction measures Japan implemented in response to the missile launch and the nuclear test, and particularly to Japan’s decision to ban exports to North Korea. It conducted protest activities against Japanese government institutions (July) and street demonstrations in Tokyo and Osaka calling for the sanction measures to be lifted (September).

Furthermore, Chongryon stepped up its activities toward Japan in response to the change in Japan’s government. Among them, Chongryon expanded its personal connections
with political and other circles, and worked to have sanction measures against North Korea lifted. These actions were taken under a policy of “strengthening activities toward Japan in order to let the new Japanese administration change its hostile policy toward North Korea and implement the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration.”

North Korea reinforces its efforts to lift Japan’s sanction measures against North Korea and soften Japanese public opinion regarding North Korea

For the time being, it is anticipated that North Korea will make repeated demands for Japan to “settle its past” and lift sanction measures against Pyongyang as it also closely watches developments in the US-North Korea relationship and Japan’s policy toward North Korea. At the same time, through Chongryon and other media, North Korea will likely vitalize its approaches to various circles of Japan in order to soften public opinion regarding North Korea. Furthermore, it is expected that Chongryon will strive to request Japan’s central and local governments in order to gain “practical benefits”—such as better treatment for Korean schools in Japan—for North Koreans in Japan and Chongryon-affiliated organizations.
North Korea alters its unbending hard-line stance against South Korea

- North Korea shifted its hard-line stance against South Korea, which had continued since the inauguration of South Korean President Lee Myung Bak’s administration, and began cultivating a mood for North-South dialogue.

From the beginning of the year, North Korea used its military to stir up tensions and placed further pressure on economic exchange

North Korea had continued a uniformly hard-line stance against South Korea since the inauguration of South Korean President Lee Myung Bak’s administration (February 2008) with the desire of causing a change in the South Korean administration’s North Korea policy. North Korean hardened its stance vis-à-vis South Korea even further at the beginning of 2009.

The Korean People's Army raised military tensions on the peninsula by taking an unusually tough stance for recent years. It issued a General Staff “statement” (January), the first time in roughly 10 years, that declared the army “had entered into an all-out confrontational posture” with South Korea, and left open the possibility that North Korea would take “forceful military countermeasures.” Moreover, during Key Resolve, which was a joint US-South Korea military exercise (March), the KPA ordered all of its forces to “prepare to fight” and closed land links between the north and south.

Furthermore, when South Korea, in response to North Korea’s missile launch (April) and nuclear test (May), showed signs of moving toward full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), North Korea objected strongly, saying “[The DPRK] considers such action to be declaration of war against it.”

In addition, North Korea applied increasing pressure to the Kaesong Industrial Region by unilaterally notifying South Korea that it had invalidated “special benefits” pertaining to wages and land rent (May) and then demanding that wages and land rent be raised significantly (June and July). When South Korea refused to comply with these demands, North Korea indicated to close the Kaesong Industrial Region (July).

Due to this environment, trade between North and South Korea reached only approximately 1.275 billion dollars (as of October), which represented a year-on-year decline of roughly 18% compared to 2008.

Pyongyang’s hard-line stance toward South Korea suddenly changed in the summer, and it began implementing a series of conciliatory measures

North Korea began taking more active steps toward realizing dialogue with the US in the wake of former US President Bill Clinton’s visit to North Korea (August), and at the same time it began moving positively toward improving its relations with South Korea. North Korea accepted a visit to Pyongyang from the Chairwoman of the Hyundai Group,
which operates sightseeing tours to Mt. Kŭmgang (August); released a Hyundai Group employee that had detained since March for criticizing the North Korean system; and agreed to restart a North-South economic cooperation program with the Hyundai Group.

It further lifted passage and stay restrictions for the Kaesong Industrial Region and Kŭmgangsan Tourist Region (the “December 1st Measure”) that it implemented in December 2008. Moreover, following the death of ex-South Korean President Kim Dae Jung (August), North Korea dispatched a condolence mission headed by Kim Ki Nam, Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea, that delivered a message from North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong Il to South Korean President Lee regarding advancement of North-South cooperation. North Korea also allowed reunions of families separated by the Korean War to take place for the first time in approximately two years (September).

Later, North Korea expressed regret (October) when there were human casualties in South Korea after the North’s Hwanggang Dam released water without warning (September), and Pyongyang made its first ever request for humanitarian aid to South Korea’s Lee administration during the inter Korea Red Cross liaison meeting (October).

Against this backdrop, Pyongyang’s response stopped at simply denouncing the ROK’s military authorities following a skirmish between Northern and Southern naval vessels near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea (November). Even after this incident, there were signs that North Korea was approaching South Korea’s Lee administration through the Hyundai Group with the intention of reopening tourism to Mt. Kŭmgang.

For the foreseeable future, the possibility remains that, even as North Korea opens to dialogue, its stance may harden once again depending how US-DPRK talks progress and Seoul reacts

North Korea appears to have shifted its posture in the ways described above in order to lay the groundwork for US-DPRK talks and regain economic benefits that it lost as a result of its strained ties with the ROK.

It is likely that Pyongyang will maintain a dialogue-oriented posture for the foreseeable future in order to achieve these goals. However, the possibility that North Korea will once again assume a hard-line stance and that North-South relations may worsen again depending on how its talks with the US progress and how South Korea’s Lee administration reacts cannot be denied.

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<td>Development</td>
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<td>Restriction/discontinuation of political relations</td>
<td>Reopening of political relations</td>
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<td>Blocks passage across the military</td>
<td>ROK government personnel return to</td>
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<td>Demarcation line by ROK government personnel, and orders ROK government personnel stationed at Kaesong and Kumgangsan to leave</td>
<td>March 2008</td>
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<td>Declares a complete cessation of North-South dialogue</td>
<td>March 2008</td>
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<td>Detains a Hyundai Group employee stationed at Kaesong for criticizing the DPRK’s system</td>
<td>March 2009</td>
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<td>Seizes a South Korean fishing boat that crossed the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Sea of Japan and holds its crew</td>
<td>July 2009</td>
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<td>Restriction/repression of economic exchange</td>
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<td>Implements the “December 1st Measure”</td>
<td>December 2008</td>
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<td>Demands significant increases in wages and land rent at the Kaesong Industrial Region</td>
<td>June 2009</td>
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<td>Stoking of military tensions</td>
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<td>Terminates operation of North-South military communications in the Yellow Sea area, citing equipment malfunction</td>
<td>May 2008</td>
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<td>Declares it has “entered an all-out confrontational posture” with South Korea</td>
<td>January 2009</td>
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<td>Declares it has “abolished agreements pertaining to the Yellow Sea NLL”</td>
<td>January 2009</td>
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<td>Orders all military forces to “prepare to fight” and closes North-South land links in response to Key Resolve (joint US-South Korea military exercises)</td>
<td>March 2009</td>
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<td>At Kaesong Industrial Region:</td>
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<td>- Agrees to raise wages to average yearly level (September)</td>
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<td>- Concludes agreement on construction of a child-care center (September)</td>
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<td>Makes agreement with the Hyundai Group to restart economic cooperation</td>
<td>August</td>
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<td>Relaxation of military tension</td>
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<td>Restarts operation of North-South military communications in the Yellow Sea area</td>
<td>September</td>
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<td>Restains military provocation</td>
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<td>Attitude toward South Korea</td>
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<td>Beginning in April 2008, calls South Korea’s president “Traitor Lee Myung Bak,” criticizes the Lee administration’s North Korea policy on successive days, and incites “anti-government conflict”</td>
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<td>Work in Kaesong</td>
<td>September</td>
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<td>A North Korean condolence mission makes a courtesy call to ROK President Lee</td>
<td>August</td>
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<td>Releases the Hyundai Group employee</td>
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<td>Releases the South Korean fishing boat and its crew</td>
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<td>Lifts restrictions on economic exchange</td>
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<td>Lifts the “December 1st Measure”</td>
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<td>Attitude toward South Korea</td>
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<td>Beginning from late August, refrains from name-calling and criticism, while making “urgent calls for normalization of North-South relations”</td>
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(5) Chongryon focuses on reinforcement of its organization and ideology

- Based on an overview of its activities over the past 10 years, Chongryon invigorated its branches and working groups and took ideological education-oriented measures for its activists.

**A general review of activities shed light on a deteriorating organization and ideology**

In recent years, Chongryon has made expansion of its organizational strength a priority task, and has implemented organization-wide approaches toward this end, among them the “Compatriot Reintegration Campaign,” which is an effort to reach out people even including those who have become naturalized Japanese citizens. Nonetheless, Chongryon has been unable to break progressive weakening of its strength, and thus it conducted a general review of its organizational activities over the past 10 years from January to the end of March.

This review shed new light on the deterioration of Chongryon’s “base organizations,” which are comprised of branches and working groups that serve as bases for activities, as well as weakened loyalty to North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong Il and Chongryon among its activists.

**Chongryon implemented a series of activities, including a conference of branch activists and a “100-Day Campaign,” to reinforce its branches and working groups**

Based on the results of the general review, Chongryon dispatched top officials to important branches on successive occasions between April and June to provide intensive guidance. And in July, it held a conference of branch activists for the first time in 15 years. At the conference, Ho Jong Man, Chongryon’s chief vice chairman, pointed out the necessity to develop and invigorate the “base organizations.” Also, given that the activities of base organizations are stagnating due to the absence of executive officers in them, he instructed base organizations to fill these positions and normalize their activities.

Moreover, Chongryon established a “100-Day Campaign” from September 11 to December 19 to invigorate the base organizations. The campaign was a period of intensive activities that included assignment of members in their 30s, 40s, and 50s to executive positions in branches and working groups.

**Chongryon stepped up its education and propaganda for activists and members**

Chongryon held the third meeting of its 21st Central Standing Committee (September) and decided to convene the 22nd Congress in May 2010. It then hammered out a new policy for reinforcing ideological education for activities and members in preparation for the Congress.

As part of this effort, Chongryon stepped up its education and propaganda activities to cultivate activists’ “strength of spirit” and achieve other goals. Among other activities,
Chongryon published a book praising North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong Il (November) and conducted intensive activist training using the book as a textbook. And it worked to reestablish the “five-household propagandist system” in which one activist is responsible for providing education and propaganda to five North Korean households in Japan that have been assigned to him or her.

**Chongryon will continue to reinforce its organization and ideology in preparation for the 22nd Congress**

For the foreseeable future, it is anticipated that Chongryon will reinforce its approaches to stronger organization and ideology in preparation for its 22nd Congress. In step with North Korea, which has set a goal of “Opening the Gates to a Strong and Prosperous Nation” by 2012, Chongryon will likely seek to realize a “new golden age of Chongryon”—in which, among other developments, all activists will cultivate the same kind of high “strength of spirit” that is possessed by first-generation North Koreans in Japan—by the same year.

**Column: Ideological Education at Korean Schools**

Chongryon sees ethnic education at Korean schools to be the cornerstone of its “compatriot pride and patriotism campaign.” Through lessons and extracurricular activities that are matched to each grade, Chongryon is raising human resources that can contribute to North Korea and Chongryon.

At Korean schools, lessons are conducted uniformly in Korean using teaching materials that were prepared by Gakuyu Shobo, which is a business entity affiliated with Chongryon. For example, Gendai Chosen Rekishi (modern Korean history), which is a textbook for upper grades, praises North Korea’s development and the successes of General Secretary Kim Jong Il’s “military-first policy,” and it provides detailed information on the results of activities undertaken by Chongryon.

*Gendai Chosen Rekishi*, a textbook for upper grades

In addition, Chongryon assigns teachers and students who are primary 4th-grade level and above to the Union of Korean Teachers and School Clerks in Japan (Kyoshokudo) and The Korean Youth League in Japan (Chochong), respectively, where ideological education that includes extracurricular activities presenting the “greatness” of North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong Il is provided from time to time.
2. China

(1) The Chinese Communist Party administration makes an all-out effort to ensure social stability as it celebrates the 60th anniversary of its founding

- Unrest in Uighur and numerous mass protests occurred as China celebrated the 60th anniversary of its founding.
- Despite efforts to play up the government’s legitimacy and ethnic unity at ceremonies marking the nation’s 60th anniversary, China faced a difficult road in maintaining social stability.

China emphasized maintenance of social stability as it celebrated its 60th anniversary

Given that 2009 was simultaneously the 60th anniversary of China’s founding as a nation (October 1), the 50 anniversary of the Tibet uprising (March 14), and 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square incident (June 4) as well as a year when the country faced an economic slowdown caused by the global financial crisis, the administration of Chinese President Hu Jintao strove to maintain social stability by remaining vigilant to terrorism and anti-government movements and improving the Communist Party’s cohesion.

Unrest in Uighur exposed the seriousness of ethnic problems

Despite the government’s effort, large-scale unrest caused by ethnic clashes erupted in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (July). In response, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited the region and appealed for all ethnic groups to come together harmoniously (August). However, in September, Han Chinese began coming forward saying they being injured in a spate of attacks involving syringes. Claiming that those being attacked were Han Chinese and the attackers were Uighurs, Han Chinese staged massive demonstrations demanding stronger measures to maintain public order. The demonstrations resulted in the destruction of Uighur-operated shops and exposed the seriousness of ethnic problems.

A rash of mass protests also occurred; efforts to devise fundamental countermeasures to tackle social problems behind the protests were unsuccessful

At the same time, numerous mass protests that were rooted in ethnic discontent also occurred. One major cause of the protests was bribery/corruption among party and government officials.

A policy to “strictly control incidents of corruption that cause disadvantage to the people as well as corruption that is behind mass protests” was presented at the 4th plenary session of the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (September). However, fundamental countermeasures could not be formulated, as, among other reasons, introduction was made problematic by strong opposition to even a system for reporting
Moreover, the gap between China’s rich and poor is so large that it is said to be the largest in Asia, and the disparity in income levels between urban and rural areas is not narrowing, as income is 3.31 times higher in urban areas (2008). Furthermore, China failed to hammer out fundamental countermeasures for social problems that lie behind mass protests, as it has no policies in place to brake a growing number of labor disputes caused by manpower reductions, unpaid wages, and other reasons.

**China played up the legitimacy of its government and ethnic unity as it celebrated its 60th anniversary amid heightened state of alert**

China’s Hu administration took great pains to improve the cohesion of the Communist Party by launching a “mass patriotic education” campaign in April and proclaiming that “Without the Communist Party, the fatherland would not be enjoying prosperity, wealth, and power, and its people would not be living happily.” On October 1, the day of ceremonies commemorating the 60th anniversary of China’s founding as a nation, China mobilized some 200,000 military personnel and civilians to hold a military review and mass parade. These events took place amid a state of alert that was even higher than that seen during the Beijing Olympic Games, reflecting the government’s wariness of terrorism and mass protests. The parade made a grand display of the government’s legitimacy, featuring a series of portraits of past supreme leaders followed by a portrait of President Hu. Moreover, the government stressed its emphasis on ethnic unity by erecting 56 “columns of ethnic unity” in Tiananmen Square among other activities.

**Even as it strives to improve party cohesion, China faces a difficult road in maintaining social stability**

For the foreseeable future, it is anticipated that China will strive to improve cohesion in the Communist Party. This effort will particularly involve a stronger attitude with regard to bribery/corruption among top officials, which is fueling public discontent. However, objection by vested interests, including top party and government officials, is expected to be strong and will complicate efforts to hammer out fundamental policies for tackling bribery/corruption. As a result, China likely faces a difficult road in maintaining social stability.
(2) While saying that it will “maintain a strategic and mutually beneficial relationship” with the new Japanese government, China maintains a hard-line stance regarding “territorial land and sea issues”

- China gave consideration to Chinese public opinion with regard to development of resources in the East China Sea.

**China emphasized its intention to continue strengthening Japan-China relations**

Declaring “creation of an external environment that is beneficial to stable and comparatively fast domestic economic growth” as an important diplomatic task for 2009 (March, Premier Wen Jiabao), China demonstrated a stance emphasizing a “strategic and mutually beneficial relationship” in its relations with Japan.

In April, China announced at a third summit meeting with Japan’s Prime Minister Taro Aso that “promotion of a strategic and mutually beneficial relationship” is an established policy of China’s (President Hu Jintao). Moreover, at the Japan-China High-Level Economic Dialogue (June, Tokyo), which Japan and China set up as the “most important framework for promoting a strategic and mutually beneficial relationship,” China proposed the “realization of a mutually beneficial and win-win relationship by deepening mutual cooperation to tackle energy and environmental issues,” “reinforcement of regional and international cooperation,” and that “Japan and China should expand areas of collaboration as mutually important partners in economic cooperation.”

Even after the inauguration of Japan’s new government, China stated that it “wishes to continue developing a strategic and mutually beneficial relationship” at a summit meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (September, President Hu). As specific ways of achieving this goal, China proposed reinforcement of summit-level exchanges and economic cooperation as well as promotion of cooperation to tackle global issues. However, at the same time China asked Japan to “act carefully and appropriately vis-à-vis issues of Taiwan and historical perception.”

**No progress was seen with regard to the issue of resource development in the East China Sea**

With regard to resource development in the East China Sea, which remains an outstanding issue between Japan and China, China reached an agreement with Japan that Japanese companies would participate in development of the Shirakaba oil and gas field (known Chunxiao in Chinese) in June 2008. However, immediately afterward there was a flood of Internet-based criticism directed at the Chinese government’s handling of the agreement, with many claiming that “joint development was akin to selling China’s sovereignty.” Partially in response to such public opinion, China’s leadership stated that “implementing the agreement will require the public’s support and understanding” (September, President Hu Jintao; October, Premier Wen Jiabao). As a result, no talks were held toward implementing the agreement in 2009, despite Japan’s repeated requests
Outline of the agreement for development of the Shirakaba oil and gas field

“The governments of Japan and China confirm that Chinese companies will welcome the participation of Japanese corporations in the development of existing oil and gas fields of Shirakaba (Chinese name: Chunxiao) in accordance with China’s Regulations on the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises.”

China maintained a hard-line stance regarding “territorial land and sea issues”

As China displayed a stance toward strengthening maritime “patrol activities” in order to “realize effective management to secure its maritime interests” (October 2008; China Fishery Law Enforcement Command), two Chinese survey ships entered Japan’s territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands in December 2008. Chinese authorities explained that the incursion “was an actual action to publicly display of China’s position and claims regarding the Uotsuri Jima issue” (February; Sun Zhihui, Director, State Oceanic Administration). Thus, China maintained its previous position that the Senkaku Islands are a “integral territory of China.”

Furthermore, with regard to Japan’s claim that its continental shelf should be extended to the area around Okinotori Island, China stressed that Japan’s claim should not be accepted. China submitted an opinion brief to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf stating that “Okinotori Reef is a rock, and therefore Japan has no right to make it as part of its continental shelf” (August; Chinese Foreign Ministry).

While emphasizing the importance of a “strategic and mutually beneficial relationship,” China will claim that joint resource development in the East China Sea will require time

It is anticipated that China will continue to stress the importance of continued development of a “strategic and mutually beneficial relationship” with Japan, while also seeking cooperation with Japan in environmental protection, energy conservation, and other fields that are seen as particularly urgent for stable economic growth in China. On the other hand, China is expected to approach joint resource development in the East China Sea with a demand for more time due to domestic circumstances.
(3) China actively looks overseas to secure resources and friction grows with partner countries

- China worked to achieve steady supplies from suppliers and stably obtain resources by expanding its interests.
- Revolts and sense of alert were seen in partner countries as Chinese resource development enterprises expanded overseas.

China reached agreements with various countries on stable supply of resources, and in some cases acquired overseas interests and foreign companies

China has established economic construction as its highest national priority, and has set a goal of quadrupling its per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) compared to 2000 by 2020. At the same time, however, it is expected that China’s dependence on imports of petroleum will be 60% of its domestic demand in 2020. Thus, ensuring stable supplies of energy and mineral resources—which are essential to China’s effort to build its economy—is an urgent task.

Given such circumstances, China made an all-out effort to secure resources through summit diplomacy. In February, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Saudi Arabia, which is China’s largest supplier of crude oil, and signed an agreement to reinforce energy cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia. Also in February, China sent its Vice President, Xi Jinping, to Brazil to conclude an agreement for expanding crude oil imports from Brazil in exchange for financing for oil field development. And in March, it sent Li Changchun, a member of China’s Politburo Standing Committee, to Myanmar to conclude an agreement for construction of petroleum and natural gas pipelines connecting Myanmar with Yunnan Province. This agreement appears to open the way for construction of an oil supply line that will not depend on maritime transport through the Malacca Strait.

At the same time, China expanded its overseas resources interests through major national petroleum enterprises. China National Petroleum & Natural Gas Corporation agreed to acquire a 70% stake in Iran’s Azadegan oil field (July), and China Petrochemical Corporation purchased Addax Petroleum, which has oil fields in west Africa, the Middle East, and other regions, for 8.32 billion Canadian dollars (approximately 720 billion yen) (August). This amount is said to be the largest ever paid by a Chinese enterprise to acquire a foreign enterprise.

Friction in partner countries increased as revolts against Chinese enterprises developed into riots

On the other hand, criticisms and revolts in partner countries emerged in rapid succession as China’s moves to obtain resources grew energetic. In Papua New Guinea, where anti-China sentiment had been worsening due to an influx of Chinese laborers, local
laborers and residents who were unhappy with work conditions and environmental destruction incited a riot at a nickel mine being developed by a Chinese enterprise (May).

And in Vietnam, military personnels objected to the participation of a Chinese enterprise in mine development in a region known as a military hot spot, saying that such participation would “impact the security” (January). Local media also criticized the venture, reporting that the “Chinese enterprise illegally employs many Chinese and is degrading public safety.”

Moreover, in Australia, a Chinese enterprise concluded an agreement with Rio Tinto, a major British-Australian resources group, whereby the Chinese enterprise would invest in Rio Tinto and secure mining exploration rights (February). However, as public outcry against the agreement grew in Australia, and as the Australian government maintained a cautious posture, Rio Tinto decided to withdraw from the agreement (June). Later, Chinese authorities detained Rio Tinto employees for suspicion of “stealing state secrets,” which led to a temporary rise in tension between the two countries.

It is anticipated that China’s endeavors to obtain foreign resources will become more active as its demand for energy and mineral resources needed for economic growth grows, and that friction between China and its partner countries will grow accordingly.

**Column: China Maintains a Hard-Line Stance in Protecting its Maritime Interests in the East China Sea and other Areas near China**

While working to expand its overseas resources interests, China maintained a hard-line stance in protecting its maritime interests in the East China Sea and other areas near China. In March, five Chinese vessels encircled a US Navy survey ship that was operating off the coast of Hainan Island. Also in March, China reacted to the Philippines’ establishment of a law claiming a part of the Spratly Islands as its territory by dispatching a fisheries patrol boat that was a modified warship to the South China Sea. China warned that “China will not accept encroachment on its maritime interests by other countries. Concerned countries must not misunderstand China’s self-restraint and patience as weakness” (Major-General Luo Yuan of the Chinese Academy of Military Science).
(4) China seeks even stronger ties with Taiwan as a step toward “peaceful reintegration”

- China made further steps to promote its peaceful integration posture by bolstering the Taiwanese economy and providing disaster reconstruction assistance.

Even as China sought deeper ties, its external outlook stuck to the “one China” principle

China seized on the opportunity presented by the election of Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou’s administration (May 2008), which is negative to Taiwanese independence, to further strengthen its “peaceful unification” posture vis-à-vis Taiwan, and it finally lifted restrictions on direct China-Taiwan air passage, which is viewed as an important step toward peaceful unification (November 2008).

China continued moving toward closer relations with Taiwan in a variety of fields in 2009. Particularly noteworthy here was China’s allowing Taiwan to participate as an observer at the 2009 World Health Assembly (May), despite China’s heretofore objection to Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Organization (WHO) as a violation of the “one China” principle.

At the same time, China responded to a decline in the Taiwanese economy due to the global financial crisis by dispatching a series of groups to make large-scale purchases of electronic products and other goods beginning in May, and by demonstrating a positive stance with regard to the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (EFCA), for which Taiwan’s Ma administration had sought an early conclusion. Moreover, China took advantage of major typhoon-caused flooding in southern Taiwan (August) to build friendship between China-Taiwan by actively providing disaster reconstruction assistance that included sending relief funds and materials.

On the other hand, China did not budge from its external outlook concerning the “one China” principle. In a meeting with US President Barack Obama (September), Chinese President Hu Jintao stated that “the Taiwan issue concerns Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity.” And in a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (September), President Hu demanded that Japan “act carefully and appropriately” with regard to the Taiwan issue.

Further twists and turns in developments toward peace accord negotiations

In order to prevent a return to power by Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party, which aspires to achieve independence for Taiwan, it is anticipated that China will continue to seek closer relations with Taiwan through a variety of exchanges-with focus on conclusion of the ECFA and other economic initiatives-with the Ma administration, as it also searches for avenues toward beginning “peace accord” negotiations. Nonetheless, it is likewise anticipated that such moves will face considerable twists and turns due to deep-seated wariness of the Ma administration’s accelerated approaches to China among the Taiwanese public.
3. Russia

(1) Russia moves to improve its security environment

- Russia improved its relationships with the United States and NATO, which had been worsening due to the conflict in Georgia and the missile defense problem.
- Russia worked to suppress anti-Russia movements pertaining to perceptions of World War II.

While grappling with concerns that include poor economic performance and terrorism in Caucasus region (see note), Russia moved forward toward improving its security environment based on a stable “two-head system” formed around President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

*R The region around the Caucasus Mountains that is situated between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea.

Russia held three summit meetings with the US and reopened military cooperation with NATO

Russia took positive steps toward improving its relationships with the US and NATO, which had become strained due to the conflict in Georgia, NATO’s eastern expansion, and the United States’ plan to install a missile defense system (MD) in Eastern Europe.

Looking at Russia’s relationship with the United States, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev held a summit meeting with US President Barack Obama (April), where he agreed to begin negotiations toward a new nuclear arms reduction treaty to replace the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which was an outstanding issue. In addition, President Medvedev held summit meetings with President Obama in July and September, where he showed a cooperative stance regarding the MD problem and other issues.

Looking at Russia’s relationship with NATO, the “NATO-Russia Council,” which had been postponed due to a conflict in Georgia that broke out in August 2008, was convened (June). At the Council, Russia agreed with NATO to “restart relations at the political level as well as political military contacts that had been frozen since the Georgia conflict.”

Outline of the Obama-Medvedev summits

| April  London | • Issuance of a joint statement appealing for the building of a new cooperative relationship that moves beyond Cold War-era thinking  
|               | • Agreement to begin negotiations toward a new nuclear arms reduction treaty to replace the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) |
| July  Moscow | • Signing of a “joint understanding regarding the issue of further reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons” as a step toward conclusion of a new nuclear arms reduction treaty to replace START I |
Issuance of a “joint statement on the MD issue” that recognizes there are differences in opinion between Russia and the US regarding the MD issue, and expression of desire to resolve the issue

Statement by President Medvedev highly praising President Obama’s pre-summit announcement that the US would review its plan to deploy MD in Eastern Europe and expressing willingness to coordinate with the US with regard to the Iran problem

Post-summit statement by President Medvedev expressing Russia’s intention to review a plan to deploy missiles in Europe, which Russia had been planning as a response to the US’s plan to install MD in Eastern Europe

Creation of a “Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia's Interests”

Russia reacted to demonstration marches by Nazi supporters in neighboring Latvia and other similar movements by claiming that “support for the Nazis represents a denial of the Soviet Union’s heroic achievements in overthrowing the Nazis and liberating Europe.” Russia took quick action in response, fearing that such anti-Russian movements related to perceptions of the Second World War could affect its international standing and stimulate anti-Russian sentiment in members of the former USSR and Eastern Bloc.

Prior to Russia’s day celebrating the “Anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War” on May 9, President Medvedev announced that Russia would not tolerate people who entertain doubts about the “USSR’s heroic achievement” in defeating the Nazis. Moreover, on the day of the anniversary, President Medvedev stressed the need to remember the outcome of the “Great Patriotic War.”

Furthermore, President Medvedev established a “Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia's Interests” (May). Chaired by Sergey Naryshkin, chief of the Presidential Administration of Russia, the Commission is charged with formulating strategies for countering moves to “falsify historical fact” that can damage Russian interests.

Continued efforts to improve Russia’s security environment

Although the gap between the Russian and American stances regarding negotiations for a new nuclear arms reduction treaty to replace START I and the MD issue is not narrow, it is expected that Russia will continue dialogue with the United States toward improving its security environment. Moreover, it is expected that Russia will continue responding vigorously to movements to deny the “USSR’s heroic achievement” against the Nazis.
(2) Russia further strengthens its effort to convert Japan’s Northern Territories to Russian territory

- Russia conspicuously displayed its “sovereignty” over the Northern Territories at every opportunity.
- Russia once again suggested a solution based on “return of two islands” to Japan.

Russia repeatedly and conspicuously displayed its “sovereignty”

Despite being affected by the global financial crisis, Russia showed moves to display its “sovereignty” over the Northern Territories by continuously building airports, harbors, and other infrastructure in the Northern Territories.

Russia’s Border Guard Service demanded that a Japanese delegation visiting the Northern Territories go through immigration procedures in accordance with Russian domestic law (January), and President Medvedev advocated the construction of housing in order to promote settlement in the Northern Territories by Russians during a teleconference with the governor of Sakhalin Oblast (April). Moreover, when Japan revised its “Act on Special Measures concerning Advancement of Resolution of Northern Territories Issues, etc.,” which stipulates that the Northern Territories are an integral part of Japan, the legislative assembly of Sakhalin Oblast responded by adopting a statement claiming that the “four islands became Russian territory as a result of the war” (July), and Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to cancel acceptance of Japanese humanitarian assistance and supplies to the Northern Territories (August). In addition, Sergey Mironov, Speaker of the Federation Council, visited the Northern Territories, where he proclaimed that “development of the Kurils is impossible without national funding” and displayed Russian “sovereignty” by erecting the Russian flag on Kunashiri Island (August).

Russia constrained Japan’s attempts to resolve the Northern Territories issue

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev held summit meetings with Japan’s Prime Minister on four occasions (February, July, September, and November), where he discussed the Northern Territories issue. However, not only did President Medvedev fail to make any specific proposals toward resolving the issue, he worked to constrain Japan as it sought the return of the four islands by saying in press conferences that “the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration is the basis for resolving the issue” (July), and “I am prepared to suggest to the new Japanese prime minister that he should move away from Japan’s extreme position” (September).

It is anticipated that Russia’s approach vis-à-vis Japan will be based on a stance of resolving the Northern Territories issue through the “return of two islands,” as it also reinforces its effort to convert the Northern Territories to Russian territory by building infrastructure, guarding its national borders, and conducting propaganda activities.
4. Middle East

(1) The future of the Palestinian territories and Lebanon remains unclear

- In the Palestinian territories, Hamas continued to have effective control in the Gaza Strip.
- In Lebanon, Hezbollah maintained its influence on the country’s domestic affairs.

In the Palestinian territories, Hamas maintained its control of the Gaza Strip despite clashes with Israel

Beginning in December 2008, Hamas threatened southern Israel by firing a series of rockets into the region. Israel responded by invading the Gaza Strip with ground forces that included tanks and artillery (January) to deliver a sustained attack against Hamas. However, Israel withdrew its ground forces (January), saying that it had “reached an agreement on interdiction of arms smuggling by Hamas” (January). No major clashes occurred following Israel’s withdrawal.

Moreover, Hamas drove out Jund Ansar Allah (Soldiers of the Companions of God), an Islamic extremist force that had repeatedly criticized Hamas for being conciliatory to Israel, from the Gaza Strip (August), and prevented it from expanding its influence.

Furthermore, no progress was seen in Hamas’ peace negotiations with Fatah, which leads the Palestinian National Authority, as no compromised could be reached despite mediation by Egypt.

Although a feeling of entrapment brought by economic sanctions and other factors has caused some residents of the Gaza Strip to express dissatisfaction with Hamas, Hamas still garners deep-rooted support through its medical and educational activities. It is therefore anticipated that Hamas will continue to have effective control over the Gaza Strip.

Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon remained steady following a general election

A general parliamentary election (128 seats) was held in Lebanon (June). Although the anti-Syrian factions maintained their majority, candidates for Hezbollah, which forms a part of the pro-Syrian faction, once again captured more than 10 seats. Moreover, Hezbollah maintained its influence in Lebanese domestic affairs, as two of its representatives were appointed to cabinet posts in the post-election cabinet.

It was discovered from Hezbollah members detained in Egypt (announced in April) that Hezbollah sought to destabilize Egypt and that it supported resistance against Israel in the Gaza Strip.
(2) Rising concern in the international community regarding Iran’s nuclear and missile development

- Iran conducted various missile launches as it moved forward with uranium enrichment.
- Moves related to weapons proliferation were seen between Iran and North Korea.

Iran proceeded with installation of centrifuges and production of low-enriched uranium, and built new uranium enrichment facilities

Iran continued with its nuclear activities in defiance of a UN Security Council resolution demanding that it stop such activities. According to a report issued by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (November) and other reports, the number of centrifuges Iran installed grew from more than 5,000 in November 2008 to close to 8,700, while the amount of low enriched uranium hexafluoride that Iran produced grew from 630 kilograms to more than 1,700 kilograms during the same period.

In addition, Iran acknowledged in a notification to the IAEA that a facility near Qom that Western nations had been watching for several years was a uranium enrichment facility. However, the fact that this notification was delivered after the start of construction drew criticism from the United Nations, United States, and others who said that it was in violation of the UN Security Council’s resolution (September).

Against this backdrop, the permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany offered proposals to Iran to re-enrich and process low-enriched uranium possessed by Iran abroad for medical purposes only as a means of resolving the nuclear development issue (October). For a short time, Iran showed willingness to accept some of these proposals; however, after the IAEA issued a resolution critical of Iran for its facility near Qom (November), Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad showed a negative stance, saying “Iran will not discuss the nuclear issue for any reason” (December).
As Iran launches medium-range ballistic missiles, attention becomes focused on Russia

Iran announced that it successfully launched a satellite using a Safir-2 liquid-fueled, two-stage rocket (February). This was followed by launches of Sejjil-2 solid-fueled, two-stage, medium-range ballistic missiles (May, September). Iran also sustained its missile development in areas that included continuous launches of Shahab-3, which allegedly uses technology of North Korea’s Nodong missiles, and short-range missiles having ranges of less than 150 kilometers.

Russia has assisted Iran in the nuclear and missile fields by supplying it with technical cooperation and nuclear fuel for the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant and selling it surface-to-air missile system. Thus, how Russia positions itself between the United States and Iran while also protecting its own interests in response to nuclear and various other issues will be a point of focus going forward.

Sanctions were applied to North Korean enterprises in Iran, and a vessel carrying North Korean arms to Iran was seized

Looking at weapons proliferation between Iran and North Korea, the United States government imposed sanctions on North Korean enterprises in Iran that were involved in sending money between North Korea and Iran. The US claimed that the enterprises where connected to a network for proliferation of ballistic missiles (June). Following this, the UN’s North Korea sanctions committee implemented a freeze on the assets of these enterprises (July). It also came to light that the United Arab Emirates had seized a cargo ship carrying North Korean weapons that was bound for Iran (August).

It is anticipated that Iran will continue to move forward with nuclear and missile development under the hard-line regime of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Column: Suspicions of Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Development Program

The IAEA Director General’s report of September 2008 expressed concern that Iran’s nuclear program could have military applications and identified the following relevant research activities:

- Development of detonators made of bridge wires and implosion lenses (essential for causing atomic fission by imploding uranium or plutonium; used in the plutonium-type atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki)
- Contribution of foreign technologies toward development of the detonators (foreign experts in related fields had already visited Iran)
- Improved design of Shahab-3’s warhead interior (concern that a nuclear weapon could be loaded into the warhead)

The IAEA Director General’s report of September 2008 noted that Iran was not cooperating with the IAEA toward dispelling concerns about such military aspects, and pointed out the urgency of Iran’s taking steps to dispel such concerns.
5. Adverse Activities against Japan

Japan is concerned about outflow of dual-use materials and critical information

- Japan reinforced its efforts to prevent proliferation after illegal exports of WMD-related materials were uncovered.
- Japan strengthened its counterintelligence functions due to concerns regarding outflow of critical information.

Discovery of illegal exports of materials applicable to weapons of mass destruction, and efforts to prevent proliferation

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a major threat to international peace and stability. The “L'Aquila Statement on Non-Proliferation” adopted by the G8 summit (July) confirmed that universalization and reinforcement of nonproliferation systems remains an issue of the highest urgency and priority.

In Japan, there was a series of illegal exportation cases involving materials that can be diverted to WMD development. Identified cases included the illegal export of a large truck that can be used to transport missiles, which was said to be sent to South Korea but was actually destined for North Korea; an attempt to illegally export a direct-current magnetic measuring device that is applicable to WMD development to Myanmar via Malaysia; and illegal export of a small cylindrical grinder that can be used in nuclear development to Myanmar (May, June, and July, respectively).

In response to these developments, Japan is working to reinforce its export management frameworks. It strengthened its regulations on unauthorized export and trade by revising the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (April), and expanded the sphere of goods requiring export permission from the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry by partially revising the Export Trade Control Order (July).
Efforts to strengthen counterintelligence functions amid concerns of outflow of critical information

There have been reports of cases in which countries such as China and Russia actively gather information concerning politics, economics, military affairs, science and technology, or other fields in Western countries. Cases that came to light in the United States include the arrest of a Chinese-American who was providing technologies subject to export restrictions, which include integrated circuits, to China (January), and an incident in which a diplomat of the US Embassy in Russia was urged to work for the Russians after being threatened with images of him in a sexual relationship with a woman (August).

Cases have also been uncovered in Japan in recent years. Among them, a Chinese technician who was affiliated with a private company removed a personal computer containing large quantities of in-house data from the company without permission (2007), and a staff member of the Russian Embassy in Japan, who was believed to be an intelligence officer, obtained official information from a Japanese government employee (2008). Based on such circumstances, it appears that these countries are actively seeking to gather information on Japan’s politics, diplomacy, defense, and advanced technologies.

Against this backdrop, Japan—which has been gathering and sharing information on counterintelligence based on the enforcement portion of the “Basic Principles on the Strengthening of Counter-Intelligence Function”-is making a government-wide effort to protect the nation’s critical information. Among other activities, this effort involves executing the remaining portion of the Basic Principles in April and introducing a new Specially Controlled Secret System that will involve strict physical and human management.

Newly introduced Specially Controlled Secret System

- **Specially Controlled Secret** = Information to be kept secret specially

- **Physical management**
  - Strict application of the latest “uniform standards of information security measures to be introduced at government agencies” (determined by the National Information Security Center), etc.

- **Human management**
  - Security clearance system, information security training program, etc.

Continuing concern regarding the procurement activities of countries suspected of proliferation and efforts by foreign countries to critical information from Japan

Given Japan’s world-class technical level and the international situation surrounding Japan, concerns will persist regarding procurement of WMD-related materials by countries suspected of proliferating weapons as well as information-gathering by countries seeking to obtain Japan’s advanced technologies and critical information.
6. International Terrorism

(1) Al-Qaeda threatens the international community by calling for “global jihad”

- Many suspected terrorists were identified in the United States as al-Qaeda called for intensified attacks.

Al-Qaeda sought to drive “global jihad”

Osama bin Laden and other leaders of al-Qaeda repeatedly issued statements declaring the necessity of “global jihad” that would conduct a worldwide counterattack against the “Jews and Crusaders that surround and invade the Islamic world” (i.e., Israel and the Western nations).

In the United States, which al-Qaeda regards as its main enemy, the Obama administration was launched under a banner proclaiming a “new beginning” with the Muslim world (January). However, while the Obama administration continued with a withdrawal of combat forces from Iraq, it gave strategic importance to the fight against Islamic extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al-Qaeda seized upon the withdrawal by claiming it was winning the fight in Iraq, while at the same time stating that Afghanistan would remain a primary battleground and demanding the withdrawal of Western forces deployed there. In particular, a German member of al-Qaeda appeared in a video message to Germany prior to its federal election (September) and made the same demands in German.

Al-Qaeda claimed that Israel and the West were oppressing Muslims (in Iraq, the Palestinian territories and Somalia, in addition to Afghanistan and Pakistan), and it repeatedly stressed that it is the obligation of every Muslim in the world to participate in and support “jihad” to eliminate such oppression.

Dedication to the “global jihad” line by Islamic extremists throughout the world

It is thought that al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations in the Middle East and North Africa that swear loyalty to Osama bin Laden are following the “global jihad” line, as is the case with Islamic Jihad Union, an Islamic extremist group that was originally formed to overthrow the Uzbekistani government. There also are reports that the hard-liner faction of Jemaah Islamiyah, which was responsible for the suicide bombings at US-affiliated hotels in Jakarta (July), and al-Shabaab, which has been intensifying attacks against the forces of the Transitional Federal Government and United Nations in Somalia, are also dedicated to the “global jihad” line. Furthermore, some leaders of forces supporting the Taliban in north-western Pakistan, where leaders of al-Qaeda are allegedly hiding, have declared they were conducting “global jihad” (around April).

As described above, “global jihad” that al-Qaeda is advocating is influencing Islamic extremists worldwide. Islamic extremist forces that are dedicated to “global jihad” pose
a serious threat to the United States and its allies.

**A spate of “homegrown terrorists” in the United States**

Al-Qaeda and other “global jihad” forces conducted active propaganda campaigns and called for participation in jihad. It is suspected that a number of these forces are conducting military training for foreigners, including Westerners. Under such circumstances, some of radicalized immigrants and converts in Western countries have conducted or attempted to conduct terrorist activities. Many such “homegrown terrorists” were detected in 2009, particularly in the United States, and among the suspects were people who attempted to contact al-Qaeda. Many of them allegedly schemed to commit terror attacks as “revenge” against the US military activities in Muslim countries, and this highlighted the danger that homegrown terrorists may become a player in global jihad.

**Major terrorist-related cases in the US**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of detection</th>
<th>Suspect (s)</th>
<th>Case description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 20 4 US converts</td>
<td>Attempted terrorist bombing of a Jewish facility in New York, among others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1 US convert</td>
<td>Fired shots at a military recruit center in Arkansas, killing two soldiers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 27 8 including US religious convert</td>
<td>Planned attack on a Marine base in Virginia, among others</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>September 19 Afghan permanent resident</td>
<td>Planned terrorist bombing in the US purchased materials to make a hydrogen peroxide bomb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 23 US convert</td>
<td>Attempted terrorist bombing of a US federal government building in Illinois</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 3 and 18 5 including US citizen (born in Pakistan)</td>
<td>Planned terrorist act targeting a newspaper in Denmark (which printed a cartoon of the Prophet Mohammed in 2005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 21 3 including US citizen (with dual Egyptian nationality)</td>
<td>Planned to travel to Yemen in 2004 to participate in terrorist training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Taliban expands its influence in Afghanistan

- The Taliban stepped up its attacks on foreign forces stationed in Afghanistan to disrupt the presidential election.
- As Pakistan continued its sweeping operations, pro-Taliban forces struck back with continuous acts of terrorism.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban seems to have conducted attacks in almost all provinces

The Taliban continued to be active in Afghanistan.

The Taliban stepped up its attacks on foreign forces stationed in Afghanistan as well as Afghan security forces in order to disrupt the presidential election held on August 20.

The Taliban issued statements claiming responsibility for a suicide bombing at the German Embassy that killed or wounded more than 20 people (January) and a suicide bombing of the International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) headquarters that killed or wounded more than 100 (August). According to these claims of responsibility, Taliban forces have conducted attacks in almost all of the nation’s provinces.

Even on the day of the election, more than 130 terrorist incidents occurred, including the firing of rockets near polling stations, which had an impact on the opening of polling stations. Noting a dramatic decline in the voting rate compared to the previous election (2004), the Taliban claimed that “the people completely boycotted the election.”

When it was decided that a run-off election would be conducted (October), the Taliban once again stepped up its attacks. A series of terrorist activities against foreign forces, Afghan security forces and others took place all over the country. In Kabul, a guest house for UN employees was attacked (October), and eight people, including five UN employees, were killed.

When the run-off election was later canceled because one of the candidates withdrew his candidacy, the Taliban claimed that they had “completely foiled the election process.”

There are concerns that terrorist activity by the Taliban and other militants will intensify in Afghanistan, and therefore there is no room for optimism regarding Afghanistan’s security situation in the future.

In Pakistan, pro-Taliban forces conducted continuous acts of terrorism in response to the sweeping campaign

In north western Pakistan, where al-Qaeda members are said to be hiding, pro-Taliban forces conducted acts of terrorism against the Pakistani security forces in order to expand their area of control.
In response, the Pakistani security forces began a continuous campaign at the end of April, designed to destroy the pro-Taliban forces and successfully neutralized part of Taliban’s area of control.

Pro-Taliban forces fiercely resisted the campaign, conducting continuous terrorist acts against the Pakistani security forces in northwest Pakistan. Moreover, from the end of September, pro-Taliban forces expanded their terrorist acts to major cities outside the northwestern part of the country, namely Islamabad, Lahore and Rawalpindi. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which is the leading pro-Taliban organization, claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing of the office of the UN World Food Program (WFP) in Islamabad (October), an attack against a military command facility in Rawalpindi (October) and attacks against three police facilities in Lahore (October). It is anticipated that the terrorist threat posed by pro-Taliban forces will continue in the future.
The threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia remains even as terrorists are detected and rounded up

- In Indonesia, terrorist acts against Western interests occurred amid continuous uncovering of suspected terrorists.
- In the Philippines, a spate of terrorist bombings, kidnappings and other crimes persisted.

The hard-linr faction of Jemaah Islamiyah carried out suicide bombings at US-affiliated hotels

In Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah’s (JI) hard-liner group led by Noordin Top conducted terrorist suicide bombings that targeted Western interests, the first such attacks in Indonesia since the coordinated terrorist bombings in Bali (2005). The bombings targeted two US-affiliated hotels in the capital city of Jakarta (July) and killed seven people, including Australian businessmen. In addition to these attacks, Top’s group was suspected of planning numerous terrorist acts that included bombing of Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s private residence.

Police authorities announced that they had captured or killed all 22 suspects involved in the above-mentioned terrorist attacks in Jakarta (October). This included a series of killings of leading members, including the leader Noordin Top himself, during the investigation and exposure of Top’s group.

JI’s mainstream faction remains a threat even as it placed priority on organizational rebuilding

Aside from the hard-liner faction led by top, who sought to conduct large-scale terrorist activities, JI’s mainstream faction placed priority on recovery of its organizational strength, which had been in decline following the detainment of its top leaders (June 2007), and continued to engage in propaganda, recruitment, and fundraising activities.

However, as this effort proceeds, it is possible that new splinter groups seeking to engage in terrorism will emerge in the foreseeable future out of dissatisfaction with the organization’s emphasis on organizational rebuilding. Thus, there is a danger that such groups and remaining members of Top’s group will use the human network of JI’s mainstream faction for recruitment and hiring in order to conduct terrorist activities.

Islamic extremists remained active in the southern Philippines

In the southern Philippines, clashes between hard-line factions of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Armed Forces of the Philippine had been escalating throughout the region since peace negotiations between the MILF and Philippine government collapsed (August 2008). However, in July, the MILF agreed to resume peace negotiations with the government, and in October it agreed the activities of the
International Monitoring Team to be resumed in order to prevent clashes.

Nonetheless, even after these developments, the MILF’s hard-liner faction, which clashed with the government troops following the above-mentioned collapse of the peace negotiations, continued to engage in sporadic terrorist bombings and attacks against the government troops.

Activities of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) are largely limited to the southwestern Philippines as a result of search-and-sweep operations and clampdowns by the government troops. Despite this, the ASG continues to conduct sporadic attacks against the government troops as it obtains money through kidnappings for ransom and other activities.

Column: Crush of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) strongholds in Sri Lanka

After formally scrapping the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE in January 2008, the Sri Lankan government intensified its offensive, successively killed the LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and other top leaders, and destroyed the group’s strongholds in the country. As a result, the Sri Lankan government declared victory in the 26-year long civil war (May).

However, remaining LTTE forces that survive overseas have shown signs of seeking to rebuild their organization. Among such signs is an announcement that an “advisory committee” was launched for establishing a government in exile (October).
(4) Terrorist acts by al-Qaeda affiliated organizations continue in Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula

- Al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations maintained the ability to engage in terrorism.
- The terrorist threat to Westerners and others remained.

In Iraq, al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations and other militant groups continued to engage in terrorism

Militant groups including al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) committed a string of terrorist acts against the US forces stationed in Iraq, Iraqi security forces, Shiite Muslims, among others.

Against this backdrop, the US military, which had played the central role in counter-terrorism operations, withdrew combat troops from urban areas after claiming that the public order had been restored (June).

Although it was reported that the ISI’s activities had tapered off due to the killing of its leaders as well as poor recruitment and fundraising, it joined with some former Ba’ath Party forces to engage in terrorism after the above-mentioned withdrawal.

The ISI claimed responsibility for coordinated suicide bombings against Iraq’s Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Foreign Affairs that killed more than 100 people (August) and for a similar attack against the Ministry of Justice that killed more than 150 people (October).

There are signs that al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations are intensifying their activities in the Arabian Peninsula

In the Arabian Peninsula, a new terrorist organization called “al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” (AQAP) was formed by al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations in Yemeni and Saudi Arabian terrorists (Announcement of formation was issued in January).

Claiming that the establishment of an “extensive battlefront to resist Christian nations and their supporters” is the “key to victory,” AQAP announced that it was intensifying its activities in the Arabian Peninsula in order to eradicate the influence of the US and its major allies by “blowing up citizens of Christian nations and their supporters on the sea and killing them on the land.”

AQAP claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing against South Korean tourists (March, Yemen) and a suicide bombing against Vice Interior Minister in charge of security (August, Saudi Arabia).

Other incidents in the Arabian Peninsula include a series of terrorist acts in Yemen by Shiite insurgents against the Yemeni security forces.
Moreover, in Somalia, which is located opposite the Arabian Peninsula on the other side of the Gulf of Aden, al-Shabaab—a group that has issued statements praising Osama bin Laden—and other militant groups conducted repeated terrorist acts against Transitional Federal Government forces and foreign troops stationed in Somalia and kidnapped two French security advisors working for the Somali government (July).

**North Africa saw expanding terrorism in countries neighboring Algeria**

In North Africa, continuous terrorist acts struck security forces and others in Algeria. Meanwhile, kidnappings and killings of Westerners pointed to a trend toward expanding terrorism targeting Westerners out of Algeria to its neighboring countries.

**The threat of terrorism by al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations against Westerners and others will continue**

Although the governments of Iraq and other countries have endeavored to implement counter-terrorist measures, anger at Western countries remains strong in some quarters of the Arab world. For this and other reasons, al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations remain capable of sustaining themselves by continuing recruitment of fund-raising operations at home and abroad. Moreover, even today, such organizations still seem to implement terrorist acts against highly vigilant central government offices and other hard targets.

Accordingly, it is anticipated that the threat of terrorism that al-Qaeda-affiliated organizations pose against Westerners and others will continue into the future.
III. Focal Issues of the Domestic Public Security Situation in 2009

1. Aum Shinrikyo

(1) The period of surveillance on Aum Shinrikyo is renewed (third time), as the group still poses a threat.

- The Public Security Examination Commission was convinced that Shoko Asahara still possessed the seemingly absolute influence on the group’s activities.
- The PSIA will continue to strictly implement surveillance activities and reinforce its efforts to eliminate anxiety in the community.

The Public Security Examination Commission decided to renew the period of surveillance (third extension)

When the Act Regarding the Control of Organizations Which Have Committed Indiscriminate Mass Murder (Organization Control Act) went into effect in December 1999, the Public Security Intelligence Agency demanded that Aum Shinrikyo be placed under the surveillance of Director-General of the Public Security Intelligence Agency. Then, in January 2000, the PSIA began surveillance of Aum Shinrikyo for a period of three years based on a decision by the Public Security Examination Commission. The PSIA implemented strict surveillance for eight years through two extensions until December 2008, when it determined that a need remained to shed light on Aum Shinrikyo’s activities. The PSIA accordingly requested a third extension of the surveillance period based on the second sentence of Section 12 (1) of the Organization Control Act.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developments regarding surveillance of Aum Shinrikyo</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1999 The Organization Control Act enacted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2000 Commission decision to implement surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2003 Commission decision to extend surveillance period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2006 Commission decision to extend surveillance period (2nd extension)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2007 Joyu faction’s announcement of formation of Hikarinowa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2009 Commission decision to extend surveillance period (3rd extension)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On January 23, the Public Security Examination Commission made the following decisions regarding Aum Shinrikyo:

1) At the present time, Shoko Asahara and the Aum Shinrikyo teachings that he had preached remain the foundation of the group’s existence, and Asahara maintains almost absolute influence on the group’s activities (Article 5, paragraph 1 of the Organization Control Act).

2) Masami Tsuchiya and Tomomitsu Niimi were involved in the sarin gas attacks in Matsumoto and on the Tokyo subway, and Kazumi Watanabe and Tomomi Kadokawa were involved in the attack in Matsumoto. All the four people remain
members of the group (Article 5, paragraph 1 b of the Organization Control Act).

3) Fumihiro Joyu, who was an executive member of the group at the time of both sarin gas attacks, remains an executive member of the group (Article 5, paragraph 1 c of the Organization Control Act).

4) Members are made familiar with dangerous teachings that implicitly recommend murder, and members accept all teachings, including those with dangerous content, as truth and have the intention of following them. Accordingly, the dangerous teachings that implicitly recommend murder still form part of the group’s “mission statement,” and thus the group maintains a “mission statement” that implicitly recommends murder (Article 5, paragraph 1 d of the Organization Control Act).

5) Besides the particulars listed in the preceding items (1) ~ (4), there are sufficient facts to find that the group is potentially dangerous to carry out indiscriminate mass murder. Among them, the group continues to have an independent and closed top-down society with Shoko Asahara at the top, and it has members that justify both sarin gas attacks (Article 5, paragraph 1 e of the Organization Control Act).

6) The group is recognized to have a closed and deceptive organizational nature, and it may be reasonably stated that its activities are difficult to be fully grasped. Moreover, residents in various regions of Japan feel fear and anxiety arising from the said closed and deceptive organizational nature. Due to these circumstances, there remains a need to continue shedding lights on the group’s activities (Article 5, paragraph 4 of the Organization Control Act).

In accordance with these decisions, the Public Security Examination Commission decided to extend the period of surveillance for three years (until January 31, 2012).

It should be noted that, when making the above-mentioned decisions, the Public Security Examination Commission made the following comment regarding “Hikarinowa,” which Fumihiro Joyu’s group announced to have launched: “Hikarinowa is recognized to be a group organized for the purposes of eluding surveillance and realizing the will of Shoko Asahara by people who believe in him and follow the Aum Shinrikyo teachings that he preaches. As for its future activities, it is considered that Hikarinowa remains an organization having Asahara and the Aum Shinrikyo teachings that he preaches as a common foundation and is an important component of Aum Shinrikyo.” The Commission further announced that it would not exercise its authority with regard to a request by the Joyu group to cancel surveillance (September 5, 2008).

Aum Shinrikyo maintained organizational strength

In Japan, the cult has approximately 1,500 followers, of whom approximately 500 are live-in members (approximately 50 belong to the Joyu group) and approximately 1,000 are lay members (approximately 150 are belong to the Joyu group). Most of the live-in members and about 60% of the lay members are those who joined the cult before the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system. The cult has 31 major facilities in
15 prefectures (of which 8 belong to the Joyu group and 1 has overlapping functions). In Russia, the cult has about 200 members and several facilities.

The PSIA implemented strict surveillance

From January to the end of November, the PSIA conducted on-site inspections at a total of 34 Aum Shinrikyo facilities in 15 prefectures as surveillance activities prescribed in the Organization Control Act.

During the on-site inspections of mainstream group facilities, it was confirmed that multiple facilities, including the Ikuno facility in Osaka, were displaying photo portraits of Shoko Asahara, which Aum Shinrikyo had refrained from displaying before, on or near alters of religious training halls. Moreover, at the Mito facility, it was learned that the “getting back to Asahara” movement was being accelerated, as shown in a case where the group was manufacturing religious training devices that were used by Asahara and his leading followers prior to the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack.

Also, at facilities of the Joyu group, items were found that would prove the group’s effort to bring mainstream faction’s members as well as former members into its organization.

In 2009, the PSIA received four quarterly reports from the cult on its organization and activities. In accordance with Article 32 of the Organization Control Act, the PSIA used the contents of these reports as well as the results of the PSIA’s on-site inspections to provide relevant information to 14 municipal governments in four prefectures on a total of 51 occasions between January and the end of November.

Local residents demanded continuation and reinforcement of the Organization Control Act

Residents living in areas near Aum Shinrikyo facilities remained fearful and anxious about the cult. Associations to discuss countermeasures and other groups organized by local residents conducted regular activities that included protest gatherings and demonstrations demanding disbanding of the cult and removal of its facilities. With an eye to the deadline for review of the Organization Control Act (which occurs every five years marked from the day of the law’s execution on December 27, 1999), concerned members of the “Liaison Conference of Cities, Towns and Villages against Aum Shinrikyo” as well as residents living near the Minami Karasuyama facility in Tokyo submitted a demand to the Minister of Justice and PSIA Director-General in October for continued and strict application of the law and strengthened regulations. Residents near the Kanazawa, among others, made a similar demand in November.

Meanwhile the PSIA held 32 opinion-exchange meetings with residents living near Aum Shinrikyo facilities up to the end of November. At these meetings, the PSIA briefed on the current conditions surrounding the cult, surveillance activities and other issues for the residents.
(2) The mainstream group further sharpens its “getting back to Asahara” policy

- There was an organizational effort to cement absolute faith in Asahara.
- Recruitment activities became more active to expand the cult’s organization.

Aum Shinrikyo restored teaching materials and religious training facilities that were used before the sarin gas attacks

As a group of mid-ranking leaders endeavored to cement absolute faith in Shoko Asahara, the mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo worked to solidify its organization by expelling Seigoshi Naruhito Noda, who had objected to the mid-ranking leaders’ organizational management, from Aleph in March. On top of this, the mainstream group openly displayed photographs of Asahara at religious training halls in each facility, and issued instructions to continue training in prayer to extend the life of Asahara, whose death sentence has been handed down (September 2006). It also held a number of events as it did in 2008, including a “birth celebration” for Asahara (March) and a “Samana Festival” to give praise to him (July).

Furthermore, at an intensive seminar for lay members in May, a “tape on the mysteries of reincarnating with the guru of the next world”-a material that was voluntarily recalled by Aum Shinrikyo seven years before as it contained Asahara’s dangerous teachings-was reused, and participants were made to engage in training that had them sing in chorus sermons emphasizing “unity with the guru (Asahara)”. And in June, the group resumed selling videotaped sermons by Asahara (a set of 14 DVDs featuring “sermons for the faithful”, each of which costs 30,000 yen). The group had suspended the sales of the DVDs following the sarin gas attacks on Tokyo subway.

In addition, Aum Shinrikyo worked to restore religious training methods that Asahara had established prior to the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway. The group manufactured a sealed religious training device called a “chamber” in its Mito facility. Imitating the kind of meditative training over long hours in a sealed room that Asahara and his leading followers had once practiced, the group used the “chamber” to realize the concrete form to the “path to liberation and enlightenment”.

Aum Shinrikyo engaged in deceptive recruitment activities, targeting young people as well

Since the Joyu group announced the establishment of Hikarinowa and launched its activities in May 2007, the mainstream group has been continually promoting recruitment activities aimed at expanding its own strength and attracting new members. At an intensive seminar held at the beginning of the year, the mainstream faction established 2009 as “the year of compassionate salvation” and announced a policy of vigorously expanding membership. Moreover, during an intensive seminar in May, participants listened to a video sermon called “10 techniques for salvation,” in which Asahara gives a concrete explanation of recruitment techniques. And at the end of May, Seigoshi Koichi
Ninomiya issued the following call: “Today is an age of democracy. The power of numbers will be needed to block the guru’s (Asahara’s) attainment of nirvana (execution of his death sentence), and therefore we must bring in 100,000 members as soon as possible.” In these and other ways, the mainstream group sharpened its intention to engage in organization-wide recruitment.

Against this backdrop, branches of the mainstream group aimed to improve recruitment skills by selecting lay members with strong faith in Asahara and then having leaders instruct them on speaking skills needed for recruitment activities. At the same time, they held regular workshops on recruitment activities as well as presentations and discussions featuring the actual experiences of members who achieved actual results. It then organized lay members into recruiting groups and had them approach people using “on-the-street sales” techniques in various places and opportunities, such as at “religion” or “spiritual world” sections in bookstores that are frequented by young people, places where people have part-time jobs, and waiting rooms at hospitals. Likewise, it used clever and vigorous means to recruit university students. One example was an attempt to bring in new members through unauthorized display of posters soliciting participation in yoga clubs. The posters, which didn’t mention the cult’s name, were displayed at universities that lay members had attended. In addition, it actively implemented recruitment activities that used forums and social networking services (SNS) provided on the Internet.

As a result of the activities like those described above, the mainstream group has succeeded in bringing in over 100 new members since the beginning of 2009. A breakdown of these new members by age group reveals a conspicuous increase of young people, and a breakdown by region shows noticeably large increases of people from Hokkaido and the Kinki region.

**Aum Shinrikyo takes a confrontational stance with the PSIA**

Objecting to the decision to extend surveillance for the third time, the mainstream group brought a lawsuit demanding cancellation of the decision to the Tokyo District Court on July 8. At a press conference held on the same day, the mainstream faction stressed its position that “the decision of the Public Security Examination Commission was an illegal decision as it was set from the beginning.”

The mainstream group also took further steps to protect its organization following the decision. At a meeting intended for live-in members in May, the group claimed about the PSIA’s on-site inspections that “The PSIA is our enemy. We do not have to answer the investigators’ questions,” and instructed the members to firmly maintain the attitude of non-cooperation and intransigence. Moreover, it sharpened its confrontational posture with the PSIA, as members from the group’s headquarters visited onsite inspections throughout Japan and kept in check the behavior of members dealing with inspectors, divert inspections by making minute demands regarding how the inspection was to be proceeded, etc.
Compared to January 2000, when the decision was made to begin surveillance, there has been a shift in age composition from one centered on people in their 30s to one centered people in their 40s. The number of members aged 60 or older has risen from about 4% to about 9%.

Meanwhile, active recruitment activities that targeted young people have kept the share of members aged 34 or younger at about 20%.
(3) The Joyu group continually and determinedly follows its policy of “hiding the influence of Asahara”

- The group stressed a “breaking away from Asahara” stance by reinforcing its public relations activities.

Hikarinowa stressed its “independence” yet relied on Asahara-based religious training

The Joyu group stressed the “independence of its teachings” and “regret” for the series of crimes attributed to it by, among other activities, posting “differences between the teachings and history of Hikarinowa and the teachings of Aum Shinrikyo” on its official website-in objection to the Public Security Intelligence Agency’s demand to extend the surveillance period-and having deputy leader Akitoshi Hirose attend at a symposium hosted by journalists. In addition, Fumihiro Joyu himself gave interviews with various magazines, where he stressed Hikarinowa’s “breaking away from Asahara” by emphasizing the group’s “self-reform away from Aum Shinrikyo.”

While it engaged in such outward activities, Hikarinowa continued practicing religious training having the same content as the “standing worship” practiced by Asahara as well as recitation of mantras with wordings that closely resembled those used by Asahara. Furthermore, continuing from 2008, the group incorporated a ritual known as “empowerment,” which is recognized as being only very slightly different from the “initiation” that characterized the religious training of Asahara.

Approaches were stepped up toward mainstream group members and former members

The Joyu group launched a website for the general public called “Hikarinowa Net-Dojo” (July 2008), through which it actively engaged in proselytizing and propaganda activities by delivering videos of Joyu’s sermons and training practices. However, the website did not lead to a larger membership. As a result, the group planned to attract mainstream group members and former members, and in mid-May it established a new department for “supporting breakaway from Aum Shinrikyo” to promote membership in Hikarinowa. The group also sought out exchanges with other religious organizations, and in early September, Joyu and other leading members visited Ukraine, where they assembled dozens of Russian members so that Joyu could personally meet them and give them a sermon.
Facilities where on-site inspections were carried out

(From January to end of November 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>Facility Name</th>
<th>Inspection Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tokushima Prefecture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ibaraki Prefecture</td>
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<td>Iriya Daini facility</td>
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<td>Hokima facility</td>
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2. Radical Leftist Groups

(1) Radical leftist groups work to reinforce and expand their organizational bases

- The three major groups sharpened their anti-authority stance as they worked to expand their organizations by approaching laborers and specific segments of society.

The “Chukaku-ha” re-declared its commitment to violent revolution

After “Chukaku-ha” split into the central faction and anti-central faction in the summer of 2008, each faction announced a proposed mission statement and worked to solidify and reinforce its organization by re-declaring its commitment to violent revolution-as they remained antagonistic to each other. Both factions endeavored to expand their strength by approaching citizens’ groups and labor unions.

Of the two factions, the central faction set as its goal the infiltration of “four main industries” that it placed greatest priority on (namely: teachers, local governments, Japan Railways [JR], and Japan Post [JP]) from the beginning of the year under a “policy of class labor movements” that sought to build worker-oriented organizations. The central faction engaged in publicity campaigns in the areas around meeting halls at which labor unions of these “four main industries” held regular meetings, stressing support for struggles against deregulation and privatization as well as for dismissed workers. In addition, the central faction concentrated on bringing in laborers by participating in labor-management negotiations in various regions in order to raise issues pertaining to better employment and labor conditions.

Moreover, in July, a central faction-affiliated labor union participated in an international workers’ conference organized by US labor unions (San Francisco, USA), where it appealed for global revolution and stronger international solidarity among laborers. And in November, the faction mobilized some 2,300 people (compared to roughly 2,600 people in 2008), including some 70 labor union-related personnel from four foreign countries, to attend the National Workers' Rally (Tokyo), which is an event held to review the year’s activities. The faction summed up the results of the rally by emphasizing its “complete confidence that international solidarity toward socialism will be victorious” in its official publication.

Meantime, in October, the faction presented its “proposed mission statement” after organizational discussions and called for the “achievement of revolution through international solidarity among workers.” It also declared that it would “build an illegal and covert political party” and “strike down capitalism through violent revolution.”

In addition, a student organization affiliated with the central faction reacted strongly when the authorities at Hosei University, one of their strongholds, began disciplining student activists by relentlessly conducting protest activities throughout the year. These activities resulted in successive arrests of student activists brought in from around the
country for violations of laws against physical violence.

Meantime, the anti-central faction, which stresses “rebuilding of the original Chukaku-ha,” presented at a political rally of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League in September, a “draft mission statement” clearly stating that “the essence of revolution is violent revolution.” Moreover, as a move to “welcome the participation of other factions in the revolutionary movement,” it worked to expand its own force by seeking collaboration with labor unions and citizens’ groups as it also criticized the government with regard to poverty, social disparities and other such problems.

It is anticipated that both factions will continue seeking to solidify and strengthen their organizations toward the realization of violent revolution and will concentrate on approaching laborers and private citizens.

**The “Kakumaru-ha” promoted organizational expansion and reinforcement**

Based on its basic policy of “crushing the state authority’s attack on its organization and of building an indomitable vanguard party organization,” the “Kakumaru-ha” implemented “student and laborer joint actions” in major cities, including Tokyo and Osaka, from the beginning of the year. These actions were conducted under various slogans, including those demanding cessation of overseas dispatches of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and cessation of efforts to revise the constitution. Through such activities, the faction invested its efforts into organizing laborers. Meanwhile, in its attempts to win students’ minds, the Kakumaru-ha-affiliated Zengakuren held its 79th national assembly (Tokyo) in July, where it held officers’ election for the first time in four years and stressed that it had “built a rock-solid organizational structure against university authorities’ attacks against student movements and student councils.” It later organized events protesting management by university authorities, while calling on ordinary students to participate.

Against this backdrop, Kakumaru-ha strengthened its organizational defense by reporting on the arrest of its activists (November 2008; Osaka) in its official publication and urging vigilance against security organs because the “state is preparing a destructive neo-fascist attack.”

It is anticipated that Kakumaru-ha will continue to strengthen its vigilance toward security organs as it also promotes efforts to expand its power.

**The “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association focused on solidifying its organization as it battled against authority**

Both the mainstream and anti-mainstream factions of “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association focused on solidifying their organizations as they remained committed to policies based on armed struggle.
Of these two factions, the mainstream faction responded to a trial for violation of organized crime laws that was brought against seven of its activists for conspiring to deceitfully receive livelihood assistance benefits for disabled people (May 2008; Fukuoka) by claiming that the trial was “suppression of their organization that seeks to destroy the revolutionary party” and by engaging in a “battle to rescue” the defendants. As part of this effort, the faction worked to strengthen its organizational solidarity by mobilizing activists around Japan to hold rallies. In the meantime, 11 members were arrested for various acts, including repeated use of abusive language while observing the trial and forcible obstruction of business by interfering with the distribution of tickets to the trial (February). Additionally, during the construction to extend a parallel runway at Narita Airport (service began in October), the faction joined with the Chukaku-ha extremist group and others to hold on-site gatherings and demonstrations for blocking the extension, which they saw as an “attack for developing the runway for military use.”

Meanwhile, the anti-mainstream faction struggled to hamper the realignment of the US forces in Japan and to oppose the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s dispatch to the coast of Somalia. In addition, the faction made efforts to assist day laborers at so-called yoseba (urban day-labor markets) in Tokyo and Fukuoka by supporting their claims for supplementary income payments as it also tried to bring these laborers into its fold. Meanwhile, faction activists were arrested on suspicion of swindling support payments for long-term in-home nursing care to disabled people from local governments (November; Tokyo, Osaka).

As both factions are stressing continuation and reinforcement of armed struggle in Revolutionary Army Appeal and other media, it is anticipated that they will continue to expand their organizational bases and maintain hard-line stances that do not preclude the use of terrorism or guerilla activity.
(2) Radical leftist groups stage protest movements targeting issues of high public interest

- Groups demanded abolition of the lay judge system and criticized important policies pertaining to energy and security.

Radical leftist groups conducted campaigns criticizing the government for familiar issues for the public

Radical leftist groups staged activities throughout Japan calling for abolition of the lay judge system, which was launched in May, saying it amounted to a “‘modern-day draft’ intended to forcefully mobilize the general public for the state.” In particular, activists of the Chukaku-ha group’s central faction worked to stoke the abolition movement by participating in street campaigns and petition drive activities in various regions and attending national assemblies that were held in April and October (Tokyo). Moreover, when the first trial using the lay judge system took place in the Fukuoka District Court in September, activists of the Kaiho-ha’s mainstream faction conducted a street campaign in protest near the district court.

As the employment situation worsened, radical leftist groups claimed that “discarding workers based on capitalist principles is unacceptable” and they engaged in activities demanding withdrawal of worker dismissals. In particular, the Kakumaru-ha group sent activists to a national assembly in February (Tokyo) to urge worker solidarity. And from the beginning of the year, activists of the Chukaku-ha’s central faction participated in protest demonstrations against employers’ associations on several occasions, where they appealed for “crushing the attacks of disemployment.”

Radical leftist groups instigated protest movements against important national policies

Radical leftist groups engaged in movements protesting Japan’s first implementation of the “pluthermal” program. In particular, the Chukaku-ha’s central faction and the Kakumaru-ha group criticized the program as “showing the government’s intent to obtain nuclear arms” and to “improve technologies for manufacturing nuclear weapons.” These groups sought to “block pluthermal operation” by conducting protests against power companies when MOX fuel was brought into the Hamaoka and Genkai Nuclear Power Plants and having activists participate in protest gatherings among other activities.

Moreover, radical leftist groups conducted acts toward hindering and abandonment of plans to realign the US forces in Japan. These activities mainly targeted the construction of a substitute facility for the US’s Futenma Base and the deployment of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier to the US’s Yokosuka Base. In particular, the Chukaku-ha’s central faction and the Kakumaru-ha group appealed for the removal of US military bases by sending large numbers of activists to citizens’ gatherings held in conjunction with the anniversary of Okinawa’s return to Japan (May) and the first
anniversary of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier’s deployment (September), as well as to a “prefectural assembly to protest the construction of new base facilities in Hekono and transfer of base facilities inside Okinawa Prefecture” (November).
(3) Collaboration with overseas organizations becomes stronger through the anti-globalization movement

- Radical leftist groups began activities to stoke protest activities with an eye to the APEC Japan 2010 summit.

Protest activities against APEC Japan began amid active interchange with overseas organizations

Radical leftist groups and anti-globalization forces led by such groups concentrated on stirring up movements based on their experiences linking with overseas organizations through protest activities at the Hokkaido Toyako Summit of 2008. Among other activities, groups actively pursued exchanges with overseas organizations as they focused their attention on the APEC Japan 2010, and particularly on the summit meetings to take place in Yokohama (November 13 to 14, 2010).

Looking at particular cases, the Japan Revolutionary Communist League (JRCL) of the former Fourth International put forward a clear policy of “intentionally and actively strengthening ties to social resistance movements while further developing networks with Asia and the world” in an article appearing in its official publication at the beginning of the year. This policy grew from its calling for “a continuous protest movement extending from the 2008 G8 summit to the APEC Japan 2010 summit” and its view that “APEC has played a leading role in expanding war and poverty.” Based on the policy, the JRCL-led ATTAC-Japan sent activists to the World Social Forum, a gathering staged by international anti-globalization organizations in Belém, Brazil in January. There, the activists participated in seminars and demonstrations on poverty and economy and discussed current conditions and issues concerning the anti-globalization movement with organizations from Asian countries. Furthermore, ATTAC-Japan worked to reinforce its relationships with organizations around the world by inviting personnel affiliated with ATTAC France to participate in open discussion sessions in Tokyo and Osaka in November and holding opinion exchanges on solutions to international economic disparities and poverty.

Moreover, the “Asian Wide Campaign, Japan Committee” (AWC-Japan) of the Japan Communist League’s Unified Committee participated in the International Solidarity Affair (May) in the Philippines, a gathering that brought together organizations from 17 countries and regions. It followed this by holding the 3rd AWC general meeting in Kyoto (September), to which it invited organizations from South Korea, the Philippines, the United States, and other countries. At the general meeting, an agreement was reached for close cooperation among all organizations and, based on this agreement, a common will was forged to work together toward expanding anti-globalization campaigns in Asia and the Pacific in protest of the APEC Japan summit.
Greater effort is expected to build an anti-APEC Japan force that includes overseas organizations

Insisting that APEC Japan will be a “ceremony to promote war and neoliberalism” and “a meeting to strengthen oppression and exploitation of the people,” radical leftist groups and anti-globalization forces led by such groups are reinforcing their resistance to the summit. It is anticipated that these groups will continue to strengthen their partnerships with overseas organizations in South Korea and other countries and to work to build protest momentum.

APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) was launched in 1989 as a forum for discussion of trade and investment liberalization in the Asia and Pacific region. Currently, 21 nations and regions participate, and discussions have expanded to include counter-terrorism measures.

**Major venues for APEC Japan**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting of Ministers in charge of Trade (June, Hokkaido)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Energy Ministerial Meeting (June, Fukui)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tourism Ministerial Meeting (September, Nara)</td>
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<td>SME Ministerial Meeting (October, Gifu)</td>
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<td>Agricultural Ministerial Meeting (October, Niigata)</td>
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<td>Ministerial Meeting on Telecommunications and Information Industry (October, Okinawa)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finance Ministerial Meeting (November, Kyoto)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APEC Ministerial Meeting and APEC Summit Meeting (November, Yokohama)</td>
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</table>

The coming APEC Japan summit will be the second time APEC members meet in Japan, following the previous summit in 1995 (the summit meeting was held in Osaka). APEC Japan’s main topic will be approaches toward achieving the Bogor Goal (see note). The APEC Japan is scheduled to start with a symposium in December 2009 (Tokyo) and will include ministerial meetings at various locations leading up to the summit meeting in November 2010.

Note: The Bogor Goal is the goal of “achieving trade and investment liberalization in the region by 2020.” It was adopted at the APEC Indonesia (Bogor) summit in 2002.

At past APEC summits, anti-globalization forces protesting “economic globalization” held on-site demonstrations, some of which resulted in reckless behavior by participants (Chile in 2004, South Korea in 2005).

At APEC Japan 1995, radical leftist groups held protest gatherings and demonstrations (attracting some 2,500 participants) in the Tokyo metropolitan area and the Kinki district. Moreover, during APEC Korea 2005, ATTAC-Japan and AWC-Japan, which are led by radical leftist groups, each sent activists to South Korea to participate in protest movements with organizations from other countries.
(4) Moves of the “Yodo-go” group and the Japanese Red Army

- The “Yodo-go” group demanded “retraction of arrest warrants on charge of kidnapping.”
- The Japanese Red Army continued trying to justify the Lod Airport Massacre in Tel Aviv.

The “Yodo-go” group continued to demand “retraction of arrest warrants on charge of kidnapping”

The “Yodo-go” group returned its members’ last child remaining in North Korea to Japan (January).

Regarding the issue of returning Yodo-go group members (including those suspected of kidnapping Japanese nationals) to Japan, the group demonstrated through its official publication and other means that it would stick to the principle of “consent return,” which means the members would return as political refugees upon consultation with the Japanese government instead of being extradited as criminals. It also strongly demanded the “retraction of arrest warrants on charge of kidnapping.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internationally wanted “Yodo-go” group members</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shiro Akagi</td>
<td>Suspicion of hijacking</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kimihiro Uomoto</td>
<td>Suspicion of hijacking and kidnapping</td>
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<tr>
<td>Takahiro Konishi</td>
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<td>Moriaki Wakabayashi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junko Mori</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sakiko Wakabayashi</td>
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<tr>
<td>Takeshi Okamoto (see note)</td>
<td>Suspicion of hijacking</td>
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*The Yodo-go group claims that Okamoto is “dead.”

Because 2010 will mark the passage of 40 years since the hijacking (March 31, 1970), it is anticipated that the Yodo-go group will use its supporters and others to invigorate approaches on every level as it works towards the members’ return to Japan.

No change in the dangerous nature of the Japanese Red Army

The Japanese Red Army has attempted to justify the Lod Airport Massacre in Tel Aviv (May 30, 1972; 24 dead, 76 wounded), calling the incident the “Lydda Struggle.” As in previous years, Japanese Red Army members and supporters held a gathering to commemorate the incident in 2009 (May). Fusako Shigenobu, the top leader of the Japanese Red Army who is currently in detention, and Kozo Okamoto, who is responsible for the massacre and is in exile in Lebanon, each sent statements to the gathering stressing that they have maintained their commitment to the fight and that the incident was justified.
There has been no change in the Japanese Red Army’s dangerous nature, as it continues to try to justify the incident, and also as seven of its members, including the aforementioned Kozo Okamoto, remain on the international wanted list.

| Japanese Red Army members on trial or serving time (as of the end of November) |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Fusako Shigenobu                | On Supreme Court trial (sentenced to 20 years imprisonment by High Court)       |
| Jun Nishikawa                  | On Supreme Court trial (sentenced to life imprisonment by High Court)           |
| Haruo Wako                     | Sentence of life imprisonment fixed                                            |
| Hiroshi Sensui                 | Serving time (life imprisonment)                                              |
| Osamu Morioka                  | Serving time (life imprisonment)                                              |
| Yukiko Ekida                   | Serving time (20 years imprisonment)                                          |
| Tsutomu Shirosaki              | Serving time in a prison in the United States (30 years imprisonment)          |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japanese Red Army members on the international wanted list</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kozo Okamoto</td>
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<td>Kunio Bando</td>
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3. The Japan Communist Party

The JCP works to establish its own identity between the “two major parties”

- Even though the JCP highlighted its approaches to major enterprises and the United States, it could only maintain its number of pre-election seats.
- The JCP responded to individual policies of the Hatoyama government by positioning itself as a “constructive opposition party.”

Declaring that it would make 2009 “a historical year of general election victory for the JCP,” the Japan Communist Party worked to demonstrate its own identity so as to enhance its presence between the “two major parties.” Following the election, the JCP responded to the policies of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s administration in a fair and unbiased manner.

The JCP devoted itself to the employment problem both inside and outside the Diet

The JCP criticized former Prime Minister Taro Aso’s administration for its handling of the employment problem and other issues at ordinary Diet sessions. At a Lower House plenary session in January, JCP Chairman Kazuo Shii said the government bore responsibility for the employment situation because it relaxed regulations of employment laws, and he demanded revision of the Worker Dispatch Law. Likewise, at a Lower House Budget Committee meeting in February, the JCP stressed that the government must impose tough guidance on enterprises, and it demanded that representatives of employers’ associations be called before the Diet. And in June, it refused to cosponsor a proposal to revise the Worker Dispatch Law that was put forward by three opposition parties, including the Democratic Party of Japan, criticizing that the proposal’s “regulations on manufacturing industry dispatches were insufficient.”

Moreover, outside the Diet, Chairman Shii participated in an assembly demanding revision of the Worker Dispatch Law, where he pressed for reinforced efforts toward revision and conducted an “on-the-street consultation meeting” for workers who had lost their jobs.

The JCP approached young people and conservative voters as it played up a response it received from Washington

In May, the JCP announced that it had received a response to a letter it sent to US President Barack Obama appealing for the abolishment of nuclear weapons, and it stressed that the response “opened the door for official dialogue between the JCP and the US government.” Together with overtures to enterprises regarding cancellation of worker dismissals, the JCP presented the response as an example of how it was “driving realistic politics.” It worked to expand its publicity and support base by using these approaches as a tool for raising the party’s appeal.
Specific endeavors here included the JCP’s focusing on approaches to young people and conservative voters. For young people, the JCP worked to spur dialogue by calling on young people to participate in gatherings held after party-initiated speech meetings and to cooperate with on-the-street “employment questionnaires.” And for conservative voters, the party appealed for support by sending its staff to various groups-including trade organizations, agricultural and fishery cooperatives, and medical associations-to hold interviews with interested parties and by bringing together business managers for discussion meetings.

The JCP won 9 seats in the general election, the same number it had before the election, as its efforts to expand its power bore little fruit

In the August general election, the JCP fielded 152 candidates in single-seat constituencies and 79 candidates in proportional-representation constituencies, and it set a goal of garnering more than 6.5 million votes in the latter. However, the election resulted in the JCP’s receiving just 4.94 million votes and capturing nine seats (proportional-representation constituencies), which was the same number it had before the election. The JCP’s Standing Executive Committee issued a “statement” concerning the election’s results in which it stressed that it had fought a “good and brave fight.”

Later, at the JCP Central Committee’s 9th Plenum in October, the JCP announced that its election strategy of narrowing down candidates for single-seat constituencies and concentrating its efforts in proportional-representation constituencies was the “correct strategy given the party’s current capacity and circumstances,” and showed its intention to use the same strategy in the next general election.

Furthermore, the JCP stressed that “expansion of the party’s power is the fundamental force of election victory,” and it poured its efforts into expanding party support and subscriptions to Shimbun Akahata. As a result, the JCP announced a growing trend in party membership, saying in October that the membership “had grown for the 23 consecutive months.” However, the party also suffered from loss of membership, and thus the actual growth was very little, with membership being around 410,000. Shimbun Akahata’s circulation increased up to July, which was prior to the election; however there was a declining trend following the election and the circulation fell to approximately 1.45 million copies.

Fair and unbiased responses to individual policies of the Hatoyama administration

Following the inauguration of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s administration in September, the JCP pushed strongly for implementation of policies with which it agreed under a policy of approaching individual policies in a fair and unbiased manner as a “constructive opposition party.” Specifically, the JCP welcomed Prime Minister Hatoyama’s plan to seek the submittal of a revised Worker Dispatch Law and pressed for its early realization. On the other hand, regarding the construction of a substitute facility for the United States’ Futenma Base in Okinawa, the JCP seized on the Prime Minister’s pre-election statement that “it would be best to move the facility outside of Okinawa and
even out of the country” by criticizing the fact that “after the new government’
inauguration, concerned ministers have repeatedly made remarks contrary to the Prime
Minister’s statement, and the Prime Minister is accepting these remarks.”

The JCP will make an all-out effort to build an organization that can stand up to
the “two major parties”

The JCP will hold its 25th Congress in January 2010, when it plans to set near-term
strategies for response to national policies, election campaigning, expansion of party
power and other issues. Following the Congress, it is anticipated that the JCP will use
these strategies to pursue various activities while also working to reinforce its capacity
with an eye to victory in the summer Upper House election and to build an organization
that can stand up to the “two major parties.”
4. Right-Wing Groups

Right-wing groups conduct activities regarding North Korea and the Northern Territories issue

- Right-wing groups engaged in protests in various locations against the North Korean missile launch and nuclear test.
- Right-wing groups actively held demonstrations regarding diplomatic and territorial issues with Russia and China.

Although the organizational strength of right-wing groups has remained unchanged over the past few years, there has been an apparent trend whereby the share of groups affiliated with organized crime is rising. Against this backdrop, many groups engaged in activities focused on North Korea and other diplomatic and territorial issues.

Protests against North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test were directed at Chongryon

Right-wing groups reacted strongly to North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test by conducting protests against Chongryon.

In response to reports in February that “North Korea is preparing to launch a missile” followed by an announcement by Pyongyang that it would “launch a satellite between April 4 and 8” in mid-March, right-wing groups conducted protest activities near Chongryon-affiliated facilities, shouting, “Stop the launch of a missile disguised as a satellite!” among other slogans. When North Korea launched a missile that passed through Japan’s air space (April 5), right-wing groups made a unified protest charging the launch as a “reckless act against the international community and equivalent to a proclamation of war against Japan.” Loudspeaker vehicles of the groups descended upon Chongryon-affiliated facilities in various locations, where they conducted protests claiming that “the missile launch is a threat to Japan; all North Koreans in Japan get out!” In addition, some groups held rallies near the Cabinet Office and Ministry of Defense buildings, where they demanded that these government organs “apply strict sanctions against North Korea” and “prepare for war against North Korea.”

Moreover, when North Korea announced that it had conducted a nuclear test (May 25), right-wing groups condemned the test as “an unforgivable act that threatens world peace.” As was the case during the missile launch, groups held protest activities near Chongryon-affiliated facilities in various locations, where they shouted “North Korea is a lawless country that ignores the international community. Dismantle your nuclear weapons!” among other slogans.

In addition, right-wing groups reacted to the implementation by some local governments of measures to exempt or reduce real estate tax on Chongryon-affiliated facilities by conducting protests demanding that these measures be repealed. And when Kumgangsan Opera Troupe, an organization that is affiliated with Chongryon, sought to stage a
performance using a public facility, right-wing groups claimed that the “money collected from the performance will be sent to North Korea and diverted to nuclear and missile development.” The groups thus engaged in activities demanding that permission to use the facility be withdrawn and the performance cancelled.

Furthermore, immediately following the inauguration of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s administration (September 16), right-wing groups made moves based on their view that the Prime Minister’s “stance toward North Korea was unclear.” The groups sent advisory letters to the Prime Minister saying, “Our kidnapped brethren are waiting for the motherland to rescue them. Take a strong stance toward North Korea.”

**Right-wing groups conducted activities stressing “return of the Northern Territories” during Prime Minister Putin’s visit to Japan**

Prior to the visit by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (May 11 to 13), there were reports that discussions were taking place toward a “return of 3.5 islands” solution to the Northern Territories issue (April). Right-wing groups responded by sending a letter to the Cabinet Office demanding that it “adhere to the ‘return of all four islands’ policy as a matter of course, and also remember that the Northern Territories include not only the four islands but also South Karafuto and all of the Kuril Islands.” They also conducted street protests demanding that the government “abandon the ‘return of 3.5 islands’ discussion, which is an absurd idea and ruinous to the nation.” When Prime Minister Putin arrived in Japan, the groups held gatherings and demonstrations claiming that the Prime Minister “is not entitled to coming to Japan if he doesn’t return the Northern Territories,” as well as street protests near the Russian Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanding that Japan “take back the Northern Territories immediately and crush any discussion of partial return.”

When Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso met with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Italy in July, right-wing groups protested, saying that “President Medvedev did not make any concrete proposals and exposed Russia’s insincerity.” They also sent protest letters to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanding that it “review its diplomacy with Russia due to the lack of progress in resolving the Northern Territories issue.” Amid such activities was an incident in which members of a right-wing group crashed a passenger car into the front gate of the Russian Embassy, shouting, “Take back the Northern Territories!” (July 26).

On the other hand, there was a right-wing group that stressed “promotion of private sector-level exchanges between Japan and Russia and resolution of the territorial issue through mutual understanding and dialogue.” This group sent a delegation to Russia in March that met with government officials.

**Right-wing groups took advantage of Chinese dignitaries’ visits to Japan and other opportunities to conduct activities critical of China**

During the “12th Japan-China Friendship and Exchange Meeting” (May, Kagawa), which
was organized by the Japan-China Friendship Association, right-wing groups decried the event as a “traitorous meeting to fawn over China.” Many groups from western Japan and other regions gathered in loudspeaker vehicles in Takamatsu City, which was the venue for the meeting, to engage in protests where they shouted “Stop the strategy on Japan of the Japan-China Friendship Association, the puppet organ of China.” and other slogans. In particular, the groups conducted activities criticizing the Japan-China Friendship Association chairman and Diet members attending the meeting as “China toadies.”

Furthermore, when China’s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited Japan (June 6 to 9), right-wing groups claimed that “China is trying to steal Japan’s technology under the guise of economic dialogue.” Groups also used opportunities presented by other important figures’ visits to Japan to engage in protest activities near the venues of their visits.

Moreover, based on their view that the anniversary of the signing of the Japan-China Joint Statement (September 29, 1972) is “a day to anticipate Japan’s breaking diplomatic relations with China,” right-wing groups declared September 29 as “Anti-Communist China Day.” They held street protests, gatherings and demonstrations criticizing China primarily in the cities hosting Chinese diplomatic offices, including Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagasaki. They made various demands during these activities, including that Japan “never permit China to illegally drill in gas fields of the East China Sea.”

**Right-wing groups criticized Mindan for issues concerning foreigners’ voting rights and conducted illegal acts concerning the Yasukuni issue**

In addition, right-wing groups actively addressed various domestic and overseas issues.

Right-wing groups protested against giving foreign permanent residents local election voting rights—which is something the Korean Residents Union in Japan (Mindan) and other groups are demanding—saying that doing so would “allow other countries to interfere with domestic affairs and lead to Japan’s destruction from within.” In May, some right-wing groups joined with conservative groups to hold demonstrations in major cities and protested a Mindan-led rally demanding voting rights that took place in Tokyo.

As for the Takeshima Island issue, right-wing groups held activities on and around Shimane Prefecture-designated “Takeshima Day” (February 22), demanding that Japan “take back Takeshima, which is being illegally occupied by South Korea” in Tokyo, Shimane, and other areas. Furthermore, when South Korean President Lee Myung Bak visited Japan (June 28), groups demanded that “South Korea leave Takeshima” near the Republic of Korea’s Embassy in Japan. And in October, groups staged protests against ROK diplomatic offices throughout Japan as part of a “national simultaneous joint action to take back Takeshima.”

With regard to the wartime “comfort women” issue, right-wing groups protested the passage of “opinion briefs demanding a sincere national response” by the municipal
assembly of Minoh City, Osaka Prefecture (June), and other local assemblies. The groups claimed that “the briefs are based on the Kono Statement, which unilaterally decided that the Imperial Japanese Army was involved in the practice, and (the passage) is an act that tramples on the spirits of our war dead.” Groups engaged in activities near the local assemblies to demand that they “rescind their passage of the opinion briefs.”

Moreover, in the days before the general election in August, right-wing groups engaged in activities to criticize expected candidates in Tokyo, Yamagata, Fukuoka and other areas whom they viewed as “China toadies” or “pro-North Korean.”

Against this backdrop, a member of a right-wing group brought his self-severed little finger and a letter to the Cabinet Office urging Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso to visit Yasukuni Shrine (August 10). And on the day before the official start of campaigning for the general election (August 17), a member of a right-wing group brought a letter to the National Diet Building, demanding that all Diet members visit Yasukuni Shrine and then he stabbed himself in the abdomen on the road outside the main gate.

Right-wing groups will stand ready to act as they closely observe the diplomatic posture of the Hatoyama administration

It is anticipated that right-wing groups will step up their protest activities if they deem that the DPJ-centered administration of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama is showing a diplomatic stance that is incompatible with right-wing views, or if the administration brings various policies—such as allowing married couples the option of keeping separate family names and the construction of a national memorial site—to fruition. Since their protest activities may develop to illegal acts, their moves require careful vigilance.

Column: The Changing Nature of Right-Wing Street Propaganda Activities

Traditionally, right-wing groups have used large loudspeaker vehicles as their primary means for putting forth their views. This is because such vehicles make it easy for a small number of people to get their views out loudly and broadly, and because the trucks have a unique appearance that gives them an intimidating nature. However, in recent years, groups have been switching from large diesel-powered vehicles to smaller gasoline-powered cars. This has been a response to ordinances regulating the emissions of diesel-powered vehicles that have been enacted in Tokyo, Osaka, and other cities.

Recently, more and more groups that traditionally centered their activities on loudspeaker vehicles are also employing gatherings and walking demonstrations, as they recognize that citizens do not listen to what they are saying in their loudspeaker vehicle activities.

Moreover, some groups that use retired emergency vehicles or home delivery trucks that are converted to loudspeaker vehicles in their activities. Such vehicles are used to evade tight security nets set up by the police authorities and as camouflage that allows groups to get closer to the targets of their protests.
Postface

Nuclear development by North Korea and Iran, the threat of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to mention a few, show that the state of affairs surrounding Japan continues to be dangerous, and thus the intelligence needs on these issues are growing.

As a member of the Japanese intelligence community, the Public Security Intelligence Agency is required to collect, analyze and provide relevant intelligence to government organizations in a prompt, appropriate and timely manner in order to secure the safety of Japan and its people. For this purpose, the PSIA will continue to improve and strengthen its system for gathering information, while also working to enhance cooperation with relevant domestic and foreign organizations.

As for Aum Shinrikyo, the Public Security Examination Commission recognized in January 2009 that “Shoko Asahara still possesses the seemingly absolute influence on the activities of the group,” and it therefore decided to extend surveillance for the third time.

In response, the PSIA intends to maintain strict surveillance of Aum Shinrikyo while working to alleviate and eliminate public anxiety concerning the group by conducting continuous dialogues with residents living near Aum Shinrikyo facilities.

Under the increasingly complex and diverse international and domestic circumstances, the PSIA intends to perform its mission and duties by making an even greater effort to fulfill its responsibility to the Japanese public-which desires a peaceful and secure society-with renewed recognition of the importance of its function.