Preface

Based on the Subversive Activities Prevention Act and the Act Regarding the Control of Organizations Which Committed Indiscriminate Mass Murder, the Public Security Intelligence Agency (公安調査庁, Koanchosa-cho) conducts control activities targeting such organizations and investigations for the purpose of implementing control measures, including surveillance of Aum Shinrikyo. Moreover, as a member of the intelligence community in Japan, the PSIA also collects and analyzes both domestic and foreign information, including data pertaining to international terrorism and the situation in North Korea.

This 2012 edition of the Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations reviews developments in domestic and international public security in 2011 (as of the end of November), as well as looking at the future prospects in these areas.

It is hoped that this report will be of assistance in understanding the domestic and international security situation.

In this report, unless otherwise noted, the months refer to the year 2011. In addition, the titles of individuals mentioned hereinafter are those at the time of writing.

The Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations is also available on the PSIA website:
http://www.moj.go.jp/psia/
I. Overall Review of the Public Security Situation in 2011

II. Focal Issues of the External Situation in 2011

1. North Korea and Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan)
   (1) North Korea pursued economic reconstruction while preparing for
       the succession of Kim Jong Un ................................................................. 4
       Column: Economic Cooperation with China
   (2) North Korea strengthened ties with China and Russia as the nuclear issue faced
       deadlock ........................................................................................................ 8
       Column: North Korea sought closer military relationships with China
       and Russia
   (3) North Korea aimed to unsettle South Korea in an attempt to get it to change its
       stance towards North Korea ......................................................................... 12
       Column: The Wang Jae-san spy network uncovered in South Korea
   (4) While the bilateral relations stalled, exchanges between Japan and North Korea were
       based mainly on sport .................................................................................... 15
   (5) With a view to a “new heyday,” Chongryon further strengthened its organization and
       ideology ........................................................................................................... 17

2. China
   (1) China feared the loss of unifying force of the Party, and sought “enhancement and
       innovation of social management” .................................................................. 19
   (2) While declaring that it intended “peaceful development,” China has strengthened
       its stance towards becoming a “powerful maritime nation” ............................ 23
       Column: China’s maritime security systems
       Column: Pending issues indicate ongoing conflict, but dialogue is continuing
       and expanding between the US and China
   (3) China dispatched government vessels into Japan’s surrounding seas while seeking to
       improve relations with Japan .......................................................................... 28
   (4) Focusing on the Taiwanese presidential election, China struggled to maintain an
       environment that would promote “peaceful unification” .................................. 31

3. Russia
   (1) Russia stepped up internal and external activities in eastern areas ...................... 33
   (2) Russia employed a range of ways towards taking Japan’s Northern Territories
       within its own borders .................................................................................... 36
4. Middle East/North Africa
   As the situation in the Middle East and North Africa became more acute, Middle East peace negotiations stalled ................................................................. 38

5. International Terrorism
   (1) Al-Qaeda and related organizations sought to continue Jihad in the aftermath of the death of Osama bin Laden ................................................................. 41
   (2) Multiple, serious terrorist incidents occurred in Afghanistan and Pakistan .......... 44
   (3) Radical Islamist organizations continued their activities in various locations around Asia ............................................................................................................. 46
       Column: 10 years since the 9.11 terrorist attacks in the US
       Column: Serial terrorist attacks in Norway
       Column: European countries banned the wearing of burqa

6. Adverse Activities against Japan
   Increasing concerns about the leak of important information through cyber-attacks and continued illegal exports of WMD-related materials .................................................... 49
       Column: Recent cyber-attack methods
       Column: North Korea and Iran continued nuclear and missile development

III. Focal Issues of the Domestic Public Security Situation in 2011 ........................................ 52
1. Aum Shinrikyo
   (1) The mainstream group tried to expand the organization while continuing its policy of “getting back to Asahara” ................................................................. 52
       Column: Increase of new members seen in the cult’s report
       Column: Moves concerning the Great East Japan Earthquake
   (2) The Joyu group continued to “hide the influence of Asahara,” aiming to evade surveillance .............................................................................................................. 56
       Column: Status of compensation payment by the mainstream and Joyu groups
   (3) PSIA requested extension of the surveillance period .............................................. 59
       Column: Moves of Aum Shinrikyo’s key Seigoshi
       Column: “The case is not over for the victims and their families”

2. Moves concerning the Great East Japan Earthquake and the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant
   (1) Domestic groups engaged in various activities in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake .................................................................................. 65
   (2) The accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant activated the antinuclear power movement ................................................................. 67
3. Radical Leftist Groups
(1) Radical leftist groups worked to build their organization ........................................ 69
   Column: Stronghold offices of “Chukaku-ha” and “Kakumaru-ha,” as well as the
   “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association
(2) Radical leftist groups actively engaged in anti-globalization campaign in cooperation
   with overseas organizations .................................................................................... 71
   Column: AWC Japan
(3) Moves of the “Yodo-go” group and the Japanese Red Army ................................. 72

4. The Japan Communist Party
   The JCP worked to reinforce its organizational bases ........................................... 74
   Column: Changes in the circulation of Shim bun Akahata of the JCP

5. Right-Wing Groups
   Right-wing groups conducted activities focusing on criticism of the government and
   diplomatic/territorial issues ..................................................................................... 76
   Column: Right-wing-affiliated groups criticized the pachinko (pinball game)
   industry and conducted protest activities against the antinuclear power movement
   in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake

Recent Major Security Developments
I. Overall Review of the Public Security Situation in 2011

1. International Situation

(1) North Korea made frequent reports of the activities of Kim Jong Un, the third son of General Secretary Kim Jong Il and Vice Chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission, and through a range of broadcasts and propaganda activities, strengthened the impression among observers both in and out of the country that Jong Un has special status. Furthermore, the country worked towards economic restructuring by 2012 through renewing its manufacturing facilities and other infrastructure. With regard to external relations, North Korea made it clear that it would refuse taking denuclearization measures by repeating its demand for “reopening the six-party talks with no preconditions,” in response to American and South Korean demands for taking such measures prior to the reopening of the talks. In relations with South Korea, while South Korea continued to demand “responsible measures” in regard to the sinking of its corvette (March 2010), North Korea called for dialogue in order to transform South Korea’s position in regard to it, but at the same time it indicated the possibility of military attacks, thereby maintaining a state of uncertainty. At the same time, General Secretary Kim Jong Il made visits to China and Russia (May and August respectively), and worked on strengthening ties through improving economic cooperation in border areas. In regard to Japan, General Secretary Kim Jong Il referred to “improving the relations between North Korea and Japan” in October, based on “reparation for the past,” indicating North Korea’s interest in improving the bilateral relations.

(2) In China, as mass protests occurred frequently, triggered by social and other problems, the unifying force within the party was reduced, causing a sense of impending crisis. At the same time, efforts were made to strengthen social management. In diplomacy, China pressed ahead with measures to establish itself as a “powerful maritime nation,” and demonstrated stubbornness in its responses to territorial disputes in the South China Sea. While China was proactive in taking measures to improve its relationship with Japan – which had stagnated following the incident where a Chinese trawler collided into Japan Coast Guard vessels in 2010 – through support and assistance after the Great East Japan Earthquake, it frequently dispatched government vessels to the waters around the Senkaku Islands, among other activities.

(3) Russia engaged in activities to develop resources and expand their sales routes as well as increasing its military strength in the Russian Far East. In terms of diplomacy, it worked to expand its sphere of influence in East Asia. In addition to working towards economic development in the Northern Territories of Japan, Russia also spelled out policies for military buildup, demonstrating its intention to bring the territories within its own borders.
(4) Countries in the Middle East and North Africa experienced large-scale anti-government protests. The Presidents of Tunisia and Egypt resigned, and the Gaddafi regime in Libya was overthrown. As direct peace negotiations stalled, the Palestinian Authority applied for membership of the United Nations.

(5) With regard to international terrorism, subsequent to the killing of Osama bin Laden in May, al-Qaeda and other organizations expressed their intention to continue Jihad, and radical Islamist organizations carried out a series of terrorist attacks, some in retaliation for the death of bin Laden.

(6) Malicious attacks against Japan involved repeated cyber-attacks on government agencies and companies with the purpose of stealing important information. The perpetrators of these attacks have not yet been identified.

2. Domestic Situation

(1) The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo continued to promote the policy of “getting back to Asahara,” emphasizing absolute faith in Asahara in its instruction to followers. The group made aggressive efforts to expand its membership and significantly increased the number of newly recruited members.

The Joyu group stressed its stance of “breaking away from Asahara,” using various media, but there was no change in the reality of the group remaining under the influence of Asahara. This was seen in their conducting a ritual which was very similar to the “initiation” that used to be conducted by Asahara.

The PSIA decided that there still is the danger of the cult’s committing another indiscriminate mass murder and that it is therefore necessary to continue surveillance of its activities; the PSIA requested an extension of the surveillance period (for the fourth time).

(2) In the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, radical leftist groups tried to bring in workers and students through their activities to support the disaster areas while engaging in activities demanding shutdown and decommissioning of reactors. The Japan Communist Party made efforts to promote the party through fundraising to support victims while trying to boost the mass movement toward breaking away from nuclear power generation.

(3) Radical leftist groups put much effort into maintaining and expanding their organization, and worked to bring in contingent workers and increase their influence on members of key industry labor unions. Some forces engaged in anti-globalization campaigns in cooperation with overseas organizations.

(4) In response to the loss in the nationwide local elections, the Japan Communist Party worked on a “grand campaign to expand the party’s strength” and also tried to impress its distinctiveness
by taking a clearly adversarial stand against the DPJ government.

(5) Right-wing groups called for the defeat of the government by criticizing DPJ policies, such as granting local suffrage to foreign residents, and also engaged in street campaigns taking up diplomatic/territorial issues with neighboring countries.
II. Focal Issues of the External Situation in 2011

1. North Korea and Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan)

(1) North Korea pursued economic reconstruction while preparing for the succession of Kim Jong Un.
- Kim Jong Un’s accompanying Kim Jong Il during “on-the-spot guidances” and the increased use of the slogan “Blessings to the Leader” have promoted the establishment of Kim Jong Un’s authority.
- North Korea attempted to strengthen economic cooperation with China and Russia, while renewing manufacturing facilities and proceeding with various construction projects, but the effects of these measures have been limited.

North Korea stepped up publicity efforts for Kim Jong Un through media coverage on his activities and display of slogans.
Subsequent to the official debut of Kim Jong Un, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, at the representative conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea in September 2010, it was frequently reported that he accompanied Kim Jong Il during “on-the-spot guidances,” as well as attending conferences with dignitaries from overseas, in order to clearly demonstrate that he was building up the experience required of a leader. In particular, when Kim Jong Il and his delegation returned home from their visits to China and Russia (May and August), Kim Jong Un greeted him at the border, thus giving an impression in and out of the country that the latter was in charge of the country during his father’s absence.
North Korea also introduced celebratory remarks for “having solved the succession issue” made by China’s Minister of Public Security Meng Jianzhu during his visit to North Korea in February, and raised Vice Chairman Kim Jong Un’s rank (from the sixth immediately after the representative conference to the current third place). Furthermore, North Korea displayed signs and installed commemorative stone monuments engraved with the phrase “Blessings to the Leader” in various locations in an attempt to show his special status and establish his authority.

The rise of new leaders along with relatives of General Secretary Kim Jong Il.
After the debut of Kim Jong Un, newly appointed Secretaries at the representative conference, such as Kim Kyong Hui (65) (General Secretary Kim Jong Il’s younger sister and the WPK’s Department Director), Chang Song Taek (65) (her husband and Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission) as well as Choe Ryong Hae (61), Pak To Chun (67), and Thae Jong Su (75),
frequently accompanied General Secretary Kim Jong Il, indicating their central role within the leadership. Furthermore, Workers’ Party Departmental Director O Il Jong (57), who is said to be a son of an anti-Japanese partisan, appeared as Commander of the Worker-Peasant Red Guards Parade in celebration of the 63rd anniversary of the establishment of North Korea on September 9, further indicating the rise of new leaders.

North Korea struggled to achieve economic benefits through construction of infrastructure and housing and renewal of plant facilities, etc.

In preparation for economic reconstruction set for 2012, North Korea’s “New Year Joint Editorial” dated January 1 called for an “all-out offensive” mainly in economic fields in order to construct a “strong and prosperous state.”

Based on this, General Secretary Kim Jong Il and Premier Choe Yong Rim frequently inspected plants, farms and construction sites and encouraged them to increase production and construction. North Korea also continued to work on the infrastructure at the Huichon hydroelectric generation plant (Jagang province) and the renewal of facilities for light industry, as well as establishing a manufacturing process for vinylon fiber and introducing a non-coke method for steel production (Juche steel) in an attempt to stimulate manufacturing through the utilization of the domestic hard coal resources.

However, in addition to the slogan of “strong and prosperous state,” North Korea has also begun using such phrases as “thriving state” and “strong and prosperous recovery.” Furthermore, the construction of 100,000 housing units in Pyongyang – one of the country’s major projects for 2012 – was contracted down to the construction of a high-rise housing complex in the center of the city, indicating that the “all-out offensive” was not necessarily bringing about the anticipated benefits.
North Korea promoted stronger economic ties with China through trade expansion and joint development of special economic zones. In terms of external economic relations, North Korea significantly increased the export of hard coal to China (a 166% increase in January-October from the same period in the previous year), aiming to further expand the bilateral trade relationship. As a result of this, the trade amount between the two countries rose by 73.5% compared with the previous year to 4.67 billion dollars, indicating North Korea’s increasing economic dependence on China.

Furthermore, North Korea embarked in June on the joint development of special economic zones (“Rason Economic and Trade Zone” and “Hwanggumpyong-Wihwa Island Economic Zone”). No significant progress has so far been noted on the Hwanggumpyong-Wihwa Island Economic Zone, but in the Rason area, the road between the China-North Korea border and Rajin Port has been widened and resurfaced, and it is anticipated that once this work has been completed, Rajin Port will be used for the transportation of Chinese freight. As for the Rason area, after his visit to Russia in August, General Secretary Kim Jong Il agreed to the establishment of a working group in September to work towards the construction of a gas pipeline between Russia and South Korea via North Korea, and a further move was seen towards economic cooperation with Russia, including the trial operation of the Hasan-Rajin railway in October.

In addition to these, the Korea Taepung International Investment Group, which was established as an institution for introducing foreign capital in 2010, was re-designated in January as the implementing organization for the “State Economic Development 10-year Strategic Plan,” but no specific benefits were seen as a result of this measure.

There may be further developments in terms of succession as the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung approaches.

As North Korea prepares for the 100th anniversary of the birth of President Kim Il Sung in April 2012, the inclusion of Vice Chairman Kim Jung Un in the preparations for various important events is thought to be an effort to increase his authority. This process may include the publication of independent “guidance” activities being carried out by Vice Chairman Kim Jong Un, and his appointment to important posts.

From an economic point of view, also for coordinating the environment for succession, North Korea is believed to engage in the ongoing measures to make achievements that will strengthen the
impression that the standard of living of the people is improving. In addition, taking advantage of the intention of China, which hopes to develop its north-eastern region, and Russia, which is pressing ahead with developments in the far eastern region of Siberia, North Korea likely will aim to expand investment and support from both countries.

**Column: Economic Cooperation with China**

- In the “Rason Economic and Trade Zone” (see right map), expansion and resurfacing work on the road between the Chinese border and Rajin Port has been ongoing. In addition, there are plans for the servicing of Rajin Port wharf, and the constructions of a cement factory and agricultural model area.
- Meanwhile, there has not been much progress in the development of the “Hwanggumpyong-Wihwa Island Economic Zone” (see left map), although plans have been made for the development of the area as an industrial zone for information and light industries.
- Near “Hwanggumpyong,” full-scale construction work has begun in 2011 on the “Yalu River Public Road Bridge” as agreed between China and North Korea in 2009.
In response to North Korea’s efforts to strengthen ties with China through dignitary visits and economic cooperation, China showed a willingness to cooperate in strengthening relations.

After General Secretary Kim Jong Il’s first visit to Russia in 9 years, Russia showed an interest in proactive involvement with the Korean Peninsula, in response to North Korea’s various measures to strengthen ties with Russia.

North Korea stubbornly insisted on “no preconditions to the reopening of the six-party talks,” adding difficulties to negotiations with South Korea and the US.

In response to the demands by the US and South Korea for denuclearization measures and improving the South-North relations as a precondition for reopening talks, North Korea continued to emphasize it would “participate in the six-party talks only if there were no preconditions” (Foreign Ministry spokesperson, March), clarifying its stance of avoiding denuclearization measures prior to the reopening of the talks.

Against this background, Wu Dawei, China’s Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs, met with North Korea’s First Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan in April, after which a three-step process for the reopening of the six-party talks was outlined (South-North talks → US-North talks → six-party talks). Then two rounds of South-North talks on denuclearization (July and September), and two rounds of US-North talks (July and October) were held. North Korea, however, continued to reiterate its emphasis on “reopening the six-party talks with no preconditions,” creating difficulties in the discussion process.

General Secretary Kim Jong Il visited China twice, and works began on the joint development of border areas.

As North Korea’s relations with the US and South Korea stalled, General Secretary Kim Jong Il made an unusual third visit within just over a year to China in May (following the visits in May and August 2010), holding talks with President Hu Jintao, among others. North Korea’s media reported on the talks that agreements were reached on further strengthening political and economic relations, and also emphasized that the two parties “shared the opinion that solutions (of the nuclear issue) should be pursued through the reopening of the six-party talks and other opportunities for dialogue.” General Secretary Kim Jong Il made another visit to China on his way home from his visit to Russia
in August, strengthening the impression both within and outside the country of the closeness with China.

Following on from 2010, China and North Korea continued to actively exchange delegations. In June, Party Secretary Choe Thae Bok held talks in Pyongyang with a delegation of representatives from the Communist Party of China (CPC) led by Li Yuanchao, Head of the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee, a meeting that North Korea designated as “strategic dialogue.” In commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, North Korea’s goodwill delegation (led by Yang Hyong Sop, Vice President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly) visited China and China’s friendship delegation (led by Vice Premier Zhang Dejiang) visited North Korea.

From an economic perspective, works began on Hwanggumpyong (North Phyongan province) and Rason municipality, among other China-North Korean joint development projects in the border areas (June), while Vice Premier Li Keqiang, who is considered by some to be in line to become the next Premier of China, also visited North Korea with leading officials of the Ministry of Commerce (October) and signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement.

Furthermore, on the occasion of the above-mentioned 50th anniversary of the treaty, China’s navy fleet made a port call in Wonsan in August for the first time in 15 years, giving the impression of strengthening military ties.

China emphasized toward North Korea the importance of the reopening of the six-party talks and economic cooperation through the exchanges of dignitaries’ visits. This move seems intended to secure the stability of China’s surrounding areas, and to maintain and expand its influence on North Korea.

North Korea made efforts to step up exchange activities in political, economic and military fields with Russia.

General Secretary Kim Jong Il met with Mikhail Fradkov, head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, during the latter’s visit to Pyongyang in May. He also made his first visit to Russia in nine years (August) and met with President Medvedev, demonstrating North Korea’s stance to strengthen ties with Russia. The North Korean media reported on the meeting between the two leaders that the “expansion of the goodwill and cooperative relations between the two countries were emphasized.” It also reported that the two leaders “shared the opinion to resume (the six-party talks) without preconditions.”

The two countries agreed to press ahead with economic cooperation projects such as the construction of a gas pipeline between Russia and South Korea via North Korea. Interaction has been stimulated at both central and regional levels to allow this to happen.

Furthermore, Ri Yong Ho, Chief of General Staff of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), held talks
with a Russian military delegation in August in Pyongyang, after which a plan for joint military
exercises was announced, indicating the resumption of military exchanges.

Russia’s positive stance toward stronger ties with North Korea seems intended to expand its
influence in East Asia, and to stabilize the neighboring Korean Peninsula, prior to the APEC
summit meeting scheduled in Vladivostok in September 2012.

North Korea, China and Russia have their own intention in seeking stronger bilateral ties.

As North Korea continues to take measures to ensure the succession of Kim Jong Un, it will make
efforts for reconstructing the economy and achieving practical gains, such as economic assistance
and the removal of UN sanctions, through the ongoing dialogue with the US and South Korea.
Furthermore, North Korea is believed to aim for a “peace accord” with the US, which will benefit
its security guarantees, and may make some moves in the future towards the reopening of the
six-party talks, depending on the response of the US and South Korea. If, however, there is no
progress in relationships with the US and South Korea, North Korea may indicate or carry out such
provocative acts as a nuclear test, the test-firing of a missile or a military maneuver near the
Northern Limit Line (NLL), in an attempt to unsettle the US and South Korea, both of which will
hold presidential elections in 2012.

At the same time, in order to achieve breakthroughs in diplomatic relations and economic
reconstruction, North Korea likely will try to strengthen bilateral relations with China and Russia,
maintaining a not-too-close yet not-too-remote distance, in order to maximize their support.

In dealing with such intentions of North Korea, China likely will work for enhancing its influence
on North Korea through continuing active exchanges of dignitaries and coordination for the
six-party talks. China is also believed to promote joint development projects in the border areas
with a view to encouraging economic development in its north-eastern region.

Seeking to expand its sphere of influence in East Asia, Russia likely will step up its involvement in
the region with the leverage of economic cooperation with North Korea and active engagement in
the framework of the six-party talks.
Noth Korea is concerned about the aging of its military equipment and the lack of relevant parts, the military buildup in South Korea, and the enhanced military partnership between the US and South Korea. In addition, there is an observation that North Korea has requested China and Russia to assist with the renewal of its equipment. North Korea appears to be attempting to put pressure on the US and South Korea, whose navies have been conducting joint military exercises in the surrounding waters, through not only improving its military equipment with the assistance of China and Russia, but also attracting attention to the reinforced military exchanges with China and Russia.

**Column: North Korea sought closer military relationships with China and Russia**

- On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Sino-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on July 11, Chinese navy training vessels (the high-sea training vessel *Zheng He* and the missile destroyer *Luoyang*) made a port call at the North Korean port of Wonsan in August, after visiting Vladivostok in Russia. This was the first time for a Chinese Navy ship to visit North Korea in 15 years since July 1996, when the 35th anniversary was celebrated for the treaty. The latest visit is said to have been made at the request of North Korea.

- General Secretary Kim Jong Il was reported to have been accompanied by senior military officials and leaders in charge of military procurement during his visit to Russia in August. Immediately after the visit, Sidenko, Commander of the Eastern Military District, visited North Korea, and reportedly agreed to conduct joint military exercises intended for sea rescue training among others, in 2012.

- North Korea is concerned about the aging of its military equipment and the lack of relevant parts, the military buildup in South Korea, and the enhanced military partnership between the US and South Korea. In addition, there is an observation that North Korea has requested China and Russia to assist with the renewal of its equipment. North Korea appears to be attempting to put pressure on the US and South Korea, whose navies have been conducting joint military exercises in the surrounding waters, through not only improving its military equipment with the assistance of China and Russia, but also attracting attention to the reinforced military exchanges with China and Russia.
(3) North Korea aimed to unsettle South Korea in an attempt to get it to change its stance towards North Korea.
- North Korea called for various types of dialogues and joined denuclearization talks, while maintaining the hard-line stance.

North Korea engaged in “dialogue offensive” from the start of the year and called for reopening dialogue and improving relations.

North Korea began the year with the “New Year Joint Editorial” and other statements in which it called repeatedly for an improved relationship and further dialogue with South Korea. Subsequently, up until around April, preparatory talks were held in February for South-North high-level military talks. However, the sinking of a South Korean corvette in March 2010, and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November the same year, resulted in neither side being prepared to take reconciliatory measures, with South Korea demanding that North Korea “take responsible measures,” and North Korea continuing to deny its involvement in any of these incidents. As a result, no agreement was reached during the talks.

In addition, North Korea continued to demonstrate opposition to the distribution of propaganda leaflets intended for its residents by private South Korean organizations, and to the US-South Korea joint military exercises (held in February-April). These indicated North Korea’s increasing discontent against South Korea’s stance towards North Korea.

North Korea held denuclearization talks, while unsettling South Korea by hinting at military attacks.

In response to President Lee Myung Bak’s remark that “if North Korea agrees to denuclearization, General Secretary Kim Jong Il will be invited to the second Nuclear Security Summit (to be held in Seoul in March 2012),” North Korea repeatedly denounced President Lee, stating that the comment was a “heinous provocation against our [North Korea’s] regime and dignity.” In the end of May, North Korea declared that “we will no longer deal with the gang of the traitor Lee Myung Bak.” Furthermore, in June, North Korea announced that it had had contact with South Korea behind closed doors, and reiterated its intention “not to deal” with the Lee administration. In response to South Korean media reports that “photos of General Secretary Kim Jong Il and other North Korean leaders have been used as targets for firing practice, and slogans criticizing him have been displayed within the South Korean army,” North Korea reacted strongly, stating it would “enter into retaliatory military action.”

Against this background, chief representatives of the six-party talks (North Korea’s Vice Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho and South Korea’s Director of the Peace Negotiation on the Korean Peninsula
of the Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry Wi Sung Lak) held two rounds of denuclearization talks (July and September). During the two meetings, however, North Korea did not change its basic stance, and no specific progress was made towards the solution of the nuclear issue.

In September, North Korea responded to the replacement of South Korea’s Minister of Unification by stating that it “represents the collapse of (South Korea’s) confrontational policies,” and repeatedly called for a change in South Korea’s stance in regard to the North. Furthermore, in October, it sent what it referred to as a “final warning” to South Korea, again taking up South Korea’s distributing anti-North leaflets. The warning claimed that “our army and people will have no other choice but to respond physically,” indicating the possibility of a military attack.

North Korea exerted further pressure on the Mt. Kumgang tourism project with a more hard-line stance.

North Korea stepped up its efforts to shake South Korea through a variety of aggressive measures from April onwards in regard to the Mt. Kumgang tourism project, which had been suspended since 2008, when a South Korean tourist was shot and killed. These measures involved announcing in April that the exclusive rights to the project held by the South Korean company Hyundai Asan Co., had been rescinded, and newly constructing “Special Zone for International Tourism of Mt. Kumgang,” along with the enactment of the “Law on Special Zone for International Tourism of Mt. Kumgang,” which would promote international investment (May). Subsequently, North Korea hinted at “legal disposal” of the South Korean assets in the Special Zone, while pressing the South Korean government and relevant companies for choosing either reopening the tourism project or renting or selling their assets. However, no progress was made at the talks with South Korea, which requested the removal of the set of measures, and in August, North Korea announced its decision to go ahead with the “legal disposal.” Furthermore, through inviting Chinese tourists and international media to Mt. Kumgang, North Korea called for both tourism and investment from third countries, putting pressure on South Korea.

North Korea sought a South Korean administration that is conciliatory to the North, and it is likely to step up approaches to the South.

North Korea likely will continue to implement a range of measures designed to unsettle South Korea in an attempt to change the Lee administration’s stance towards North Korea. With the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled in South Korea in April and December 2012 respectively, North Korea is believed to step up both overt and covert efforts towards expanding pro-Pyongyang forces in South Korea, and also having a South Korean administration that is conciliatory to the North established.
In August, the South Korean authorities announced the arrests and indictments of five South Korean individuals on suspicion of having formed an underground organization known as “Wang Jae-san”* in 2001 and engaged in spying activities on the orders of North Korea. According to the South Korean authorities, the organization was engaged in the following activities:
- The organization collected South Korea’s political and military information and passed it to North Korea, based on instructions from the late Kim Il Sung to “create an organization to promote a revolution in South Korea.”
- Attempting to enter the political circle, the organization had a member assume the post of the secretary to Speaker of the National Assembly, and prepared to have its members run for elections for the National Assembly in 2008.
- In addition, the organization had received instructions from North Korea to be prepared for taking over government agencies and broadcasting stations, and bombing military facilities and oil storage facilities, among others, in time of need.

* Wang Jae-san is the name of a mountain in the Onsŏng area of North Hamgyong province, North Korea. North Korea considers this area to be closely related to the late Kim Il Sung’s anti-Japan activities.
(4) While the bilateral relations stalled, exchanges between Japan and North Korea were based mainly on sport.
- The North Korean soccer team visited Japan for the first time in about five years, and the Japanese team also visited North Korea.
- General Secretary Kim Jong Il made a public pronouncement regarding the country’s stance on Japan, calling once again for “reparations for the past.”

North Korea maintained a passive stance in regard to improving relations, continuing criticism of Japan on various occasions.

In 2011, North Korea reiterated its position that “any improvement in relations with Japan will depend on Japan’s move,” and as previously, continued to repeat criticisms of Japan on various occasions. In particular, when Japan took the decision to make a one-year extension of sanction measures (April), North Korea issued strong condemnation, stating it to be an “absurd act which could only be conducted by people who have at their core an enmity to North Korea.” North Korea also repeatedly issued critical propaganda against the moves within the Japanese political circle.

When the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred in March, the North Korean Red Cross sent a donation of US$100,000 to the Japanese Red Cross, and North Korea’s various media reported on the damages caused in the disaster and the incident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant on a daily basis.

A North Korean delegation visited Japan for the first time in about five years, and the Japanese and North Korean soccer teams also visited each other’s countries.

As relations between Japan and North Korea continued to stagnate, in the world of sports, bilateral exchange was realized and various North Korean delegations visited Japan for the first time since 2006, when various measures were implemented, such as the “ban in principle on North Korean officials’ entry to Japan” and the “ban in principle on individual North Korean nationals’ entry to Japan.”

When Japan hosted the 30th general assembly of the Olympic Council of Asia in July, North Korea’s IOC member Chang Ung and representatives of the North Korean Olympic Committee visited Japan after the Japanese government had decided that the North Koreans were in “exceptional circumstances” and had given them special permission to enter Japan.

Following on from this, when Japan hosted the Japan-North Korea soccer game in September for the third round of the 2014 FIFA World Cup qualifying matches, the North Korean team members were given the same special permission and visited Japan for the game.

Subsequently, when the second leg of the qualifier was held in North Korea in November, the
Japanese government partially and exceptionally lifted the voluntary restraint request on travel to North Korea, which has been in effect since 2006, and North Korea accepted the Japanese soccer team and around 150 fans.

General Secretary Kim Jong Il referred to “improving relations with Japan” based on the precondition of “reparations for the past.”

With the inauguration of the Noda administration in September, North Korea emphasized that “if the new administration is prepared to improve relations, then we will also move in that direction,” and that “we will look closely at future developments.” In other words, North Korea indicated that it would wait and monitor the new administration’s policy on North Korea for the time being, while maintaining its stance towards previous administrations that “any improvement in relations with Japan will depend on Japan’s move.”

Against this background, and in preparation for its second contact with the US, General Secretary Kim Jong Il responded to written questions from the Russian Itar-Tass news agency in October by stating, among other things, that “if Japan makes reparations for the past and ceases its hostile policies against us, it will be possible to normalize the bilateral relations.” Subsequently, the WPK’s organ paper “Rodong Sinmun” repeatedly carried editorial articles (October-November) that the remark of Kim Jong Il was the “basic stance in regard to the improvement of the bilateral relations with Japan.” Although there is no change in North Korea’s claim itself, the frequent media coverage may indicate a growing interest in improving relationships with Japan.

While maintaining a stance of “waiting” in regard to the relations with Japan, North Korea made efforts to build links with the Japanese political circle.

North Korea is believed to maintain its stance that “any improvement in relations with Japan will depend on Japan’s move” and focus on scrutinizing the Noda administration’s policy on North Korea for the time being. Meanwhile, it likely will attempt to establish links with the political circle in Japan via Chongryon for instance.

Furthermore, North Korea may make more positive moves toward improving the relations with Japan, if and when it decides that a chance arises, while taking into consideration not only Japan’s stance but also relevant developments, such as the South-North and the US-North relations.
(5) With a view to a “new heyday,” Chongryon further strengthened its organization and ideology.

- Chongryon continued the “Compatriot Reintegration Campaign” to expand the organization, and further tightened ideological education on full-time activists.
- Chongryon seemed to be promoting publicity and educational activities on the succession issue in a cautious manner.

Chongryon made concentrated efforts for the expansion and strengthening of the organization through the “90-day campaign.”

Chongryon has set a goal to “bring about a new heyday to the movement of Korean residents in Japan in 2012.” Following on from 2010, the organization offered daily life counseling and welfare activities to improve its image, while at the same time making organizational efforts of the “Compatriot Reintegration Campaign” with the intention of bringing a broad range of Korean residents into the organization. In particular, from March onwards, the organization engaged in a mass activity referred to as the “90-day campaign,” in which Chongryon encouraged its branches and affiliated bodies, such as the Korean Youth League in Japan (KYL) and the Korean Youth Commerce Community in Japan (KYC), to actively participate, thus trying to reinforce its base organizations (branches and subunits) and nurture next-generation activists.

Chongryon held the “Central earnest supporters’ meeting for realizing another heyday in Chongryon” in July to review the “90-day campaign.” At the meeting, the activities of successful local organizations were introduced – such as “efforts to attract students to Korean schools have resulted in a higher number of enrollment for the next year,” and “organizing various events has doubled the membership of the KYC’s prefectural branch” – and all the local bodies were instructed to follow the successful cases.

Chongryon engaged in organizational support activities in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake.

Immediately after the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred (March), Chongryon delivered and distributed daily commodities to Korean residents in Japan residing in the affected areas. It also rolled out nationwide fundraising activities for the reconstruction of damaged facilities, such as the Tohoku Korean Elementary and Junior High School (in Miyagi prefecture), and for assisting the lives of disaster victims, thus showing its organizational solidarity. General Secretary Kim Jong Il sent US $500,000 to Korean residents in the affected areas, and the North Korean Red Cross made a “sympathy donation” of US $100,000 to the Japanese Red Cross. Chongryon also organized
soup-runs for residents, including Japanese, in the affected areas. Chongryon attempted to attract more supporters for the organization by actively publicizing all these activities.

As ideological education was tightened on activists, Chongryon proceeded with propaganda on North Korea’s succession issue.

While Chongryon used these activities to call attention to the “soft” image of the organization, it also struggled to strengthen educational activities in regard to its full-time activists in order to ensure the high organizational morale in terms of ideology. In particular, Chongryon made a special effort to ensure the “spirit of the Party’s representative conference” (concerted solidarity, overcoming difficulties, and continuous revolution) as proposed by North Korea. Under such a situation, the issue of succession in North Korea was dealt with at the 2nd session of the 22nd Central Committee in July, at which Chief Vice Chairman Ho Jong Man reportedly emphasized a vow of loyalty to Kim Jong Un, Vice Chairman of the Party’s Central Military Commission, saying that “We look up in awe to our revered General Kim Jong Il and our respected leader Kim Jong Un.” A book titled “President Kim Il Sung and Compatriots in Japan” was also published in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of the late Kim Il Sung in 2012. The book deals with the process of succession from Kim Il Sung to General Secretary Kim Jong Il. Likewise, photographs showing General Secretary Kim Jong Il and Vice Chairman Kim Jong Un together have been published in Chongryon’s organ paper the “Choson Shinbo.” These indicate that educational and propaganda activities that can be taken as a preparation for the succession of powers from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un are ongoing in a cautious but steady manner.

North Korea is believed to continue ideological education along with efforts for expanding organization.

Chongryon likely will continue ideological education and efforts for organizational expansion for the time being toward a “new heyday in the movement of Korean residents in Japan,” while eyeing the succession issue in North Korea. As for ideological education, Chongryon is believed, in particular, to gradually expand the coverage of education and communication while taking into consideration the negative response within the organization against the “heredity” of power. Furthermore, in order to expand the organization, Chongryon will identify base organizations and Korean schools in Japan as “activity centers.” Especially the latter have access to many Korean residents, including students, graduates and their families. Utilizing these assets, Chongryon is believed to step up the “Compatriot Reintegration Campaign.”
(1) China feared the loss of unifying force of the Party, and sought “enhancement and innovation of social management.”
- The number of mass protests increased, and securing social stability became an urgent issue.
- China made a wide variety of efforts, including “control on the Internet,” in order to strengthen solidarity between the people and the Party.

The number of mass protests increased.

Recently, there have been frequent mass protests in China by citizens expressing discontent over such issues as the compulsory land appropriation, environmental pollution, and rising prices. There is an observation that the number of such cases “has doubled in 2010 compared to the 90,000 of 2006.” (Chinese paper “Economic Observer” dated February 26)

In particular, in 2011, health threats caused by wastewater emissions from chemical plants, repeated fuel price rises, illegal sales and purchases of land, and other issues directly inflicting damage on the life and health of the people tended to make the protests more large-scale and radical. Furthermore, in addition to the Tibetan and Uyghur Autonomous Regions, where large-scale protests had occurred in the past, protests stemming from ethnic minority issues occurred also in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (May). In Zhejiang province in October, a dispute between migrant workers and the local authorities escalated into a protest involving several tens of thousands of people.

Meanwhile, the call for a “Jasmine Revolution,” which became more conspicuous after February in the wake of the “Arab Spring,” did not develop into a large-scale movement due to the authorities’ thorough containment measures.

In the background to frequent mass protests lie the growth of Internet-based media and uncertainties regarding the economic future.

In the background to these frequent mass protests lie the growth of Internet-based media, such as the Chinese equivalent of Twitter (known as “Weibo”), and mobile email and text message services. It is said that more than 500 million people now use the Internet in China, and this fact has not only made it easier for people to access information, but also to communicate information. This resulted in a situation where these tools can be used to invite others to participate in protest activities, enabling the instantaneous gathering of residents over a wide area. In fact, information regarding accidents such as the high-speed railway crash that occurred in Wenzhou city, Zhejiang province in
July, and the September underground train collision in Shanghai, was communicated using these tools, resulting in the publication of facts on the Internet in advance of official announcements, which had a large impact on the response by the authorities.

Additionally, another background to the frequent mass protests seems to be a general sense of unease and discontent among the general populace in regard to the economic situation. Economic growth in China posted a high figure of 9.4% (January-September), but the consumer price index also rose by approximately 6% during the same period, placing a significant burden on the populace. Excessive development of real estate has also led to regional debt problems, which furthered the financial burden, and there are fears that the speed of economic growth, which is a prerequisite to maintaining social stability, may be slowing.

China called for “solidarity between the people and the Party,” and strengthened measures for “social management.”

Under the situation described above, the Communist Party and the government of China expressed a sense of crisis on the Party’s declining unifying force, stating that “Closer ties must be maintained between the Party and the people. Disengagement from the people is the greatest threat we could face.” They also called on Party members and leaders to “use the authority on behalf of the people, and seek profits for the sake of the people.” (July 1 speech by Hu Jintao on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the foundation of the Party)

In addition to this, China held up a policy to “enhance and innovate social management” in order to “strengthen social solidarity” and frequently held conferences and seminars to ensure the thorough understanding and implementation of the policy. Furthermore, the Party’s “Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Social Security,” which administered the policy, was renamed the “Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Social Management.” Along with the change of the name came the addition of new members, to the security and legal experts, from such fields as publicity (control on popular press and Internet media), the “three rural issues” (agriculture, including the issue of migrant workers, farming villages and farmers), religion (issues of Christianity and underground churches), and economy (issues regarding civil life), in order to provide a more comprehensive organizational system (September).

At the same time, in order to increase the number of staff allocated to maintaining security and improve equipment and facilities for this purpose, a 13.8% increase (624.4 billion yuan, approximately 7.5 trillion yen) in the budget for security maintenance was approved for 2011. In particular, the government showed a strong sense of caution against the use of the Internet in mass protest activities. The State Internet Information Office held a conference on October 13 on “healthy development of microblogs and strengthening of appropriate controls,” and instructed to deal severely with the creation and dissemination of false rumors, illegal use of the Internet and
other “acts that threaten public safety and interests” in order to strengthen control on information flow on the Internet.

**China called for “reform in cultural structure” with stronger measures to guide public opinion.**

Under such a situation, the 6th Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (October 15-18) adopted the decision regarding the “reform in cultural structure.” In the background to this lies the fact that Chinese society has been subject to various pressures caused by the influx of western values such as democracy, causing an awareness of uncertainty. The reform seemed intended to improve the quality of the ideology and morality of the people in line with “China’s unique socialism,” and to stabilize the system and the regime.

The decision explicitly mentioned the policy for stronger measures to guide public opinion through the consolidation of Party- and government-affiliated media, as well as popular press and Internet media. This policy seemed designed to control the flow of information among the people, in the face of the people’s increasing capabilities to communicate information and higher awareness of their rights. The policy also seems to reflect the administration’s awareness regarding the importance of being proactive in disseminating information.

**China carries over some issues.**

In China, the 18th National Congress of the CPC will be held in the second half of 2012, and it is expected that the regime will be handed over from one of the fourth generation leaders President Hu Jintao to the leadership of the fifth generation headed by Xi Jinping.

The Party and the government of China are expected to continue to work on removing the social paradoxes that are causing mass unrest in order to allow this transition to take place smoothly, but the ongoing series of scandals involving Party and government leaders have only contributed to dissatisfaction among the people, and no improvements have so far been noted.

In economic terms, too, the “12th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development,” which was adopted in March, calls for the maintenance of sustainable economic growth and a changeover of the economic development formula from dependency on external demand into an economy that supports itself based on internal demand. However, the demographic trend* indicates a dramatic fall in the birthrate and increasingly ageing population, which may add to the burden of social security. This may subsequently become a factor in restricting economic growth in the future. Under these severe conditions, the next generation of leaders will have to deal with the difficult challenges of maintaining economic growth and ensuring social stability.

* According to the “6th Population Census” published by the National Bureau of Statistics on April 28, the population aged 60 and above increased to 178 million (13.3% of the entire population) as of the end of 2010, while the population aged 14 and under fell to 222 million (16.6% of the entire population).
population).
The 12th Five-Year Plan explicitly mentioned the policy for the “development of maritime economy,” while making a carrot-and-stick approach on relevant countries.

With its economic power, China continued to engage in diplomacy with the intention of becoming a “major power.”

- The 12th Five-Year Plan explicitly mentioned the policy for the “development of maritime economy,” while making a carrot-and-stick approach on relevant countries.

China made efforts to dispel the “China threat theory” which would hinder the promotion of “modernization.”

China had stated that its main diplomatic tasks in 2011 would be to “create a more solid external environment that is favorable to modernization,” and to “walk the path to peaceful development” and “share opportunities for development alongside the international community.” (Policy statement by Premier Wen Jiabao in March) In addition to this, China issued a white paper entitled “China’s Peaceful Development” in September, which claimed that “China’s path to peaceful development is not a threat but an opportunity for the surrounding countries (and) will counter the old hegemony model by the major powers.”

The background of China’s emphasizing “peaceful development” seems the country’s awareness that the increasingly conspicuous “China threat theory” accompanied by its rising economic, political and military status will become great obstacles to “modernization.”

China called attention to itself as a “superpower” based on its economic strength.

Based on the diplomatic policy outlined above, China continued to actively engage in omnidirectional diplomacy through summit meetings by Party and government leaders.

In its relations with the major powers, China called attention to itself, too, as a “major power,” backed by its economic status as having the 2nd highest GDP in the world, while emphasizing its intention to “develop healthy and stable relationships.” (Premier Wen Jiabao in March)

Particularly in relations with the US, while China firmly maintained its basic stance in regard to “core issues” such as Taiwan and Tibet, it also claimed its status as another “major power” that has important influence in the international community, and stressed the importance of cooperation not only in bilateral relations but in dealing with global issues. In particular, when President Hu Jintao visited the US in January and held talks with President Obama, the former stated that “both China and the US are responsible and constructive major powers, and must cooperate as partners at a global level.” In another occasion in August, Vice President Xi Jinping told Vice President Biden, who was on his visit to China, that the two countries were the “two largest economies in the world”
and that “both countries must bear the responsibility for promoting healthy recovery of the global economy,” thus seeking to establish a comprehensive relationship of trust that would incorporate military, party, regional and private exchanges. Furthermore, at the “US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue” held in May, the two countries reached agreements on newly establishing the frameworks of “strategic and security dialogue” and “Asia-Pacific conference.”

While strengthening economic cooperation with surrounding countries, China also strengthened its stance toward securing marine interests.

In regard to surrounding countries, China continued to work towards “deepening friendly relationships with neighbors” (Premier Wen Jiabao, March), leveraging economic cooperation for a stronger influence, while at the same time further strengthening its stance in regard to protecting its marine interests in the South and East China Seas.

China included a chapter on the “development of maritime economy” for the first time in the “12th Five-Year Plan” (adopted in March). In the plan, China announced the policy of “constructing a powerful maritime nation” and stated that it would “define a maritime development strategy, and then improve skills in maritime development, control and integrated management.” This policy led to the deployment of a 1,500-ton marine patrol boat in May to the South Sea Fleet of the China Marine Surveillance, which holds jurisdiction over the South China Sea. Under the policy, China also stepped up patrol activities by dispatching the fisheries patrol boats managed by Hainan province, Shanghai city and other local governments to the seas around the Spratly Islands and the Senkaku Islands; previously, they had only patrolled China’s coastline. Furthermore, China conducted six military exercises in the South China Sea in June alone in an attempt to increase its naval presence in the area.

Against this background, China experienced conflicts with Vietnam and the Philippines, among others, in relation to the issues of territorial disputes and exclusive economic zones. The Philippines maintained that Chinese marine survey vessels had made multiple intrusions into its territorial waters near the Spratly Islands, to which China responded in June that “it is only natural for China to regularly patrol the areas of its own jurisdiction. We will not accept unfounded criticism.” In regard to the Philippines’ announcement that the “military facility under construction in Flat Island is nearly complete,” China warned in August that it “will abide by the principle of joint development, but [China] will not accept the encroachment of the territory.” As for Vietnam, its survey vessels operating in the South China Sea had their exploration probe cables cut by Chinese patrol boats twice in May and June, resulting in successive anti-China demonstrations in Vietnam. Vietnam also reached an agreement with India regarding the development of resources in the South China Sea (September). In response to this, China requested Vietnam to work towards the stability
of the South China Sea, while claiming the agreement to be an “infringement of China’s sovereignty,” thus warning against the involvement of a country outside the region. Also at the East Asia Summit (November), China claimed that the issue of the South China Sea should be solved through discussion and negotiation “by directly involved sovereign states.”

However, at the same time as demonstrating the uncompromising stance, China also showed a softer line at the China-ASEAN foreign ministerial meeting in July, where it agreed to the adoption of the “guideline” for the implementation of the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” (adopted in 2002), which called for a peaceful solution to the issues of the South China Sea. During the visit of President Aquino of the Philippines to China in September, China agreed to double the amount of the bilateral trade over the next five years, and during Vietnamese General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s visit to China in October, China proposed to “promote strategic mutual trust and develop economic and trade relations,” demonstrating more conciliatory policies backed by its own economic strength.

China struggled to secure stable supply of resources in diplomacy with developing countries. With its dependence on overseas oil resources reaching a record high of 53.7% in 2010, China continued to actively promote energy and resource diplomacy with developing countries, but faced some difficult aspects in securing stable supplies. For example, in Zambia, Michael Sata, who is said to have harshly criticized the inflow of Chinese capital, was elected President in September, indicating the increasing negative feeling in Africa against the Chinese presence. Furthermore, subsequent to the independence of South Sudan, which is an important source of crude oil for China, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited both South and North Sudan in August to maintain relationships with them. After the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya, China made a request to the National Transitional Council, the new ruling regime in the country, for the protection of its investment in energy facilities and other interests.

China continued various efforts to expand its international influence and further accelerated the dispatch of government vessels to protect maritime interests. China likely will continue to call for “peaceful development,” and also attempt to expand its influence in the international community by minding about its responses to international opinion as well as employing a combination of hard-liner and soft measures.

As for its relationship with the US, China is expected to maintain the uncompromising stance in what it refers to as “core interests” such as Taiwan and Tibet. At the same time, however, it is also believed to make efforts to maintain and expand high-level exchanges and dialogues in advance of the major personnel changes in the leadership expected to take place at the 18th National Congress. In regard to its maritime interests, at the diplomatic level, China likely will continue to call on Japan
and other surrounding countries to “shelve disputes and work on joint development.” At the level of marine security, China is expected to increase the number of naval ships deployed, improve equipment and reinforce patrol activities, and further accelerate the pace of dispatching government vessels.

**Column: China’s maritime security systems**

In China, the Fishing Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and the State Oceanic Administration have pressed ahead with better equipping patrol boats and expanding the area of operation. China has also attempted to claim sovereignty over the South and East China Seas, and secure maritime interests by dispatching fisheries administration vessels (that patrol fishing activity) and other government vessels to the seas.

In 2011, fisheries administration vessels managed by Hainan province, Shanghai city and other local governments, which had previously been used only to patrol the Chinese coastline, were dispatched to the Spratly Islands and the Senkaku Islands for the first time. Furthermore, the Fishing Bureau and other maritime patrol organs participated in joint exercises with the navy in the South China Sea.

<table>
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<th>South China Sea</th>
<th>East China Sea</th>
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| **Jan** | - Navy’s South Sea Fleet conducts minesweeping exercises  
- Maritime Bureau and Fisheries Administration Bureau conduct large-scale joint patrols off Guangdong and Fujian provinces  
- Two patrol boats of China Marine Surveillance (CMS) interrupt resources surveying by the Philippines in the Spratly Islands (Reed Bank)  
- Fighter-bomber unit of the Navy’s South Sea Fleet conducts flyover bombing exercise over the sea | Mar  
- CMS helicopter approaches a Maritime Self-Defense Forces escort ship in the central East China Sea  
- State Oceanic Administration aircraft approaches a Maritime Self-Defense Forces escort ship in the central East China Sea  
- Survey boat Nan Feng crosses into EEZ off Miyagi coast  
- 11 ships including destroyers and frigates pass approx. 100km NE of Miyakojima, sailing in a southeasterly direction from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean |
| **Mar** | - Chinese fishing boat supported by Fisheries Administration boats cuts cables of Vietnamese survey boat  
- Survey and other ships enter waters claimed by the Philippines and erect steel poles and buoys  
- Hai Jian 84 deployed to CMS South Sea Fleet  
- Hai Xun 31 dispatched to Singapore  
- Hainan province’s Fisheries Administration vessel makes first patrol in Mischief Reef on the Spratly Islands  
- 400-ton Yuzheng 306 permanently deployed in the Paracel Islands |
| **Apr** | - Fighter-bomber unit of the Navy’s South Sea Fleet conducts flyover bombing exercise over the sea  
- Survey boat Bei Dou cuts cables of Vietnamese survey ship  
- Survey boats Bei Dou and Ke Aue 3 as well as Fisheries Administration boats sail in the Senkaku Islands waters  
- Survey boat Dong Fang Hong 2 and Fisheries Administration boats sail in the Senkaku Islands waters  
- Total of six destroyers, frigates and other vessels pass approx. 100km NE of Miyakojima, sailing in a southeasterly direction from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean |
| **May** | - CMS patrol boat cuts cables of Vietnamese survey ship  
- Survey and other ships enter waters claimed by the Philippines and erect steel poles and buoys  
- Hai Jian 84 deployed to CMS South Sea Fleet  
- Hai Xun 31 dispatched to Singapore  
- Hainan province’s Fisheries Administration vessel makes first patrol in Mischief Reef on the Spratly Islands  
- 400-ton Yuzheng 306 permanently deployed in the Paracel Islands |
| **Jun** | - Survey boat Bei Dou  
- Survey boat Hai Xun 31  
- Survey boat Hai Jian 84  
- Survey boat Hai Jian 50  
- Survey boat Bei Dou sails in the Senkaku Islands contiguous zone  
- Survey boat Hai Xun 31 dispatched to Singapore  
- Survey boat Hai Xun 31 dispatched to Singapore |
| **Jul** | - Survey and other ships enter waters claimed by the Philippines and erect steel poles and buoys  
- Hai Jian 84 deployed to CMS South Sea Fleet  
- Hai Xun 31 dispatched to Singapore  
- Hainan province’s Fisheries Administration vessel makes first patrol in Mischief Reef on the Spratly Islands  
- 400-ton Yuzheng 306 permanently deployed in the Paracel Islands |
| **Aug** | - Survey boat Hai Xun 31 dispatched to Singapore  
- Hainan province’s Fisheries Administration vessel makes first patrol in Mischief Reef on the Spratly Islands  
- 400-ton Yuzheng 306 permanently deployed in the Paracel Islands |
| **Sep** | - Survey and other ships enter waters claimed by the Philippines and erect steel poles and buoys  
- Hai Jian 84 deployed to CMS South Sea Fleet  
- Hai Xun 31 dispatched to Singapore  
- Hainan province’s Fisheries Administration vessel makes first patrol in Mischief Reef on the Spratly Islands  
- 400-ton Yuzheng 306 permanently deployed in the Paracel Islands |
Both the US and China have various issues over which they remain at conflict, such as the sales of arms by the US to Taiwan, and a lack of clarity in regard to the current state and objectives of modernization of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. At the same time, both countries repeated high-level dialogues between the heads of states, cabinet members and military leaders. They also expanded the framework for bilateral communications, such as strategic and security dialogue.

### Column: Pending issues indicate ongoing conflict, but dialogue is continuing and expanding between the US and China.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Dialogue</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
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| Jan   | - US Defense Secretary Robert Gates visits China for military exchange (9-12)  
- President Hu Jintao makes an official visit to the US (18-21) | US State Department publishes an annual report on human rights situations in various countries, and State Secretary Clinton expresses concern about the situation in China (8). China’s State Council Information Office publishes its annual report on human rights violations in the US (10) |
| Apr   | - US State Secretary Hillary Clinton and China’s State Councillor Liu Yandong co-host 2nd U.S.-China high-level consultation on human exchange in Washington DC (12)  
- US-China human rights dialogue (by assistant secretary/bureau head) is held in Beijing (27-28) |  |
| May   | - US State Secretary Hillary Clinton, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, China’s State Councillor Dai Bingguo and Vice Premier Wang Qishang, among others, attend the 3rd US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue in Washington DC and newly established strategic security dialogue and Asia-Pacific conference (9-10)  
- PLA’s Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde visits the US, and holds talks with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen (15 – 22) | The Dalai Lama visits the US (5 -16) and meets with President Obama (16). Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson publishes a statement that criticizes the US of “interference in domestic affairs.” (17) |
| Jun   | - US Defense Secretary Robert Gates holds talks with National Defense Minister Liang Guanglie in Singapore (3)  
| Jul   | - Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen visits China, and holds talks with PLA’s Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde (9-13)  
- US State Secretary Hillary Clinton visits Indonesia for the ASEAN Regional Forum and holds talks with China’s Foreign MinisterYang Jiechi in Bali (22), followed by talks with State Councillor Dai Bingguo in Shenzhen (25)  
- Wang Yi, Director of State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, visits the US and holds talks with US State Secretary Hillary Clinton (27-30) |  |
| Aug   | US Vice President Biden visits China and holds talks with President Hu Jintao (17-21) |  |
| Sep   | Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, during his visit to the US to attend the UN, meets with US State Secretary Hillary Clinton and announces that the US-China relations are extremely important (26) | - US Government implements the Congress notification of the sales of arms to Taiwan. China’s Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zhijun summons Gary Locke, US Ambassador to China, to protest it (21)  
- At the US-China foreign ministerial meeting, China’s foreign minister Yang Jiechi requests State Secretary Hillary Clinton to reconsider the US decision to sell arms to Taiwan (26) |
| Oct   | 2nd US-China Asia-Pacific conference (by assistant secretary/bureau head) held (11) | In response to US President Obama’s announcement in Australia to station 2,500 US Marines in the country’s northern city of Darwin, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson comments that “It will be worth debating whether or not it is appropriate, given the current international situation, to strengthen military alliances” (16) |
| Nov   | - US President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao, who are in France for the G20 summit, hold talks in Cannes (3)  
- US President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao, who are in Hawaii for the APEC summit, hold talks in Honolulu (12)  
- US President Obama and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, who are in Indonesia for the East Asia Summit, hold talks in Bali (19) |  |
China showed a positive posture toward mutual visits of VIPs and resuming dialogue that had been stagnant in the aftermath of the collision incident of a Chinese fishing boat. From the beginning of the year, China displayed a willingness for mutual visits of VIPs and restoring dialogue with Japan, both of which had become stagnant in the wake of the collision incident by a Chinese fishing boat against Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels (September 2010). In January defense officials on both sides were said to reach a mutual understanding to establish a maritime communication network at the Japan-China Security Dialogue in Beijing. During the visit of Japan’s Deputy Foreign Minister in the same month, China and Japan agreed to work towards high-level exchange and cultural exchange in order to deepen a strategic and mutually beneficial relationship. Subsequently, in February, Japan and China reached an agreement at the Japan-China Strategic Dialogue in Tokyo to “not only improve the feelings of the people, but also find appropriate solutions for the subtle problems, in order to celebrate the 40th year of diplomatic normalization between Japan and China.”

Chinese leaders called for support subsequent to the earthquake disaster, and also showed willingness to improve relations after the inauguration of the Noda administration. The stance demonstrated by China became even clearer subsequent to the Great East Japan Earthquake (March 11). China dispatched emergency rescue teams, as well as providing supplies totaling 30 million yuan (approx. 360 million yen). It was widely noted that President Hu Jintao himself visited the Japanese Embassy in China to express his condolences (March 18). In May, Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan to attend the Japan-China-South Korea trilateral summit meeting, and personally visited the disaster areas in Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures, saying that “we wish to continue assisting the recovery from this disaster.” China showed the impression that it was working to improve its image in Japan. Furthermore, China supported Japanese companies that had suffered the impact of the disaster for financial aid, and offered opportunities to those companies to move to China. The Chinese media reported that the “relocation, subsequent to the earthquake disaster, of Japanese companies with
advanced technologies, will provide new commercial opportunities for China, and many regional
governments are now competing to attract them.” (September, International Business)

Subsequent to the appointment of Prime Minister Noda, China showed its willingness to improve
relations with Japan. Premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao both held dialogue with the
Prime Minister (Premier Wen: telephone conference on September 6; President Hu: in Hawaii on
November 12), expressing that “we wish to press ahead with new developments in our strategic and
mutually beneficial relationship,” and inviting Prime Minister Noda to China at the earliest
opportunity.

Chinese Fisheries Administration and other ships frequently operated in the waters around the
Senkaku Islands.

On the other hand, China repeatedly implemented a tough stance in regard to the coastal waters
around Japan, subsequent to the incident of the collision of a Chinese fishing vessel, through
dispatching government ships (“Fisheries Administration Ships”) attached to the Ministry of
Agriculture, among other measures. The dispatch of government ships to the area around the
Senkaku Islands had not been observed for a short time after the earthquake disaster. But in July,
government ships showed up again, and on August 24, two “Fisheries Administration ships”
temporarily intruded Japanese territory in the sea off Kubashima Island, and, claimed that “Diaoyu
Island and its surrounding islands are Chinese territory, and we are acting entirely appropriately in
regard to the territory under our own jurisdiction,” in response to warnings issued by Japan Coast
Guard. The seas around the Senkaku Islands have also been frequently flown over by Chinese
military aircraft, and Chinese marine survey ships have continually crossed Japan’s exclusive
economic zones (EEZ), in contravention of their advance notification.

Furthermore, Chinese State Oceanic Administration helicopters and small aircraft made dangerous
approaches to Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers in the area of the median line between Japan
and China in the East China Sea (March and April), while Chinese navy ships crossed the high seas
between Okinawa Island and Miyakojima Island before conducting exercises on the Pacific (June
and November), among other activities.

In regard to the joint development of resources in the East China Sea by Japan and China,
subsequent to the incident involving the collision of a Chinese fishing vessel, the Chinese
government announced the suspensions of the negotiations to achieve an international agreement
necessary for joint development implementation (September 2010). Negotiations have not been
conducted after this incident.

China struggled to improve Japanese public opinion toward China, in conjunction with the 40th
anniversary of diplomatic normalization.
It is anticipated that there will be no significant changes to the stance taken by China in the immediate future, and that government ships will be dispatched to the Senkaku Islands.

The year 2012 marks the 40th anniversary of diplomatic normalization between Japan and China, and as such, China is expected to conduct related events and mutual visits at all levels, with the objective of improving public opinion in Japan in regard to China. In addition, it is believed that China will work on building stronger relationships with both the ruling and opposition parties.
Focusing on the Taiwanese presidential election, China struggled to maintain an environment that would promote “peaceful unification.”

- China evaluated the progress in China-Taiwan relations under the Kuomintang administration, and intended to continue supporting this administration through stimulating economic exchange and other forms of support.

While China hoped for the re-election of Kuomintang candidate, it also feared the words and deeds of the Democratic Progressive Party candidate.

In Taiwan, the incumbent President Ma Yingjeou of the Kuomintang, and Tsai Ingwen, leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will stand in the Taiwanese presidential election in January 2012.

China evaluated that relations between China and Taiwan have “made significant strides forward” (President Hu Jintao, May) since the start of the Ma administration (May 2008), and indicated its hopes that the administration would continue. At the same time, in response to the fact that Ms. Tsai, leader of the DPP, refuted the existence of the “1992 Consensus,” which China considers to be the “political basis” for China-Taiwan relations, China continued against her, saying that “if [Ms. Tsai] insists on denying the “1992 Consensus,” and maintains a position of “independence for Taiwan,” relations between China and Taiwan will be shaken and less secure” (September, Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council).

China focused on strengthening China-Taiwan economic relations, with moves towards dispatch of purchasing groups, etc.

In this background, China continued to stimulate economic exchange with Taiwan. In particular, China indicated a policy of positively implementing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which came into effect in January, in the 12th Five-Year Plan (March), and promoted its economic ties as saying in June that “excellent economic and social benefits have been given to Taiwan.” Furthermore, up until the end of July, China repeatedly dispatched purchasing groups to Taiwan, which were mainly engaged in the purchase of agricultural products, and made a strong effort to purchase items from the central and southern regions, which are considered to be the support base for the DPP.

It is expected that, in the background to these actions, China desires that stronger ties based on economic exchange with Taiwan will not only support the administration of President Ma, but ensure that a relationship will have been created from which the administration cannot subsequently withdraw, even if a regime change occurs as a result of a presidential election.

In the future, China is expected to work towards the creation of an environment that allows
“peaceful unification,” while continuing to try to thwart the efforts of Taiwan independence and to utilize existing frameworks, including ECFA to the maximum.
(1) Russia stepped up internal and external activities in eastern areas.

- Prime Minister Vladimir Putin expressed his intention to stand in the forthcoming presidential election, and return to the position of the highest power.
- Domestically, Russia focused on economic and military augmentation in the Far East, and external expansion of influence to East Asia.

Prime Minister Putin’s candidacy for the forthcoming presidential election was confirmed at the party congress of “United Russia.”

Russia is to hold a presidential election in March 2012, and while attention is focused on the issue of which of the “tandem” leaders will stand, President Medvedev has hesitated in declaring his candidacy, and has maintained the position that his nomination will be decided through discussion. Prime Minister Putin also stated in April that it would be premature to debate candidacy before the completion of the lower house elections in December.

As the ruling party “United Russia” suffered a time of low approval ratings, “All-Russia People’s Front” was formed in May with the intention of rallying people across a broad spectrum of society, and President Medvedev recommended Prime Minister Putin for the candidacy in the next presidential election at the “United Russia” party congress, which the Prime Minister accepted in September.

Russia stepped up the development of resources in the east of Eastern Siberia and showed moves to strengthen the military presence in the Far East region.

The Russian government, aiming to break away from having its economy dependent on resources, has sought for a route into technical innovation, but financial authorities stated that “the recent high price of crude oil will allow the 3.6% GDP deficit to be covered” (September), indicating, in fact, an increased level of dependency on natural resources in the future. In this background, the government is instigating new resources development projects in Eastern Siberia and the Far East regions, as well as working to extend its sales routes into East Asia. In particular, Prime Minister Putin has ordered Gazprom to come up with specific policies to allow the supply of liquid natural gas to Japan, and increased cooperation with other countries in East Asia (October).

Furthermore, in terms of its national defense strategy, Russia indicated its intention to allocate two French-manufactured amphibious assault ships and a new-model strategic nuclear-powered submarine to its Pacific Fleet, as well as to station its newest air defense systems on the Kamchatka Peninsula and Japan’s Northern Territories, based on the unprecedentedly large-scale military
acquisition plans approved at the end of 2010. The Pacific Fleet of the Eastern Military District carried out the largest military exercises in its history (from late August to mid September) in the waters near the Japanese territory (the Okhotsk Sea, etc.), giving a strong indication that Russia is increasing its military presence in the area.

Russia worked to extend its influence in East Asia.

On the diplomatic front, Russia drew attention as it maintained a stance of cooperation with Europe and the United States, and worked towards stronger relations with CIS countries, while demonstrating the tendency to expand its influence in East Asia. Regarding the relations with China, Russia became the largest trading partner during 2010, and during the visit by Chinese President Hu Jintao to Russia in June, the two countries released a “joint statement on the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Russia-China Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation.” In this statement, it was revealed that an agreement had been reached to expand trade to 200 billion dollars by 2020 (the expected value of trade in 2011 is 70 billion dollars) between the two countries. During Prime Minister Putin’s visit to China in October, both countries confirmed the policy of strengthening economic relations between the two countries. In regard to relations with North Korea, with which Russia had previously had little connection, Russia changed its posture to positive engagement and both countries agreed to specific plans for the construction of a gas pipeline across the Korean peninsula as a result of General Secretary Kim Jong Il’s visit to Russia in August. In relations with Vietnam, two Russian-manufactured frigates were handed over to Vietnam in March and August, and Vietnamese Defense Minister Gen. Phung Quang Thanh also revealed a contract to purchase six nuclear submarines (June). Furthermore, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov attended the East Asian Leaders’ Summit in November for the first time as a Russian official.

Russia may accelerate its engagement in East Asia under Putin’s leadership.

Since there are no other promising candidates in the forthcoming presidential election, it is considered a foregone conclusion that Prime Minister Putin will win the election. It is expected that domestic and foreign policies in Russia are likely to be strongly influenced by the leadership of
President Putin, as he returns to the highest position of authority in the future. Relations with the East Asian countries will also be guided by Putin, and it is thought that the further strengthening of ties will be sought. It remains to be seen, however, how Russia will handle the issue of arms sales to Vietnam, given the possibility of friction with China in terms of both countries’ vested interests in the South China Sea.
(2) Russia employed a range of ways towards taking Japan’s Northern Territories within its own borders.

- As Russia’s cabinet members visited the Northern Territories, Russia promoted economic and military augmentations in the Territories.
- Russia stepped up its approach to Japan in order to expand economic cooperation.

Russia stepped up economic and military augmentations in the Northern Territories under the instruction of the President.

Russia pursued a variety of ways to take Japan’s Northern Territories within its own borders. In February, President Medvedev stated to cabinet members that the “[Northern Territories] are a part of Russia,” and issued instructions for economic development and military augmentation in the area. Based on this, Vice Premier Sergei Ivanov and the Ministers of Economic Development, Regional Development, Transportation and Natural Resources visited Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands, to observe the conditions of infrastructure development in May, and the budget for the “Special Federal Program for Socioeconomic Development in the Kuril Islands from 2007 to 2015” was increased significantly (August).

On the military front, after Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov had visited troops in the Northern Territories (February), he announced a policy to strengthen the unit (also February). Furthermore, during the large-scale military exercises conducted in the area around the Okhotsk Sea in September, Nicolay Patrushev, Russian Security Council Secretary, who is responsible for national security, including border protection of Russia, visited and observed troops on Kunashiri and Suisho Islands.

Separating negotiations for economic cooperation with Japan, Russia conducted promotions to control the Northern Territories within its own borders.

After the Great East Japan Earthquake (March), Russia dispatched an emergency rescue team to Japan, and provided additional energy supplies. Russia also proposed cooperation in the nuclear power and energy fields, as well as joint development of its Far East and Eastern Siberian areas, demonstrating its efforts for improvement in its relations with Japan, which had been deteriorated since President Medvedev’s visit to Kunashiri Island in November 2010. In regard to the issue of the Northern Territories, Russia and Japan held a summit meeting in Douville (May), and agreed to continue discussions “in a quiet environment.”

However, Prime Minister Putin, who is widely expected to win the presidential election in March 2012, has stated that he intended to press ahead with development in regard to the Northern Territories. It is anticipated that Russia, apart from its approach to Japan for extended economic cooperation, will begin to look for investments from other countries, in order to continue controlling...
the territories within its own borders.
As the situation in the Middle East and North Africa became more acute, Middle East peace negotiations stalled.

- The “Arab Spring” spread throughout many countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
- The Palestinian Authority applied for UN membership despite the stalling Middle East peace talks.

Changes of administration occurred in Tunisia and Egypt, and the Libyan regime collapsed.

Unprecedented mass anti-government protests (known as the “Arab Spring”), stemming from Tunisia in December 2010, spread throughout the Middle East and North Africa. The factors behind the anti-government protests differed in each country, but public dissatisfaction with existing problems, such as long-term administrations, political corruption, economic disparity, and youth unemployment caused a large-scale political movement.

In **Tunisia**, after a young unemployed man committed self-immolation in December 2010, anti-government demonstrations were sparked in various areas of the country, demanding measures for poverty and unemployment to be taken. President Ben Ali initially tried to suppress the protests through dispatching security forces, and announced employment measures, but the army refused orders to suppress the protests, and as a result President Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia (January). The country held its first parliamentary election subsequent to the collapse of the Ben Ali administration (October).

In **Egypt**, in late January, a pro-democratic movement, inspired by the change of administration in Tunisia, called for the resignation of President Mubarak through the Internet, and conducted mass anti-government demonstrations in the capital city of Cairo. President Mubarak was forced into resignation not only by the ongoing large-scale anti-government demonstrations, but also by the breaking away of the army (February). Egypt approved to reform its constitution by public vote (March).

In **Libya**, a demonstration took place in mid-February demanding the release of human rights activists in eastern Benghazi, and it led to anti-government movement. The Gaddafi regime dispatched security forces to suppress protests, but the anti-government forces established the National Transitional Council in Benghazi and resisted suppression, throwing Libya into a state of civil war. NATO subsequently conducted air-strikes in the area. After several months of stalemate, the National Transitional Council managed to control most of the capital city of Tripoli (August). The Council announced the death of Colonel Gaddafi and declared liberation throughout the...
In **Syria**, mass anti-government demonstrations occurred in the southern city of Dara’a in mid-March. Faced with a series of anti-government demonstrations, the Syrian government announced conciliatory policies such as resignation of the cabinet, and lifting of the emergency law, but at the same time continued to try to suppress the protests through the dispatch of military force. As a result, more than 3,500 people died in the clash (announcement by the UN, November).

In **Yemen**, anti-government protests began in late January. President Ali Abdullah Saleh was injured in an attempted assassination (June), and he moved to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. The President returned to the country in September, and complied with the transfer of power to Vice-President (November), but the conflict continues between the government and anti-government factions.

In **Saudi Arabia**, there has been no major anti-government protest, but some new movement has been observed, such as approving enfranchisement for women.

It has also been pointed out, along with the “Arab Spring” movement, that there is the concern of arms transfer to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and an increased level of activity within Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) over the deteriorating situation in Yemen. One needs to keep an eye on activities of such terrorist organizations as they may have an impact on regional security.

The Palestinian Authority applied for UN membership, despite the US announcement to exercise the veto.

As the Palestinian Authority-Israel direct talks brokered by the US had resumed in September 2010 but later stalled, President Mahmoud Abbas applied for UN membership, appealing to the “foundation of an independent state.”

In advance of this application, President Abbas had stated that “122 countries support Palestine joining the United Nations.” At the same time, while the Islamist fundamentalist organization Hamas reached an agreement with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which leads the Palestinian Authority, regarding the establishment of an Interim Unity Government (May), Hamas expressed its opposition because Palestine’s application for the UN membership presupposes the existence of both the states of Israel and Palestine as a prerequisite for UN membership, and further emphasized its stance that the existence of Israel would not be acknowledged.

Prior to the application, the US had explicitly announced its intention to exercise the veto at the UN Security Council, and subsequently the US, Russia, the EU and the UN proposed a peace agreement to be achieved by the end of 2012 after the Palestinian Authority submitted the application. However, Palestine continued to maintain its position that a prerequisite to resuming direct peace talks is the freeze of Israeli settlement, while Israel stated that the freezing of settlement activities
was “an issue that must be solved during negotiations.” Israel expressed strong objections to the Palestinian Authority’s formal entry to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). It remains to be seen how the Middle East peace talks will proceed.
5. International Terrorism

(1) Al-Qaeda and related organizations sought to continue Jihad in the aftermath of the death of Osama bin Laden.
- Al-Qaeda continued to express its intention to carry out Jihad, despite the deaths of many leaders.
- Al-Qaeda-related organizations expressed their support for the new al-Qaeda leadership.
- Continued vigilance is necessary against “home-grown terrorists.”

Al-Qaeda continued to call for Jihad despite a blow by the deaths of many leaders.

Osama bin Laden, who had been in hiding in Pakistan, was killed by the US Special Forces on May 2. With his death, al-Qaeda lost a “symbolic presence,” who had led the organization for more than 20 years since its foundation. Influential leaders within the organization, such as Ilyas Kashmiri and Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, who had been suspected of involvement in planning terrorist attacks in Europe and the US, were also killed in tribal regions of Pakistan after June, dealing a further blow to al-Qaeda.

However, al-Qaeda referred to Osama bin Laden’s death as “martyrdom,” declared the continuation of Jihad (May 6), and announced its appointment of Ayman al Zawahiri as the new leader of the organization (June 16). Zawahiri, an Egyptian, formerly the second-in-command, and known as al-Qaeda’s theorist, has published a wide range of messages and writings.

There have been some indications that Zawahiri is not capable of being the leader of al-Qaeda, but organizations such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) expressed their loyalty to Zawahiri (on July 7 and 26 respectively). The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) also expressed its congratulations to Zawahiri on his appointment on August 7, meaning that by August, the main organizations related to al-Qaeda had pledged their support and loyalty, and the turbulence surrounding the new structure of the organization appeared to calm down. Subsequently, Zawahiri called for attacks on US interests in a range of locations (August 15), demonstrating that the willingness to carry out terrorist attacks in the US and its allies remains strong.

Al-Qaeda-related organizations that hamper regional stability.

In Yemen, anti-government protests that are thought to have been influenced by the “Arab Spring” since January continued, and armed Islamist elements, identifying themselves as “Ansar al Sharia,” occupied Zinjibar, the capital city of Abyan province (May). Subsequent to the attempted assassinations of President Saleh in June, and of Defense Minister Mohamed Nasser Ali in August
and September, the situation worsened in Yemen, with terrorist attacks occurring throughout the country. AQAP, based in Yemen, not only contributed to these acts of terrorism, but also continued to distribute propaganda through *Inspire*, an English online newsletter, playing a large role in propaganda operations of extremist ideologies. The death of the famous Islamist extremist leader Anwar al-Awlaki in September – who is considered highly dangerous and was suspected of involvement in various terrorist activities in the Arabian Peninsula, including the incident in October 2010, when explosives were discovered in air freight from Yemen to the United States – may also have an impact on these terrorist activities.

In **North Africa**, AQIM has continued with an active program of terrorist acts, mainly in Algeria. AQIM has targeted security organizations, engaging in an attack on the Algerian army base in the northern area of Cabiria in April, as well as being behind a suicide bomb attack on a police headquarters in eastern Algiers in August. In addition, it attacked its neighbor Mauritania’s army in July, and was suspected of being involved in the bombing incident in Marrakesh, Morocco, in April, indicating a widening of the scope of its activities across the Saharan area. In addition to this, it has been indicated that AQIM took advantage of the confusion in Libya to obtain arms, and was involved in the August suicide bomb attack on the United Nations building in Abuja, Nigeria, implemented by the Islamist extremist organization Boko Haram.*

* Boko Haram is an Islamist extremist organization based in Nigeria. It issued a manifesto document via AQIM’s media wing in 2010.

In **Iraq**, the ISI, which is led by Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), carried out a suicide bomb attack on a regional government office in Tikreet, Salahadeen province (March), bomb attacks on more than 10 targets, including government and military facilities in Baghdad (May), and serial bomb attacks in the Taji area of Baghdad (July), with the complete withdrawal of the US troops stationed in Iraq by the end of December drawing closer. The strength of the ISI was thought to have declined as a result of the clean-up operations by the US troops in Iraq, but these terrorist acts prove that the ISI still had the capacity to carry out devastating terrorist attacks.

In **Somalia**, al-Shabaab, which has alleged its loyalty to al-Qaeda, continued its attacks and terrorist activities in regard to both the Somali transitional government and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Al-Shabaab abandoned the Somali capital city of Mogadishu in August, but it was still responsible for the suicide truck bombing in front of the building that housed the Somali transitional government, resulting in the deaths of over 100 people in October, and threatened terrorist attacks on Kenya (October), which has militarily advanced into Somalia. Al-Shabaab has also indicated collaboration with AQAP, and Somali fighters have joined Islamist armed groups in Yemen.
Fears continued in Europe and the US regarding “home-grown terrorists.”

Al-Qaeda and some of its affiliated organizations are not only recruiting members and planning terrorist attacks, but are also recommending that individuals who support their ideals should conduct their own self-motivated terrorist acts. It is widely believed that so-called “home-grown terrorists” who were born and brought up in the US and Europe but have been radicalized through the Internet and other means and are beginning to plan terrorist attacks within their own countries, are strongly influenced by the propaganda activities of these organizations.

In the US, a US soldier was arrested (on July 27) who planned a terrorist attack against a facility in Texas frequented by members of the US military. The suspect, who had refused to be assigned to Afghanistan and requested a discharge from the military, possessed not only explosives but also a simplified bomb-making manual that had been published in the AQAP online English newsletter *Inspire* (published in July 2010), entitled “How to make a bomb in the kitchen of your Mom.”

In addition, a resident in Germany shot at a US Army bus parked outside an airport terminal, killing two US soldiers in Frankfurt, Germany (March 2). On his arrest, the suspect stated that he had watched videos on the Internet, which made him “terribly angry at the US forces in Afghanistan, and led [him] to commit the crime.”

The suspects in these cases were not directly trained or “brainwashed” by terrorist organizations, but could have been influenced by the extremist ideologies communicated by al-Qaeda and other organizations. Extremist propaganda and SNS sites that allow such material to be transmitted facilitate the spread of such behavior, and there is a concern that “home-grown terrorists” who were influenced by them may carry out terrorist attacks in the future.

The threat of al-Qaeda and other organizations in Japan.

As has been stated above, the threat from al-Qaeda, its affiliated organizations and so-called “home-grown terrorists” still continued after the death of Osama bin Laden. Japan has been named more than once by al-Qaeda as a target for terrorist acts (2008, etc.), and members of international terrorist organizations have illegally entered Japan on multiple occasions (from 1999 to 2003). In addition, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, one of the leaders of al-Qaeda, has admitted to planning terrorist attacks against the US Embassy in Japan (2007), and more recently, propaganda from Islamist extremist organizations has become easy to distribute across a wide area in Japan through the use of SNS. For these reasons, it is necessary to keep a close watch on the activities of al-Qaeda and related organizations.
Multiple, serious terrorist incidents occurred in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

- In Afghanistan, while security control has begun to be handed over, the Taliban still engaged in frequent terrorist attacks.
- In Pakistan, the “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan” (Pakistan Taliban Movement) carried out terror attacks in retaliation for the death of Osama bin Laden.

In Afghanistan, the security forces’ lack of capability allowed the Taliban to launch offensives. Afghanistan observed the 10th anniversary of the US military offensive in the country in October, which had been instigated following the 9.11 terrorist attacks in September 2001. In July, Afghanistan saw the phased handover of security control from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan authorities, as well as the beginning of a phased withdrawal of foreign (mainly US) troops stationed in the country. Afghanistan entered a new stage, as it prepared for self-rule over responsibility for maintaining security.

However, anti-government militants, including the Taliban, interpreted the beginning of the withdrawal of foreign troops in Afghanistan as a victory in the Jihad, and expressed its intention to step up the intensity of Jihad until foreign troops completely withdraw. These militants carried out frequent terrorist attacks on security forces and government officials in various areas. In particular, serious and continual terrorist attacks targeted supermarkets and first-class hotels in the capital Kabul, which were frequently used by foreigners, as well as embassies, other official facilities administered by foreign governments, and presidential advisers and government dignitaries. Some of these incidents were ascribed to the Haqqani network, a hard-line faction within the Taliban. Even in regions where security controls were being handed over, terrorist attacks considered designed to disrupt the handover process were carried out on an ongoing basis.

In the midst of this, in September, Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former president of Afghanistan, who headed the Peace Council for reconciliation with anti-government militants, was killed by a suicide bomber posing as a Taliban representative. As these terrorist attacks became more serious, in September, President Hamid Karzai expressed his intention to discontinue dialogue with the Taliban, creating a further lack of clarity in regard to the direction in which the Afghan peace process is progressing.

In Afghanistan, the training of security forces by the international community has been a pressing issue. It is considered that it will still take a significant amount of time before the Afghan authorities are able to maintain security alone, and in the future, as the withdrawal of foreign troops and the handover of security control progress, there are concerns about deteriorating security in the country.
“Pakistan Taliban Movement” carried out retaliatory terrorist attacks after the death of Osama bin Laden.

In Pakistan, the “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan” (TTP; Pakistan Taliban Movement), which conducts terrorist attacks against the US to establish an Islamist state in the same way as the Taliban, stated that the death of Osama bin Laden was “martyrdom,” and declared revenge upon the US and the Pakistani government seen as its supporter, after which it engaged in frequent terrorist acts.

In particular, the TTP conducted a series of terror attacks during a short period in May, including a suicide bombing on a security forces training school in Charsadda, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (May 13), a bombing attack on a US Consulate vehicle in Peshawar (May 20), and an attack on a naval base in Karachi, Sindh province (May 22). The attack on the naval base was unprecedented in terms of the perpetrator’s entering a heavily guarded base, blowing up an antisubmarine aircraft supplied by the US government, and occupying the base for a long period of time. The area around the base included facilities that stored some of the nuclear weapons, and this incident increased international concern regarding Pakistan’s ability to manage its nuclear arsenal.

Furthermore, the TTP expressed its support to Ayman al Zawahiri after he was nominated to the leadership of al-Qaeda in June, and in addition to continuing terror attacks in revenge for the killing of Osama bin Laden, maintained an offensive stance. A female suicide bomber attacked a police station in Peshawar in August, and tribespeople who were cooperative with the government in the northwest border areas of Afghanistan were taken hostage in September, among other aggressive attacks.

Against this background, the UN Security Council designated TTP as an organization to be subject to sanctions in July, including the freezing of its assets.
(3) Radical Islamist organizations continued their activities in various locations around Asia.
- Small groups carried out suicide bombing attacks in Indonesia.

Groups influenced by Jemaah Islamiyah continued suicide bombing attacks.

The Indonesia-based Islamist extremist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was said to have reduced its capability to conduct terrorist acts due to the crackdown by the Indonesian authorities. Meanwhile, small groups influenced by JI carried out suicide bombings in a mosque inside a police station (April) and a Protestant church (September).

These groups were partly exposed by the authorities, but are considered to still have a certain potential for attack. Furthermore, in Indonesia, in addition to these groups, other individuals and organizations have emerged that have been influenced by JI, and it is impossible to deny the possibility of further suicide bombing attacks. The moves of these forces will need to be monitored.

In the Philippines, Islamist extremist organizations and communist militants continued activities.

In the Philippines, while the government has pressed ahead with implementing peace negotiations and conducting crackdowns, Islamist extremist organizations and communist militant organizations continued to undertake armed attacks to demonstrate their strength.

The Islamist extremist organization Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) reduced its strength as a result of the crackdown, but it still went as far as to demonstrate its threat by beheading soldiers in an incident in July. Furthermore, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) killed 19 soldiers in October, causing the government to react by carrying out air strikes, for the first time in three years. Peace negotiations, which have been ongoing to date, need to be carefully watched in the near future. The Philippine Communist Party’s military wing, New People’s Army (NPA), continued its repeated violent activities, which were apparently conducted for the purpose of extortion, and under the slogan of “preventing environmental destruction,” launched its biggest attack to date simultaneously on three mines, including one in which Japanese companies had invested (October).

India was also subject to terrorist attacks by Islamist extremist organizations.

Bombing attacks in Mumbai (July) and New Delhi (August) are considered to have been carried out by the Islamist extremist organization known as the Indian Mujahideen (IM), and the Pakistani Islamist extremist organization known as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which is pointed out to have connections with IM. The future moves of these groups need to be closely watched.
The underlying threat of terrorism, however, is still significant, as has been discussed here, and spoke of the need for a “transition to a future of peace after 10 years of war.”

The US and its allies began an offensive operation in Afghanistan in 2001, and after destroying the administration of the Taliban, which was harboring al-Qaeda, it also killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of the al-Qaeda forces in Iraq (in 2006), and Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, and conducted clean-up operations in regard to al-Qaeda forces throughout the world. Against this background, the US government announced the complete withdrawal of its troops from Iraq by the end of December, and the staged withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan by 2014.

Subsequent to these incidents, the response of the international community has included the imposition of UN sanctions, such as the freezing of assets, travel restrictions, and the prohibition of arms sales against al-Qaeda, the Taliban and related organizations. In addition, at the G8 summit, an action plan was drawn up in regard to responding to terrorist activities, and various other measures were implemented within the APEC, the ASEAN and other regional forums in order to strengthen the response to terrorism worldwide.

In addition to these global measures, Japan also defined an “Action Plan for the Prevention of Terrorism” in December 2004 in order to respond to the potential for domestic terrorism. The Action Plan involved measures to prevent terrorism, including the following: (1) Strengthening of measures to ensure that terrorists are not allowed into Japan, (2) Strengthening of measures to ensure that terrorists cannot act freely within Japan, (3) Strengthening of controls over substances and items that could be used in terrorism, (4) Strengthening of measures to ensure the suppression of funding for terrorism, (5) Strengthening of measures to ensure the safety of key facilities, and (6) Increase in capacity to collect information regarding terrorists and terrorist activity, etc. In addition to this, the “Action Plan for the Realization of a Society Resistant to Crime,” formulated in 2008, defined measures to deal with cyber terrorism and cyber intelligence, promoting further strengthening of anti-terrorism measures.

The underlying threat of terrorism, however, is still significant, as has been discussed here, and the response to this threat is one of the most pressing issues for the international community.
Column: Serial terrorist attacks in Norway

At around 3.30 pm on July 22, a bomb exploded in government buildings that housed the Prime Minister’s and other offices, killing eight people. Approximately an hour and a half later, at a youth conference organized by the governing Labor Party on Utoeya Island, around 50km north west of Oslo, a man dressed as a policeman went on a shooting spree, killing 69 people.

Anders Breivik, who was arrested on suspicion of serial terrorist acts, had repeated anti-Islam opinions via postings on the Internet before he committed the crimes, and subsequently demanded during his testimony in court the “elimination of Islam from Norway and Europe,” and “sanctions against the Labor Party, which has accepted Muslims as immigrants, and promoted multiculturalism.”

Since 1990, Norway has been proactive in welcoming immigrants from Iraq, Somalia and other Muslim countries, with the purpose of relieving a labor shortage, but an increase in the number of Muslim immigrants who cannot find a job has increased the social security burden, leading to increasing calls from Norwegian nationals for immigration controls.

Against this background, Breivik was discontent with the current immigration policy and extent of Muslim immigration. This has led to an increasingly anti-Islam feeling, which is thought to have manifested itself in extremism, and resulted in these terrorist acts.

Column: European countries banned the wearing of burqa

In April, France enacted a law that banned the wearing of burqa, niqab and other forms of dress worn by Muslim women to cover their entire bodies, on the grounds that religious expression in a public place infringes the spirit of the “secular republic,” which is protected by the French constitution.* In Belgium, too, a similar law was enacted in July with the purpose of countering terrorism, while Italy, Holland and Switzerland are also debating the introduction of similar laws. In response to the enactment of the French law, protest demonstrations have been held in France and the UK, and objections were raised by some Muslims.

In 2010, al-Qaeda also criticized France for the enactment of this law in an official statement.

* This law allows exceptions of wearing these items in places of worship, since to do otherwise would infringe the freedom of religion. It also gives exceptions for the hijab, which covers only the hair and neck, as well as the chador and other items that cover the body but not the face.
6. Adverse Activities against Japan

Increasing concerns about the leak of important information through cyber-attacks and continued illegal exports of WMD-related materials.

- There was a spate of cyber-attacks targeting government agencies and defense-related companies.
- Concerns about the transfer of dual-use materials to North Korea and Iran.

There were many cyber-attacks with the apparent aim of obtaining defense technology information. In Japan there were many cyber-attacks supposedly aimed at stealing critical information by sending targeted e-mails to specific government agencies and companies. Cyber-attacks on several private companies, including Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, were uncovered in September, followed by those on government agencies, such as the House of Representatives and Japanese diplomatic offices abroad in October. It is believed that these attacks targeted defense technology information and classified information that such companies and agencies held. The perpetrators of these attacks are not yet known, but all of the attacks are believed to have been systematically planned, and some observers pointed to the possible involvement of foreign states conducting cyber intelligence.

There were also cyber-attacks by hacker groups aiming to stop the website functions of government agencies. Postings to call for cyber-attacks on Japan’s government agencies on September 18, the 80th anniversary of the Lake Liutiao Incident, were found on major Chinese websites and there were actually cyber-attacks targeting the government agencies, etc. believed to be conducted by Chinese hacker groups around that day.

Large-scale cyber-attacks occurred frequently in other countries as well. For example, attacks apparently aimed at stealing classified information from Lockheed Martin, a US defense-related company, were detected in May. The US government for the first time publicly pointed to the possible involvement of the Chinese and Russian governments in these cyber-attacks (November).

Intelligence activities by Russia were detected in Germany, suggesting similar threats to those against Japan.

A person suspected to have conducted intelligence activities for a long period of time in Germany for Russia was arrested (October), and there were continued concerns about intelligence activities
conducted by China, Russia and other countries in Western countries. Because similar threats may exist also in Japan, continued vigilance is required.

There is a possibility that countries causing concerns about nuclear proliferation may continue procurement/proliferation of WMD-related materials.

In spite of the repeated UN Security Council resolutions demanding discontinuation of nuclear-related activities, North Korea and Iran are believed to be continuing the procurement of materials for ballistic missiles via third countries. In June it was found that a North Korean ship, *MV Light*, which was suspected of carrying WMD-related materials, had been chased by US ships off the southern coast of China, refused repeated demands for inspection of its freight, and returned to North Korea. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a resolution at its annual general assembly (September) to express concerns about the uranium-enrichment program and light-water reactor construction by North Korea.

The threat of adverse activities against Japan will likely further intensify.

Foreign countries still hold high interest in Japan’s advanced technologies, and foreign intelligence agencies are expected to continue their activities to target Japan. The outflow of important information due to cyber-attacks has already become a reality, which requires more stringent security. In addition, North Korea and Iran are expected to continue using various means in order to obtain materials and technologies for nuclear and missile development. Their moves require continued and careful observation.

**Column: Recent cyber-attack methods**

Traditional cyber attacks were directed at unspecified targets and mostly used simple methods, such as DDoS attacks and defacing of websites. Most of them were aimed at showing off their success. Recently, however, sophisticated and prolonged cyber-attacks targeting specific corporations, etc. (Advanced Persistent Threat: APT) are increasing. Characteristics of APT include: (1) targeting specific persons or groups; (2) obtaining inside information, etc. through a collaborator inside the target or through social engineering (illegally obtaining information by exploiting gaps in human psychology/behavior), and; (3) attacking persistently and in multiple steps using multiple techniques. In recent years APT is attracting attention as a new cyber-attack technique that cannot be defended in cyber space alone.

Traditional techniques of targeting a system’s vulnerability are also used, causing serious damage. An example is the hacking of the network of Sony, a Japanese company, which announced the leak of personal information on up to approximately 77 million customers (May).
North Korea and Iran continued nuclear and missile development

**<North Korea demonstrated nuclear and missile capabilities>**
- North Korea announced in October 2003 that it would divert the plutonium extracted from spent fuel rods of the 5MW graphite-moderated nuclear reactor in Yongbyon into military use, and declared that it owned a nuclear weapon in February 2005. In October 2006 and May 2009, North Korea announced the success of “nuclear experiments.”
- In June 2009, North Korea announced that it would start uranium enrichment to secure fuel for what it claimed to be a light-water reactor. In November 2010, North Korea had US nuclear specialists tour a facility termed as a uranium enrichment facility in Yongbyon and announced that uranium-enrichment work was progressing in the facility. It is pointed out that North Korea is advancing such work as tunnel boring in preparation for further nuclear experiments at the experiment site in Kilju, where two nuclear experiments were purported to have been carried out.
- North Korea seems to be developing and producing mid- and long-range ballistic missiles, including Nodong, Musudan, and Taepodong 1 and 2, while domestically producing Scuds, which are short-range ballistic missiles developed by the former Soviet Union. North Korea showed off the results of its missile development by launching a ballistic missile that was supposedly based on Taepodong 2 in April 2009 and by revealing ballistic missiles that are supposedly Nodong and Musudan through North Korean news media at a military parade in October 2010. In addition, North Korea seems to have launched surface-to-air missiles, etc. in 2011.

**<Iran forced through the launch of ballistic missiles>**
- In August 2002, Iranian dissidents exposed Iran’s secret construction of uranium-enrichment facilities and heavy-water production facilities. Later examination conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) revealed that Iran had been conducting various nuclear development activities, including plutonium extraction.
- Since July 2006, the UN Security Council has repeatedly adopted resolutions to oblige Iran to stop uranium-enrichment, etc. However, Iran has continued nuclear-related activities, ignoring these resolutions. In November 2011, the IAEA’s Secretary General distributed a report claiming that “we are more concerned about the possibility of Iran developing nuclear weapons in secrecy” to the council members.
- Having developed mid-range ballistic missiles named Shahab 3, Ghadr and Sejil, Iran launched a total of 14 missiles, including Shahab 3, at a military exercise conducted by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in June 2011. Iran keeps up a hard-liner stance, as the Guard’s commander said, “Our missiles can reach the US bases in the region as well as Israel,” showing that Iran has not changed its stubborn stance.
III Focal Issues of the Domestic Public Security Situation in 2011

1 Aum Shinrikyo

(1) The mainstream group tried to expand the organization while continuing its policy of “getting back to Asahara.”
  - The group continued to promote absolute faith in Asahara.
  - The group increased the number of newly recruited followers through active recruitment activities.

The group promoted its policy of “getting back to Asahara” in both follower education and control. The mainstream group promoted the policy of “getting back to Asahara,” emphasizing absolute faith in him following on from 2010. In followers’ education, the group resumed training in an intensive seminar for lay members (January) that had followers repeat in chorus an entire sermon including expressions requiring absolute faith in Asahara, such as, “Always think about what the will of the guru is,” and, “Am I practicing his will?” The training had not been conducted for about 15 years since 1996, just after the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system. In later intensive seminars (May and September), the group consistently gave guidance to strengthen absolute faith in Asahara by continuing the same training and making participants memorize as many as several hundred of Asahara’s preachings from textbooks. For follower control, the group developed and distributed “Commandments for Followers (2011 edition)” by adding to “Commandments” (code of conduct for followers) explanations in line with Asahara’s preachings, such as, “Don’t rely on what is not right” (February), to ensure conduct in accordance with the dogma preached by Asahara. In addition, they held a “birth celebration” around Asahara’s birthday (March 2), as they had in the past. Senior members said, “We wish to recover the momentum we had before the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system. We will focus on tantra vajrayana from this year.” Thus they emphasized that they would expand their influence by practicing tantra vajrayana, which they regard to be the fastest way to saving all life as preached by Asahara. Participating lay followers also expressed their strong faith in Asahara, saying, “We will protect the truth at the price of our lives and follow the guru for eternity,” for example.

The group continued aggressive efforts to expand their follower base and significantly increased the number of newly recruited members.

Assuming that expansion of their follower base is essential for saving all life as preached by Asahara, the mainstream group aggressively engaged in activities to recruit new followers.
Especially in April, when universities accept new students, (1) live-in members in the guise of students entered campuses of universities in the Kinki Region without permission and distributed leaflets for solicitation to students without mentioning the cult’s name, while saying to students, “You can have a lot of fun besides study,” and (2) live-in members made students who were lay followers gather other students of their ages and hold events, for example.

During intensive seminars held in May and September, the group made lay followers who were successful in recruiting new members present their experiences, while senior members urged members to make recruitment efforts, saying, “Guiding people is our mission. Devote yourself wholeheartedly to the salvation mission for the guru,” etc. In addition, the mainstream group strengthened the organization’s overall efforts in recruitment activities by compiling a recruitment manual by July based on the methods of branches and training centers that succeeded in recruiting new followers, and by holding workshops in the cult’s facilities across the country. In addition to continued solicitation on the street and in bookstores, the group adopted new recruitment methods, such as contacting people who showed interest in religion, yoga, divination, the spiritual world, etc. through SNS and luring them to a yoga training session that was operated by the group without mentioning the cult’s name.

As a result of all these activities, the mainstream group recruited more than 200 new members as of the end of October based only on the sect’s report, greatly exceeding the number of new members in 2010 (more than 90). Looking at the breakdown, younger age brackets and the Hokkaido and Kinki regions stand out.

The group hardened its confrontational approach against the Public Security Intelligence Agency, as seen in the arrests of its members.

The mainstream group had been strengthening its confrontational approach against the control measures by the PSIA. During an on-site inspection of their facility at Hokima, Tokyo, in July, a live-in member who acted as an observer obstructed the inspection by yelling at the public security intelligence officers who were trying to inspect the property. Furthermore, a live-in member of the
legal department of the mainstream group who was in a position to instruct how to respond to the inspection repeatedly hit the video camera held by another public security intelligence officer who was recording the scene of the inspection as evidence. PSIA made accusations of the observer in the former case described above on the charge of obstructing performance of inspection (according to Article 39 of the Organization Control Act), and the live-in member of the legal department in the latter case on the charge of obstructing performance of public duty (according to Article 95 of the Penal Code) to the Metropolitan Police Department. In response, the Police Department accepted the accusations and arrested the two members.

**Column: Increase of new members seen in the cult’s report**

The cult had reported increases of approx. 100 new members, combining the mainstream group and the Joyu group, every year since 2009. The number of new members described in the cult’s report in 2011 substantially exceeded the number of new members in 2010 (see the chart below).

![Change in the number of new members based on the cult’s report](chart.png)
Column: Moves concerning the Great East Japan Earthquake

- While posting a comment of sympathy on its official website on March 12, the day after the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred, the mainstream group immediately started to store a large amount of supplies, such as food and water in its facilities, in accordance with “Survival Manual for Salvation (1996),” created based on the “end-time” predicted by Asahara. At the same time, senior members gave guidance, such as “disciples who don’t believe or take refuge in the guru will die.” The group also created a DVD titled “Urgent Special Program: Through the Great Earthquake – Prepare for Death” and made its followers view news reporting the tsunami damage and past preaching of Asahara saying “you will be saved even facing death in disaster if you contemplate the guru.” Furthermore, in April the group instructed live-in followers to make and submit “a written will” to refuse the taking-over of their remains by their relatives, insisting “if you die in a disaster and your relatives take over your remains and carry out mundane funeral, it will have a negative impact on your transmigration.”

- Regarding the Joyu group, Joyu posted a comment of sympathy on his blog on March 11, the day of the earthquake, and on March 13, the group published measures to support victims, focusing on money and clothing donations, and electricity conservation in the cult’s facilities. On the other hand, however, Joyu preached in his sermons that the earthquake disaster and radioactive contamination were “partially human-generated calamities caused by human ignorance” and that “people living in the vicinity (of the nuclear plant) were not unsuspecting but had accepted the plants knowing the potential danger.”

- The cult’s teaching material titled “Step To Truth” (published in 1992) carries a preaching of Asahara, saying, “Hooking a fish may make you go to hell,” as an example of “the principle of karma”—that pains you have inflicted on others will come back to you. Regarding the damage caused by the earthquake, senior members of the both groups provided lay followers with explanations, such as “most of the people who died in this earthquake died due to their karma of living by killing numerous marine creatures” (a senior member of the mainstream group) and “one of the causes of the earthquake damage is fishermen’s continued killing of numerous fish. It’s no wonder that killing brings karma” (a senior member of the Joyu group). This makes it clear that both groups lead followers based on the precepts of Asahara as described above.
Victims and residents remained fearful and anxious about the cult.

The Joyu group continued to stress activities of “breaking away from Asahara.”

Following 2010, the Joyu group continued to stress activities of “Hikarinowa,” which “had broken away from Asahara,” actively utilizing various media. Above all, Joyu trumpeted the stance of “breaking away from Asahara” by stressing “reflection and review” on the sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway system and on other past activities at a talk event held at a live music hall in Tokyo (January) and a speech at a lecture meeting staged by a citizens’ group (February). Joyu also said in an interview for a weekly magazine that “Hikarinowa completely casted off faith in Asahara.”

Following on from 2010, the group has held regular meetings named “off-line meetings” for people invited through SNS in major cities, including Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya and Fukuoka, and also opened Joyu’s lectures to the public on a private, free, live-video distribution site. On its official web site, the group also stressed that nonmembers also can participate in various events in order to impress that “Hikarinowa” is an open organization. In addition, the group posted experiences of people who deserted “Aleph” and joined “Hikarinowa” in a segment titled, “Contact for consultation/salvation of Aleph (formerly Aum Shinrikyo) brainwash victims,” set up on its website, aiming to attract mainstream group members.

The Joyu group vigorously stressed the stance of “breaking away from Asahara” in these promulgation/propaganda activities, but in Joyu’s preachings and the “off-line meetings” for people targeted for recruitment, Joyu repeatedly issued statements saying that the Japanese society, from which Asahara emerged, was guilty of what Asahara had done in a series of attacks conducted by the cult, etc. to shift the responsibility from Asahara to society. Furthermore, at intensive seminars (January, May and August), Joyu also implemented a ritual known as “empowerment,” which is recognized as being only very slightly different from the “initiation” that used to be conducted by Asahara, as it has done in the past, which indicates that there is no change in the fact that the group remains under the influence of Asahara.

The group stepped up activities in Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

The group’s senior members, including Joyu, visited Ukraine in January, May and September, and held seminars attended by dozens of Russian followers who visited the country. At the seminars,
Joyu preached and conducted a religious ceremony, interviews, etc. In addition, the group started a “pilgrimage to holy sites”—visiting sites in Ukraine approved as “holy” by Joyu—, as they are doing in Japan. The group taught its Russian followers on a routine basis through preachings given by Joyu from Japan, utilizing a video-phone service using an Internet connection, and through study sessions held by senior members who were sent to the Russian Federation at irregular intervals.

Victims and local residents remained fearful and anxious about the activities of the Joyu group. When the third extension of the surveillance period was decided on January 23, 2009, the Joyu group expressed an “apology to the victims and bereaved families about the series of attacks and our will to continue compensation,” and that “we will strive to bring about reconciliation with local residents by providing information and preventing nuisances, among others.” However, even an apology to the victims and the bereaved families has not yet been made sufficiently; the victims of the sarin attacks in Matsumoto and the Tokyo subway system and the bereaved families said, “the mental trauma will never heal for the rest of my life (victim)” and “in my heart I wish the cult would disappear” (survivor), for example. The Joyu group provided very little information to people living in the vicinity of the cult’s facilities, and local residents are reporting fear and anxiety, saying, “They say ‘we regret,’ but provide no explanation whatsoever on that,” “We don’t know how they are living, which makes us very anxious,” “They are touting that they cut ties with Asahara but I don’t trust them at all,” “I feel a strong sense of fear when I think they might release sarin gas again and I could be a victim,” etc. The governments of the municipalities where the cult’s facilities are located requested further extension of the surveillance period and the tightening of control. Thus, the activities of the Joyu group could not obtain understanding from the victims, the bereaved families or local residents.
The mainstream group has been increasing its cash and deposit balance by about 30 million yen every year since 2008 and using the abundant funds to extend its influence by purchasing large, new facilities since 2009, for example. In contrast to their good financial condition, their payment to “Mutual Assistance Fund for the Victims of the Sarin Gas Attack” in 2009 and 2010 decreased to approx. 20 million yen (about one half of the approx. 40 million yen paid in 2008 before the termination of the bankruptcy administration). In 2011 they paid only approx. 15 million yen as of the end of November.

There has been no major change in the cash and deposit balance of the Joyu group since 2008. As one of the reasons to continue its activities, the group stated “making full efforts to pay compensation to the victims and the bereaved families, and making apologies.” It published on its official website a “Request to Revoke Surveillance” (submitted to the Public Security Examination Commission in September 2008), describing the “determination to step up efforts to pay compensation exceeding our nonbinding target” (8 million yen). However, the group paid only 3 million yen in 2010 as well as in 2009, an amount which is less than 40% of the 8 million yen paid in 2008 before the termination of the bankruptcy administration. In 2011 as well, the group paid only about 3 million yen (as of the end of November).

Disappointed with the status of compensation payment by the cult, one of the family members of the victims of the sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system said with visible irritation, “As soon as a financial framework to regulate Aum Shinrikyo was lost with the termination of bankruptcy procedures, Aleph acquired facilities by investing more than 200 million yen, and is using them blatantly without regard to the anxiety of local residents. Hikarinowa signed a compensation contract with the Organization to Support the Victims of Crimes Committed by Aum Shinrikyo, but they started to show insincerity by paying only the minimum requirement of 3 million yen and even seeking a further reduction of the amount, ignoring the nonbinding annual target of 8 million yen. The abhorrence of Aum Shinrikyo members, who pay exclusive attention to their own interests, is no less than as it was when they committed the sarin attacks.”
Today the cult has approximately 1,500 followers in Japan, of whom approx. 400 are live-in members and approximately 1,100 are lay members. Most of the live-in members and about 50% of the lay members are those who had joined the cult before the 1995 sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway system. Compared with 2010, live-in members decreased, whereas lay members increased due to vigorous recruitment activities while there has been no major change in the total number of members. The cult has 32 major facilities in 15 prefectures. In addition, the cult has about 140 members and several facilities in the Russian Federation.

In order to handle this situation, the Public Security Intelligence Agency implemented on-site inspections of a total of 47 of the cult’s facilities in 15 prefectures from January to the end of November in accordance with the Organization Control Act, which includes simultaneous on-site inspections of 29 Aum Shinrikyo facilities nationwide, conducted by about 360 public security intelligence officers in August.

During an on-site inspection of their facility at Hokima, Tokyo (the mainstream group) in July, two live-in members obstructed the performance of the inspection and public duty, as described above. The PSIA reported the cases to the Metropolitan Police Department.

In addition, the PSIA received four quarterly reports from the cult on its organization and activities in 2011. In accordance with Article 32 of the Organization Control Act, the PSIA used the contents of the reports prepared by the cult as well as the results of the PSIA’s on-site inspections and investigations to provide relevant information to 17 municipal governments in three prefectures on a total of 49 occasions between January and the end of November.

Residents living in areas near Aum Shinrikyo facilities remained fearful and anxious about the cult and conducted a campaign to collect signatures to request extension of the surveillance period (fourth time) in addition to a series of protest gatherings and demonstrations demanding the disbanding of the cult and the removal of its facilities.

From October to November, residents living in the areas near several facilities, including Minami Karasuyama facility, and people involved in the Aum Shinrikyo Countermeasure Municipal Network lodged a request with the Minister of Justice and the PSIA Director-General for extension of the surveillance period.

Under these circumstances, the PSIA held 44 opinion-exchange meetings with local residents from January up to the end of November and provided explanations on the current state of the cult and
the implementation of surveillance in an effort to alleviate and eliminate public fear and anxiety concerning the group.

**PSIA requested extension of the surveillance period (fourth time).**

Following on from the decision to extend the surveillance period in January 2009, the PSIA judged that it was necessary to further continue surveillance of the cult’s activities based on the following facts:

i. Both Aleph and Hikarinowa have absolute faith in Asahara, and decide activity policies obeying his will and gauging his will from his words and deeds in order to spread and realize the dogma of Aum Shinrikyo, the founder of which is Asahara, which shows that their activities are under the absolute influence of Asahara;

ii. Asahara, the mastermind of the two sarin attacks, remains the cult’s representative and member, and five persons involved in the sarin attacks, including Tomomitsu Niimi, are still its members;

iii. Asahara was the cult’s representative at the time of the sarin attacks and remains the representative today, and his wife and Joyu, who were its senior officials as “ministers” at the time, are still senior officials;

iv. Both Aleph and Hikarinowa retain the “Code,” encouraging homicide by promoting the “program to transform Japan into Shambhala” and adopting as their members’ code of conduct the practice of *tantra vajrayana* in order to save all living things as preached by Asahara;

v. They maintain an unusual closed society, isolated from the general public, and their senior members made statements to justify the two sarin attacks, which shows a risk that they could commit mass murder even today;

vi. It is difficult to unravel the actual state of their activities because the nature of their organization remains closed and delusive; in addition to the victims of the cult’s crimes and their bereaved families, local residents, etc. living in the areas near the cult’s facilities are also fearful and anxious, and have requested extension of the surveillance.

Consequently, on November 28, the PSIA requested the Public Security Examination Commission to extend the surveillance period by three years (fourth time) in accordance with Article 12, para. 1 of the Organization Control Act.

Preceding the request, on November 10, Hikarinowa made an application with the Public Security Examination Commission to request execution of authority to rescind surveillance in accordance with Article 6, para. 2 of the Act.
Among Aum Shinrikyo Seigoshi, only Koichi Ninomiya is still playing a role in the cult’s management. He went on a nationwide tour of the facilities to preach at irregular intervals and instructed members to strengthen recruitment activities to attract new followers. In addition he repeatedly travels abroad on the pretext of purchasing Buddhist images to sell through a business he runs.

Seigoshi Tatsuko Muraoka, who used to be an officer of “religious organization Aleph,” left Aleph in June and said in an interview for a weekly magazine (August) that “in a conflict in the organization over the operation policy, the guru’s wife removed me from the management in 2006,” and, “I love the guru very much. It is impossible to change this sentiment.”

Seigoshi Naruhito Noda, who was also an officer of “religious organization Aleph,” has been supporting former followers since he was expelled from Aleph in March 2009. He published a book revealing the inside of the cult in March 2010. In the book he wrote, “Since Asahara’s wife came out of prison in October 2002, she and Asahara’s third daughter started to step in to the cult’s management and made orders behind the scenes,” and, “In 2006 I was removed from the top management of the cult on the wishes of the wife and the third daughter of Asahara. There is no place for you in the cult if you go against them.”

Because Asahara’s wife and others removed Muraoka and Noda from the top management of the cult and made them leave Aleph by executing the power to shuffle personnel, the PSIA recognized that Asahara’s wife is still an “officer” of Aum Shinrikyo, and it claimed and proved that she, as well as Asahara and Joyu, falls under an “officer” as provided in Article 5, para. 1, item 3 of the Organization Control Act in the request for extension of the surveillance period (fourth time) made in November.
As of the end of 2010, there were 13 death sentences in trials of a series of crimes committed as the cult’s activities, including the sarin gas attacks in Matsumoto and in the Tokyo subway system. Three of the cases were pending for appeal hearings but the Supreme Court turned down the appeal made by Masami Tsuchiya in February 2011 and the appeal made by Tomomasa Nakagawa and Seiichi Endo in November, bringing an end to 16 years of trials for a series of incidents (see the appendix).

However, the sadness and anger of the victims and the families will never disappear.

Shizue Takahashi, the representative caretaker of the Association of Victims of the Sarin Gas Attack on the Subway said:

“My husband was an assistant stationmaster, 50 years old. Around 8:10 of March 20, 1995, when bringing out the suspicious object reported by a passenger from the train, he died due to inhaling virulent sarin gas leaking from the object. When I arrived at the hospital, his body was already cold. Many times I stroked his face, squeezed his hands and rubbed his legs but he did not wake up. I cried with my cheek against his face. I still clearly remember how my tears wet his face.”

“They say Hikarinowa declared to make efforts to apologize to the victims’ families and continue payment for compensation, but I have received no contact from Joyu nor have I directly received his words or letter of apology. After all, Hikarinowa is just making good use of the media to make an impression as if they are sincere.”

“If the restriction through surveillance is lost, they would be able to act freely without being subject to any control. They are unpredictable. When I think about this, the fear and anxiety I felt at that time come back to me.”

“The sarin gas attacks are not over for the victims and the bereaved families. Considering the perceptions of the bereaved families and in order to eliminate society’s anxiety, I wish for the immediate disbanding of Aum Shinrikyo so that they cannot continue their activities. If this is difficult, keep an eye on the cult’s activities through surveillance at the very least.”

Column: “The case is not over for the victims and their families”

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## Appendix

<Trial status of 13 persons who were sentenced to death for a series of cases>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Incidents (charge)</th>
<th>Judgment of the first instance</th>
<th>Judgment of the second instance</th>
<th>Judgment of the final appellate instance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yasuo Koike (Original family name: Hayashi)</td>
<td>Matsumoto sarin attack (accessory to murder/attempted accessory to murder) Subway sarin attack (murder/attempted murder), etc.</td>
<td>Jun. 29, 2000 Death penalty</td>
<td>Dec. 5, 2003 Dismissal of appeal</td>
<td>Feb. 15, 2008 Dismissal of final appeal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Toru Toyota</td>
<td>Subway sarin attack (murder/attempted murder), etc.</td>
<td>Jul. 17, 2000 Death penalty</td>
<td>Jul. 28, 2004 Dismissal of appeal</td>
<td>Nov. 6, 2009 Dismissal of final appeal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Masato Yokoyama</td>
<td>Subway sarin attack (murder/attempted murder), etc.</td>
<td>Sep. 30, 1999 Death penalty</td>
<td>May 19, 2003 Dismissal of appeal</td>
<td>Jul. 20, 2007 Dismissal of final appeal</td>
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</table>
Facilities where on-site inspections were carried out
(From January to end of November 2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility name</th>
<th>Inspection date</th>
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<td>Yokohama facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yokohama Nishi facility</td>
<td>5.20 8.1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Facilities in Chiba Prefecture</strong></td>
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<td>Noda facility</td>
<td>4.26 8.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kamagaya facility</td>
<td>4.26 8.1</td>
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<td><strong>Facilities in Osaka Prefecture</strong></td>
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<td>Osaka facility</td>
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64
2. Moves concerning the Great East Japan Earthquake and the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant

(1) Domestic groups engaged in various activities in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake.

- Radical leftist groups approached workers and students through their activities to support the disaster areas.

- The Japan Communist Party called attention to the party through their activities to support the disaster areas.

- Right-wing groups criticized the crisis management, etc. of the government and power companies.

Radical leftist groups brought in workers and students through their activities in the disaster areas.

On March 11, the Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake centered in the sea off the coast of Sanriku occurred, causing unprecedented damage on the pacific coast of the Tohoku region (Great East Japan Earthquake). In response, radical leftist groups put effort into bringing in workers and students through intervention into employment issues accompanying the disaster and volunteer activities in the disaster areas. Among them the “Chukaku-ha” sent relief supplies to the disaster areas, bringing its affiliated labor unions to the fore, and tried to attract contingent workers whose contracts were not renewed because of the disaster to the unions.

The “Kakumaru-ha” sent its activists to the disaster area and tried to contact volunteers while encouraging students of its stronghold universities to participate in volunteer activities in an effort to win them over to the group.

The Japan Communist Party called attention to the party through fund raising for the disaster area and the sending of volunteers.

The JCP started fund raising all over the country for the victims just after the disaster and donated the collected money to local governments, agricultural cooperatives, fisheries cooperatives and commerce and industry associations of the disaster areas. Party members who visited the disaster areas removed rubble, distributed relief supplies and listened to requests in evacuation centers. The JCP introduced these activities in its organ Shimbun Akahata for publicity purposes.
Right-wing groups conducted an illegal act protesting against French media that made a mockery of the disaster.

Most of the right-wing groups refrained voluntarily from street activities after the earthquake but resumed activities around May, criticizing the crisis management, etc. of the government and power companies. In such situation, some right-wing groups protested in front of the French Embassy in Japan against a private French TV station that had broadcasted a program making a mockery of the disaster. During the protest, several members trespassed on the premises of the embassy (May).
The accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant activated the antinuclear power movement.

- Radical leftist groups demanded immediate shutdown and decommissioning of all reactors in protest gatherings and demonstrations.
- The JCP engaged in activities to demand the government to change its energy policy.
- Some right-wing groups held meetings calling for “breaking with nuclear power generation.”

Radical leftist groups criticized the government, etc. and organized an antinuclear organization.

A serious accident occurred at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant in consequence of the Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake. In the wake of the accident, radical leftist groups made antinuclear activities one of their priority struggles and repeated criticism of the crisis management, etc. of the government and power companies, as well as protesting in front of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the head office of Tokyo Electric Power Company (March and April) demanding the immediate shutdown and decommissioning of all reactors. They sent activists from across the nation to simultaneous nationwide activities (June 11 and September 11) and to a meeting calling for “breaking with nuclear power generation” (September 19, Tokyo) organized by antinuclear power groups. The activists engaged in propaganda activities, such as distributing their organ papers and leaflets, while calling for the shutdown and decommissioning of reactors.

The central faction of the “Chukaku-ha,” which viewed the rising antinuclear movement as an opportunity to expand its strength and infiltration, vigorously engaged in antinuclear power activities by sending its activists to various meetings held by antinuclear power groups, etc. and making them distribute leaflets and collect signatures. The group also organized its own meetings and demonstrations across the nation and set up “Nonukes Zenkoku Network (NAZEN)” in August.

The JCP focused on forming national public desire for “withdrawal from nuclear power generation.”

The JCP criticized the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant as a “human-made
disaster caused by an atomic energy administration that had neglected safety.” At first, the party placed focus on demanding the government to separate the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and make it independent. However, in response to the growing momentum of the antinuclear power movement involving nonpartisan citizens, the party adopted a more proactive stance toward a mass movement of “breaking with nuclear power generation” by starting a “national movement” to demand the government to establish a program for withdrawal from nuclear power generation (May). In June the party “expanded the phased withdrawal from nuclear power generation” that it had propounded before the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant into “prompt withdrawal from nuclear power generation within five to ten years.” In July the party set out a policy to build a broad coalition focusing on the single common issue of “withdrawal from nuclear power generation.”

Based on this policy, the party’s organization and affiliated groups across the country organized meetings and demonstrations demanding the withdrawal from nuclear power generation in various locations, gathered signatures, made proposals to local governments, distributed booklets introducing a lecture on nuclear power generation given by former Chair Tetsuzo Fuwa, and worked toward the adoption of its opinions and resolutions at local assemblies.

Meanwhile the JCP pointed to cozy ties between power companies and related government ministries/agencies based on its independent investigation, etc. and repeated criticism and questioning of the government and power companies. Furthermore, the party obtained “internal documents” concerning the issue of the so-called “staged emails” allegedly organized by Kyushu Electric Power Company and Hokkaido Electric Power Company and reported the documents in its organ *Shimbun Akahata* ahead of the common press (July and August). Some right-wing groups engaged in activities for “breaking with nuclear power generation,” stressing the “crisis of ruining the country.” Most of the right-wing groups were not active concerning the issue of nuclear power generation, but some of them insisted on a “breakaway from the dependence on nuclear power generation that could ruin the country,” called for the general public to participate with blogs and Twitter, and organized meetings and demonstrations named “meetings and demonstrations for breaking with nuclear power generation from the right wing-perspective” in Tokyo, Kanagawa and Chiba (July to November).
3. Radical Leftist Groups

(1) Radical leftist groups worked to build their organization.
- The “Chukaku-ha” carried on their campaigns stressing employment issues.
- The “Kakumaru-ha” intensified its approach to members of key industry labor unions.
- The “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association continued efforts to rebuild its organization.

The “Chukaku-ha” focused on bringing in contingent workers.

Criticizing employment policies of the government and companies as “increasing contingent workers, poverty and unemployment,” the “Chukaku-ha” provided labor consultations for contingent workers and intervened in labor negotiations in various locations while bringing its affiliate labor unions to the fore in order to bring in contingent workers to its affiliated unions. For contingent workers of Japan Post, in particular, the group set up a new joint union and actively encouraged them to become members of the union with the slogan of “smash JP’s major restructuring.” In addition, joint unions around the country organized an antinuclear petition drive, rallies and demonstrations after the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, while trying to recruit new members for the joint unions through these activities. In such situation, the group held the annual National Workers’ Rally (Tokyo) in November under the main theme of “against nuclear power and unemployment,” mobilizing some 2,650 people, exceeding the level of the previous year (roughly 2,400 people) and thus showing a stance to continue to promote labor movement in order to maintain and expand its organizational strength.

The “Kakumaru-ha” conducted propaganda activities at regular meetings of key industry labor unions.

Activists of the “Kakumaru-ha” are believed to be in positions enabling exertion of influence in the Japan Confederation of Railway Workers’ Unions and the East Japan Railway Worker’s Union. Under the policy of giving priority to organization building, the group also put much effort into approaching members of other key industry labor unions, including JP and NTT, mobilized activists in the areas around meeting halls where these unions held regular meetings, conducted propaganda activities criticizing the leaderships of the unions, and encouraged workers to join the group. In the
“Student and Laborer Joint Actions” in major cities (June and October), the group repeated criticism of JTUC-RENGO, of which most of the key industry labor unions are members, as “actively involved in the discussion on consumption tax increase,” aiming to increase influence on members of key industry labor unions.

For Kaihosha Okinawa Branch, which is the group’s local stronghold office, the group invested approximately 100 million yen in a building with a total floor space two times as large as that of the old office, and moved to the new office in March.

“Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association worked to organize day-laborers and mobilized them for various struggles.

In order to rebuild the organization weakened by its division to the mainstream and anti-mainstream factions (June 1999), the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association worked to organize day-laborers, etc. through livelihood support activities, and mobilized them for the Narita struggle (the mainstream faction) and antiwar/anti-military-base struggles (the anti-mainstream faction).

In such situation, when the Tokyo High Court rendered a decision ordering the removal a building of the “Tenjinmine Strike Headquarters” of the Union to Oppose the Airport within the grounds of Narita Airport in May, approximately 50 people, including six activists of the mainstream faction supporting the Union, squatted in the court’s building and were arrested on charges of unlawful trespass.

| Column: Stronghold offices of “Chukaku-ha” and “Kakumaru-ha,” as well as the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association |
|---|---|
| Chukaku-ha | “Zenshinsha” head office (Tokyo, approx. 80 residents), 6 branches (Miyagi, Kanagawa, Osaka, Hiroshima, Fukuoka and Okinawa) |
| Kakumaru-ha | “Kaihosha” head office (Tokyo, approx. 20 residents), 6 branches (Hokkaido, Ishikawa, Aichi, Osaka, Fukuoka and Okinawa) |
| Mainstream faction of the Kaiho-ha group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association | “Gendaisha” (Tokyo, approx. 20 residents) |
| Anti-mainstream faction of the Kaiho-ha group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association | “Sekisaisha” (Tokyo, several residents) |
(2) Radical leftist groups actively engaged in anti-globalization campaign in cooperation with overseas organizations.
- Radical leftist groups reinforced cooperation with overseas organizations through the dispatch of activists and joint actions.

Exchange with overseas organizations through participation in the World Social Forum, etc.
“ATTAC-Japan,” led by JRCL (formerly Fourth International group), sent its activists to the World Social Forum held in Dakar (Senegal) in February, gathering anti-globalization groups from around the world, and it announced its support for and solidarity with antigovernment demonstrations in the Middle East and North Africa.
In addition, “ATTAC-Japan” sent its activists to a local protest organized by ATTAC France, etc. against the G8 Summit in France in May.

Cooperation with overseas organizations with the aim of creating an international network against US bases.
Asian Wide Campaign Japan (AWC Japan), led by Japan Communist League, (Unified Committee) sent its activists to “International Forum Against US Bases,” which was held by gathering antiwar/anti-globalization groups from around the world to Manila (the Philippines) in July, and agreed on creating an international network against US bases together with these groups.
AWC Japan sent its activists to South Korea to exchange opinions with local groups on the current status of anti-military-base movements in August.

Column: AWC Japan
In 1996 Japan Communist League “Senki-ha” and Japan Communist League National Committee (later unified into Japan Communist League (Unified Committee)) formed AWC Japan as the Japanese organization of the “Asian Wide Campaign against American/Japanese Aggression in Asia” (Asian Wide Campaign), which was formed by left-wing groups, etc. in Asian countries in 1992. Japan Communist League (Unified Committee) identified “building and strengthening AWC as the united front of anti-imperialism in Asia” as the top priority in its international activities. Based on this policy, AWC Japan is trying to reinforce cooperation with overseas organizations, especially in Asia, while domestically engaging in movements to demand the removal of US bases from Japan.
(3) Moves of the “Yodo-go” group and the Japanese Red Army.

- The “Yodo-go” group continued to demand the retraction of the arrest warrants on the charge of kidnapping Japanese nationals.
- The Japanese Red Army maintained its dangerous nature.

The “Yodo-go” group tried to gain expanded support toward its members’ return to Japan

Again in 2011, the “Yodo-go” group, including the Japan Airline “Yodo-go” hijackers (see note) who are in North Korea, demanded the retraction of the arrest warrants on the charge of kidnapping Japanese nationals as a precondition for the members’ return to Japan, and asked for consent and support in their message to a gathering (May) held by supporters to assist their return.

It is anticipated that the “Yodo-go” group will continue to demand the retraction of the arrest warrants on the charge of kidnapping Japanese nationals and make approaches to every level in every sector in order to gain expanded support for their assertion.

Note: On March 31, 1970, nine activists of the Communist League Red Army Faction hijacked Japan Airline Flight 351, whose nickname was “Yodo-go,” with 129 crew members and passengers, and surrendered themselves to the North Korean authority after landing near Pyongyang on April 3.

The Japanese Red Army attempted to justify the Lod Airport Massacre in Tel Aviv.

The Japanese Red Army has attempted to justify the Lod Airport Massacre in Tel Aviv* committed by three of its members by calling the incident the “Lydda Struggle.”

As in previous years, Japanese Red Army members and supporters held a gathering to commemorate the incident in 2011 (May). Fusako Shigenobu, the top leader of the

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<th>Internationally wanted “Yodo-go” group members</th>
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<tr>
<td>Shiro Akagi</td>
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<td>Kimihiro Uomoto</td>
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<td>Takahiro Konishi</td>
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<td>Moriai Wakabayashi</td>
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<td>Junko Mori</td>
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<td>Sakiko Wakabayashi</td>
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<td>Takeshi Okamoto</td>
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*The Yodo-go group claims that Okamoto is “dead.”

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<th>Japanese Red Army members on the international wanted list</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kozo Okamoto</td>
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<td>Kunio Bando</td>
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<th>Japanese Red Army members on serving time</th>
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<td>(as of the end of November)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fusako Shigenobu</td>
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<td>Yukiko Ekita</td>
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<td>Hiroshi Sensui</td>
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<td>Haruo Wako</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun Nishikawa</td>
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<td>Tsutomu Shirosaki</td>
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*Osamu Maruoka died in Hachioji Medical Prison on May 29.
Japanese Red Army, who is serving time in prison, sent a statement to the gathering stressing that the incident was justified. There has been no change in the Japanese Red Army’s dangerous nature, as it continues to try to justify the incident, and also as seven of its members, who committed a heinous crime in the past, remain on the international wanted list.

* On May 30, 1972, Takeshi Okudaira, Yasuyuki Yasuda, and Kozo Okamoto killed or wounded 100 people when they fired automatic rifles and threw grenades at passengers, etc. in Lod International Airport, Israel (currently Ben Gurion International Airport).
4. The Japan Communist Party

The JCP worked to reinforce its organizational bases.
- The JCP promoted a “big campaign to expand the party’s power” in response to losing seats in prefectural assembly elections.
- The JCP impressed its distinctiveness by taking a clearly adversarial stand against the Noda Cabinet.

The JCP tried to retain seats in prefectural assembly elections but suffered losses.

At the beginning of the year, the JCP started full-blown preparation for the nationwide local elections scheduled in April. The party stressed its differences from the DPJ and the LDP, the “two major parties,” by criticizing the DPJ government as “being like a pea in the same pod as the LDP government, which increased tax and slashed social welfare spending” and stating that only the JCP can make a change to politics that gives first priority to welfare and living. After the Great East Japan Earthquake in March, the party put effort into activities to support the disaster victims and approached the government with the suggestion to enhance the support for the disaster areas, while appealing to voters as “a party making concerted efforts for support and recovery” through a campaign to publicize these efforts.

However, although the JCP aimed to retain its seats in prefectural assembly elections during nationwide local elections, it suffered losses, failing to gain support from voters who were critical of the two main parties.

Focusing on the expansion of the party’s power toward the next national election.

The JCP held the Central Committee’s 3rd Plenum in July, where the party summed up the losses in the nationwide local elections as the “inadequacy of the party strength,” called for a “big campaign to expand the party’s power” toward progress in the next national election for the period until July 2012, when the party will mark the 90th anniversary of its foundation. Under the campaign, the party tried to increase party members and the circulation of Shimbun Akahata, for example.

The party reported that there had been about 1,000 new members every month since July as a result of the “big campaign to expand the party's power,” but the total number of members decreased from approx. 400,000 at the beginning of the year to about 350,000 in October because, since September 2010, the party had been carrying forward the procedures to remove
“paper members” who had neither participated in the party’s activities for over one year nor paid membership dues. The circulation of *Shimbun Akahata* at the end of October remained at the same level (approx. 1.30 million) as that in July when the “big campaign to expand the party’s power” started, partly due to the first increase in the subscription fee of the daily (2,900 yen/month to 3,400 yen/month) in 11 years since 2000.

The JCP took a clearly adversarial stand against the Noda Cabinet by criticizing its response to the earthquake disaster and TPP.

The JCP took a clearly adversarial stand against the Noda Cabinet, which was inaugurated in September, by criticizing the proposed tax increase for recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake and other issues, saying it “is not being sensitive to the pain felt by the people.”

The party also criticized the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), arguing that “participation in the TPP would deal a devastating blow to the agriculture, forestry and fisheries industry,” and proposed cooperation to JA, which is against participation in the TPP. In addition, the JCP tried to impress its distinctiveness by publishing recommendations concerning recovery from the earthquake and the protection of domestic agriculture, while developing propaganda and dialogue activities based on them.

Meanwhile the JCP announced in October and November its candidates for the proportional-representation constituency of the next House of Representatives election (October to November) in preparation for a snap general election. The party is expected to stress its adversarial stand against the DPJ government, aiming to win more than 6.5 million votes in the proportional-representation constituency.

**Column: Changes in the circulation of *Shimbun Akahata* of the JCP**

- The circulation of *Shimbun Akahata* of the JCP has been steadily declining in recent years. At its peak, the circulation was 0.72 million for the daily paper and 2.83 million for the Sunday paper (3.55 million in total) in 1980.

- As the “three principles to establish the party life,” the JCP lists subscription to *Shimbun Akahata* daily in addition to attendance at branch meetings and the payment of the party membership fee. However, party members who subscribe to the daily account for less than 70% of all members (at the time of the 25th Congress in January 2010).
5. Right-Wing Groups

Right-wing groups conducted activities focusing on criticism of the government and diplomatic/territorial issues.

- Right-wing groups continued criticism of the government and the ruling party calling for the “defeat of the DPJ government.”
- Right-wing groups conducted activities taking up problems with neighboring countries, such as China, South Korea and Russia.

Right-wing groups called for the defeat of the government by criticizing the policies of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) and the political stance of DPJ members, while working actively on foreign-affairs issues, including China’s intrusion into territorial waters near the Senkaku Islands and the visits to the Northern Territories by senior Russian officials.

Right-wing groups called for the defeat of the government by criticizing the policies of the DPJ and the political stance of DPJ members.

Expressing their concern that the DPJ government would implement policies such as granting local suffrage to foreign residents, right-wing groups conducted street campaigns calling for the “defeat of the government” in the area surrounding the venue of the DPJ’s 2011 regular convention (January, Chiba). When Prime Minister Kan’s second reshuffled cabinet took office (January), right-wing groups staged street campaigns in areas near the DPJ Headquarters, protesting that “the cabinet members include a champion for granting local suffrage to foreign residents.” When political donations from foreign residents in Japan to the Prime Minister and Cabinet members were reported in March, right-wing groups staged a street campaign against the DPJ headquarters and local organizations.

Right-wing groups continued street campaigns calling for the “defeat of the DPJ government” after the inauguration of the Noda Cabinet, criticizing that “there is no change in the anti-Japanese nature of the government.”

In addition, they staged street campaigns criticizing that the behavior and political stance of the ruling party legislators were “anti-Japanese.” For example, they argued that a DPJ Diet member dishonored the imperial family at the ceremony to mark the 120th anniversary of the establishment of the Diet (November 29, 2010, in the parliament) and staged street campaigns calling for the Diet member’s resignation in areas surrounding the member’s local office and the
DPJ headquarters for about 11 months starting in December. Next, taking the opportunity of the report that another DPJ Diet member (who left the party in March) who participated in a meeting in South Korea (Seoul, February) signed a joint declaration including an expression that the “Japanese government should discontinue the claim to Takeshima,” etc, they staged street campaigns against the member’s local office and the DPJ headquarters, calling for the Diet member’s resignation.

Right-wing groups conducted activities taking up diplomatic/territorial issues involving Senkaku, Takeshima and the Northern Territories.

Right-wing groups vigorously conducted activities taking up problems with neighboring countries such as China, South Korea and Russia.

When Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and South Korean President Lee Myung Bak visited Japan to attend the fourth Japan-China-South Korea trilateral summit (Tokyo, May), right-wing groups staged street campaigns urging to “protect Senkaku at all costs,” “return Takeshima,” etc. around the venue of the summit and Chinese and South Korean diplomatic offices in Japan.

On “9.29 Anti-Communist-China Day” (the Japan-China Joint Communiqué was signed on that day in 1972), which has been held every year since 2002, they conducted demonstration marches, etc. criticizing China and calling to “stop Chinese marine research vessels’ intrusion into our territorial waters,” primarily in the cities hosting Chinese diplomatic offices, including Tokyo and Osaka.

In addition, they engaged in activities to demand the “return of Takeshima” in Tokyo and Shimane, focusing on “Takeshima Day” (February 22), which was designated by Shimane prefecture. Taking the opportunity of the incident of South Korea’s denial of entry to three Diet members who visited South Korea to visit the “Independent Hall” on Ulleungdo (August), right-wing groups conducted protest activities against South Korean diplomatic offices in Japan.

Regarding the issue of the Northern Territories, taking the opportunity of Russian Defense Minister Serdyukov’s visit to Etorofu Island, etc. (February) and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ivanov’s and South Korean parliament members’ visits to Kunashiri Island (May), they conducted protest activities against Russian and South Korean diplomatic offices in Japan. On “Anti-Russia Day” (August 9), they staged street campaigns criticizing the Russian government and the “weak-kneed diplomacy” of the Japanese government in areas surrounding Russian diplomatic offices in various locations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Right-wing groups will continue their criticism of the DPJ government and activities, taking the opportunity of neighboring countries’ moves against Japan. It is anticipated that right-wing groups will continue activities against the policies and diplomatic footing of the DPJ government. Since their protest activities may develop into illegal acts if policies attracting their special attention, such as granting local suffrage to foreign residents, are put into effect, or if neighboring countries take a hard-line attitude in territorial issues, for example, their moves require careful vigilance.

Column: Right-wing-affiliated groups criticized the pachinko (pinball game) industry and conducted protest activities against the antinuclear power movement in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake

Right-wing-affiliated groups whose members were arrested in 2010 during the protests against the Kyoto Korean School (August) and the Tokushima Teachers’ Union (September) continued activities, advocating anti-foreigners contentions, such as banishment of South and North Korean residents in Japan. They mainly engaged in street actions, while gathering participants from the general public by posting video files of their activities on the Internet. As the power shortage in consequence of the nuclear power plant accident caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake was recognized as a social problem, right-wing-affiliated groups conducted activities calling for a total ban on pachinko, arguing that “pachinko, one of the key industries of South and North Korean residents in Japan, is wasting power.” In addition, they conducted protest activities against the intensified antinuclear movement, arguing “the movement is used by leftists for political purposes.”
### Appendix: Recent Major Security Developments

<p>| Major Security Developments in International Relations |
|---|---|
| <strong>Jan</strong> | <strong>14</strong> President Ben Ali of Tunisia resigns in response to anti-government protests, and goes into exile in Saudi Arabia, ending a 23-year reign of tyranny. |
| | <strong>18</strong> President Hu Jintao of China makes an official visit to the US (to January 21). He meets with President Barack Obama on January 19, and discusses the US sale of arms to Taiwan, as well as China’s human rights problems, and a joint statement is released relating to the creation of a comprehensive, mutually beneficial economic partnership. |
| | <strong>24</strong> A suicide bomber attacks Domodedovo Airport in Moscow, Russia, killing 36 and injuring more than 150. Doku Umarov, leader of the Caucasus Islamic Emirate, an Islamist extremist faction based in the northern Caucasus region, claims responsibility for the incident (February 7). |
| | <strong>27</strong> A Chinese fisheries patrol ship crosses into Japanese territorial waters off Kuba Island, one of the Senkaku Islands. Subsequently, Chinese patrol ships make frequent incursions into Japanese waters around the Senkaku Islands (March, July, August, September, October). |
| <strong>Feb</strong> | <strong>4</strong> Russia's Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov visits Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands in the Northern Territories, to inspect the troops stationed there. Subsequently, Deputy Prime Ministry Sergei Ivanov visited both islands with four other cabinet members, to observe infrastructure (May 15), and Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council, visited Kunashiri and Habomai Islands (Suisho Island) to inspect border patrols (September 11). |
| | <strong>11</strong> Egypt's Vice President Suleiman announces the resignation of President Mubarak and the handover of power to the military's Supreme Council. |
| | <strong>16</strong> North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong Il reaches his 69th birthday, and the central leadership of Chongryon holds a central lecture meeting (11 at Tokyo Korea Central Hall), among other events. A celebratory delegation is dispatched to North Korea, led by Vice Chairman Bae Jin Gu (February 12). |
| <strong>Mar</strong> | <strong>7</strong> Self-Defense Forces destroyer &quot;Samidare&quot; is approached while patrolling the central region of the East China Sea by a Chinese helicopter, and on March 26, destroyer &quot;Isoyuki&quot; was also approached. The Japanese government protests against the two incidents via diplomatic channels. |
| <strong>Apr</strong> | <strong>7</strong> North Korea holds the 4th session of the 12th Supreme People's Assembly (in the Mansudae Assembly Hall, Pyongyang), and reports and adopts (1) the 2010 activities and 2011 goals of the cabinet, (2) 2010 accounts and 2011 budget, and (3) changes in personnel. |
| <strong>May</strong> | <strong>2</strong> American troops discover the hideout of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad, northern Pakistan, and kill him and four others. On May 6, al-Qaeda acknowledged the death of Osama bin Laden on an Islamist extremist faction’s website. |
| | <strong>4</strong> The North Korean Central News Agency announces that &quot;Three Japanese people were arrested on entering Rason City on March 14 in possession of narcotics and fake currency. They were detained, and then one was expelled, while the other two are currently subject to legal measures.&quot; |
| | <strong>13</strong> A suicide bomber targets a security forces training college inCharsadda, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, killing at least 69 and injuring over 100 people. Furthermore, terrorists carry out an attack on the Mehran naval base in Karachi, Sindh province, blowing up an antisubmarine aircraft supplied by the US government, and subsequently killing more than 10 army personnel (May 22). The &quot;Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan&quot; (Pakistan Taliban Movement, TTP) claims responsibility and that the attack was carried out in revenge for the death of Osama bin Laden. |
| | <strong>20</strong> General Secretary Kim Jong Il visits China (to May 26). In addition to holding talks with President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao, he also visited Mudanjiang city in Heilongjiang province, Changchun city in Jilin province, Yangzhou city in Jiangsu province, Nanjing and Beijing cities. |
| <strong>Jun</strong> | <strong>8</strong> On June 8 and 9, North Korea and China hold ceremonies to commemorate the start of work on the joint development and management of the &quot;Hwanggumpyong-Wihwa Island Economic Zone&quot; and the &quot;Rason Economic and Trade Zone.&quot; |
| | <strong>11</strong> Chinese naval ships (destroyers, etc.) pass approx. 100km NE of Miyakojima, moving in a southeasterly direction from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean (June 8, 9). After conducting military exercises around 450km south west of Okinotori Island, they pass by Miyakojima once again before crossing north west into the East China Sea (June 22-23). Between November 22-23, too, six Chinese naval destroyers and other vessels pass approx. 100km NE of Miyakojima, moving in a southeasterly direction from the East China Sea to the Pacific. |
| | <strong>16</strong> Al-Qaeda announces via the Internet that it has appointed Ayman al Zawahiri to the leadership of the organization, as successor to Osama bin Laden, who was killed on May 2. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jun 28</td>
<td>Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps fire a total of 14 missiles, including &quot;Shahab 3&quot; mid-range ballistic missile, in military exercises.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 14</td>
<td>The Olympic Council of Asia (OCA) holds its 30th general assembly in Tokyo. The North Korean Olympic Committee delegation, led by Son Kwang Ho, Vice Minister of Culture and Sports, and IOC committee member Chang Ung, visit Japan to participate in the meeting. The US Defense Department announces a new strategy to protect the government and private corporations from cyber attacks, entitled &quot;Department of Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 17</td>
<td>The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) hands over security control to Afghanistan in Bamiyan province, central Afghanistan. By July 24, the seven areas designated for the first stage of the withdrawal (including Lashkar Gar city in southern Afghanistan, Mazaresharif city in northern Afghanistan, and Panjshir province in central Afghanistan) had all completed handover.</td>
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<td>Jul 22</td>
<td>North and South Korean representatives to the six-party talks hold meeting in Bali, Indonesia. In Oslo, Norway, a bomb explodes near government buildings that house the Prime Minister's office, among other offices, killing eight people. Subsequently, a shooting spree occurs at a youth conference organized by the governing Labor Party on Utoeya Island, outside Oslo, killing 69 people. The Norway police arrests a Norwegian man, Anders Breivik.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 28</td>
<td>Kim Kye Gwan, North Korea's First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, meets with Stephen Bosworth, US Special Representative for North Korea Policy, to discuss North Korea's nuclear issue (to July 29, New York).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 29</td>
<td>The UN Security Council's Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee announces to have listed the Islamist extremist organization &quot;Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan&quot; (Pakistan Taliban Movement, TTP) to be subject to sanctions measures, such as a travel ban and asset freeze.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 10</td>
<td>North Korea fires shells at the sea off Yeonpyeongdo Island, South Korea. According to the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff, among others, North Korea has fired five shells, of which two landed close to the northern limit line (NLL). South Korea returned fire. The Chinese navy conducts initial trial operations of the refitted former Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>General Secretary Kim Jong Il visits Russia (August 20-25) and then China (August 25-27). He meets President Medvedev on August 24 in Ulan Ude, and then State Councillor Dai Bingguo in Qiqihar city, Heilongjiang province.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 23</td>
<td>Anti-regime forces in Libya seize almost all of Tripoli, and the 42-year dictatorship of Colonel Gaddafi is effectively ended.</td>
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<td>Sep 2</td>
<td>Japan plays North Korea in a soccer match held in Saitama, in the third round of the Asian qualifier for the 2014 FIFA Brazil World Cup. In order to compete in this match, the North Korean soccer team visited Japan (August 29-September 3).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep 9</td>
<td>A celebratory Worker-Peasant Red Guards parade is held, celebrating the 63rd anniversary of the establishment of North Korea (in Kim Il Sung Square, Pyongyang). Party, military and government leaders including General Secretary Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, watch the parade.</td>
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<td>Sep 13</td>
<td>Japan Coast Guard sights and detains a small wooden boat off Wajima city, Ishikawa prefecture, containing three men, three women and three boys. The Japanese government transfer the nine North Korean defectors to South Korea (October 4).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep 19</td>
<td>The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) holds its 55th general assembly (to September 23, in Vienna). It expresses concerns over North Korea's uranium enrichment program and light water reactor construction, and adopts a solution that demands North Korea to observe the obligations set under UNSC resolutions.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep 21</td>
<td>North and South Korean representatives to the six-party talks hold meeting in Beijing, China.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 9</td>
<td>China holds a commemorative event to celebrate the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Revolution in Beijing, attended by former President Jiang Zemin, who is rumored to have been severely ill, in his first public appearance since December 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 15</td>
<td>The 6th Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China takes place in Beijing (to October 18). General Secretary Hu Jintao presents an activities report and a keynote speech, and decisions are adopted relating to &quot;deeper reforms to the cultural structures,&quot; among others.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 18</td>
<td>The Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany arrests a person on suspicion of long-term espionage activities on behalf of Russia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Oct

20  The National Transitional Council of Libya takes control of the last stronghold of Gaddafi's supporters, Sirte, and it is announced that Colonel Gaddafi is dead.

24  Kim Kye Gwan, North Korea's First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, meets with Stephen Bosworth, US Special Representative for North Korea Policy, to discuss North Korea's nuclear issue, etc. (to October 25, Geneva). North Korea's Foreign Ministry spokesman says of the meeting that the "parties achieved a deeper understanding of one another's positions, and a certain amount of progress was made" (October 27).

### Nov

8  The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) distributes a report to member countries stating that there is a possibility that Iran is continuing to develop nuclear weapons. Based on this, the IAEA Board of Governors pass a resolution that expresses "deep concern" at the lack of clarity in regard to Iran's nuclear development (November 18), and the US and other countries announced comprehensive sanctions against Iran (November 21).

12  Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda visits Hawaii for the APEC Summit and meets with Chinese President Hu Jintao. Prime Minister Noda requests an early resumption of negotiations regarding the development of resources in the East China Sea, in regard to which President Hu announces that "we wish to press ahead with preparations, while improving communication."

15  North Korea plays Japan in a soccer match held in Kim Il Sung Stadium, Pyongyang, in the third round of the Asian qualifier for the 2014 FIFA Brazil World Cup. In order to compete in this match, the Japanese soccer team visits North Korea (November 14-16), along with Foreign Ministry staff and about 150 fans.

### Jan

1  The mainstream group and the Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo hold their respective year-end and new-year intensive seminars (December 25, 2010, to January 3; Saitama, etc. (the mainstream group); Tokyo, Osaka, etc. (Joyu group).)

13  Right-wing groups conduct street campaigns in the area surrounding the venue of the DPP's 2011 regular convention (Chiba).

### Feb

7  Northern Territories Day. Right-wing groups conduct street campaigns calling for the "return of the Northern Territories" etc. (in various locations in the country).

### Mar

11  The Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake (the Great East Japan Earthquake) occurs and causes the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant.

31  Members of a right-wing group driving a propaganda truck trespass on the premises of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant (Fukushima).

### Apr

23  The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo holds golden-week intensive seminars (until May 5, in Tokyo, Osaka, etc.).

29  Showa Day. Right-wing groups conduct street campaigns (in various locations in the country).

### May

3  Constitution Memorial Day. Right-wing groups conduct street campaigns (in various locations in the country).

4  Some right-wing group members trespass on the premises of the French Embassy, protesting an earthquake report by a private French TV station (Tokyo).

9  Tokyo District Court dismisses the second appeal for the retrial of Chizuo Matsumoto, also known as Shoko Asahara.

12  Right-wing groups conduct street campaigns named "Joint action to denounce Kan's Cabinet and promote recovery from the earthquake disaster," criticizing the response by the government and Tokyo Electric Power Company to the earthquake; they continued the street campaign intermittently during May (Tokyo).

20  After the appeal court decision on "Tenjinmine Strike Headquarters" within the grounds of Narita Airport, 50 people, including radical leftist group activists, squat in the building of the Tokyo High Court and get arrested on a charge of unlawful trespass (Tokyo).

21  Right-wing groups conduct street campaigns against the visits of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and South Korean President Lee Myung Bak to attend the fourth Japan-China-South Korea trilateral summit (until May 22, Tokyo, Miyagi and Fukushima).

29  Osamu Maruoka, a member of the Japanese Red Army, dies in Hachioji Medical Prison, where he was jailed.

### Jun

11  Radical leftist groups and the JCP send activists and party members to "nationwide simultaneous activities" calling for "breaking with nuclear power generation" (in various locations in the country).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jul 3</td>
<td>The JCP holds the Central Committee's 3rd Plenum (until July 4, Tokyo).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 7</td>
<td>Two live-in members of the mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo obstruct the performance of inspection and public duty during an on-site inspection conducted by the PSIA. The PSIA brought accusations against them with the Metropolitan Police Department by July 13.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 31</td>
<td>Right-wing groups hold a meeting and a demonstration parade named “rally and demonstration for breaking with nuclear power generation from the right-wing perspective” (Tokyo).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 1</td>
<td>The PSIA conducts simultaneous on-site inspections of 29 Aum Shinrikyo facilities in 15 prefectures (August 1, 2).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug 6</td>
<td>The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo holds summer intensive seminars (until August 16, in Tokyo, Osaka, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 9</td>
<td>Calling the day &quot;Anti-Russia Day&quot; (August 9) right-wing groups conduct street campaigns, etc. calling for the &quot;return of the Northern Territories&quot; (in various locations in the country).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 15</td>
<td>Right-wing groups visit Yasukuni Shrine and Gokoku Shrine and attend memorial services for the war dead (in various locations in the country).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 3</td>
<td>Right-wing groups hold a meeting and demonstration parade named “rally and demonstration for breaking with nuclear power generation from the right-wing perspective” (Kanagawa).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 11</td>
<td>Radical leftist groups and the JCP send activists and party members to &quot;nationwide simultaneous activities&quot; calling for &quot;breaking with nuclear power generation&quot; (in various locations in the country).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 12</td>
<td>The Supreme Court turns down an appeal from Jun Nishikawa, a member of the Japanese Red Army who was charged with attempted murder in the seizure of the French embassy in The Hague and violation of the Act on Punishment of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (so-called Hijack Prevention Law) in hijacking a Japan Airlines aircraft and forcing its landing at Dacca airport (the sentence of life imprisonment made in the first and second trials becomes final).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 16</td>
<td>The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo holds autumn intensive seminars (until September 25, in Saitama, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 18</td>
<td>Right-wing groups hold a meeting and demonstration parade named &quot;rally and demonstration for breaking with nuclear power generation from the right-wing perspective&quot; (Chiba).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 19</td>
<td>Radical leftist groups and the JCP send activists and party members to a &quot;nationwide meeting&quot; calling for &quot;breaking with nuclear power generation&quot; (Tokyo).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mitsubishi Heavy Industries announces that the company was the target of cyber attacks in August and its network became infected with a virus. Later the company announced that some data might have leaked outside (October 24).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct 29</td>
<td>Calling the day &quot;9.29 Anti-Communist China Day,&quot; right-wing groups conduct street campaigns and demonstrations calling for &quot;protecting the Senkaku Islands at all costs.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 23</td>
<td>Right-wing groups hold a meeting and demonstration parade named &quot;rally and demonstration for breaking with nuclear power generation from the right-wing perspective&quot; (Tokyo).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 26</td>
<td>It is found that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and some of Japan's diplomatic missions abroad were under &quot;targeted e-mail&quot; attacks since June and that some terminals became infected with malware. It was also found that the House of Councilors, the House of Representatives, Cabinet Secretariat and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications had also been under &quot;targeted e-mail&quot; attacks (October 25 to 28 and November 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 28</td>
<td>Calling the day &quot;The Day to Recapture Takeshima,&quot; right-wing groups conduct protest activities in areas surrounding Korean diplomatic missions in Japan (in various locations in the country).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 6</td>
<td>The &quot;Chukaku-ha&quot; holds the annual National Workers' Rally (Tokyo).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 11</td>
<td>Radical leftist groups send activists to an activity to make a &quot;human chain&quot; around the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry urging for “breaking with nuclear power generation” (Tokyo).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 16</td>
<td>The JCP holds the Central Committee's 4th Plenum (until November 17, Tokyo).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 21</td>
<td>Right-wing groups hold a meeting and demonstration parade named “rally and demonstration for breaking with nuclear power generation from the right-wing perspective” (Tokyo).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov 28</td>
<td>The PSIA requests the Public Security Examination Commission to extend the surveillance period (fourth time) in accordance with Article 12, para. 1 of the Organization Control Act.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>