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Public Security Intelligence Agency

On the Publication of the Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations

(2014 Edition)

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In January each year, the Public Security Intelligence Agency (公安調査庁, *Koanchosa-cho*; abbreviated hereinafter to PSIA) publishes the Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations, providing a summary of the public security situation within Japan and overseas during the previous year. This is the 2014 edition.

The task of the PSIA is to ensure public security on the basis of laws including the Subversive Activities Prevention Act and the Act on the Control of Organizations Which Committed Indiscriminate Mass Murder. Accordingly, as well as conducting surveillance of Aum Shinrikyo, the PSIA gathers and analyzes intelligence about situations at home and abroad that could affect public security, including intelligence concerning various domestic groups, international terrorism, and developments in other countries, especially neighboring states such as North Korea, China, and Russia. Through these endeavors, the PSIA is striving to contribute to policymaking via the provision of intelligence, as a member of the intelligence community in Japan.

Recently, both at home and abroad, Japan has found itself facing a diverse array of situations, most of which are new challenges that it has not faced for many years. These have arisen against the background of numerous major changes of great significance in the context of world history, including a shift in the world economy's center of gravity from west to east, the growth in China's economic and military might, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and the IT revolution and the remarkable development of cyberspace.

Amid this situation, as one of the advanced democracies of East Asia, Japan is expected to maintain stability and development, while defending such universal values as freedom, democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law, thereby contributing to peace and prosperity worldwide, especially in East Asia. The gathering and analysis of intelligence is becoming increasingly important, as the cornerstone of policies aimed at this goal.

In November 2013, while this publication was being compiled, the National Security Council (NSC) Establishment Act (the Act of Partial Revision of the Establishment of the Security Council) was enacted. As a key member of the intelligence community, the PSIA is required to actively supply relevant intelligence to the NSC, so it will work in close partnership with the National Security Secretariat in the future.

In addition to continuing to engage in rigorous surveillance of Aum Shinrikyo, the PSIA will strive to further improve its intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities, and aim to strengthen the contribution that it makes via intelligence, in order to respond to the needs of the times. I sincerely hope that you will find this publication useful, and that it will provide you with a greater understanding of the PSIA's work.

November 2013

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Recent Major Security Developments within Japan

*This 2014 edition of the Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations reviews developments in domestic and international public security in 2013 (as of the end of November), as well as examining future prospects in these areas. In this report, unless otherwise noted, the months refer to 2013. The titles of individuals mentioned hereinafter are those current at the time of writing.

**Focal Issues of
the External Situation**

in 2013





1-1 Kim Jong Un regime consolidated its power base as North Korea devoted its energies to economic development

- Kim Jong Un presented a new path for building up the nation and strove to establish his authority as the supreme leader, through reforms of the standards of conduct for party members and frequent reshuffles of senior military leaders.
- He took pains to show off the fruits of his efforts, such as continuing to implement large-scale construction projects, as well as promoting the development of special economic zones and the introduction of reforms.

Positioning of economic development as the top priority, advocating its development in parallel with nuclear development

In North Korea, First Secretary Kim Jong Un issued his New Year Address (January), in which he stressed that the “last instructions” of the late General Secretary Kim Jong Il had been achieved through the launch of a “satellite” in December 2012. In addition, he positioned building an economically powerful nation based on this as the country’s most important task and announced policies focused on economic development as the top priority.

Furthermore, at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK; March), First Secretary Kim stated that “now that we are a magnificent nuclear state and therefore have a powerful ability to deter war, the conditions

conducive to focusing all of our money and labor on economic construction have been put in place.” He advocated “a new strategic line on carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously” and set out a policy of combining the development and increase of nuclear weapons with economic development.

Moreover, First Secretary Kim strove to strengthen the ideological basis of his regime, revising the so-called 10 major principles (see column on p.11), which is effectively the supreme legal code in North Korea, for the first time in around 39 years and calling for all senior officials and residents to learn them.

Efforts to show off grip on and authority over the military through frequent reshuffles of senior military leaders

Amid this situation, as was the case in 2012, there were repeated promotions and demotions of those in senior military posts, with those in the key positions of Chief of the General Staff, Chief of the Operations Bureau, and Minister of People’s Armed Forces being replaced several times. In addition, the Meeting of KPA Company Commanders and Political Instructors (October) was held for the first time in 18 years, with First Secretary Kim calling for them to “unite around the Party Central Committee.” Thus, the regime strove to create a system that would ensure the army’s loyalty to First Secretary Kim.

Following the adoption of a United Nations (UN)

Security Council Resolution (January) criticizing North Korea’s launch of a “satellite,” First Secretary Kim guided a “consultative meeting of officials in the fields of state security and foreign affairs” (the same month) regarding response measures. He also sought to demonstrate his authority as the supreme leader to those at home and overseas through holding frequent military conferences, such as extended meetings of the WPK Central Military Commission (February, August) and a tactical meeting regarding the Strategic Rocket Force (March), as well as holding a large-scale military parade featuring ballistic missile units (July).

Transitions in Military Leadership Under the Kim Jong Un Regime (Parentheses indicate estimated month and year of appointment)

Position	As of Kim Jong Un’s appointment to Supreme Commander (December 2011)		
Director of the General Political Department	(Vacant)	→ Choe Ryong Hae (April 2012)	
Chief of the General Staff	Ri Yong Ho	→ Hyon Yong Chol (July 2012)	→ Kim Kyok Sik (May 2013) → Ri Yong Gil (August 2013)
Operations Bureau of the General Staff	Kim Myong Guk	→ Choe Pu Il (April 2012)	→ Ri Yong Gil (February 2013) → Pyong In Son (August 2013)
Minister of People’s Armed Forces	Kim Yong Chun	→ Kim Jong Gak (April 2012)	→ Kim Kyok Sik (November 2012) → Jang Jong Nam (May 2013)

Focus on the development of special economic zones and reform measures, with a view to economic revitalization

In relation to the economy, North Korea set out the policy at the plenary meeting of the WPK Central Committee (March) of newly establishing “economic development zones” and “tourist zones” as well as of “improving economic management methods” (economic reforms) based on the new strategic line of simultaneous economic and nuclear development, in addition to the existing policies of promoting “advanced sectors” such as electricity, coal, metals, and railways, and developing agriculture and light industry.

Based on these policies, North Korea enacted the Economic Development Zone Law (May) and designated 14 places across the country as development areas; in addition, it mobilized military units to assist with its efforts to build a large-scale ski resort at Mount Masik (Wonsan) on the east coast. Moreover, at the Rason Economic and Trade Zone, as well as promoting joint development of the urban areas of Rason with China, North Korea completed the repair of the railway line between Rajin and Khasan (September), which it had been carrying out in partnership with Russia. The renovation of the 3rd Pier of Rajin Port, which will be managed jointly with Russia, also picked up speed tremendously.

With regard to economic reforms, North Korea devised reform measures in stages, seeking to revitalize production by providing company managers, farmers, and workers with incentives, while maintaining a planned economy. These include allowing collective farms to keep part of their harvest, commensurate with their output, and expanding the discretionary powers of factories and companies concerning such matters as worker salaries and price setting.

In addition, continuing on from 2012, it devoted its energies to showing off its achievements as an “economic power” and “socialist civilization,” which First Secretary Kim takes pains to emphasize. As such, in central Pyongyang, North Korea engaged in energetic construction of modern, large-scale commercial facilities; entertainment, cultural, and sports facilities; condominiums; and hospitals. It also moved forward with the building of a large livestock facility in a mountainous area of the southeast (across Sepo County, Kangwon Province).

Emphasis on economic development for the time being, with a view to stabilizing the foundations of the regime

North Korea appears to be putting in place the leadership that will support the Kim Jong Un regime and laying its ideological foundations, so for the time being, it is likely that it will seek to strengthen its economic base and stabilize the regime by strengthening social control, while devoting its energies to introducing foreign capital and revitalizing domestic production activities.

In addition, Jang Song Thaek, Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission (WPK Political Bureau Member, Director of the WPK Administration Department), who was viewed as a

mentor to First Secretary Kim Jong Un, was dismissed from all posts on the grounds of “anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts” and was expelled from the party (December, decision of the Political Bureau), so attention will focus in future on whether any changes in domestic affairs and/or foreign policy will result from the change in power structure.

- All North Korean officials and residents are required to be able to write out and recite from memory all of the 10 major principles (10 major principles for establishing the party's absolute ideological system). These have been positioned as the supreme legal code since Secretary (as he was at the time) Kim Jong Il undertook major revisions to them in 1974, and are considered to be of even greater importance than the constitution or the constitution of the Workers' Party of Korea.
- These 10 major principles consisted of 10 principles and 65 sub-principles that demanded absolute loyalty to President Kim Il Sung, but these have recently been

revised, and in addition to a change of name (10 major principles for establishing the party's absolute guidance system), they now consist of 10 principles and 60 sub-principles. As a result of this revision, it is now General Secretary Kim Jong Il and President Kim Il Sung to whom North Koreans pledge absolute loyalty, and wording has been added in which solidarity centered on First Secretary Kim Jong Un (referred to by such expressions as "our Party" and "the leadership") is demanded. Furthermore, new content stipulating the hereditary succession of the Kim family in perpetuity has been added to the sub-principles.

10 major principles for establishing the party's absolute guidance system

- 1 Struggle with all your life to establish **Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism** throughout society.
- 2 Revere the great Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Kim Jong Il as the eternal leaders of our Party and people, and the sun of the nation.
- 3 Make absolute the authority of the great Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Kim Jong Il, and the **authority of our Party**, and defend them to the death.
- 4 Arm yourselves thoroughly with the revolutionary thought of the great Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Kim Jong Il, and the **Party line** and policies that are its embodiment.
- 5 Observe absolutely the principle of unconditional execution of the last instructions of the great Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Kim Jong Il, obeying the **Party line** and carrying through its policies.
- 6 Strengthen the unity of ideological will and revolutionary solidarity from all directions throughout our Party, centered on the **leadership**.
- 7 Model yourself on the great Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Kim Jong Il, and equip yourself with an elevated spiritual and moral dignity, the means of accomplishing revolutionary tasks, and the work style of the people.
- 8 Cherish the political life that our Party and leaders have bestowed upon you, and live up to the trust and solicitude of the Party through a high level of political awareness and the achievement of your tasks.
- 9 Establish a strong organizational discipline so that the entire Party, the entire nation, and the entire military can work together as one under the **absolute guidance of our Party**.
- 10 Ensure that the great revolution of the nation and the glorious military-first revolution pioneered by the great Comrade Kim Il Sung and led by Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il is passed on through generations and seen through to the very end.

*A sub-principle to the 10th major principle states, "**Ensure that the life-blood of our Party and the revolution are passed on eternally in the Paektu blood line, carry on and develop ceaselessly the juche revolutionary traditions of the nation in each successive generation, and thoroughly adhere to its purity.**" (The red type denotes the main additions/revisions.)

1-2

North Korea explored dialogue with the US, while seeking to establish its possession of nuclear weapons as an accomplished fact

- North Korea strove to establish itself as a nuclear state, pressing ahead with a nuclear test and making preparations to restart its nuclear facilities.
- It explored the possibility of obtaining concessions from the US, combining a hardline military stance with a readiness to engage in dialogue.

North Korea went ahead with a nuclear test amid concern on the part of the international community, and announced the restart of its Yongbyon facility.

Reacting to the resolution by the UN Security Council criticizing the launch in December 2012 of a missile purported to be a satellite, as well as insisting that the 6-party talks and the September 19 Joint Statement (September 2005) “will no longer exist,” North Korea declared that it would “launch an all-out offensive” targeting the US (January) and pressed ahead with its third nuclear test (February). North Korea stated that the test had used a “smaller and lighter” atomic bomb, and had succeeded in “diversifying the nuclear bomb,” suggesting that it has made progress in enriched uranium-based nuclear development and the creation of a nuclear warhead. Furthermore, North Korea adopted “a new strategic line on carrying out economic construction

and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously” (March), based on which it enacted legislation concerning “consolidating the position of the nuclear weapons state” and the “Law on Space Development.” In addition, it announced that it would restart its Yongbyon nuclear facility, including the five-megawatt graphite-moderated reactor that had been mothballed (April). As well as carrying out missile engine fuel tests, it also upgraded the Punggye-ri nuclear test site and the Tongchang-ri missile launch pad.

North Korea demonstrated a hardline stance toward the US, using the flight of US strategic bombers over the Korean Peninsula as an excuse.

Reacting against Foal Eagle and other joint military exercises carried out by the US and South Korea (March – April), amid intensifying criticism of the nuclear test from the international community, North Korea declared that Korean Armistice Agreement had been reduced “to a dead paper” and stressed that it would retaliate with a “nuclear strike,” further increasing tension. In particular, whenever the US

military had its B-52 or B-2 strategic bombers participate in exercises, North Korea would put its ballistic missile units on standby and move some units, demonstrating its readiness to launch ballistic missiles.

North Korea appealed for negotiations with the US while seeking to mend fences with China.

Once the US-South Korea joint military exercise ended, while North Korea advertised it to its residents as a “victory in the battle against the US” and toned down its hardline stance, First Secretary Kim Jong Un sent Director of the General Political Department of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) Choe Ryong Hae to China as his special envoy (May) in an attempt to mend fences with China, which had objected strongly to North Korea’s nuclear test. In addition, North Korea appealed for dialogue with the US and other countries concerned, indicating its willingness to participate in talks such as the 6-party

talks, which it had rejected in the beginning of the year. Furthermore, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Kye Gwan attended an international seminar (September) hosted by China on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the start of the 6-party talks, and recognized the importance of the “September 19 Joint Statement,” which stipulates that North Korea must abandon all nuclear weapons and nuclear programs. Nevertheless, First Vice Minister Kim rejected the notion that North Korea should make the first move via steps toward denuclearization, arguing that other countries should

implement the measures incorporated into the statement (such as normalizing relations between the US and North Korea). Even after this, when US Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the US was prepared to conclude a “non-aggression agreement” if North Korea carried out denuclearization (October), North Korea asserted

that while the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was the nation’s “policy goal,” the US should first stop its “nuclear blackmail,” such as military exercises.

Further nuclear and missile development appears likely in the future.

To date, there have been no signs of any concrete action by North Korea aimed at denuclearization, so for the time being, it is likely to be difficult for it to find any common ground with the US, which is demanding that denuclearization take place. Amid this situation, North Korea seems likely to continue to demand concessions from the US, while moving forward with its nuclear and missile development on

the grounds of the “US nuclear threat,” thereby heightening tensions. In addition, given reports that North Korea is continuing activities at its nuclear testing and missile launch facilities, further caution will be required in this regard.

Table: North Korea’s transition from a hardline stance to a readiness to engage in dialogue

March 1	The US-South Korea joint military exercise Foal Eagle begins (until April 30).	Hardline	
March 5	North Korea asserts that the Armistice Agreement has been nullified.		
March 7	The UN Security Council adopts a resolution on sanctions against North Korea due to its nuclear test.		
March 8	North Korea criticizes the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution and refers to the “permanent position” of the DPRK “as a nuclear weapons state and satellite launcher.”		
March 26	North Korea orders its Strategic Rocket Forces and other units to adopt “combat readiness posture number 1.”		
March 29	North Korea issues an order for the military to be on standby for strikes against the mainland US and Guam.		
March 31	North Korea adopts “a new strategic line on carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously.”		
April 1	North Korea enacts the “Law on Consolidating Position of Nuclear Weapons State for Self-defense” and “Law on Space Development.”		
April 2	North Korea announces the restart of its Yongyon nuclear facility		
April 4	It is reported that North Korea has deployed ballistic missiles on its coast facing the Sea of Japan.		
April 30	The US-South Korea joint military exercise Foal Eagle ends.		
May 22	Director of the General Political Department of the KPA Choe Ryong Hae visits China as the special envoy of First Secretary Kim Jong Un (until the 24th) and announces the country’s willingness to participate in various forms of dialogue, including the 6-party talks.		Open to dialogue
June 16	North Korea requests that the US hold high-level talks without any preconditions.		
June 18	First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Kye Gwan visits China (until the 22nd) and announces the country’s willingness to engage in dialogue with relevant countries.		
September 18	First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Kye Gwan attends the Commemorative Seminar for the 10th Anniversary of the 6-Party Talks (Beijing) and announces that North Korea is willing to participate in the 6-party talks.		

- Compared with the two previous nuclear tests (in 2006 and 2009), China responded more harshly to North Korea's decision to go ahead with its third nuclear test (February). Firstly, in February and again in April, the Ministry of Transportation requested that relevant organizations within China rigorously enforce a series of sanctions based on the UN Security Council resolution. Moreover, in September, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the General Administration of Customs, and the China Atomic Energy Authority announced a ban on exports to North Korea of materials and technologies related to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and published a 236-page list of materials and technologies subject to this ban. Furthermore, the Bank of China, one of China's major state-owned banks, closed the accounts of the Foreign Trade Bank of North Korea and stated that it was suspending all financial transactions.
- In response to these developments, it was reported that customs clearance inspections at customs checkpoints at the border between China and North Korea had become stricter. However, in terms of trade between the two, although Chinese exports to North Korea declined slightly, North Korean exports to China remained steady, and the total value of trade remained at about the same level as in 2012, so the actual impact was limited (according to statistics from China's General Administration of Customs). Moreover, construction work continued on the New

Yalu River Bridge, a new road bridge linking the Chinese city of Dandong with the North Korean city of Sinuiju, which is expected to be completed sometime in 2014. In addition, initiatives aimed at promoting economic exchange between China and North Korea also continued, such as the 3rd Rason International Trade Fair (August, Rason City, North Korea) and the 2nd China-North Korea Economic, Trade, Cultural, and Tourism Expo (October, Dandong, China).

- Factors behind China's harsh response are believed to include the fact that it was seeking to present itself to the international community as a country suitable to chair the 6-party talks and as a "responsible major power," while promoting a change in North Korean policy on nuclear development, based on the goal of achieving the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula; in addition, critical public opinion within China regarding North Korea also appears to have been a consideration. However, given its own national viewpoint – particularly the perspective of the economic development of its three northeastern provinces – and North Korea's position as a buffer zone against the US and South Korea, it appears that China's stance of maintaining stability in North Korea remains unchanged. It could be said that it was this attitude that resulted in economic exchange between the two nations remaining at the same level after the nuclear test took place. In light of China's agenda, North Korea avoided excessive criticism of China and appears to be continuing to focus on securing practical advantages.

Total Value of Trade between China and North Korea (Source: China's General Administration of Customs)



- Having suspended operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex, North Korea accepted dialogue with the Park Geun Hye administration, but after resuming operations, it postponed reunions of separated families and strongly criticized the new President's administration.

North Korea reacted against the US-South Korea joint military exercise and put the new South Korean administration under pressure by suspending operations at the Kaesong Industrial Complex.

In his New Year Address (January), Kim Jong Un called for South Korea to “abandon [its] hostile policy,” and before the inauguration of the Park Geun Hye administration, North Korea expressed its desire to make a fresh start in North-South relations, which had deteriorated during Lee Myung Bak's time in office. However, once US-South Korea joint military exercises such as Foal Eagle began (March – April), it strengthened its criticism of South Korea with references to “military provocation,” declared that it “abrogates all agreements on nonaggression reached between the north and the south,” and closed the Panmunjom liaison channel and disconnected military hotlines between the north and south (March), thereby heightening tensions. Furthermore,

reacting to reports in the South Korean media that “the Kaesong Industrial Complex (see column on p.16) is a ‘money tree’ for North Korea,” the North Korean authorities banned people from crossing the border into the industrial complex from South Korea and unilaterally withdrew North Korean employees from it before suspending its operations completely (April). However, the South Korean government opposed this and took a strong position of its own, asserting that it was prepared to withdraw from the industrial complex.

North Korea adopted a forward-looking attitude to north-south dialogue in an about-face from its hardline stance, and fostered a more conciliatory mood.

After the US-South Korea joint military exercise ended, North Korea toned down the hardline stance that it had taken up to that point and, in an about-face, proposed to South Korea that discussions take place with a view to resuming operations at Kaesong (June). Following the development, working-level talks between the authorities of the north and south commenced (July), and although they disagreed about who was responsible for the suspension of operations, after seven rounds of talks they agreed to resume operations (August), resolving the issue of responsibility through an agreement by both sides to prevent the recurrence of problems and guarantee normal operations in future. Operations then resumed (September).

Furthermore, in terms of the background to the conciliatory atmosphere resulting from the agreement to resume operations, as well as calling for further progress in north-south relations, North Korea proposed talks concerning the resumption of reunions of families separated by the Korean War and of tourist visits to Mount Kumgang. At the talks between North and South Korean Red Cross delegations held in the wake of this development (August), an agreement was reached about holding reunions of separated families for the first time in about three years.

Last-minute postponement of reunions of separated families and intensified criticism of President Park Geun Hye.

However, immediately after the agreement, North Korea began to express its regret at the response from South Korea, which would not agree to holding discussions at an early date regarding the resumption of tourist visits to Mount Kumgang. Furthermore, when a member of the South Korean National Assembly affiliated to the opposition United Progressive Party was arrested on suspicion of plotting an armed rebellion in support of North Korea's hardline military stance (September), North Korea gradually began to harden its attitude toward the South Korean authorities, criticizing the arrest and stating that "the fuss being made by south Korea about having exposed 'forces plotting to overthrow the regime in collaboration with the north' is a challenge to our (North Korea's) will to improve relations." Amid this situation, North Korea postponed the family reunion program, which was scheduled in the end of September, at the last minute. One of the pretexts that it gave for this was

the statement by a member of the South Korean authorities that the resumption of operations at Kaesong Industrial Complex was "achieved because of the 'strong principled stance' of the Park Geun Hye administration," and it stated that "normal dialogue cannot be expected in the hostile atmosphere that prevails at present." Moreover, objecting strongly to repeated calls by President Park Geun Hye on North Korea to renounce nuclear weapons and make changes to the regime, it repeatedly criticized President Park by name and demanded an end to the "defamation" of North Korea. Furthermore, North Korean news media censured the "Korean peninsula confidence building process" advocated by the Park administration as an "anti-reunification policy aimed to escalate the confrontation with compatriots" and indicated that they would scrutinize South Korea's moves, asserting that they would "observe future developments" (October).

North Korea continued to rattle the Park Geun Hye administration with the intention of seizing the initiative in north-south relations.

One of the factors behind North Korea's intermittently hardline and conciliatory responses to the Park administration is thought to be its aim of securing economic incentives from South Korea by rattling the Park administration, in the hope that this will encourage it to adopt a more conciliatory approach toward the north. Consequently, it appears

likely that North Korea will seek to seize the initiative in north-south relations in future, tailoring its response to South Korean moves, while carefully judging its attitude, with the aim of securing the resumption of tourism at Mount Kumgang and the lifting of South Korea's sanctions against the north (the "May 24 Measures").

Column

The Kaesong Industrial Complex

- The Kaesong Industrial Complex (Kaesong city, North Korea) is one of the symbolic north-south economic cooperation projects that was promoted on the basis of an agreement between North Korea's General Secretary Kim Jong Il and South Korea's Hyundai Group, against the background of the Sunshine Policy (engagement policy toward the north) advocated by the Kim Dae Jung administration in South Korea. With North Korea supplying the land and workforce, and South Korea providing the capital and technology, the industrial complex



- began operating in December 2004.
- The scale of operation of the complex has continued to expand since it began operating, and as of 2012, before the suspension of operations, there were 123 companies based there, with a total production value of approximately \$469.5 million (approximately ¥46 billion). Moreover, there were around 53,000 North Korean employees working at the complex that year, and it is estimated that North Korea earned approximately \$90 million (approximately ¥9 billion) in foreign currency, in the form of the wages of these employees. Since the industrial complex resumed operations, the number of South Korean companies there has fallen to 118, with around 44,000 North Korean employees returning to work there (as of October).

1-4 North Korea maintained its stubborn attitude toward Japan

- North Korea repeatedly criticized the Abe administration and maintained its longstanding assertion that Japan must make “reparation for the past” in order to improve relations, as well as claiming that the issue of abductions has been “settled.”
- Regarding the issue of Japanese remains, visits to graves by relatives continued, despite stagnating relations between Japan and North Korea.

North Korea repeated criticism of developments in Japan, such as the discussion around constitutional amendments and additional measures against the north.

From the beginning of 2013, North Korea repeatedly criticized the Abe administration via such outlets as news media. North Korea was particularly vehement in its criticism of developments aimed at constitutional amendments and allowing Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense, describing them as “a scheme to become a military superpower and legalize aggression overseas.” Moreover, it condemned the visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese Cabinet and Diet members (August) as “a scheme to revive militarism that overtly denies its past history of aggression.”

In addition, following North Korea’s third nuclear test (February), Japan added further measures targeting North Korea (the same month; denial, in principle, of re-entry into Japan of those residing in Japan who are positioned to effectively assist North Korean authorities <applicable to Vice Chairman of Chongryon> if they leave for North Korea), which

North Korea concluded was a “scheme to suppress Chongryon.” When Japan announced a two-year extension of its ban on imports from and exports to and other measures against North Korea (April), North Korea objected to the move, describing it as being “for the purpose of further increasing pressure on the Republic (North Korea).” Furthermore, reacting to Foal Eagle and other joint military exercises held by the US and South Korea (March – April), it asserted that “Japan offers its territory to the US as the latter’s base for aggression.” In addition, it listed cities including Tokyo, Osaka, and Yokohama, and Japanese nuclear power facilities as “targets for retaliatory strikes” and threatened that “Japan is a target of our revolutionary forces and if the sparks of war fly, Japan will certainly not escape unscathed.”

North Korea demanded “reparation for the past” and once again asserted that “the abductions issue has been resolved.”

As well as repeatedly criticizing Japan, North Korea again asserted the basic stance that it has maintained for some time in regard to outstanding issues between Japan and itself, such as the abductions issue. With regard to the issue of “reparation for the past,” it repeatedly demanded that Japan provide “reparation for the past,” asserting that “providing reparation for the past is a legal and moral obligation for Japan, and it is an historical issue that cannot be postponed any longer” and that “there can be no resolution of issues in the relationship between [North] Korea and Japan without reparation for the past.” Moreover, with regard to the abductions issue, at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial

Meeting (July, Brunei), Minister for Foreign Affairs Pak Ui Chun stated that it “has been completely resolved through our sincere efforts in good faith.” In addition, in response to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s statement in his address at the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly (September) that “the normalization of diplomatic relations with North Korea remains unthinkable without the resolution of [the abductions] issue,” North Korea described it as “an unscrupulous trick to avoid reparation for the past.”

North Korea maintained interpersonal exchange with Japanese political figures and continued to allow visits to graves in North Korea.

While it repeatedly criticized Japan, North Korea engaged in interpersonal exchange with the country. In terms of interaction with Japanese political figures, when Isao Iijima, Special Advisor to the Cabinet, visited North Korea (May), he held talks with Kim Yong Nam, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea, and Kim Yong Il, a Secretary of the WPK. In addition, when Kanji Inoki (an incumbent Member of the House of Councilors) visited North Korea (July and November), as well as speaking to both of these officials, he also held talks with Jang Song Thaek, Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission. Moreover, via Chongryon and other channels, North Korea had various local politicians, members of Japan-North Korea friendship organizations, and media figures from Japan visit North Korea on various occasions, such as the 60th anniversary of its "victory" (the conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement; July) and the 65th anniversary of the foundation of North Korea (September). During these visits, as well as participation in anniversary celebrations, the visitors met with senior officials of

organs in charge of works on Japan, who sought to promote North Korea's internal and external policy to them. In addition, North Korea also hosted visits by Japanese university students for the purpose of interaction through sport (November).

Furthermore, with regard to the issue of the remains of deceased Japanese citizens left in North Korea after the Second World War, as well as continuing to host visits to the graves by relatives of the deceased (June, September, October (twice)), which had begun in 2012, the country hosted a visit by Japanese researchers (August) and took them to Pyongyang, Hamhung (South Hamgyong Province), and Komusan (North Hamgyong Province), to hold memorial services and carry out surveys of the situation at sites where remains are believed to have been buried. North Korea disclosed to the group of Japanese relatives who visited the country in late October that it would host further visits in 2014 and beyond.

Will the issue of Japanese remains be taken as a golden opportunity to explore progress in relations between Japan and North Korea?

It seems likely that, for the time being, North Korea will explore progress in relations with Japan by classing the issue of Japanese remains as a "humanitarian issue" in order to encourage a response from the Japanese government, depending on the surrounding situation, while also carefully assessing developments in US-North Korea and north-south relations and the North Korea policy of the Abe administration. In this process, it seems likely that North Korea will continue to strive to build channels of communication with various sectors within Japan, via organizations such as

Chongryon, with the intention of fostering an environment conducive to progress in relations with Japan. Moreover, it appears that it will continue to lobby figures in various sectors, with the intention of achieving a softening in Japanese public opinion toward North Korea and expanding the ranks of those who support it.

- North Korea postponed its Congress by a year and sought to reinforce its influence and control over activists.
- Two auctions were held for the Korea Central Hall.

Chongryon strengthened education concerning loyalty to Kim Jong Un, as well as shoring up the leadership.

In order to respond to such developments as the inauguration of the Kim Jong Un regime in North Korea and the auction of the Korea Central Hall (Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo), Chongryon sought to strengthen its organization under the leadership of Ho Jon Man by shoring up its leadership and reinforcing its influence and control over activists.

More specifically, the “February 22 Remarks” of First Secretary Kim Jong Un to Chongryon, in which he instructed it to “unite the organization around the central leadership,” has been conveyed within the organization, and members have been encouraged to put them into practice. Moreover, at an extended meeting during the 4th Session of the 22nd Central Committee (March), the organization postponed its 23rd Congress (scheduled for 2013) until 2014 (see column on p.20), following which it appointed to its central executive committee activists believed to be close confidants of Chairman Ho Jon Man. In addition, it has sought to bolster the leadership of its regional organizations by integrating the departments of the central headquarters that provide guidance regarding various mass movement activities.

Furthermore, at the same meeting, Chairman Ho Jon Man stressed the “state of emergency” in North Korea, stating that “the military machinations of the US and others have brought the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war” and “First Secretary Kim has placed the whole military under orders for a full-scale counterattack and has signed off the final battle

plans.” He sought to tighten the resolve of the organization, instructing members to strengthen their defense readiness on the grounds that “oppressive machinations” by the Japanese government could be envisaged, such as the application of the Subversive Activities Prevention Act to Chongryon.

Moreover, Chongryon identified the “establishment of the ideological and guidance system” of the organization, centered on First Secretary Kim, as the top priority for 2013 and sought to reinforce the loyalty of activists toward First Secretary Kim by holding intensive study sessions focused on the “New Year’s congratulatory message” (January) and “congratulatory letter” on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the foundation of North Korea, which were sent to the organization by First Secretary Kim. At the same time, the central leadership of Chongryon repeatedly stressed to its regional organizations that they must “accomplish unconditionally the decisions and instructions of the central leadership of Chongryon, which are the embodiment of the ideas and aims of First Secretary Kim,” thereby seeking to strengthen its control over those organizations.

Chongryon filed lawsuits demanding the application of tuition-free high school education program.

Chongryon has been demanding for some time that the Japanese government apply the tuition-free high school education program to students at Korean schools as well. In light of remarks by the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology following the inauguration of the 2nd Abe administration, in which he stated that he wished “not to include the Korean schools in the [tuition-free high school education] program,” Chongryon

determined that it would be difficult to receive the waiver, and lawsuits demanding the application of the program were filed in Osaka and Nagoya (January). Following completion of the process to render them ineligible in February, a further lawsuit was filed in Hiroshima (August), with preparations for further litigation taking place in other areas, including Tokyo and Fukuoka. Moreover, at the end of September, the central leadership of Chongryon

instructed its regional organizations to hold protests at the Prime Minister's Official Residence and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, as well as gathering signatures on petitions and sending letters to national newspapers;

in response, the regional organizations carried out such activities nationwide, seeking to rouse public opinion in favor of the application of the tuition-free high school education program to Korean schools.

Chongryon explored continued use of the Korea Central Hall, in response to the start of auction proceedings.

In response to a petition by the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC), which was seeking recovery of debts from Chongryon, Tokyo District Court held two rounds of bidding (bids to be submitted within a set period) in the auction of the Korea Central Hall, which is home to Chongryon's central headquarters. In the March round, the highest bid was ¥4,519 million, placed by Saifukuji Buddhist temple (Chief Priest: Ekan Ikeguchi), but it did not pay the money by the deadline (May 10), so the order of permission of sale became invalid. In the

second round of bidding in October, the Mongolian company Avar Limited Liability Company placed the highest bid of ¥5,010 million. Instructed by North Korea to "defend the Hall to the last," the central leadership of Chongryon sought to lobby support in various quarters for its continued use of the Korea Central Hall.

Chongryon promoted improvements in the organizational system, prompted by the 23rd Congress.

With a view to the 23rd Congress, which is due to take place in 2014, it appears that Chongryon is striving to revitalize activities and setting out a program of intensive campaigns, and it seems that it will seek to enhance its organization further by such means as appointing younger activists to executive positions during the regular conferences that each of

the regional organizations holds after the Congress. With regard to the Korea Central Hall issue, it appears that it will continue to lobby for support in various quarters, with the aim of "defending the Hall to the last."

Column

Congress postponed for the first time in 43 years

- Since its founding conference in 1955, Chongryon has held its Congress 22 times up to 2013. Of the past 22 Congress gatherings, only the 6th (held in 1961) and the 9th (held in 1971) were postponed by a year, making this the third postponement and the first one in 43 years.
- The 6th Congress was postponed until the following year so that Chongryon could promote "activities for the reunification of the Fatherland" in concert with the

April Revolution (an insurrection by South Korean students demanding the resignation of President Syngman Rhee), which occurred in South Korea in April 1960. The 9th Congress was postponed until the following year to strengthen control over the organization by suppressing opponents within the organization who were critical of Chairman Han Duk Su (Chongryon's first chairman) and the central executive committee.



2-1

China maintained its hardline stance against Japan over the “issue of territorial rights” regarding the Senkaku Islands, and attempted to “use force to change the status quo”

- China continued to dispatch surveillance ships and stepped up military moves around Japan.
- It insisted in pressing for “concessions” from Japan, but also demonstrated a flexible stance regarding economic relations.

China persistently dispatched naval vessels and aircraft, and Coast Guard patrol vessels to the waters surrounding Japan.

Since the Japanese government purchased and took ownership of the Senkaku Islands in 2012, China has continually dispatched ships belonging to its maritime law enforcement agencies to the seas around the islands; these ships have repeatedly engaged in flagrant incursions into Japanese territorial waters. In particular, China has engaged in heavy-handed displays to demonstrate its opposition to groups in Japan that frequently sailed to the waters around the islands for fishing and other activities, and has trumpeted its actions as “law enforcement activities,” announcing that it “drove out Japanese right-wing fishing boats from our territorial waters.” Moreover, attempts by China to change the status quo (in which Japan effectively controls the islands) by force have been seen, including flights around the islands by aircraft belonging to the State Oceanic Administration and intelligence-gathering aircraft belonging to the

People’s Liberation Army, as well as the announcement of the establishment of the “East China Sea air defense identification zone,” which includes the airspace over the islands.

In addition, in the waters surrounding Japan, a Chinese naval vessel locked its weapon-targeting radar onto a Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) destroyer (January), and China has repeatedly carried out exercises in the Pacific Ocean after passing through the Miyako Strait, deeming these to be “routine planned drills.” China has also used various other means in an attempt to apply pressure on Japan, such as flights by early warning aircraft and bombers of the military from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean. (The table below shows major moves by Chinese surveillance ships and other air and sea vessels).

Table: Major moves by China in the airspace and waters surrounding Japan

(Red type indicates incursions around the Senkaku Islands)

January 5, 11, 15	Flight by 1 aircraft belonging to the State Oceanic Administration.
January 30	A naval vessel locks its weapon-targeting radar onto an MSDF destroyer.
February 28	Flight by 1 aircraft belonging to the State Oceanic Administration.
April 23	8 China Marine Surveillance ships make incursions into Japanese territorial waters (largest number of vessels to date).
July 14	5 naval vessels pass through the Soya Strait. Subsequently, on the 25 th of the month, naval vessels navigate from the Pacific Ocean to the East China Sea via the waters northeast of Miyako-jima.
July 24	Flight by 1 early warning aircraft as far as the Pacific Ocean.
August 7	Coast Guard patrol vessels spend more than 28 hours in Japanese territorial waters, the longest period to date.
August 26	Flight by 1 aircraft belonging to the State Oceanic Administration.
September 8	Flight by 2 bombers as far as the Pacific Ocean.
September 9	Flight by 1 unmanned aerial vehicle thought to belong to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
September 10	8 Coast Guard patrol vessels make incursions into Japanese territorial waters (largest number of vessels to date).
October 1	Flight by 1 aircraft belonging to the State Oceanic Administration.
October 25-27	Flights by 2 early warning aircraft and 2 bombers as far as the Pacific Ocean on 3 successive days.
November 16-17	Flights by 1 intelligence-gathering aircraft on 2 successive days.
November 23	Announcement of the East China Sea air defense identification zone.

China asserted the legitimacy of “Chinese territory,” linking it to the “awareness of history” and the “issue of the attribution of the Ryukyu Islands”

As well as these actions described above, China has used various means to assert the legitimacy of its “ownership” of the Senkaku Islands, both at home and overseas.

Asserting that the Potsdam Declaration was “an important underpinning of the world order established after the Second World War,” Premier Li Keqiang stated during a visit to Germany that “We should not allow anyone to destroy or deny the fruits of victory that followed this war” and criticized Japan’s effective control over the Senkaku Islands as “a destruction of the postwar order” (May). Even after this, China continued to criticize Japan, linking our nation’s “awareness of history” and moves toward constitutional amendments to the “sovereignty issue” surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and sought to cultivate an international environment favorable to it.

Moreover, regarding Okinawa Prefecture, within which the Senkaku Islands are located, China attempted to argue that “the attribution of the Ryukyu Islands is undecided,” using the argument as grounds for denying Japan’s effective control over

the Senkaku Islands, and the organ paper of the Communist Party of China (CPC), *The People’s Daily*, carried an article by an academic from a Chinese think-tank that included this claim (May). With regard to this matter, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed that this was merely the opinion of an academic, stating that “the academic article reflects attention and research paid and conducted by China’s populace and academia to and on the Diaoyu Islands and related historical problems.” On the anniversary of the end of the Pacific War on August 15, however, the same newspaper again carried an article by an academic from a Chinese think-tank that claimed that “the Okinawa reversion agreement between Japan and the US is illegal.” Such propaganda is believed to reflect the views of the CPC and the government.

Japan-China summit talks were rejected on the grounds of the “issue of territorial rights” regarding the Senkaku Islands.

With regard to the deterioration in Japan-China relations surrounding the Senkaku Islands, China continued to assert that Japan was the cause of the problem, claiming that “the root of the problem lies in Japan’s illegal theft and occupation of Chinese territory” (March, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi). In addition, stating that “the Japanese should right this wrong,” Foreign Minister Yang demanded “concessions” by Japan regarding the issue of territorial rights over the Senkaku Islands. China did not back down from its stubborn insistence that it would not allow Japan-China summit talks to take place unless Japan admits that there exists a “dispute surrounding the territorial rights” of Japan over the Senkaku Islands and “the dispute is shelved.”

Amid this situation, at the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy (G20, September) held in St. Petersburg, Russia, President Xi Jinping told Prime Minister Shinzo Abe that he wished “to promote strategic relations of mutual benefit,” but

even after that, China maintained its stance that “concessions” by Japan were a prerequisite for holding summit talks.

Moreover, China criticized Prime Minister Abe in the pages of *The People’s Daily*, claiming that his offerings to Yasukuni Shrine of evergreen sakaki trees (April and October) and money (August), without actually visiting the shrine, were “equivalent to visiting the shrine.” In addition, its criticism of Japan has intensified for visits to the shrine by Cabinet members other than the Prime Minister, Chief Cabinet Secretary, and Foreign Minister, with unprecedented objections by such senior figures as China’s Deputy Foreign Minister.

China took a stance of avoiding anti-Japanese demonstrations and emphasizing economic exchange with Japan.

In a speech at a special study session held by the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee (July), General Secretary Xi Jinping spoke of the country's maritime interests, stating that "we must adhere to the policy of 'sovereignty remains ours; shelve disputes; pursue joint development'," so it appears that China will also continue to demand that Japan accept "the shelving of the dispute" regarding the "issue of territorial rights" surrounding the Senkaku Islands.

As well as military and economic factors, persistent and strongly-rooted anti-Japanese sentiment within China appears to be behind this hardline stance on the part of China. Therefore it seems that Xi Jinping and the rest of the leadership have judged that appearing too ready to move toward improved relations would lead to their being condemned within China as "weak-kneed" and that this, combined with dissatisfaction about domestic social problems, could result in criticism of the leadership.

China publicized its "hardline anti-Japanese stance" to its citizens, always reporting on the incursions of Chinese surveillance ships into Japanese territorial waters; for example, on September 10, a year to the day since the Japanese government acquired and took possession of the Senkaku Islands, Chinese media broadcast coverage of incursions into Japanese territorial waters to domestic audiences.

At the same time, unlike in 2012, there were no anti-Japanese demonstrations in China on or around September 11. Moreover, although activists from

Hong Kong asserting China's sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands planned to sail to the islands, they did not receive permission from the authorities in Hong Kong and so were unable to set sail; this step appears to have been taken at the wishes of the Chinese authorities, and it is likely that the Chinese leadership was cautious of growing anti-Japanese sentiment.

Amid this situation, China is demonstrating an approach focused on emphasizing economic exchange and cooperation with Japan in order to ensure its own economic development; one example of this was the dispatch to Japan of a delegation consisting of the heads of leading Chinese companies (September).

It appears that in future, China will seek to elicit "concessions" from Japan using a combination of hardline and conciliatory approaches, continuing to demonstrate a hardline stance by such means as dispatching surveillance ships into the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands and aircraft into the "East China Sea air defense identification zone" that includes the airspace over the islands, while also promoting economic and cultural exchange with Japan, with the aim of securing practical benefits for itself and cultivating sentiment within Japan for an improvement in relations with China.

At the National People’s Congress in March, China decided to reorganize the State Oceanic Administration, with the intention of improving the law enforcement capabilities of its maritime law enforcement forces, which had previously been dispersed across multiple departments, such as the China Marine Surveillance (State Oceanic Administration) and fisheries administration (Ministry of Agriculture). The main reforms were as follows.

- The four maritime law enforcement forces were integrated into the State Oceanic Administration and now come under the management of the Ministry of Land and Resources.
- Maritime law enforcement by the State Oceanic Administration is carried out under the name “China Coast Guard,” with operational guidance being provided by the Ministry of Public Security.

In response to this decision, the State Oceanic Administration put up a sign on July 22 reading “China Coast Guard” in the lobby of its building. In addition, on the 24th of that month, having repainted its existing China Marine Surveillance ships and “fisheries administration ships,” it sent Coast Guard patrol vessels into the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands for the first time. Since then, these vessels have made repeated incursions into Japanese territorial waters off the islands.


The moves toward the integration of maritime law enforcement forces in response to organizational reforms are merely cosmetic changes, as can be seen above, and the current situation appears to be that no substantial integration (such as the transfer of control of each force to the administration or the unification of the chain of

command) has actually taken place.

On China’s National Day on October 1, staff from the China Marine Surveillance, fisheries administration, and border coast guard (Ministry of Public Security) took a trip aboard the Coast Guard patrol vessels (photo at bottom). The aim appears to have been to publicize the cooperative relationship between these forces, but it can also be seen that their uniforms have not been standardized.

However, organizational integration seems likely to progress and new Coast Guard patrol vessels are already being built, so it is anticipated that China will further intensify its efforts to dispatch such vessels into the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands.

Moreover, hitherto, the maritime law enforcement forces of the State Oceanic Administration were equipped only with weapons “for self-defense,” so they are considered not to have had any judicial or policing powers. It has been indicated, however, that following the recent organizational reforms, they have been granted the right to use weapons when engaging in law enforcement activities or exercising their judicial or policing powers. If the State Oceanic Administration were to exercise such authority, it is conceivable that it might engage in wrongful “law enforcement” in the waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands. Furthermore, the State Oceanic Administration and the Chinese navy have a cooperative relationship, with staff of the maritime law enforcement forces receiving training at Chinese navy training facilities, so attention will focus in future on the state of collaboration between them.



- China called on the US to build a “new type of great power relations.”
- China intensified diplomacy with surrounding countries to counter the “rebalancing” strategy and “values-oriented diplomacy.”

China remained committed to its policy of firmly defending its national interests, even while professing to advocate “peaceful development.”

In the report on government activities at the National People’s Congress (March), China set out a policy of “sticking to the path of peaceful development, while adhering to the independent foreign policy of peace,” and also repeatedly emphasized the “path of peaceful development” during international conferences and summit meetings. It appears that one factor behind this is its concern about mounting perceptions of a “China threat” in the international community, arising from China’s growing economic and political influence, the bolstering of its military force, and friction with neighboring countries regarding maritime interests. Accordingly, it seems to be seeking to curb this by emphasizing “peaceful diplomacy” with the aim of making it easier to develop an “international

environment that is conducive to China’s reform and development.” However, at the same time, while aiming for “peaceful diplomacy,” Xi Jinping and the rest of the leadership remained absolutely determined not to make concessions in terms of defending its national interests, as demonstrated by such statements as “We will stick to the road of peaceful development, but will never sacrifice our national core interests” (January, General Secretary Xi Jinping).

China advocated a “new type of great power relations,” fearing confrontation with the US

Based on this foreign policy, China engaged in intensive diplomacy with other countries, through such activities as high-level exchanges by key CPC and government figures. In particular, with the US having announced its “rebalancing” strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region, China repeatedly called for the building of a “new type of great power relations” between the US and China, whenever key figures visited the US, such as on the occasion of President Xi Jinping’s visit in June. President Xi Jinping’s stance suggested that he was seeking to avoid the formation of a competitive relationship between China and the US, as he stated that the three key points of this “new type of great power relations”

were (1) no conflict or confrontation; (2) mutual respect; and (3) the pursuit of cooperation based on a win-win relationship. On the other hand, conflict was seen between the US and China regarding such outstanding issues as cyberspace-related matters, but despite these pending problems, the two nations achieved deeper communication and cooperation at the working level through such activities as the Fifth Round of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (July).

China engaged in intensive diplomacy with neighboring countries, accompanied by a hardline stance on its maritime interests.

Emphasizing diplomatic relations with China's neighbors, the first overseas visits by President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang after taking office were to Russia and India, respectively (March and May, respectively). Moreover, visiting Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Brunei (April-May) on his first solo visit overseas after his appointment, Foreign Minister Wang Yi declared that China would "place a great emphasis on relations with neighboring countries and prioritize good-neighborly and friendly cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in our peripheral diplomacy." Furthermore, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang successively visited Southeast Asian nations (October), and the CPC Central Committee pursued stronger efforts to promote peripheral diplomacy, holding the Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference. One factor behind these activities appears to be a strong sense of caution about the formation of an "anti-China coalition," in light of the US's increased involvement in Asia as a result of its "rebalancing" strategy, as well as Japan's own "values-oriented diplomacy."

With regard to the issue of territorial rights in the South China Sea, while emphasizing "resolution by

the countries involved through peaceful dialogue and discussion," China has not hesitated to use force, dispatching Coast Guard patrol vessels to the Ayungin Reef, regarding which it is in dispute with the Philippines, and reportedly firing shots at a Vietnamese fishing boat (March). In particular, friction is deepening with the Philippines, which has submitted its conflict with China over the South China Sea for arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Amid this situation, although it presented a conciliatory demeanor, calling for Vietnam to promote maritime cooperation, and agreeing at a high-level meeting with ASEAN countries (September) that it would "make steady progress" with the process of hammering out a "regional code of conduct for the South China Sea," China has adopted an approach that appears to be focused on isolating the Philippines within ASEAN, holding summit meetings with the heads of all ASEAN countries apart from the Philippines.

China attempted to expand influence in the international community.

In order to make its presence felt as a "responsible major power," China is demonstrating a willingness to become actively involved in areas such as the North Korean nuclear issue and Middle Eastern issues, so it appears that it will further intensify its diplomacy, with a particular focus on the UN. In regard to the US, it is likely to continue to promote stronger relations, with the aim of achieving a "new type of great power relations." As far as the ASEAN countries are concerned, it appears that it will further strengthen relations in the future and seek to ensure that its influence expands and becomes

more pervasive, based on an awareness that this region is crucial to its efforts to put in place an international environment conducive to its own interests. Moreover, with regard to the countries of Africa, given that "China cannot develop in isolation from Africa" (March, President Xi Jinping), it is likely that China will use its infrastructure development assistance and other economic support as a leverage to continue to secure resources and expand its influence.

- China attempted to secure the support of the people by promoting the “Chinese dream” and pushing forward with anti-corruption measures.
- Facing distortions in its economic development, China professed to advocate “reform,” while struggling to rectify them.

China sought to achieve “solidarity” under the banner of “the Chinese dream” and implemented learning activities nationwide.

In his inaugural speech as President at the 1st Plenary Session of the 12th National People’s Congress (March), General Secretary Xi Jinping positioned “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” as the “Chinese dream” and asserted that its realization was the historic mission of the Chinese people.

The legitimacy of one-party rule could be shaken by such factors as increasingly diverse values among the populace and the growth in disparities resulting from a development strategy that prioritizes economic growth. As such, one factor behind General Secretary Xi Jinping’s propounding of the “Chinese dream” appears to have been the desire to promote solidarity among the people by using plain language free from the conventional ideological elements, thereby increasing the cohesive power of the CPC.

However, given that the content of the “Chinese

dream” was abstract, various claims emerged, such as the interpretation by groups championing the freedom of the press that “the Chinese dream is the dream of constitutionalism.” Since April, Xi Jinping and his leadership have implemented learning activities nationwide, in order to integrate the dreams of individuals into the national dream, while popularizing the “Chinese dream.” Moreover, China is also striving to eliminate any estrangement between the CPC and the people, by such means as promoting in parallel with this the “Mass Line Educational Practice,” which is a political campaign whose primary aim is to “gain a complete understanding of public opinion, so that we can serve the people.”

China bolstered its hardline stance on tightening discipline, describing rampant corruption as a “crisis that could prove fatal to the party and the state.”

General Secretary Xi Jinping demonstrated his awareness that the issue of corruption, which is a key concern for the people, is something that “could prove fatal to the party and the state” (April), and, based on this strong sense of crisis, strove to root out corruption via his policy of “swatting ‘flies’ and catching ‘tigers’” (rooting out corruption among both high-ranking officials and lowly employees. See column on p.30). One factor behind this is thought to be the desire to regain the trust of the people and implant the image of a clean party; as such, the CPC’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, which is the body tasked with rooting out corruption, strengthened the enforcement system, by such means as setting up a website through which citizens could report cases of corruption among party and government officials. As a result, a number

of party and government officials were exposed as being corrupt, including Jiang Jiemin, Chairperson of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, which is a Cabinet-level post. Moreover, a diverse array of measures was taken to improve discipline among the army. In particular, as well as embarking on efforts to tighten up the management of military-owned land, which is perceived to be a hotbed of corruption within the Chinese military, China adopted a tough stance against corruption, formally introducing a system of dispatching teams of corruption investigators to carry out investigations on the ground.

China took a harsh response to developments that could lead to “anti-government” activities.

Xi Jinping and his leadership have positioned the expression of views that challenge the CPC’s political system, such as “constitutionalism” and “universal values (liberty, democracy, and human rights)” as “wrong ideas” and demonstrated a determination to contain such ideas (April). Based on this intention, the government arrested a number of activists calling for public disclosure of the personal assets of government and party officials, as well as introducing legislation that punishes internet users for provoking the disruption of social order.

Moreover, following an attack on a police station in

the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (June), a vehicle thought to have been carrying Uyghurs crashed and burst into flame in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square (October). A backlash against the ethnic minority policy of the authorities is believed to have been behind these incidents, but the Chinese government positioned them both as “terrorist attacks” and demonstrated a harsh response to “anti-government activities.”

Facing environmental pollution and distorted development, China explored new development methods based on “reform.”

As well as the economic disparities that have emerged in its socioeconomic development to date, China is facing various other problems, including distortions in its economic structure and environmental pollution. In terms of the economy, the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate for January to September was 7.7%, holding steady from 2012, and following the high growth period experienced to date, with rates of almost 10%, it has become inevitable that growth will slow down in future to around 7-8%. It appears that the decision by the Xi Jinping administration not to use the kind of economic stimulus packages centered on large-scale investment seen hitherto is motivated by the desire to avoid further exacerbating structural problems in the economy, in the form of a surplus of production equipment and falling investment efficiency. In terms of social issues, severe air pollution, such as PM2.5 fine particulate matter, poses a grave health hazard, along with serious water and soil pollution, and mass protests triggered by environmental problems took place across the country. For example, in Shanghai as well as in the city of Kunming, Yunnan Province, large-scale protest demonstrations were held by citizens demanding that the construction of factories be halted, due to fears about environmental pollution arising from the emission of chemical substances (May).

The structural problems in the economy and serious environmental pollution are the price that now has to be paid for the choice made by previous administrations to pursue economic growth alone and effectively postpone dealing with the resultant problems. As such, rectifying such problems through “reforms” and striving to stabilize the economy and society are pressing issues for the Xi Jinping administration. Amid this situation, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (November) was held, with “comprehensively deepening reforms” as the theme. At this session, a comprehensive reform policy was set out, encompassing not only the economy, but also social and environmental fields, and the CPC Central Committee decided to establish a “leading group” to push through these reforms. Moreover, acutely concerned by security risks both at home and overseas, Xi Jinping and his leadership established the “National Security Committee,” as a “strong platform to coordinate work related to national security.”

A sense of crisis about the maintenance of the regime exists behind the enforcement of strict official discipline and “reform.”

Regarding initiatives to combat corruption, General Secretary Xi Jinping referred to “historic lessons from the disintegration of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union” (January), demonstrating an acute sense that corruption is a matter of life and death for the CPC. In addition, Premier Li Keqiang emphasized the importance of “reform,” stating that it “concerns the destiny of the country and the future of the nation” (March). Xi Jinping and his leadership took a

hard line in the enforcement of strict official discipline, and an awareness that the success or failure of this initiative would directly influence the stability of the “regime” appears to have been behind the championing of “reform.”

The key to the stability of the Xi Jinping regime is the success or failure of “reform,” which directly influences economic and social stability.

Xi Jinping and his leadership propounded the “Chinese dream” with the goal of securing support among the people, but some have pointed out that it has actually thrown into even starker relief the estrangement of the CPC from the people, so attention will focus on how Xi Jinping and his leadership will increase the theoretical influence of the “Chinese dream” and ensure that it permeates society.

Moreover, it would appear that a desire to allay social discontent by feeding back some of the anticipated outcomes of development via “reform” was behind the presentation of a series of reform policies by Xi Jinping and his leadership at the 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee. However, these were merely policies, and the

administration is still left with the task of fleshing these out into specific initiatives. General Secretary Xi Jinping has admitted that it will be difficult to do this, stating, “The problems we face in the current phase of reform are especially difficult. They are hard nuts to crack, so to speak” (October). The future success or otherwise of Xi Jinping and his leadership in curbing resistance among those with vested interests and realizing “reform,” as well as in implementing thorough anti-corruption measures and securing the support of the people seem likely to substantially affect the stability of his regime in the future.

Immediately after his appointment, General Secretary Xi Jinping appealed to senior party officials, saying, “Corruption could cause the collapse of the party and the fall of the state. Wake up!” Also at a plenary meeting of the CPC’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection in January, he launched a large-scale “anti-corruption campaign” focused on “swatting flies and catching tigers”. This campaign clearly demonstrates the leadership’s policy of strictly cracking down on corruption not only among lowly party and government employees (the “flies”), but also on high-ranking party and government officials who enjoy immense authority and status (the “tigers”). In response, the CPC’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection took steps such as setting up an official website that allows citizens to report government officials accused of being corrupt.

As a result of this strict crackdown on corruption by Xi Jinping and his leadership, almost 31,000 party and government staff were rooted out between January and August, including a number of Cabinet- and bureau director-level officials, such as Li Chuncheng, Deputy Secretary of the CPC Sichuan Provincial Committee, and Jiang Jiemin, Chairperson of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (Central Committee member).


Amid this situation, attention focused on the trial of the former Political Bureau Member Bo Xilai (former Secretary of the CPC Chongqing Municipal Committee) on corruption charges. At both the first trial (August) and the appeal (October), Bo Xilai’s life sentence for “bribery, embezzlement and abuse of power” was upheld, but his statement during the first trial that there had been “orders from above” led to speculation that the investigation would extend as far as former Standing Committee

Member of the Political Bureau Zhou Yongkang, who had had a close relationship with Bo Xilai for many years and who was rumored to be corrupt. Even after that, the dismissal of several executives of the state-owned company China National Petroleum Corporation on suspicion of corruption resulted in widespread rumors of the possibility that an investigation into Zhou Yongkang – a leading figure in the “oil clique” – had begun. However, it was reported that Zhou Yongkang had visited his alma mater China University of Petroleum (October), so as of the end of November, it appeared that he had not been dismissed.

Moreover, Xu Caihou, former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, was similarly rumored to be under investigation on suspicion of corruption, but there is an observation that that his presence at a ceremony to commemorate the country’s founding at the end of September suggests that he is still considered “sound.”

Zhou Yongkang and Xu Caihou are figures with a great deal of influence, on the petroleum sector and the security, judicial, and military sectors respectively, so it appears that even Xi Jinping and his leadership have to be cautious about their handling of these two men.

Among Chinese intellectuals, there are those who deride that such individuals were not subject to being rooted out from the outset, describing Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and senior officials in the Central Military Commission as “dragons” rather than “tigers.” In future, attention will focus on whether, having stressed the thorough implementation of “anti-corruption” measures, Xi Jinping and his leadership will actually root out such “dragons.”



*The diagram shows the number of employees of state organs up to the bureau director-level (published by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, October) and Cabinet-level party and government officials (Xinhua report) rooted out between January and August.

2-4

Xi Jinping and his leadership sought to develop cross-strait economic and political relations

- China intended to develop an environment conducive to accelerated economic cooperation and “political dialogue.”
- Taiwan rejected cooperation concerning the Senkaku Islands, but its interaction with other countries intensified.

First contact was held between high-ranking officials from the bodies in charge of cross-strait relations, with signs of progress in political relations.

General Secretary Xi Jinping held talks with Vincent Siew Wan-chang, Taiwan’s former Vice President (April), and emphasized the acceleration of economic relations between China and Taiwan, stating that “we should complete discussions concerning trade and dispute resolution within the year.” In addition, during further talks with Mr. Siew at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit Meeting (October), General Secretary Xi demonstrated a positive attitude to “dialogue about political issues,” stating that “the issue of political disagreements cannot be passed on from generation to generation.” Moreover, the high-ranking officials from both the Chinese and Taiwanese bodies in charge of cross-strait relations who were present at that meeting called each other by their respective job titles for the first time and agreed to make reciprocal visits.

There is a possibility that discussions between China and Taiwan concerning “political issues” could begin, if such visits actually take place.

With regard to economic relations, the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement was signed (June), based on the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). However, increasingly vocal opposition emerged in Taiwan from those fearing the loss of employment and rises in property prices, and discussions in parliament concerning the entry into force of the agreement have floundered, so things are not necessarily progressing in the way that China had anticipated.

China explored collaboration on the “issue of territorial rights” concerning the Senkaku Islands, but Taiwan rejected this.

China explored the possibility of collaboration with Taiwan regarding the Senkaku Islands, with the appeal that “we should defend this territory together”. However, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement to the effect that it would not cooperate with China, citing reasons including differences in legal opinion (February). In addition, the Japan-Taiwan Fishery Arrangement was concluded (April) via private sector organizations in Taiwan and Japan, permitting Taiwan to carry out fishing activity in the marine area that includes the area around the Senkaku Islands. Moreover, Taiwan intensified its exchanges with other countries,

concluding economic cooperation agreements with New Zealand and Singapore, and participating in the General Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) as a guest. In future, it is likely that China will seek to develop economic and political relations, accepting such international exchange activities by Taiwan, on the condition that a “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” situation does not arise.



3-1 The Putin administration actively promoted initiatives aimed at strengthening his power base

- Growth in the administration's approval rating was sluggish, due to a slowdown in economic growth and delays in implementing anti-corruption measures.
- Russia strengthened control of domestic public opinion, while seeking cohesion among supporters of the administration.

Russia carried out successive Cabinet reshuffles as initiatives to tackle policy issues ran into difficulty.

In Russia, during his first annual Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly after returning to the presidency (December 2012), President Vladimir Putin announced his intention to promote structural reforms of the economy and beef up anti-corruption measures. However, regarding structural reforms, although policies such as the creation of new industrial fields were formulated, no progress was made in breaking free from the economy's dependence on natural resources and the 2013 GDP growth forecast was revised downward from 2.4% to 1.8%, due to economic stagnation in Europe and sluggish growth in resource exports. Moreover, regarding the problem of corruption, although measures such as restrictions on the ownership of foreign assets by high-ranking government official

were implemented, they did not achieve significant results and successive reshuffles of major Cabinet members such as Deputy Prime Minister Vladislav Surkov and Minister for Development of Russian Far East Victor Ishaev were implemented. Although President Putin had boasted an approval rating of around 80% during his first administration, his approval rating remained in the low 60% range.

While a nonpartisan group supporting the president has been established, pressure on opposition groups increased.

In response to the situation, the Putin administration sought to rally supporters, founding a nonpartisan social group called the "All Russia People's Front" that brought together labor unions and economic organizations, with the ruling party "United Russia" as its core and President Putin as its leader (June). Moreover, the Putin administration increased the pressure on its opponents, embarking on a wholesale crackdown on foreign-funded non-profit organizations engaging in political activities (March), as well as detaining several hundred participants in a demonstration against the jail sentences imposed on the leader of an "anti-Putin" movement (July).

With policy issues proving hard to deal with, it seems that the Putin administration will seek to strengthen its power base by continuing to implement measures to influence public opinion, but such initiatives – above all the tightening of control of public opinion – could provoke a backlash among the populace and could actually weaken the president's powerbase.

3-2 Russia struggled to maintain a presence as a “great power” amid a “multipolar world”

- While stressing that Russia has the “best relationship” with China, it did not budge on the important issues.
- Russia avoided a decisive deterioration in relations with the US, despite a period of severe conflict.

Russia showed moves of keeping China in check with increase in vigilance toward the country in terms of security issues.

In the “Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation” (February), which sets out the basic foreign policy of the Putin administration, Russia cited “securing [Russia’s] high standing as one of the influential and competitive poles of the modern world” as one of its foreign policies in a “multipolar world.”

Based on this policy, Russia played host to President Xi Jinping and held a summit meeting on his first overseas visit after his appointment (March). During this meeting, they stressed that their two countries enjoyed the “best relationship,” announcing that they would “deepen strategic partnership” and offer “mutual support for core interests,” as well as stressing that they were in accord regarding efforts to seek a peaceful resolution to conflicts such as the Syrian situation. On the other hand, they failed to reach an agreement in negotiations on the price of

natural gas exports to China, regarding which discussions have been ongoing for some years. Furthermore, following the joint military exercise by Russia and China in waters off Vladivostok (July), Chinese ships entered the Sea of Okhotsk and carried out live fire exercises the following day in that marine area (the same month), leading to the realization on Russia’s part that China was demonstrating an active interest in moving into the Arctic Ocean. Accordingly, Russia adhered to its fundamental stances in the fields of security and the economy, announcing, for example, a policy of reinforcing its military forces in the Arctic Ocean region (September).

Russia alleviated the conflict with the US by proposing international supervision of Syrian chemical weapons.

Amid ongoing conflict over such matters as issues relating to Iran and Syria, and the question of the deployment of missile defense (MD) in Europe, Russia’s relationship with the US deteriorated further when it granted temporary asylum in Russia to the former US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee Edward Snowden (August). On the other hand, while the US was making preparations for a military intervention in the Syrian conflict on the grounds of “the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime,” Russia proposed to Syria “the disposal of chemical weapons under international supervision” (September). Syria’s acceptance of this proposal not only ensured that the US military

intervention in Syria was avoided, but also alleviated the conflict with the US and enabled Russia to assert its presence in the international community.

In order to maintain and expand its position as a “great power” in a “multipolar world,” it seems that Russia will seek to secure its own interests in its foreign relations, especially its relations with the US and China, while also becoming actively involved in key international issues and demonstrating a greater willingness to take the initiative.

3-3

Russia emphasized the development of its relations with Japan, yet stressed the difference in positions on the territorial issue.

- Russia advocated the expansion of relations in a wide range of fields, with a view to concluding a peace treaty.
- Russia adhered to its existing stance on the issue of the sovereignty of the Northern Territories, while promoting development there.

Russia moved to strengthen relations with Japan with a focus on economic cooperation, amid intensifying political dialogue.

Regarding relations with Japan, the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (February) sets out Russia's policy of aiming for (1) the expansion of bilateral relations in a wide range of fields; and (2) continuing negotiations concerning the conclusion of a peace treaty, against the background of strengthened bilateral cooperation and partnership in regard to international issues.

In accordance with this policy, Russia strove to expand and strengthen relations with Japan in a wide range of fields, holding four summit meetings with Japan (April, June, September, October) and its first Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations ("2+2", November) with an Asian

country. Moreover, there were developments in the economic fields to which Russia attaches importance: As well as calling for the expansion of trade and investment, technical cooperation in the fields of medical care, urban development, and agriculture, and cooperation in the development of resources in the Far East, Russia dispatched a succession of energy company executives to Japan to promote exports of energy resources to Japan (February-April).

Russia asserted that territorial negotiations were "the most difficult issue" but was prepared to keep it separate from other matters.


Regarding the Northern Territories issue, in a joint press conference during Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's official visit to Russia (April), President Putin expressed a willingness to adopt a positive approach to negotiations concerning the conclusion of a peace treaty, but on the other hand, he positioned those negotiations as "the most difficult issue" and stressed that in his view, it was necessary to improve the environment by expanding economic cooperation, in order to ensure progress in negotiations. Moreover, with regard to exploring solutions, he showed his awareness that compromise would be required on both sides, using the term "a draw," suggesting that he would not be prepared to return all four islands as per Japan's request.

While showing a positive attitude toward the

strengthening of relations with Japan, there were hints that Russia would not make a concession to Japan over the issue of the sovereignty of the Northern Territories. In addition, Russia instructed the government of Sakhalin Oblast, which has "jurisdiction" over the four islands, to formulate a new development program to run from 2016, so there are concerns that it is seeking to place the negotiations concerning the Northern Territories "on the back-burner" and to achieve both an expansion in bilateral relations and the establishment of the Northern Territories as "its own territory."

- At present, based on a special federal program called the "Social and Economic Development Program for the Kuril Islands" (2007-2015), basic infrastructure development is being carried out on the four islands of the Northern Territories, with a particular focus on the transport and energy fields; in addition, the construction and refurbishment of homes and public facilities is being financed by the budget of Sakhalin Oblast's government, which has "jurisdiction" over the four islands.
- This special federal program was approved by the Russian government in 2006, and the initial plan announced the same year incorporated a policy of aiming to cultivate local industry, as well as upgrading basic infrastructure, but during numerous subsequent revisions of the program, the Russian government adopted an approach that focused more heavily on basic infrastructure development. As of 2013, which marks the seventh year since the start of the special federal program, basic infrastructure development is progressing steadily, but hardly any moves toward the cultivation of local industry were seen.
- Amid this situation, Russia shows signs of exploring the formulation of a new development framework, in anticipation of the end of the special federal program. In July, while attending a conference in Sakhalin Oblast concerning its socioeconomic development, President Putin gave instructions that the projects contained in the special federal program should be accomplished before the deadline of the program, and also agreed to consider the Sakhalin government's proposal to continue the development of the Northern Territories even after 2016.
- In response to this, the government of Sakhalin Oblast is currently working on a draft of the new development program. The details have not yet emerged, but it seems that the new program will include projects aimed at developing mineral resources and cultivating the tourism industry through the local hot springs, with the aim of breaking free from the local economy's current reliance on the fisheries and seafood processing industries.
- The Northern Territories face two major problems: (1) the lack of higher education institutions such as a university; and (2) the departure from the islands of local young people because of the dominant share of the industrial structure accounted for by the fisheries and seafood processing industries, which prize foreign workers over Russian ones, because the former will work for lower wages. However, the cultivation of new industries will create a new employment environment on the islands, so it is possible that this could stem the exodus of young people and attract settlers from outside the islands. Moreover, the development of the tourism industry could increase the number of visitors – both domestic and foreign – and create a new "flow of people, goods, and money" into the four islands of the Northern Territories, thereby resulting in their remaining effectively "Russian territory."
- It is anticipated that the government of Sakhalin Oblast will submit its draft of the new development program before the end of February 2014. With President Putin citing Far Eastern development as one of his major policies, there is a concern that Russian development of the Northern Territories will enter a new phase.

Changes in budget by field under the special federal program





4

An uncertain outlook for the Middle East and North Africa

- Syria remains in turmoil.
- Political, economic, and security turbulence continues.

In Syria, battles continued between the Assad regime and anti-regime groups such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), and the UN announced that the number of people killed since March 2011, when the anti-regime insurgency broke out, was estimated to have reached in excess of 100,000 (July). Hezbollah, a Shiite group based in Lebanon, stepped up its military support for the Assad regime. The Syrian army recaptured some strategic positions in the south from the anti-regime forces (June). Among the anti-regime forces, while Islamist extremist groups have absorbed foreign combatants flowing in from other countries, boosting their ranks, they repeated clashes with groups such as the FSA over the areas under their control. Moreover, suspicions arose that the Assad regime had used chemical weapons on the outskirts of the capital, Damascus (August), and there were moves toward military intervention, but the regime announced its intention to eliminate all of its chemical weapons and showed its willingness to comply with the UN Security Council resolution concerning the disposal of its chemical weapons.

In Libya, although two years had passed since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, turbulence was still seen, with outbreaks of rioting in various locations. In the capital, Tripoli, militia groups laid siege to government buildings and demanded that those who had held key posts under the Gaddafi regime be expelled from public office (April-May). Libya's General National Congress passed a bill banning such officials from public office and the President of the General National Congress, Mohammed Magariaf, who was formerly the country's ambassador to India, resigned (May). Moreover, as well as incidents such as the kidnapping of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan (October, released after several hours), there were frequent incidents in the eastern city of Benghazi, including the assassinations of

security officials.

In Tunisia, secular opposition party leaders were killed in shootings which were seemingly the work of radical Islamists (February, July). In addition, Islamist extremists repeatedly clashed with security authorities near the western border with Algeria, while further south in the Sidi Bouzid Governorate, eight police officers were killed in a gun battle between the security authorities and extremists (October). Amid mounting criticism of the ruling moderate Islamist Ennahdha party, opposition parties responded by boycotting the National Constituent Assembly, demanding the resignation of the entire Cabinet (August), casting a shadow over the future of the democratization process.

In Egypt, dissatisfaction with President Mohamed Morsi (who had been a member of the Muslim Brotherhood) grew, due to the worsening economic situation, among other factors. Amid intensifying protests calling for President Morsi's resignation, the Egyptian military declared that the authority of the president had been revoked and an interim administration established, detaining him (July). This triggered a backlash from the Muslim Brotherhood, which clashed with security authorities in various parts of the country, but the interim administration arrested a number of senior members of the organization. Since July, armed insurgents thought to be Islamist extremists had carried out attacks targeting security authorities, primarily in the Sinai Peninsula. In Cairo, the Minister of Interior was the target of an assassination attempt in which a bomb was detonated (September).

The Tuareg people who live in the Sahara Desert in northern Mali, in a region they call "Azawad," have been engaged in several separatist uprisings since Mali gained its independence from France (1960).

In January 2012, an armed Tuareg group called the "National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad" (MNLA) launched attacks on Mali's government, alongside "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM) and the related organizations such as "Ansar Dine" (AD) and the "Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa" (MUJAO). These attacks intensified after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime (August 2011), as Tuareg combatants returning from Libya became involved, and in April 2012, government forces were driven out from the Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu areas of northern Mali.

However, conflict between the MNLA and Islamist extremist groups deepened over such matters as the imposition of *sharia* (Islamic law), and by November that

year, these groups had driven the MNLA out of the main cities in the aforementioned three areas. Amid concerns that Islamist extremist groups had turned the region into a safe haven, such groups pressed ahead with the imposition of an extreme interpretation of *sharia* law and destroyed mausoleums in Timbuktu, which had been designated as a World Heritage Site.

In January 2013, these groups launched a southward onslaught, so France embarked on a military intervention at the request of Mali's interim president, and recaptured the main cities in the aforementioned three areas, alongside troops from a number of African countries.

While terrorist attacks by Islamist extremist groups in this region have continued since then, presidential elections were held in Mali from July to August, resulting in the appointment of a new president, and parliamentary elections were held in November.



5-1 Proliferating threat from Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups

- Al-Qaeda sought to maintain its influence.
- Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups broadened their scope of operations.
- Threat of “lone wolf” terrorist attacks continued.

Although weakening, Al-Qaeda sought to maintain its influence

About two and a half years have passed since Al-Qaeda, whose main stronghold is in the tribal region of northwestern Pakistan, announced the appointment of Ayman al-Zawahiri as its leader (June 2011). During this time, al-Zawahiri showed a keen interest in the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa, and repeatedly stressed the necessity of establishing Islamic states in these regions. Amid this situation, Abu Anas al-Libi, who was wanted by the US authorities for involvement in the simultaneous US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (August 1998), was detained by the US special forces unit in the Libyan capital of Tripoli (October). Al-Libi is a veteran member of Al-Qaeda who is believed to have been a key person linking the organization with extremists in Libya. Therefore his detention was a further blow to Al-Qaeda, which is reported to have been in decline in recent years.

At the same time, the leadership of Al-Qaeda came into question with the conflict between Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and a related Syrian organization, the Al-Nusra Front, which surfaced in April (see p.39). In an attempt to mediate between the two organizations, al-Zawahiri instructed their leaders to (1) dissolve the integration of the AQI with the Al-Nusra Front, which the AQI had unilaterally declared; and (2) restrict the activities of the AQI in Iraq and those of the Al-Nusra Front to Syria.

In response, AQI leaders criticized al-Zawahiri's decision as being “sinful” and announced that they would not comply with it (June), throwing into sharp relief the limitations of Al-Qaeda's influence over the AQI.

Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups broadened their scope of operations.

In 2012, “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM) and the related organizations “Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa” (MUJAO) and “Ansar Dine” (AD) seized northern Mali and established bases there. These groups launched a southward onslaught (January). France embarked on a military intervention at the request of Mali's interim president, and recaptured the main cities in northern Mali, alongside troops from a number of African countries. Abdelhamid Abou Zeid and other senior AQIM figures are believed to have been killed in this process.

Immediately after this intervention began, armed insurgents attacked a natural gas facility on the outskirts of In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria

(January 16-19, see column on p.40: Terrorist attack on Japanese nationals in Algeria). The “Signed-in-Blood Battalion”, a unit of the “Masked Brigade”, which is led by former senior AQIM figure Mokhtar Belmokhtar, is believed to have been involved in this incident.

AQIM and its related organizations continued their terrorist activities even after that, and both MUJAO and the “Signed-in-Blood Battalion” admitted their involvement in simultaneous suicide bombings in northern Niger (May), in which a facility operated by a French company was among the targets. The “Masked Brigade” claimed responsibility for the incident in which a prison in Niger's capital, Niamey, was attacked and a large number of prisoners

escaped (June). Moreover, Belmokhtar and others announced the disbanding of the “Masked Brigade” and MUJAO, and the formation of a new organization called “al-Mourabitoun,” and declared that it would carry out attacks on France and its allies (August).

Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has a substantial capacity to conduct terrorist attacks and carried out attacks targeting Shiites and security authorities in various parts of Iraq. In particular, in the capital city of Baghdad, as well as carrying out a series of synchronized bombings in areas such as Shiite residential districts, it attacked a prison and helped senior AQI figures to escape (July). AQI unilaterally declared that it had merged with Al-Nusra Front, a related organization in Iraq, and called the enlarged organization the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL), but Al-Nusra Front apparently rejected this (April). AQI subsequently stepped up its activities in Syria too, and as well as subjugating part of the north of the country, separately from Al-Nusra Front, and expanding its forces, it repeatedly clashed with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), another opposition force, regarding the areas under their control.

In the Somali capital of Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab carried out suicide bombings on facilities including a

court (April), an attack on a UN facility (June), and an attack on a residential facility for staff at the Turkish embassy (July), among other acts of terrorism. Moreover, it attacked a shopping mall in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi, murdering more than 60 people, including some foreign nationals (September). On the other hand, clashes between senior Al-Shabaab figures indicated rivalries within the organization, with some major figures being driven out.

Amid the loss of numerous senior figures, including its deputy leader, Said Ali al-Shihri, due to attacks carried out by both the Yemeni government and the US government in support of the Yemeni authorities, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attacked military bases in the eastern governorate of Hadhramut, murdering numerous military personnel (September). AQAP also devoted some effort to propaganda activities such as publishing in the 10th issue of its English-language magazine “Inspire” and making an appeal to Muslims living in Western countries to carry out “individual *jihad*” (February).

Threat of “lone wolf” terrorist attacks continued.

With regard to “home-grown terrorists” living in Western countries and radicalized by the influence of Al-Qaeda, a growing concern is an upsurge of lone wolf terrorists, who plan and carry out terrorist attacks alone or in small groups, without receiving active instructions or support from a terrorist organization. It is considered to be more difficult to ascertain trends in relation to such terrorists than it is in the case of terrorists who act as part of an organization.

In Boston, Massachusetts, a homemade bomb placed along the route of a marathon exploded, killing 3 people and injuring approximately 200 (April). The perpetrators of this crime were two brothers who had emigrated to the US from the Republic of Dagestan in Russia, who are believed to have planned and executed the attack alone. In the 11th issue of “Inspire,” AQAP applauded the

brothers and claimed that “they were inspired by this magazine” (May). Moreover, in London, an off-duty British soldier was killed in an attack by two men armed with knives (May), following which the British government announced that there were “strong indications that it was an act of terrorism.”

There are indications that the foreign combatants that are traveling to Syria and joining local Islamist extremist groups in battle include some from the countries of the West, and it is pointed out that there is a risk that, upon returning to their home countries, such individuals could become involved in terrorist activities, based on their combat experience.

Column

Terrorist attack on Japanese nationals in Algeria

On January 16, armed insurgents attacked a natural gas facility in the Tigantourine district, on the outskirts of In Amenas in southeastern Algeria (the terrorist attack on Japanese nationals in Algeria). Armed insurgents who had barricaded themselves into a residential area attempted to move elsewhere by motor vehicles on the 17th, taking the hostages with them. Therefore the Algerian military attacked them and brought the residential area under control. Following this, on the 19th, the military stormed the plant in which other armed insurgents were holed up and brought them under control as well. Numerous people including 10 Japanese nationals were killed in this incident.

Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who is believed to have masterminded this incident, had been active for many years as the leader of the “Masked Brigade,” an organization operating under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Rifts with the AQIM

leadership made him and his organization (the “Masked Brigade”) breakaway from AQIM in the latter half of 2012.

It is believed that, originally, Belmokhtar repeatedly engaged in smuggling and kidnappings for pecuniary gain. However, according to a document said to be a letter written by the AQIM leadership that was discovered in northern Mali (dated October 2012, May 28, report by Associated Press), whereas the AQIM leadership emphasized that kidnapping was “prioritized as its top military activity,” the “Masked Brigade” – at that time still affiliated to AQIM and under its leadership – demonstrated a negative attitude toward the activities of AQIM. The “Masked Brigade” expressed its dissatisfaction, complaining that it was “fed up” with the fact that AQIM’s activities involved “nothing but kidnapping” and that AQIM carried out no “large-scale military action.”

5-2 The security situation remained serious in Afghanistan and Pakistan

- Amid frequent terrorist attacks by the Taliban, moves toward exploring negotiations were seen.
- In Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan) continued to be a major threat.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban continued to target government institutions, the military, and security authorities in terrorist attacks.

In Afghanistan, terrorist attacks by the Taliban are still ongoing, while phased withdrawal of the troops from various countries stationed in Afghanistan progressed toward the end of the combat mission of the ISAF led by the NATO, which is scheduled to be ended by the end of 2014.

The Taliban has carried out numerous attacks throughout Afghanistan, targeting government institutions, security forces, and foreign military personnel. In the capital city of Kabul, it carried out a suicide bombing that targeted the headquarters of the National Directorate of Security (NDS), among other buildings (January), a suicide bombing that targeted the Supreme Court (June), an attack thought to have targeted buildings including the office of the president (June), and a suicide bombing targeting ISAF depot facilities (July).

Presidential elections and provincial council elections are due to take place in April 2014, but the Taliban, which is calling for a boycott of the

elections, assassinated the head of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) in the province of Kunduz (September). Therefore there is a concern about future attacks on election officials and relevant facilities.

On the other hand, although the Taliban opened a political office in Doha, the capital of Qatar (June), in order to conduct discussions with US government representatives, mistrust between the parties concerned prevented negotiations from taking place and the office was closed (July). Other developments included the announcement (September) by the Pakistani government that it had released Abdul Ghani Baradar, the former deputy leader of the Taliban, who had previously been detained in Pakistan.

In Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan continued frequent terrorist attacks.

In Pakistan, following on from 2012, terrorist attacks on the security authorities and government institutions continued to be carried out by Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP: the Taliban Movement of Pakistan), a group of Taliban supporters. These included a terrorist attack on a prison in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (July), which allowed more than 250 prisoners – including some key terrorists – to escape; this demonstrated the TTP's continued interest in "liberating" prisoners. Moreover, when former president Pervez Musharraf, who had been living overseas, disclosed (March) his intention to return home to stand for the general election scheduled to take place in May, the TTP showed off its presence with the announcement that it had formed a death squad to target him. During the general election period, it engaged in intensive activities aimed at obstructing the elections, naming parties including the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)

– the former ruling coalition party – and the Awami National Party (ANP) as terrorist attack targets. A suicide bombing was carried out at an ANP election rally, injuring the former railways minister, one of the party's senior leaders (April). Subsequently, in response to calls by the new administration of Nawaz Sharif for peace negotiations, the TTP set conditions for embarking on negotiations, including the release of its currently-jailed members and the withdrawal of the military from the northwest of the country, where it has its strongholds. However, in November, it rejected moves to open negotiations, as its supreme leader Hakimullah Mehsud was killed in a bomb strike. Maulana Fazlullah, who was chosen as its new supreme leader, is believed to have been involved in the shooting of a young Pakistani girl campaigning for the right of girls to receive an education (October 2012).

In addition, a terrorist attack was carried out at a

tourist spot in the Gilgit-Baltistan region (June), in which 11 people including foreign tourists were killed. Both the TTP and an organization calling itself “Jundallah” claimed responsibility for this terrorist attack. Terrorist attacks targeting Shiite citizens were carried out in areas including Quetta.

The Islamist extremist group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) claimed responsibility for the large-scale bomb attacks carried out in Quetta in January and February.

5-3 Activities by Islamist extremist groups continued in Southeast Asia

- Small groups continued terrorist attacks in Indonesia.
- Large-scale attacks occurred in the southern Philippines.

Small groups influenced by Jemaah Islamiyah carried out successive terrorist attacks in Indonesia.

Although no terrorist attacks by the Islamist extremist group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) have been confirmed since 2009 in Indonesia, terrorist attacks by small groups believed to be influenced by JI have continued, including a suicide bombing targeting a police station (June) and a succession of gun battles with police officers since July.

In addition, despite being in jail, JI’s former supreme leader Abu Bakar Bashir issued a statement referring to the “Rohingya issue” in Myanmar and calling for *jihād* against the country (April). Amid

this situation, members of the group that planned to carry out a terrorist bombing at Myanmar’s embassy were arrested in Jakarta, while actually carrying the bombs they planned to use (May); in addition, there was a bombing at a Buddhist temple in the city (August).

The Moro National Liberation Front carried out large-scale attacks in the southern Philippines.

In the Philippines, the Misuari faction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) attacked and seized a village in Zamboanga, on the southern island of Mindanao, taking approximately 200 hostages (September). In October 2012, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) agreed to a peace framework with the Philippine government and peace negotiations are currently underway. The former chairman of the MNLF, Nur Misuari, strongly objected to this.

In other developments, the New People’s Army

(NPA), the military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines, issued a statement on the anniversary of the organization’s founding, in which it criticized a Japanese fruit company by name, along with US companies, and declared that it would continue its armed struggle against the Philippine government (March). It subsequently carried out an attack on soldiers of the Philippine army (October).

Dokka Umarov, self-proclaimed Emir of the Caucasus Emirate, a group of Islamist armed insurgents based in the North Caucasus region of Russia, issued a video statement via the internet, calling for terrorist attacks to thwart the Sochi Winter Olympics, which are due to be held in February 2014 (July). In February 2012, Umarov had declared a temporary halt to military action, but annulled that in this statement. The following provides an outline of Umarov’s statement.

- Our peace initiative, in which we halted military activity on Russian territory, was interpreted not as an act of kindness, but as a sign of weakness. Accordingly, infidels and apostates stepped up their oppression of Muslim citizens in the Caucasus and the number of citizens killed has risen sharply.
- We must prove to these infidels that our peace initiative was not a sign of weakness, but an act of kindness. They do not understand our laws and traditions, and continue with their diabolical games.
- They plan to hold the Olympics on the bones of our

ancestors, on the bones of many dead Muslims murdered by Russians on our land by the Black Sea. *Mujahideen* must not allow this. That is why I am calling on all *mujahideen* in neighboring areas to thwart the Olympics with all their might.

Umarov has previously issued statements claiming responsibility for a number of terrorist attacks including a series of suicide bombings on the Moscow metro (2010) and a suicide bombing at Moscow’s Domodedovo international airport (2011). Therefore the Russian government is beefing up its anti-terrorism measures ahead of the Sochi Olympics.

Amid this situation, a bus was blown up in a suicide bombing carried out in the southern city of Volgograd (October). Although it is unclear whether the incident was linked to this statement, tension within Russia is growing because this terrorist attack took place outside the North Caucasus region.



6

Activities aimed at acquiring important information or materials/technology that could be repurposed for military use.

- North Korea's procurement and proliferation of materials related to weapons of mass destruction continued.
- The international community was concerned about the illicit acquisition by China of materials that could be repurposed for military use.
- The intensification of espionage in cyberspace and elsewhere caused concerns also in Japan.

North Korea and others continued their procurement and proliferation of materials related to weapons of mass destruction.

As can be seen from the fact that it carried out missile engine fuel tests (September, according to media reports), as well as pressing ahead with the launch of a missile purported to be a satellite in December 2012 and conducting a nuclear test in February 2013, North Korea continued its nuclear and missile development in contravention of successive UN Security Council resolutions. It resulted in growing concerns over procurement and proliferation in relation to this. Furthermore, it was reported that a North Korean-registered cargo ship carrying military supplies was discovered by Panamanian authorities (July), and that weapons being transported from North Korea to Syria had been seized by the Turkish authorities (August). In addition, the Annual Report of the Panel of Experts assisting the UN Security Council's North Korea

Sanctions Committee pointed out that procurement and proliferation by North Korea of materials related to weapons of mass destruction continued (June).

A report by the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) stated that Iran continued to carry out uranium enrichment (August), while the Annual Report of the Panel of Experts assisting the UN Security Council's Iran Sanctions Committee indicated that Iran used sophisticated methods to obtain materials related to weapons of mass destruction, such as establishing front companies for the purpose of camouflaging procurement, using the names of third-party companies, and forging documentation (June).

Various countries expressed concern about the illicit acquisition by China of materials/technology that could be repurposed for military use.

The US judiciary handed down a sentence of 70 months' imprisonment to a Chinese citizen who had been working in a technical role for a US defense contractor, after he was found guilty of having provided China with military technology relating to the performance and design of missile guidance systems, in violation of the Arms Export Control Act and the Economic Espionage Act (March).

Moreover, the report by the US Secretary of Defense to the Congress on military and security developments in regard to China indicated that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) procured materials and technology, which could be diverted to military

use, via the commercial activities of the national defense industry and research activities carried out by research institutes under its auspices (May). Furthermore, a report by the British parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee set out concerns about the gathering of technical information by Chinese intelligence agencies (July), and there have been reports from other countries regarding cases of theft of technical information in which Chinese involvement is suspected.

External espionage activities were seen in various countries.

In Estonia, a 15-year prison sentence was handed down to a former technical operations specialist of the Estonian Internal Security Service for having assisted a Russian intelligence agency (October). In Germany, a married couple believed to be Russian spies who had lived in Germany on false passports for many years were convicted of espionage, with the husband being jailed for six and a half years and the wife for five and a half (July).

Concerns also arose about espionage in cyberspace carried out by various countries. It was indicated

that the PLA might have been involved in a mass hacking attack on the computer systems of a US media organ (January). In addition, President Obama was reported to have expressed his concerns about Chinese theft of economic intelligence in cyberspace directly to President Xi Jinping during a US-China summit meeting (June).

Outflows of materials and technology, and espionage in cyberspace and elsewhere raised concern in Japan.

In Japan, following the discovery in August 2012 of nuclear-related material that originated in North Korea on a cargo ship that called at Tokyo Port, customs authorities ordered the ship to submit the material (March). Furthermore, while China showed a hardline stance over its claims of ownership of the Senkaku Islands, there were reports regarding international exchange groups thought to be affiliated to the PLA and suspected of attempting to manipulate public opinion and gather intelligence in Okinawa (February) (see 'China maintained its hardline stance against Japan over the "issue of

territorial rights" regarding the Senkaku Islands, and attempted to "use force to change the status quo", pp.21-24). Moreover, unauthorized access via China and the US was confirmed in the case of cyber-attack on the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) (April), resulting in concern about leaks of information about Japan's advanced technology.

The intensification of espionage activities is concerned in Japan.

North Korea and other countries of particular concern in regard to proliferation continued their research and development focused on weapons of mass destruction, and it is anticipated that they will carry on using sophisticated means to evade initiatives by the international community, in order to procure the requisite materials and technology. In Japan, too, there is concern about the illicit

acquisition of materials/technology by countries of particular concern in regard to proliferation and various other countries that could be repurposed for military use, as well as the intensification of espionage in cyberspace and elsewhere.

According to reports from the US Department of Defense, Syria began its chemical weapons development program in the 1970s. It was dependent on other countries for some of the chemical agents and technologies required for their chemical weapons and the raw materials used in their manufacture, and it is believed that Syria imported several hundred tons of hydrochloric acid and ethylene glycol (required in the manufacture of chemical weapons) from Iran (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a US private sector think-tank). In addition, there are reports that Syria has hosted North Korean technical experts in the field of chemical weapons development since the 1990s. Therefore it is concluded that Syria received support – in terms of both materials and technology – from North

Korea and Iran in the field of chemical weapons development. Furthermore, Adnan Sillu, who is said to have been a senior officer in the Syrian army's chemical weapons division, was reported in September 2012 to have stated that "there is a chemical weapons facility on the outskirts of Aleppo and I heard that Iranian and Syrian experts conducted joint research there" and "the headquarters of the chemical weapons battalion are located southwest of Damascus. The commanding officer of that battalion visited Iran and North Korea many times in the past to purchase apparatus to protect against poisonous substances and chemical-related equipment" (for the latest details of the situation in Syria, see pp.36-37).

Reports of Syrian chemical weapons development and North Korean and Iranian connections

September 2009	South Korean authorities inspect a Panamanian-registered cargo ship at Busan Port and discover chemical protective clothing in a Syria-bound container that originated in North Korea (2010 UN report)
November 2009	Greek authorities discover a container loaded with reagents for identifying chemical substances and chemical protective clothing in a Liberian-registered cargo ship bound for Syria from North Korea (Yomiuri Shimbun, January 5, 2012)
August 2012	Indications that the Syrian army carried out tests involving the launch of shells capable of delivering chemical weapons, in the presence of representatives of the Iranian authorities (Telegraph, September 18, 2012)
April 2013	Turkish authorities discover gas masks and rifles on a Libyan-registered cargo ship. The captain admits that they were en route from North Korea to Syria (Sankei Shimbun, August 27, 2013)

It has been indicated that the PLA procures from other countries materials/technology that could be repurposed for military use and uses these to upgrade its own weapons, in some military technology fields in which it is difficult to carry out development within China.

Part of Chinese research and development in the field of science and technology has both civilian and military aspects. For example, in such fields as advanced materials and nanotechnology, which are a key focus in the state science and technology development program, not only the country's national defense industry, but also some research institutes and universities seemingly participate in research and development for military purposes, using grants from government institutions.

Amid this situation, the US Department of Defense indicated in its report to the Congress on China's military

and security developments that the PLA uses the networks of the national defense industry and research institutes to come into contact with technologies that could be diverted for military use and experts in those technologies, while passing this off as commercial activities or research and development in the civilian sector.

In addition to such procurement activities by the PLA via China's defense industry and other channels, concern has been growing in recent years about espionage activities conducted via international student programs at universities and research institutes. In the US, it has been reported that Chinese researchers could be studying at US universities, disguising their actual field of expertise (military technology) or the institution in China to which they were affiliated.

**Focal Issues of
the Domestic Public
Security Situation**

in 2013





1-1 Aum Shinrikyo expanded its membership


- The mainstream group continued to engage in recruitment activities that played down the religious aspect, while concealing the cult's name.
- The Joyu group carried out recruitment activities under its own name, emphasizing Joyu's approach.

The number of followers grew from around 1,500 to about 1,650.

At the time of the subway sarin gas attacks (March 1995), Aum Shinrikyo (hereinafter referred to as “the cult”) had around 11,400 followers within Japan. Although the attack led to those numbers falling to around 1,000 people (January 1997), the cult took the rejection of the application for a dissolution order under the Subversive Activities Prevention Act as a golden opportunity to rebuild itself, and the number of followers subsequently reached about 1,650 people (December 2002). Differences in perceptions of Asahara's intentions and policies on activities to achieve his objectives subsequently resulted in the cult splitting into a mainstream group, going by the name Aleph, and the Joyu group (named after its

leader, Fumihiro Joyu), which called itself “Hikarinowa (The Circle of Rainbow Light),” and conducting activities separately (May 2007). Due to such conflicting approaches, the number of followers fell to around 1,500 (December 2008). However, over the last few years, the mainstream group in particular has engaged in intensive recruitment activities, and the number of followers within Japan grew by about 150 people, including those who joined the Joyu group, reaching a total of around 1,650 (as of the end of June). Moreover, the number of followers of this cult in the Russian Federation also increased by about 20, bringing the total number to around 160 people.

Changes in the number of Aum Shinrikyo followers in Japan



The mainstream group used sophisticated methods and “conspiracy theories” in efforts to recruit students and young adults.

Believing that it is essential to swell the ranks of followers in order to achieve the “salvation of the people” preached by Asahara, the mainstream group continued to make students and young adults their main target, as they had in 2012. The group carried out systematic, proactive recruitment activities, concealing the name of the cult and creating opportunities to come into contact with the general public by striking up conversations with them on the street or in bookstores, and holding events at public facilities and restaurants. When seeking to recruit people by striking up conversations with them, followers targeted those who were browsing in the religion, yoga, or similar sections of bookstores, asking them questions such as “Would you like to look for a book with me?” or “I’m starting to teach a class – would you like to try it out?” In terms of recruitment via events, the group used such techniques as planning an event focused on food therapy (based on traditional medicinal herbs) restricted to those aged 35 or under, placing leaflets about the event in public facilities, and approaching people to invite them to the event, explaining that “It’s an event at which we’ll talk while cooking and

eating a meal together.” In addition, the group recruited the general public by using social networking services (SNS) to notify people of events, posing as a club that does not actually exist. Other techniques included trying to recruit students on university campuses by posing as an unofficial walking club for students.

The mainstream group targets the general public who has demonstrated an interest in yoga or the spiritual world. Followers other than the one who originally approached them sought to convince them of the cult’s sanctimonious “conspiracy theories,” such as “The powers that control the world framed Aum Shinrikyo” and “The cult didn’t carry out the subway sarin gas attacks,” before encouraging them to join the cult.

In addition, the mainstream group carried out recruitment activities via the internet in the Russian Federation, in the same way as it did in Japan.

The Joyu group used various media to openly encourage participation in the gatherings at which he preaches.

Following on from 2012, the Joyu group took advantage of the public’s familiarity with Fumihiro Joyu’s name and used private sector internet broadcasting companies to broadcast invitations from Joyu himself to attend the group’s social events. In addition, the group used Joyu’s blog to advertise the fact that people did not need to become members in order to participate in the gatherings at which he preaches, as well as the group’s seminars and “pilgrimages to holy places” (visits to shrines and temples deemed “holy” by Joyu), with messages such

as “Even if you don’t become a member, you can still take part in and experience many events and learn things.” Furthermore, the group also sought to recruit members by holding symposiums that it called “social gatherings,” but none of these activities led to an increase in participants from among the general public.

1-2 Adhering to “absolute faith in Asahara,” the mainstream group exhibited dangerous traits

- The mainstream group controlled followers via strict guidance concerning absolute faith in Asahara.
- The mainstream group maintained the dangerous dogma that resulted in a series of incidents, clearly showing its antisocial nature

The cult introduced a new selection system, while continuing the study of Asahara’s sermons and praying that his life be prolonged.

Following on from 2012, the mainstream group implemented strict guidance aimed at establishing absolute faith in Asahara, through events such as intensive seminars for lay members and the “Birth Festival” to celebrate Asahara’s birthday. In particular, during the intensive seminars held three times each year (January, May, and September), the participating lay members were subjected to ascetic practices in harsh conditions, in which they were not allowed any time to sleep or rest. They were then made to memorize the content of Asahara’s sermons and take tests of their understanding of the “Revised Special Religious Education System Textbook,” which contains sermons on achieving the “salvation of the people” preached by Asahara, as well as sermons demanding absolute faith in Asahara. Including teachings such as “The most important being is the Holy Master Asahara. Your family and friends are as nothing compared to him. Concentrate on your religious training with all your might and accumulate the data of the Guru (Asahara),” senior followers gave sermons that stressed the importance of absolute faith in Asahara. Some lay members who participated described a deepening of faith in Asahara, saying that they had “experienced heaven and hell and exaltation, and had gained a renewed sense of the greatness of the Guru.” During each seminar, followers were seen to take part in what was termed a “pilgrimage,” during which they walked around the perimeter of the Tokyo Detention House, where Asahara is currently detained.


Participants in Asahara’s “Birth Festival” have been increasing year on year, with 2.5 times as many people taking part in 2013 as did in 2008. At the facilities where the festivities were held, senior followers stressed the greatness of Asahara and the importance of absolute faith in him, with statements such as “There is no path open to us other than the Guru’s teachings and the way of Truth,” and had

participating followers engage in religious training to pray for Asahara’s life to be prolonged.

The mainstream group used teaching materials featuring recordings of Asahara’s sermons to provide followers who were minors with guidance demanding absolute faith in Asahara. It also dispatched senior members to Russia, to encourage its Russian followers to practice and pass on the religious training established by Asahara, in the same way as in Japan.

In addition, while the mainstream group was using a system for selecting particularly devout followers of Asahara from among its lay members (the Maha Paramita System <MPS>, introduced in 2010), it introduced a new system (the Vajra Paramita System; introduced in June) for selecting from among the lay members selected by the MPS (MPS followers) those who demonstrated absolute devotion to Asahara, as well as those whose faith remained unshaken even after having been arrested or detained, and those who had achieved particularly good results in their recruitment activities. Such followers underwent an initiation with special robes for their religious training, as a way of strengthening control over followers.

Number of participants in the Birth Festival



As its confrontational attitude toward the authorities increased, photographs of public security intelligence officers were found “skewered” with a knife.

Stating that “security organizations fabricate materials to try to prove that the cult is dangerous, so we will learn the law and gain a precise understanding of the difference between the police and the PSIA,” the mainstream group held briefings called “legal workshops” for its lay members at its regional training facilities nationwide. During these briefings, participants were provided with guidance on techniques for dealing with the personnel of security organizations, should they come into contact with them, such as ignoring them or refusing their requests. Moreover, from January, briefings dubbed “on-site inspection countermeasures” were held at the various facilities for live-in members, at which they were instructed that, in the event of an on-site inspection by the PSIA, they should distract the public security intelligence officers by filming them including their faces while they show their identification cards, question followers, and inspect items at the facility. As a result, at many of the cult’s facilities, it demonstrated a more confrontational attitude, with live-in members taking video footage and failing to answer the questions of public security

intelligence officers, as they had been instructed.

Amid this situation, during an on-site inspection of a facility where senior members live that was conducted in the spring of 2013, 16 photographs of public security intelligence officers, police officers, and lawyers who are opponents of the mainstream group were found placed near an altar, having been “skewered” with a knife designed to look like a Japanese sword. Looked at in light of the fact that, based on “*tantra vajrayana* (the secret route to enlightenment),” which is a dangerous dogma that implicitly condones murder, Asahara once stated, “Kill those who oppose the Truth as soon as possible” and caused a series of incidents, these “skewered” photographs betray the fact that there has been no change in the danger posed by this cult, nor in its antisocial nature.

1-3 The Joyu group maintained its attempts to evade surveillance by deceit

- The Joyu group professed to advocate dispelling the taint of Asahara, but no change in the reality that it was still influenced by him.
- The Joyu group continued to proselytize overseas, while gaining footholds for its activities in different locations.

The Joyu group sought to promote its “breakaway from Asahara” via media including books authored by Joyu.

The Joyu group, positioning 2013 as the “year we take up the challenge of our survival,” actively used various media in its efforts to publicize its “breakaway from Asahara.” In particular, Joyu published the books “Confession in the 17th Year after the Aum Incident” (Fusosha, December 2012), “Aum isn’t Over” (Rokusaisha, June) and “How to Spot a Dangerous Religion” (Poplar, November) to appeal to the public, saying, “I have no allegiance whatsoever to Asahara.” Moreover, on the Hikarinowa website, the group stressed the differences between Hikarinowa and Aleph, and a compliant impression that would dispel the taint of

Asahara to society, through such statements as “we have broken away from Asahara and the Aum faith, and have apologized for the incidents. We have formally concluded a compensation agreement with the group representing the victims and are striving to implement it.”

However, the Joyu group ranks Asahara alongside Shiva and Daikokuten, believing him to be an avatar of those deities, and has secretly maintained its faith in Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo, using an image of Daikokuten as an object of worship. Following on from 2012, the group placed an image of Daikokuten on the altars at its facilities, and at its seminars

(January, May, and August), Joyu performed the same kind of religious ceremony as the initiation that Asahara used to perform. Thus, there was no change in the fact that this group remains under the

influence of Asahara. Moreover, regarding the issue of compensation for the victims of its attack, it has been explained within the organization that “legally, we have no liability.”

The Joyu group was denied of entry into Ukraine, but conducted activities in the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey.

Joyu and senior members from the Joyu group went to Ukraine to hold a seminar for its Russian followers there, but the Ukrainian immigration bureau denied them entry at the airport (February).

However, even after that, the group dispatched senior members to the Russian Federation (March, April, May, August) to provide guidance to its Russian followers directly, as well as using internet-

based voice and video calls to provide daily guidance from Japan. In addition, Joyu and his senior members visited the Republic of Turkey, where they held a seminar to which they invited a dozen or so Russian followers (October).

1-4 The PSIA conducted surveillance over the cult properly and strictly

- The PSIA carried out on-site inspections at a cumulative total of 22 sites in 12 prefectures.
- The PSIA continued efforts to allay the fears and anxieties of local citizens.

The danger of the cult became apparent through on-site inspections.

Between January and the end of November, the PSIA mobilized a cumulative total of around 400 public security intelligence officers to carry out on-site inspections in accordance with the Act on the Control of Organizations Which Committed Indiscriminate Mass Murder (Organizations Control Act). A cumulative total of 22 of the cult’s facilities in 12 prefectures were inspected.

In the case of the mainstream group, multiple portraits of Asahara and teaching materials featuring his sermons were found at all facilities inspected. In addition, teaching materials used for instructing and preaching to minors, which featured Asahara’s sermons, were found at several facilities equipped with training centers for the guidance and religious

instruction of lay members. Moreover, as described above, photographs that had been “skewered” were discovered at a facility where senior members live.

The PSIA also received four reports (one every three months) from the cult, concerning the current status of the organization and its activities. In response to requests from 4 prefectures and 14 municipalities, the PSIA provided information on a total of 41 occasions, based on the content of these reports and the outcomes of on-site inspections and investigations.

Local citizens harbor fear and anxiety even now.


Even now, citizens living in the vicinity of the cult's facilities harbor substantial fears and a strong sense of anxiety about this cult. As such, local citizens held gatherings and demonstrations demanding that the cult be disbanded and that it leave its facilities, as well as distributing leaflets warning others about the cult's recruitment activities targeting young people.

Moreover, the "Anti-Aum Municipalities Liaison Group" submitted a petition to the Minister of Justice and the Director of the Public Security Intelligence Agency, demanding that legislation be introduced in

order to ensure the fundamental resolution of the Aum Shinrikyo problem (January).

In addition, in order to help to alleviate the fears and anxieties of citizens living in the vicinity of the cult's facilities, the PSIA held sessions for the exchange of opinions with citizens on a total of 45 occasions in 18 areas, at which PSIA representatives explained the current status of the cult.

Facilities where on-site inspections were carried out (January – end of November 2013)



Moves of domestic groups concerning events that drew attention from society



2-1

Ongoing activity by the anti-nuclear power movement, with the goal of “blocking the restarts”

- Radical leftist groups and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) sought to expand their membership by criticizing the government over such issues as the leakage of contaminated water.

The JCP criticized the government’s response to the leakage of contaminated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.

The number of participants in protests outside the Prime Minister’s Office and the Diet hosted by anti-nuclear power groups in the Greater Tokyo Area (from the end of March 2012) began to fall from the summer of 2012. However, the JCP had its Diet members participate in those protests almost every week and called for the declaration overcoming the accident to be revoked and compensation offered to disaster victims. Moreover, regarding the leakage of contaminated water, the JCP criticized the response by the government and Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), stating during an extraordinary

session of the Diet that “TEPCO should be liquidated and a system to ensure that the government takes full responsibility for resolving the accident, providing compensation, and carrying out decontamination should be constructed without delay.” It also announced “an urgent proposal to resolve the crisis over radioactive water at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station” (September).

Chukaku-ha continued to be very active, putting its affiliated group at the forefront.

As well as arguing for the immediate shutdown and decommissioning of reactors, radical leftist groups distributed their own group’s newspapers and pamphlets while participating in rallies and demonstrations by organizations such as anti-nuclear power groups. In particular, “Chukaku-ha” became involved in the anti-nuclear power movement, putting its anti-nuclear organization “Nonukes Zenkoku Network (NAZEN)” at the forefront, and held an anti-nuclear power rally in Fukushima City, claiming solidarity with the disaster-affected area

(March). In addition, the JRCL (Japan Revolutionary Communist League, formerly the Fourth International group) ran a feature in its newspaper concerning the activities of the “Hibakurodo-wo Kangaeru Network,” an organization that offers labor consultation services to workers involved in the clean-up at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and decontamination work in disaster-afflicted areas.

Radical leftist groups appealed for support in the lawsuit regarding illegally placed tent.

In September 2011, an anti-nuclear power group illegally pitched a tent in a corner of the grounds of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry building and has been occupying it ever since, so the government filed a lawsuit demanding the removal of the tent (March). The group claimed this was an “abuse of the right to take legal action” and demanded that the suit be dismissed. Amid this

situation, various radical leftist groups criticized the government’s response as “the tightening of repression of the anti-nuclear power movement” to restart the reactors; in addition, they called for people to provide support in the lawsuit and prevent the removal of the tent.

2-2

Ongoing activity by the anti-base movement, calling for the relocation of the Futenma base and revocation of Osprey deployment

- Radical leftist groups and the JCP held a series of rallies and protests in Okinawa and Tokyo.

Ahead of a decision on the advisability of the Henoko reclamation plan, opponents campaigned for its rejection.

Moves toward the relocation of US Futenma base got underway in earnest, with the submission to the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture of an application for approval to reclaim the public water area at Henoko in Nago City that is earmarked for the construction of an alternative facility (March). Amid this situation, the JCP and radical leftist groups joined forces with civic groups opposing the plan and took the opportunity of the Prime Minister's visits to Okinawa (February, June, July) and the "Ceremony to Commemorate the Anniversary of Japan's Restoration of Sovereignty and Return to the International Community" (April) to call for the government to "abandon the construction of the new base at Henoko" and "close and remove the Futenma

base." Following the submission of the application for approval, the JCP and its affiliated groups launched campaigns that involved inundating the Governor of Okinawa Prefecture with postcards from across the country, requesting that the landfill request be rejected; in addition, during the House of Councillors election (July), the JCP supported an anti-relocation candidate. Moreover, the party supported the incumbent mayor, who opposes the relocation, in the run-up to the Nago mayoral election (due to be held in January 2014), which is positioned as a decisive battle for the opposition movement.

Some protests against Osprey deployment led to obstructive behavior.

Following on from 2012, the JCP and radical leftist groups continued to campaign alongside civic groups opposing the deployment of the US military's MV-22 Osprey transport aircraft, demanding a retraction of the deployment at various locations, including the US Futenma base. In Tokyo, the party mobilized its members and activists for a rally and petition to the Prime Minister organized by the nonpartisan Executive Committee of the Okinawa Prefectural Citizens' Rally Against Osprey Deployment (January). Moreover, in Okinawa, in response to the deployment of additional Ospreys (August, September), the JCP and civic groups staged protest action at the gates of the base, opposing the deployment as "making a mockery of the citizens of

Okinawa Prefecture, whose anxiety about the possibility that one of the aircraft might crash is growing." In particular, "Kakumaru-ha" mobilized its activists from across the country and, alongside some citizens opposed to the deployment, staged a sit-in on the road in front of the gates of the base, to obstruct traffic around the base. In addition, in Shiga, party members and activists were mobilized for rallies and demonstrations organized by civic groups opposing the first Japan-US joint training exercise involving the use of Ospreys (September, October).

2-3 A diverse range of criticism over national political issues

- Radical leftist groups and the JCP sought to foment opposition among the public regarding such matters as the amendment of the Constitution, the Protection of Specified Secrets Bill, and government economic policy.

Radical leftist groups and the JCP criticized discussion over Article 96 of the Constitution and the right of collective self-defense as “aiming for the amendment of Article 9.”

At the 6th Plenum of its Central Committee (February), the JCP confirmed the policy of strengthening its campaign to galvanize public opinion regarding the issue of the amendment of the Constitution, calling on members to “build an unshakable national majority of voices who will protect Article 9 and keep it alive.” Subsequently, when the government and senior members of the ruling party indicated a desire to amend Article 96, which prescribes the requirements for initiating amendments to the Constitution, *Shimbun Akahata* carried an article that academics advocated constitutional amendment were “denying constitutionalism.” In addition, the JCP ran a publicity campaign claiming that “criticism is also being voiced by advocates of constitutional amendment” and at a rally organized by its affiliated groups with similar affiliations on Constitution Memorial Day (May), JCP Chairman Kazuo Shii criticized the proposed amendment, stating that “the government’s aim is to amend Article 9 so that it can go to war overseas.” Furthermore, following Prime

Minister Abe’s announcement after the House of Councillors election (July) that he intended to consider reviewing the interpretation of the Constitution regarding the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, the JCP criticized this move, asserting that this was “de facto constitutional changes through modifying interpretation of the existing constitution, in an attempt to chip away at Article 9 and destroy it.”

Moreover, via rallies and propaganda activities on the streets, radical leftist groups called for “the overthrow of the Abe administration, which is rushing headlong into the amendment of the Constitution and war.” Among these groups, “Chukaku-ha”’s “Block the Path to War! One Million Signatures Campaign” sought signatures for a petition against the amendment of Article 9 of the Constitution.

The NSC Establishment Bill and Protection of Specified Secrets Bill were criticized as “aimed at strengthening the military.”

The JCP and radical leftist groups engaged in criticism of the government, viewing the National Security Council (NSC) Establishment Bill and the Protection of Specified Secrets Bill as being part of the same whole. During an extraordinary session of the Diet (October – December), the JCP called for the rejection of both bills on the grounds that “the NSC is a modern-day version of the Imperial General Headquarters, a headquarters for war.” The JCP also issued an announcement entitled “We are vehemently against the ‘Protection of Secrets Bill,’ which robs citizens’ right to know” (October), and called for a wide range of groups and citizens to form

a united front in opposition to the bill.

On the other hand, various radical leftist groups criticized it in their newspapers as “a scheme to reinforce a despotic and militaristic system of rule” (“Kakumaru-ha”) and “an attempt to build a framework for war” (“Chukaku-ha”). These groups held a succession of rallies and demonstrations protesting against the Protection of Specified Secrets Bill and calling for blocking the bill.

Radical leftist groups and the JCP continued activities to oppose government economic policy.

Following on from 2012, the JCP and radical leftist groups continued to campaign against Japan's participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), on the grounds that "agriculture in Japan will be destroyed." The JCP's Diet members attended opposition rallies organized by agricultural groups nationwide, at which they called for the formation of a wide-ranging coalition to "oppose participation in TPP." Farmers' organizations affiliated to the JCP also organized rallies against TPP in various areas, and continued to participate in protests by civic groups outside the Prime Minister's Office.

In terms of activities by radical leftist groups, the

JRCL-led ATTAC Japan sought to stir up the campaign by holding rallies and workshops with civic groups opposed to participation in TPP, while "Chukaku-ha" used its organ paper to criticize participation in TPP as being "for the benefit of monopolistic big capital."

The JCP and its affiliated groups held rallies (April, September) against the April 2014 rise in the rate of consumption tax, claiming that it was "neither just nor rational".

Column

Activities to oppose the hosting of the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo

- The JCP Expressed its opposition to Tokyo's hosting of the 2020 Olympics, which was decided at an IOC Session in September and stated in the Diet that "reconstruction in the aftermath of the earthquake and nuclear power plant accident should come before the Olympics". Organ papers of radical leftist groups also offered criticism, stating that "the modern Olympics are a tool of the ruling class to control the workers" ("Chukaku-ha") and calling for supporters to "crush the

Olympics of oppressive security" (the mainstream faction of the "Kaiho-ha" group of the Revolutionary Workers' Association).

- Moreover, within the capital, demonstrations opposing the Tokyo Olympics were held intermittently (June, August, September, October) and activists of radical leftist groups were confirmed to have participated in these.



3-1

Radical leftist groups sought to penetrate labor unions and ordinary citizens, in an effort to expand their membership

- Radical leftist groups stepped up efforts to lobby labor unions in key industries while concealing the nature of the group, and strengthened their anti-nuclear power campaigns and student movements.

“Chukaku-ha” sought to expand its organization via student movements and anti-nuclear power campaigns.

“Chukaku-ha” tried to bring more workers into the organization, by having contingent workers join labor unions affiliated to the group and intervening in labor-management negotiations. Moreover, the group conducted recruitment activities among new university students at which it has bases, set up an affiliated student council (not admitted by the university) at Hiroshima University (July), and held protests at Hosei University, against the expulsions of student activists (April, October). Through such activities, the group sought to strengthen the foundations of its organization.

Furthermore, it sought to infiltrate ordinary citizens through its anti-nuclear power campaign fronted by the Chukaku-ha-affiliated public group “Nonukes Zenkoku Network (NAZEN).”

Following such initiatives, the group attracted around 1,800 people to its annual National Workers’ Rally (November, Tokyo), which marked as the mop-up of the year, and called for “the abolition of non-fulltime employment.”

“Kakumaru-ha” focused its energies on drawing in labor union members in key industries.

Based on its policy of prioritizing efforts to build up the organization, “Kakumaru-ha” focused its energies on drawing in labor union members in key industries, such as the Japan Confederation of Railway Workers’ Unions, to which unions including the East Japan Railway Workers’ Union and the JR Hokkaido Trade Unions belong. At its Great Rally of Workers’ Anger with slogans including “opposition against pay cuts” (March), the group criticized the executives of labor unions affiliated to RENGO (Japanese Trade Union Confederation), stating that “we will not tolerate labor union executives that cave in to pay cuts.” In addition, it set out a policy to focus on drawing in younger employees in the motor vehicle and electrical machinery industries. Moreover, it

mobilized activists around venues at which labor unions were holding their regular conferences, such as the Japan Postal Group Union Conference (August), and directly lobbied union members attending those conferences, seeking their approval for the group’s initiatives.


Amid this situation, the group’s covert activities partly came to light when, as a result of the arrest of a senior “Kakumaru-ha” activist (on suspicion of forgery of a private sealed document and its use), police exposed the group’s hideouts in Koto Ward (March) and Arakawa Ward (November) in Tokyo.

The “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association focused on drawing in day laborers.

The mainstream faction and anti-mainstream faction of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association strove to attract workers, placing their respective labor unions for day laborers at the forefront of support activities such as distributing food and protests and petitions demanding that administrative bodies introduce employment measures.

The mainstream faction mobilized such workers in the “Narita struggle” and joined forces with anti-airport alliances and other radical leftist groups to hold national rallies there (March, October). On the

other hand, the anti-mainstream faction repeatedly held demonstrations with the goal of “thwarting construction of nuclear power stations” (Aomori), as well as protesting against the overseas dispatch of the Self-Defense Forces and the realignment of US forces in Japan. Moreover, this faction was behind the incident in which metal projectiles were shot toward the US Yokota base (November).



3-2 Developments relating to the “Yodo-go” group and the Japanese Red Army

- The “Yodo-go” group filed a suit for state compensation for the retraction of the arrest warrants on charges of abducting Japanese nationals.
- The Japanese Red Army continued to pose a dangerous nature.

The “Yodo-go” group sought to galvanize public opinion by filing a suit for state compensation and publishing a book.

The “Yodo-go” group, including the Japan Airline “Yodo-go” hijackers (see note), who remain in North Korea, have sought to galvanize public opinion in defense of the group, toward the retraction of the arrest warrants for their arrest on charges of the abduction of Japanese nationals revoked, as a prerequisite for their return to Japan. As part of these endeavors, three members filed a suit for state compensation against the Tokyo Metropolitan Government in the Tokyo District Court (April), claiming that “the charge on the arrest warrant is illegal.” In addition, they appealed for public understanding and support regarding the claims of the six members, by publishing a book entitled “‘Suspected Abduction’ and Returning Home: Back to Our Homeland after the Hijacking,” (April).

With a view to progress in the campaign for their return home, it appears that the “Yodo-go” group will continue to strive to galvanize public opinion in their favor in the future, focusing on the suit for state compensation.

(Note) An incident that occurred on March 31, 1970, when nine activists from the Red Army Faction of the Communist League hijacked Japan Airlines Flight 351 (nicknamed “Yodo-go”), entering North Korea on April 3.

Members of the “Yodo-go” group currently on the Interpol wanted list

Shiro Akagi	Suspicion of hijacking
Kimihiro Uomoto	Suspicion of hijacking and abduction of Japanese nationals
Takahiro Konishi	Suspicion of hijacking
Moriaki Wakabayashi	Suspicion of hijacking
Yoriko Mori	Suspicion of abduction of Japanese nationals, etc.
Sakiko Wakabayashi	Suspicion of abduction of Japanese nationals, etc.
Takeshi Okamoto	Suspicion of hijacking

*The “Yodo-go” Group claims that Takeshi Okamoto is dead.

The Japanese Red Army continued to pose a dangerous nature and made moves to collaborate with other groups.

Calling it the “Lydda Struggle,” the Japanese Red Army continues to claim that the Lod Airport massacre (May 30, 1972) perpetrated by Kozo Okamoto and two other members was a legitimate act. In 2013, on the occasion of a rally to commemorate the incident (May), its leader, Fusako Shigenobu (currently serving a prison sentence) again issued a statement seeking to justify the massacre. In addition, seven members who have previously committed heinous crimes are currently on the Interpol wanted list. There has been no obvious change in the danger posed by the Japanese Red Army.

The rally for the first time took the form of a symposium organized by an executive committee consisting of several groups and showed an approach

of “focusing on joint struggle” with members of the anti-nuclear power campaign, for example. This indicates that the members of the Japanese Red Army and their supporters will in future explore collaboration with other groups through activities such as the anti-nuclear power campaign.

Japanese Red Army members currently on the Interpol wanted list

Kozo Okamoto	Kunio Bando
Junzo Okudaira	Hisashi Matsuda
Norio Sasaki	Ayako Daidoji
Akira Nihei	



4

Under the banner of “confrontation between the LDP and the JCP,” the JCP gained seats in the House of Councillors election

- The JCP showed its presence by calling for “joint struggle on a single point issue” both in and out of the Diet.
- It focused on enhancing the party strength, with a view to bolstering its capacity.

The JCP made an all-out effort to capture the anti-LDP vote from the beginning of the year, with a view to victory in the House of Councillors election.

The JCP strove from the beginning of the year to swell its supporters, positioning the House of Councillors election in July as “the election when we switch to the offensive in earnest.”


In the JCP’s street campaigns and meetings addressed by those it intended to field as candidates, the party criticized the Abe administration for “repeatedly riding roughshod over the will of the people in all fields, including the economy, nuclear power, and the Constitution” and denounced other political parties for “revealing themselves to be a complementary force of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).” In addition, the party claimed that “the JCP is the only party that is confronting the LDP and the Abe administration head-on, so the true axis of confrontation in the House of Councillors election is the LDP versus the JCP.”

Moreover, with a view to cultivating public opinion critical of the government, it focused its efforts on what it calls “joint struggle on a single point issue” – forming a united front based on any points on which

it is in agreement with other groups – by having senior party members participate in events such as rallies organized by agriculture, forestry and fishery industry groups opposed to participation in TPP, and rallies organized by civic groups protesting against the restart of the nuclear power stations. Through such initiatives, it strove to create the impression that the “party influences politics in partnership with the people.”

As a result of having devoted its energies to these endeavors, the JCP won five seats in the proportional representation constituency and three in electoral districts (Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto), increasing its seats to eight from the three that were up for election. It was 15 years since the JCP had increased its seats in a national election – the first time since the House of Councillors election in 1998 – and the result met with great acclaim from the JCP, which described it as “the start of a third tide of advance, following the period from the latter half of the 1960s to the 1970s, and the latter half of the 1990s.”

Changes in the number of JCP Diet members



The JCP showed its presence in the Diet through debate with the Abe administration and joint struggle with opposition parties.

The JCP strove to demonstrate its unique identity by submitting bills as well as criticizing the policies of the administration, under its policy of “confronting the Abe administration head-on.”

Regarding the economic policy dubbed “Abenomics” being promoted by the Abe administration, the JCP asserted during the ordinary session of the Diet that “only a handful of large corporations and wealthy people will reap the benefits; the lives of the populace will be destroyed.” Moreover, the JCP criticized the amendment of Article 96 of the Constitution as “a dangerous move that will make it easy for the administration of the time to arbitrarily amend the Constitution” and sought to galvanize public opinion against it, with the *Shimbun Akahata* publishing interviews with eminent figures representing various fields who declared themselves to be “opposed to the

amendment of the Constitution.”

As a result of the House of Councillors election, the JCP regained the right to propose bills for the first time in nine years, so during the extraordinary session of the Diet in the autumn, it proposed the “Black Companies Regulation Bill” to the House of Councillors (October), which includes restrictions on working long hours, and other exploitative practices, thereby publicizing the party’s policy-making ability. Moreover, the JCP announced the outline of a bill for halting the consumption tax rate increase and called on other parties to propose it jointly (October) to demonstrate a stance to actively engage in joint struggle with other opposition parties.

The JCP promoted a “big campaign to expand the party strength” ahead of the 26th Party Congress

The JCP held the 8th Plenum of its Central Committee (September) and decided to hold its 26th Party Congress in January 2014. Moreover, it summed up the outcome of the House of Councillors election as “a result in which the situation worked in our favor, due to the stagnation of the Democratic Party and the loss of momentum by the Japan Restoration Party.” It stated that in order to ensure that the party would be able to win a national election under any circumstances in the future, it would be necessary to overcome its greatest weak point – the party’s “lack of its own strength” – and create a big, strong party. As such, it advocated a “big campaign to expand the party strength” with the end of January 2014 as the deadline and thereafter strove to increase the number of party members and the circulation of *Shimbun Akahata*.

However, the number of party members remained at the same level even after that, and the membership as of the end of October – 320,000 people – was about the same as it had been at the beginning of the year. Moreover, the JCP was unable to stem the decline in the circulation of *Shimbun Akahata*, which fell by more than 70,000 copies, from about 1.3 million at the beginning of the year to around 1.23 million as of the end of October.

At the 26th Congress, the JCP intends to decide on

its policy regarding such matters as its response to the situation within Japan and overseas, as well as election activities and efforts to expand its membership. However, there is a growing sense of crisis that the decline in party membership is a life-or-death situation for the JCP, so it is believed that it will devote its energies to activities aimed at overcoming the party’s “lack of its own strength,” with a view to various elections in due course.

Changes in the number of party members at the time of the party Congress and the circulation of *Shimbun Akahata*





5-1 Right-wing groups mainly focused on foreign relations and territorial issues

- Activities focused on problems involving neighboring countries, including the Senkaku Islands, Takeshima, and the Northern Territories.
- Various activities called on the government to “fulfill your commitment,” following the inauguration of the Abe administration.

Right-wing groups engaged in protest activities in response to incursions into territorial waters by Chinese surveillance ships and the landing of the South Korean parliament members on Takeshima.

Right-wing groups engaged in intensive activities in response to moves by Chinese naval vessels in the East China Sea and Chinese surveillance ships, which made repeated incursions into territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands.

Following the incident in which a Chinese naval vessel locked its weapon-targeting radar onto a Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) destroyer (January), such groups carried out propaganda activities near Chinese diplomatic offices in Japan in order to criticize China. In addition, they submitted petitions demanding that government organs adopt an uncompromising diplomatic posture. Moreover, in response to repeated incursions by Chinese surveillance ships into territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, such groups carried out propaganda activities near Chinese diplomatic offices in Japan, during which they called for China to “get out of the Senkaku Islands.” Furthermore, on their annual “September 29th Anti-Chinese Communist Day” (marking the date on which the Joint Communiqué was signed by Japan and China in 1972), many organizations engaged in propaganda activities and demonstrations criticizing China, with activity focused on cities such as Tokyo and Osaka where Chinese diplomatic offices are located.

At the same time, regarding the Takeshima issue, on “Takeshima Day” (February 22, prefectural ordinance of Shimane Prefecture) and also in

response to the landing on Takeshima by three Japanese nationals who claimed that “Dokdo (the Korean name of Takeshima) is Korean territory” (May) and the landing on Takeshima of ruling and opposition party members of the South Korean parliament (August), right-wing groups held protests near South Korean diplomatic offices in Japan and also near the facilities of the group to which the aforementioned three Japanese nationals belong.

Moreover, regarding the Northern Territories issue, such groups held protests against the Russian government near Russian diplomatic offices in various parts of Japan and also near the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on “Northern Territories Day” (February 7) and “Anti-Russia Day” (August 9), and also on the occasion of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Japan (November). They also engaged in propaganda activities criticizing the diplomatic posture of the Japanese government as “weak-kneed.”

In response to reports of North Korea’s nuclear test (February) and missile launch (April), right-wing groups held protests near Chongryon-related facilities, denouncing these actions as a “declaration of war against Japan.”

Right-wing groups called for the Prime Minister to visit Yasukuni Shrine, as well as demanding the revocation of the Kono Statement of 1993 and the amendment of the Constitution.

Following the inauguration of the Abe administration, right-wing groups carried out various activities in which they called on the Cabinet Office or LDP to take such action as the Prime Minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine, revoking the Kono Statement of 1993 regarding the "comfort women" issue, and amending the Constitution.

In the course of such activities, while some groups submitted petitions demanding that the Prime Minister visit Yasukuni Shrine from the perspective of maintaining a conservative administration, there were others that engaged in protests around the Cabinet Office and LDP headquarters, complaining that "you are not fulfilling your commitment," in response to the fact that Prime Minister Abe had not

visited Yasukuni Shrine on the anniversary of the end of the War (August 15) or during the shrine's spring and autumn festivals (April and October).

Right-wing groups also engaged in propaganda activities on the streets during the 62th National Conference on Educational Research of the Japan Teachers' Union (JTU) (January, Saga) and the FY2013 Educational Research Meeting of the All Japan Teachers and Staff Union (Zenkyo) (August, Aichi), with calls to "disband the JTU for its politically-biased education" and "crush Zenkyo for its anti-Japanese education."

Column**Intensification of calls by various groups within Japan to strengthen effective control over the Senkaku Islands**

Since the acquisition and retention of the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese government (September 2012), there have been numerous incursions into territorial waters by Chinese surveillance ships. In response, groups including conservative civic groups (January – November), members of local assemblies (April – November), and party members belonging to political groups affiliated to new religions (May – November) have repeatedly called for the strengthening of effective

control over these islands. Furthermore, members of such groups have actually sailed into the waters surrounding the islands. Fishing boats chartered by such groups have repeatedly been followed or chased by Chinese surveillance ships during the latter's incursions into those waters, and there have been cases in which prolonged standoffs with these surveillance ships took place at very close quarters (May – August; see p.21).

5-2

A right-wing-affiliated group carried out activities, calling for the “break-off of relations between Japan and South Korea”

- Hate speech became a social problem, triggered by the anti-South Korean activities in Korean town.

A group called for the “break-off of diplomatic relations” and the “expulsion of foreign nationals” in response to various issues with South Korea and China.

A right-wing-affiliated group that uses the internet to solicit participants in their activities and makes jingoistic demands carried out protests outside South Korean and Chinese diplomatic offices in Japan, in response to various issues between Japan and these nations, including issues relating to territory and awareness of history. In addition, the group organized rallies and demonstrations calling for the “break-off of diplomatic relations.”

In particular, in activities dubbed “anti-South Korean,” the group repeatedly held demonstrations near the so-called Korean town areas of Tokyo and Osaka, with calls to “drive the South Koreans into the Sea of Japan.” Amid this situation, there were

frequent scuffles with the group (“counter-demonstrators;” see column below) who criticized the calls of the group as “hate speech,” and there were outbreaks of violence in some cases (May – June, Tokyo).

The activities of the right-wing-affiliated group were raised in a question in the Diet. In addition, a court issued a ruling (October, Kyoto District Court) ordering the group to pay compensation for a protest (2009) at the Kyoto Korean 1st Elementary School.

Column

Scuffles with “counter-demonstrators” over activities in Okubo, Tokyo

Since February, “counter-demonstrators” criticizing right-wing-affiliated groups as racist and their calls as “hate speech” have organized protests against discrimination, holding these protests alongside the routes taken by a right-wing-affiliated group in its demonstrations. The “counter-demonstrators” brandished placards with

messages such as “Racists are Japan’s national shame” and called “racists go home” while provoking the right-wing-affiliated group, so scuffles frequently broke out with the right-wing-affiliated group who objected to this, and there were cases in which people were arrested from both sides on suspicion of assault (Tokyo, Osaka).

Appendix

Recent Major Security Developments Overseas

Jan. 1st (Tue)	First Secretary Kim Jong Un of North Korea gives his New Year's address. He stresses that the "last instructions" of the late General Secretary Kim Jong Il have been achieved through the launch of a "satellite." He cites "the building of an economic giant" as the country's most important task.	25th (Mon)	The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) holds an enlarged meeting during the Fourth Meeting of its 22nd Central Committee (Korea Central Hall, Tokyo).
5th (Sat)	An aircraft belonging to China's State Oceanic Administration flies over the waters off the Senkaku Islands. The same aircraft also flies over the area on January 11th and 15th, February 28th, August 26th, and October 1st.	29th (Fri)	The Tokyo District Court approves the sale of the Korea Central Hall (headquarters of Chongryon) to the Saifukuji Buddhist temple (Kagoshima City; Chief Priest: Ekan Ikeguchi), following its successful bid for the hall (land and building) in an auction (bidding period: March 12th-19th). Chief Priest Ikeguchi subsequently announces his decision to abandon the purchase on May 10th.
10th (Thu)	The Islamic extremist organization that had occupied northern Mali captures the central Mali town of Konna. The country's interim President Dioncounda Traoré declares a state of emergency and requests French military intervention. The French army begins its military action on the 11th.	31st (Sun)	At a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (in Pyongyang), a written decision on "a new strategic line on carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously" is adopted.
16th (Wed)	A group of armed insurgents known as the "Signed-in-Blood Battalion" attack a natural gas facility on the outskirts of In Amenas in southeastern Algeria. Until they are brought under control by the Algerian army on the 19th, they hold plant employees hostage at the facility. Numerous people are killed, including 10 Japanese nationals.	Apr. 2nd (Tue)	North Korea announces that it will refurbish and restart the currently mothballed 5 megawatt graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon.
22nd (Tue)	The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 2087, condemning the launch by North Korea of a missile purported to be a "satellite" (on December 12th, 2012).	8th (Mon)	North Korea announces the withdrawal of North Korean employees from the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the provisional suspension of operations there. On the 25th, the South Korean government proposes to North Korea that working-level talks should be held between the relevant authorities, but North Korea rejects this, so on the 26th, the South Korean government decides to withdraw all South Korean personnel from the industrial complex.
23rd (Wed)	Osaka Korean School and high school students from Aichi Korean Middle and High School file lawsuits against the Japanese government at the Osaka and Nagoya district courts, concerning the application of tuition fee waivers to students of Korean schools.	15th (Mon)	An explosion occurs at a marathon taking place in the US city of Boston, Massachusetts; 3 people die and around 200 are injured. 2 brothers who had emigrated to the US from the Republic of Dagestan in Russia are arrested as suspects (the older brother subsequently dies).
30th (Wed)	A Chinese naval vessel locks its weapon-targeting radar onto an MSDF destroyer in the East China Sea. The US information security company Mandiant indicates the possibility that the Chinese People's Liberation Army was involved in a mass hacking attack on the systems of The New York Times.	23rd (Tue)	8 China Marine Surveillance ships make an incursion into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands (this is the largest-ever incursion). The Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) announces that unauthorized access to its server had occurred on April 17th. When the results of its investigation into the incident are announced in July, JAXA indicates that technical information relating to operational preparations for the Japanese Experiment Module "Kibo" used at the International Space Station and the personal e-mail addresses of personnel involved have been accessed.
Feb. 12th (Tue)	North Korea's Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) announces that the 3rd underground nuclear test has been carried out.	27th (Sat)	The Taliban declares the start of its 2013 full-scale offensive, dubbed the "Khalid bin Waleed operation," in which it will primarily target foreign military personnel stationed in Afghanistan and those assisting them. The Taliban carries out suicide bombings in the Afghan capital, Kabul, in May, June, and July.
18th (Mon)	The US information security company Mandiant releases a report stating that there is a strong possibility that the Chinese People's Liberation Army's General Staff Department, 3rd Department, 2nd Bureau (Unit 61398) is involved in cyber-attacks on US companies and the US government.	29th (Mon)	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe holds talks with President Putin of Russia (Kremlin, Moscow). After the talks, the two leaders release a joint statement covering 53 topics, including the acceleration of peace treaty negotiations and the establishment of discussions between the foreign and defense ministers of the two nations.
Mar. 1st (Fri)	The US-South Korean joint military exercise Foal Eagle begins (until April 30th).	May 6th (Mon)	The US Department of Defense submits to the US Congress its Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China. The report indicates that, via the commercial activities of the national defense industry and research activities carried out by research institutes under its auspices, the Chinese People's Liberation Army is acquiring supplies and technology that could be diverted to military use.
7th (Thu)	The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 2094, condemning the North Korea's nuclear test (on February 12th).	16th (Thu)	Kim Yong Nam, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea, meets with Isao Iijima, Special Advisor to the Cabinet, during the latter's visit to North Korea (14th-17th).
18th (Mon)	The Japanese government announces that nuclear-related material was found on a cargo ship that called at Tokyo Port in August 2012 and that the customs authorities have now ordered that the material be handed over.		
19th (Tue)	Terrorists in Iraq launch a series of car bombings in Shiite Muslim neighborhoods, including central Baghdad and Sadr City. At least 50 people are killed and 171 injured. Al-Qaeda-affiliated organization Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) issues a statement claiming responsibility.		
22nd (Fri)	Chinese President Xi Jinping makes official visits to Russia, Tanzania, South Africa, and the Republic of the Congo (until the 30th). This is his first overseas visit since being appointed president and in South Africa he attends the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) summit.		

22nd (Wed) North Korea's Choe Ryong Hae, Director of the General Political Department of the Korean People's Army, visits China as the special envoy of First Secretary Kim Jong Un (until the 24th) to hold talks with President Xi Jinping and other government figures.

In the British capital of London, an off-duty British soldier is killed in an attack by 2 men armed with knives. The British government announces that there are "strong indications that it was an act of terrorism."

Jun. 3rd (Mon) The Panel of Experts assisting the UN Security Council's Iran Sanctions Committee submits its annual report to the President of the Security Council. The report indicates that Iran is using sophisticated methods, such as establishing front companies for the purpose of camouflaging procurement, using the names of third-party companies, and forging air waybills.

7th (Fri) China's President Xi Jinping visits the US and holds talks with US President Obama (until the 8th). Discussions cover topics including US-China relations in general, the issue of nuclear development by North Korea, policies to deal with economic espionage in cyberspace, and the situation surrounding the Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea.

The Panel of Experts assisting the UN Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee submits its annual report to the President of the Security Council. The report indicates that North Korea diplomats have been involved in many violations of the arms embargo and recommends that sanctions be applied to 15 new organizations and individuals, including North Korea's Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry.

15th (Sat) The relatives of Japanese nationals whose remains are buried in what is now North Korea travel to the country to visit their graves, as part of a delegation led by the Kita Izoku Renraku Kai (until the 25th. Including this visit, relatives and others make 4 trips to North Korea between June and October, in order to visit the graves of family members).

22nd (Sat) At the foot of Nanga Parbat, a high mountain in the Gilgit-Baltistan region of northern Pakistan, an armed gang attacks the base camp where foreign tourists are staying and 11 people are killed, 10 of whom are foreign nationals. Organizations calling themselves Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP; the Taliban Movement of Pakistan) and Jundallah both issue statements claiming responsibility for the attack.

Jul. 2nd (Tue) A court in Stuttgart, Germany, jails a married couple believed to be Russian spies who lived in Germany on false passports for many years and were arrested in October 2011 on suspicion of espionage; the husband is jailed for 6.5 years and the wife for 5.5.

3rd (Wed) Dokka Umarov, leader of the Caucasus Emirate, a group of Islamic armed insurgents based in the North Caucasus region of Russia, issues a video statement calling for terrorist attacks to thwart the Sochi Winter Olympics, which are due to be held in February 2014.

14th (Sun) 5 Chinese naval vessels pass through the Soya Strait, the first Chinese naval vessels to do so. Subsequently, on the 25th of the month, naval vessels navigate from the Pacific Ocean to the East China Sea via the waters northeast of Miyako-jima in Okinawa Prefecture.

16th (Tue) Russia's President Putin visits Sakhalin Oblast and proposes to consider Sakhalin Governor Alexander Khoroshavin's request to extend the Kuril Development Program (a development plan initiated by the Russian government, focused on the Northern Territories and the Chishima Islands and covering the period 2007-2015).

17th (Wed) Japanese news media report that the Panamanian authorities in the northern Panama port of Colón have discovered that the *Chong Chan Gang*, a North Korean-registered cargo ship, is carrying "undeclared military cargo" and have seized the ship and detained its captain and crew.

24th (Wed) 4 Chinese Coast Guard patrol vessels appear in Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands for the first time.

1 Chinese People's Liberation Army early warning aircraft flies from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean, passing between Okinawa Island and Miyako-jima, Okinawa Prefecture.

27th (Sat) To celebrate the 60th anniversary of the "Victory in the Fatherland Liberation War" (conclusion of the Korean Armistice Agreement), North Korea holds a military parade and mass rally in Pyongyang, with First Secretary Kim Jong Un in attendance (Kim Il Sung Square).

Aug. 1st (Thu) Hiroshima Korean School and students from its high school division file a lawsuit against the Japanese government at the Hiroshima District Court, concerning the application of tuition-free high school education program to students of Korean schools.

Russia's Federal Migration Service grants temporary asylum in Russia to Edward Snowden, the former US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee who revealed that US authorities were gathering people's personal information.

7th (Wed) 5 Chinese Coast Guard patrol vessels make an incursion into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands. 3 of these spent more than 28 hours in Japanese territorial waters, the longest period to date.

14th (Wed) Authorities from North and South Korea hold the 7th working-level talks, concerning the issue of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and adopt an agreement that includes guarantees about the normal operation of the industrial park. The industrial park resumes operations on September 16.

27th (Tue) Japanese news media report that Turkish authorities searched a Libyan-registered cargo ship, the *Al Entisar*, at Tuzla Port in Istanbul on April 4th and 5th, and seized gas masks for protection against chemical agents, rifles, and pistols, which were being transported from North Korea to Syria.

28th (Wed) Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) submits a report on Iran nuclear issue to the IAEA Board of Directors. The report indicates that Iran is continuing to install more advanced centrifuges to enrich uranium and has started to produce nuclear fuel for its experimental heavy-water reactor.

Sep. 7th (Sat) First Secretary Kim Jong Un sends a congratulatory message to Chongryon on the occasion of the 65th anniversary of the founding of North Korea.

8th (Sun) 2 Chinese People's Liberation Army bombers fly from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean, passing between Okinawa Island and Miyako-jima, Okinawa Prefecture.

9th (Mon) To celebrate the 65th anniversary of its founding, North Korea holds a parade by the Worker-Peasant Red Guards and mass rally in Pyongyang, with First Secretary Kim Jong Un in attendance (Kim Il Sung Square).

An unmanned aerial vehicle thought to belong to the Chinese People's Liberation Army flies over the waters off the Senkaku Islands.

10th (Tue) 8 Chinese Coast Guard patrol vessels make an incursion into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands (this is the second time that such a large incursion has taken place).

14th (Sat) Following Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov's proposal for "the disposal of Syrian chemical weapons under international supervision," the US and Russia agree on an action plan aimed at the disposal of those weapons.

21st (Sat) In the Kenyan capital Nairobi, Al-Shabaab, a Somali organization affiliated to Al-Qaeda, attacks a large shopping mall, killing more than 60 people, including foreign nationals.

Oct. 17th (Thu) The Tokyo District Court discloses the results of the unsealing of the bids in the auction (bidding period: 3rd-10th) of the Korea Central Hall (headquarters of Chongryon) and announces that the highest bid of ¥5.01 billion was placed by Avar Limited Liability Company. On the 22nd of the month, the same court extends the deadline for a decision on the sale, which had been due to be announced that day.

22nd (Tue) North Korea holds the 4th Meeting of Korean People's Army Company Commanders and Political Instructors (until the 23rd, Pyongyang). First Secretary Kim Jong Un gives a speech in which he sets them the task of strengthening and developing companies.

25th (Fri) Over the course of 3 days, until the 27th, 2 Chinese People's Liberation Army airborne early warning aircraft and 2 bombers make successive flights from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean, passing between Okinawa Island and Miyako-jima, Okinawa Prefecture.

28th (Mon) A car bursts into flames in Tiananmen Square, Beijing. The 3 people inside the car and 2 pedestrians die, and 38 people, including Japanese nationals, are injured. On the 30th, the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau announces that the incident has been deemed to be a violent terrorist attack and that 5 suspects – believed to be Uyghurs – have been detained.

30th (Wed) A court in Harju, Estonia hands down a 15-year prison sentence to a former technical operations specialist with the Estonian Internal Security Service, who was arrested in August for having provided intelligence to a Russian intelligence agency

Nov. 1st (Fri) Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visit Japan (until the 2nd) and individually hold talks with their respective counterparts in the Japanese government that day. On the 2nd, the first meeting as part of the Japan-Russia Joint Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultations (“2+2”) takes place; the two Russian ministers also make a courtesy visit to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

Hakimullah Mehsud, the emir of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP; the Taliban Movement of Pakistan), is killed in an air attack in North Waziristan, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of northwestern Pakistan.

6th (Wed) A series of explosions near the office of the Shanxi Provincial Committee of the Communist Party in Taiyuan, Shanxi Province kills 1 person and injures 8. On the 8th, the local public security authorities arrest a suspect. The public security authorities announce that they seized home-made explosive devices at the suspect's home and that the suspect has stated that he had committed the crime in order to take revenge on society.

9th (Sat) The 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China begins (until the 12th). “The Decision on Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening Reform” is adopted and proposals for 55 reforms in 15 fields, including the establishment of a “state security committee” are presented.

16th (Sat) 1 Chinese People's Liberation Army intelligence-gathering aircraft flies over the waters off the Senkaku Islands on both the 16th and the 17th.

23rd (Tue) The Chinese government announces the establishment of an “East China Sea air defense identification zone,” which includes the airspace over the Senkaku Islands. In addition, 2 Chinese People's Liberation Army intelligence-gathering aircraft fly over the waters off the Senkaku Islands, among other areas.

Recent Major Security Developments within Japan

Jan. 1st (Tue) The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its year-end and new year intensive seminars (December 28th, 2012 – January 6th; Saitama and other locations).

The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its year-end and new year intensive seminars. (December 22nd, 2012 – January 14th; Tokyo, Osaka, and other locations).

16th (Wed) In an appeal court decision (appeal lodged by the government) concerning the lawsuit in which the mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo demanded the revocation of the extension of the surveillance period (2009, 3rd extension), the Tokyo High Court quashes the judgment of first instance, which ordered the revocation of the new reporting obligation imposed by the Public Security Examination Commission, and dismisses the cult's demand.

27th (Sun) Radical leftist groups and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) mobilize activists and party members for protests in Tokyo to demand that the deployment of the MV-22 Osprey to the US military base at Futenma be rescinded (until the 28th, Tokyo).

30th (Wed) The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo makes a final appeal to the Supreme Court, objecting to the appeal court decision in the lawsuit in which they demanded the revocation of the extension of the surveillance period (2009, 3rd extension).

Feb. 7th (Thu) Right-wing groups mark Northern Territories Day by engaging in propaganda activities calling for the “recapture of the Northern Territories” (various locations nationwide).

9th (Sat) The JCP holds the 6th Plenum of its Central Committee (until the 10th, Tokyo).

10th (Sun) Kakumaru-ha (Revolutionary Marxist Faction) holds the Japan Revolutionary Communist League Political Meeting to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the Kakumaru-ha (Tokyo).

12th (Tue) Right-wing groups and other groups engage in propaganda activities around Chongryon-related facilities, in response to North Korea's nuclear test (various locations nationwide).

22nd (Fri) Right-wing groups and other groups mark Takeshima Day (prefectural ordinance of Shimane Prefecture) by engaging in propaganda activities calling for the “recapture of Takeshima” (Tokyo, Shimane, and other locations).

Mar. 4th (Mon) The Metropolitan Police Department raids a Kakumaru-ha hideout (Tokyo).

10th (Sun) “Kakumaru-ha” holds “The Great Rally of Workers' Anger” (Tokyo).
Radical leftist groups and the JCP mobilize activists and party members for rallies and demonstrations to mark the 2nd anniversary of the nuclear power plant accident (until the 11th, nationwide).

15th (Fri) The government announces its participation in TPP negotiations.

Apr. 11th (Thu) Groups affiliated to the JCP and others hold a rally and demonstration opposing the consumption tax rate increase (Tokyo).

26th (Fri) The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its Golden Week intensive seminars (until the 6th; Saitama and other locations).

27th (Sat) The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its Golden Week intensive seminars (until the 29th, and May 2nd-6th; Tokyo, Osaka, and other locations).

28th (Sun) Right-wing groups mark Restoration of Sovereignty Day by engaging in propaganda activities (various locations nationwide).

29th (Mon) Right-wing groups mark Showa Day by engaging in propaganda activities (various locations nationwide).

May 3rd (Fri) Right-wing groups mark Constitution Day by engaging in propaganda activities (various locations nationwide).

Groups affiliated to the JCP and others mark Constitution Day by holding rallies and demonstrations (various locations nationwide).

8th (Wed)	The Supreme Court rules that it is dismissing the special appeal concerning the 2 nd appeal for a retrial of Chizuo Matsumoto, also known as Shoko Asahara (the 3 rd appeal for a retrial is currently underway). The JCP holds the 7 th Plenum of its Central Committee (Tokyo).	18th (Wed)	The JCP holds the 8 th Plenum of its Central Committee (Tokyo).
19th (Sun)	Violence breaks out between participants in a demonstration by a right-wing-affiliated group and members of a group of "counter-demonstrators" (Tokyo).	27th (Fri)	Groups affiliated to the JCP and others hold a rally and demonstration opposing the consumption tax rate increase (Tokyo).
Jun. 2nd (Sun)	Radical leftist groups and the JCP mobilize activists and party members for a protest rally near the Diet, calling for "denuclearization" and "opposition to the restart of the reactors" (Tokyo).	29th (Sun)	Right-wing groups dub the day "the September 29th Anti-Chinese Communist Day" and engage in propaganda activities and demonstrations calling for Japan to "defend the Senkaku Islands to the last," among other demands (various locations nationwide).
16th (Sun)	Violence breaks out between a right-wing-affiliated group holding a demonstration concerning the "comfort women issue" and members of a group of "counter-demonstrators" (Tokyo).	Oct. 1st (Tue)	The government announces that the consumption tax rate will be raised to 8% in April 2014.
22nd (Sat)	A right-wing-affiliated group holds a demonstration dubbed "the Nationwide Simultaneous Grand March of Citizens for the Severing of Diplomatic Relations Between Japan and South Korea," calling for the "break-off of relations between Japan and South Korea," among other demands (various locations nationwide).	13th (Sun)	Radical leftist groups and the JCP mobilize activists and party members for a protest rally near the Diet, calling for "denuclearization" and "opposition to the restart of the reactors" (Tokyo).
Jul. 21st (Sun)	Voting takes place and ballots are counted in the 23 rd Elections to the House of Councillors.	18th (Fri)	The JCP issues a statement entitled "We are vehemently opposed to the 'Protection of Secrets Bill,' which robs citizens of the right to know."
23rd (Tue)	Japan participates in TPP negotiations for the first time (18 th round, Malaysia).	25th (Fri)	The House of Representatives begins deliberations concerning the NSC Establishment Bill. The Protection of Specified Secrets Bill is submitted to the Diet. Radical leftist groups mobilize activists for a protest rally in front of the Prime Minister's Office, opposing the Protection of Specified Secrets Bill.
Aug. 3rd (Sat)	The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its summer intensive seminars (until the 4th, 10th-15th, and September 8th-9th; Tokyo, Osaka, and other locations). Radical leftist groups and the JCP mobilize activists and party members for protests to demand that the deployment of the MV-22 Osprey to the US military base at Futenma be rescinded (until September 25th, Okinawa).	28th (Mon)	Right-wing groups dub the day "Recapture Takeshima Day" and engage in protest action near the diplomatic establishments of South Korea located in Japan (various locations nationwide).
9th (Fri)	Right-wing groups dub the day "Anti-Russia Day" and engage in propaganda activities calling for the "recapture of the Northern Territories" (various locations nationwide).	Nov. 3rd (Sun)	Chukaku-ha (Middle Core Faction) holds the annual National Workers' Rally (Tokyo).
15th (Thu)	Right-wing groups attend Yasukuni Shrine, their local Gokoku Shrine, or memorial services for the war dead to pay homage (various locations nationwide).	12th (Tue)	The JCP holds the 9 th Plenum of its Central Committee (until the 13th, Tokyo).
Sep. 13th (Fri)	The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its autumn intensive seminars (until the 16th, and 20th-23rd; Saitama, Tokyo, and other locations).	13th (Wed)	The Metropolitan Police Department raids a "Kakumaru-ha" hideout (Tokyo).
		21st (Thu)	The Supreme Court rules that it is dismissing the final appeal concerning the demand by the mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo for the revocation of the extension of the surveillance period.
		28th (Thu)	The anti-mainstream faction of the "Kaiho-ha" group and anti-mainstream faction of the Revolutionary Workers' Association shoot metal projectiles toward the US Yokota base (Tokyo).



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