

Annual Report 2014 Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations January 2015

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Public Security Intelligence Agency

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On the Publication of the Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations (2015 Edition)

Director-General, Public Security Intelligence Agency Kazumine Terawaki

In January each year, the Public Security Intelligence Agency (公安調査庁, *Koancho*; abbreviated hereinafter to PSIA) publishes the Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations, providing a summary of the public security situation within Japan and overseas during the previous year. This is the 2015 edition.

The task of the PSIA is to ensure public security on the basis of laws including the Subversive Activities Prevention Act and the Act on the Control of Organizations Which Committed Indiscriminate Mass Murder. Accordingly, as well as conducting surveillance of Aum Shinrikyo, the PSIA gathers and analyzes intelligence about situations at home and abroad that could affect public security, including intelligence concerning various domestic groups, international terrorism, and developments in other countries, especially neighboring states such as North Korea, China, and Russia. Through these endeavors, the PSIA is striving to contribute to policymaking via the provision of intelligence, as a member of the intelligence community in Japan.

Looking at the recent internal and external situations, unilateral attempts to use “force” to change the status quo have been seen in China’s actions based on the unilateral assertion in the East and South China Seas, including its repeated incursions into Japanese territorial waters in the seas around the Senkaku Islands, and the intensified tension in the eastern Ukraine triggered by the “annexation” of Crimea by Russia, as well as activities of “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL), which declared the “establishment of the state” in the Middle East, having various impacts of the security environment as a serious challenge to the international order. In addition, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rash of terrorist attacks, cyber-attacks aimed at the theft of important information, and other problems have become the common issues challenging the international community as a global threat.

Amid this situation, as one of the advanced democracies of East Asia, Japan is expected to maintain stability and development, while defending such universal values as freedom, democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law, thereby contributing to peace and prosperity worldwide, not only in East Asia. The gathering and analysis of intelligence is becoming increasingly important, as the cornerstone of policies aimed at this goal.

Furthermore, Japan is required to promote enhancement of the intelligence gathering function and proactive measures of cyber-attacks and terrorist attacks to safely and smoothly host the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games to be held in six years.

In addition to continuing to engage in rigorous surveillance of Aum Shinrikyo, the PSIA will strive to further improve its intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities, and aim to strengthen the contribution that it makes via intelligence, in order to respond to the needs of the times.

I sincerely hope that you will find this publication useful, and that it will provide you with a greater understanding of the PSIA’s work.

November 2014

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*This 2015 edition of the Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations reviews developments in domestic and international public security in 2014 (as of the end of November), as well as examining future prospects in these areas. In this report, unless otherwise noted, the months refer to those of 2014. The titles of individuals mentioned hereinafter are those current at the time of writing.



Focal Issues of the External Situation in 2014

External
Situation

1 North Korea and Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan)



1-1 North Korea reinforced the Kim Jong Un regime's leadership

- While continuing to investigate and purge people related to Jang Song Thaek after his purge, North Korea attempted to enhance executives' and residents' loyalty to First Secretary Kim Jong Un.
- North Korea put efforts into improving people's livelihood and inviting foreign capital, under a difficult situation.

Attempting to consolidate the Kim Jong Un regime by realigning his aides while liquidating the Jang Song Thaek incident

After executing Jang Song Thaek, a former Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission, for "anti-party, counter-revolutionary factional acts" (December 2013), North Korea investigated and purged executives related to Jang and removed his name and photos from various literature to thoroughly eliminate his traces. In an election of the Supreme People's Assembly that came amid such move (March), Mun Kyong Dok, a Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), and other highly ranked executives suspected as being close to Jang failed to be elected and faded from the limelight.

Meanwhile, North Korea dismissed Choe Ryong Hae, known as the closest aide to First Secretary Kim Jong Un, from the role of Director of the General Political Department of the Korean People's Army (KPA) (April). However, Choe continued to accompany First Secretary Kim during his on-the-spot guidance tours frequently and was appointed as Chairman of the State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission, which undertakes sports promotion given priority by the Kim Jong Un regime (September), indicating Kim's deep confidence in Choe.

As for the KPA, WPK First Vice Director Hwang Pyong So, who had been in charge of KPA personnel affairs for a long term, was promoted as Director of the KPA General Political

Department to succeed Choe (May). General Hyon Yong Chol, who had once been promoted to Chief of the General Staff under the Kim Jong Un regime, was picked as Minister of the People's Armed Forces (Defense Minister) (June). While media reports about WPK Secretary Kim Kyong Hui, the wife of Jang Song Thaek and an aunt of First Secretary Kim stopped, Kim's sister Kim Yo Jong emerged as a senior WPK official (found as a WPK Vice Director in November), making her official appearance (March).

After the purge of Jang, North Korea held the KWP Eighth Conference of Ideological Activists (February) and the Ninth National Meeting of Artists (May) to encourage the enhancement of ideological education and the regime's propaganda. North Korea also consolidated the regime by letting party, military and government leaders engage in exploratory marches to the "revolutionary sacred" mountain of Paektu (March through September) and vow loyalty to First Secretary Kim.

Under such situation, North Korean media in early July released video footage in which First Secretary Kim was limping. Information said he had a leg injury or a disease, and for about 40 days from early September, media suspended reports on any appearance of First Secretary Kim. But no particular change emerged in the Kim regime.



Mobilizing citizens for coping with drought while attempting to enhance economic relations with Russia

Regarding the domestic economy, North Korea emphasized precipitation shortages from the beginning of 2014 as “the worst drought in a century” and mobilized citizens and troops to irrigate farmland and develop water conduits to help prevent the drought from affecting food production. As hydropower plants lowered capacity utilization rates because of the drought, the authorities promoted the enhanced operation of fossil-fired power plants and the expansion of coal output. In Pyongyang, North Korea continued to step up the construction of high-rise condominium buildings. But a building collapsed at a housing construction site, prompting senior officials to apologize to nearby residents (May).

As for external economic relations, North Korea held meetings of the trade, and economic and scientific cooperation committee with Russia (March, June), agreeing to enhance bilateral cooperation in investment, energy and labor provision, and to implement Ruble settlements. They also agreed to set a target of boosting

bilateral trade value from \$100 million at present to \$1 billion by 2020. The development of a Russian-financed third pier at the Port of Rajin was completed (July), allowing test transportation of Russian coal using the port. North Korea and Russia also agreed to renovate railways in North Korea and held a groundbreaking ceremony for the renovation in Pyongyang (October).

In economic relations with China, Chinese crude oil exports to North Korea, accounting for nearly 10% of bilateral trade value, were booked as zero in Chinese statistics. However, North Korea’s imports of televisions and other electronics, and gasoline and other petroleum products from China increased together with North Korean clothing exports to China, allowing bilateral trade value to remain almost unchanged from 2013 (trade value in the January–October period increased by 0.2% from a year earlier). No development indicating interruptions to crude oil supply was seen in North Korea.



Promoting the 70th KWP anniversary

Toward the 70th anniversary of the KWP foundation in October 2015, North Korea is expected to enhance the authority of First Secretary Kim Jong Un and stabilize his regime by stepping up ideological education and propaganda and promoting economic construction.

In a bid to reduce economic dependence on China that accounts for 90% of North Korea’s external trade, North Korea is also likely to explore the expansion of economic relations with other countries including Russia.

Column

Focuses of attention in recent military trends

- From February to March and from June to September, North Korea fired 500-kilometer range “Scud” and 1,300-km range Nodong ballistic missiles and multiple launch rocket systems in drills to counter U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. Formerly, North Korea had fired missiles from east coast locations such as Wonsan into the Sea of Japan. In the series of missile launchings in 2014, however, west coast and inland locations were used for firing missiles that crossed North Korea. Some missiles were moved with vehicles during the late night or early morning hours before firing, demonstrating ballistic missile units’ advanced operational capabilities. North Korea apparently mobilized new 300-millimeter rocket launchers (with a 180 km range) in the drills, indicating it was improving capabilities to attack central South Korea, where U.S. and South Korean military facilities are located.
- At a missile launching facility in Tongchangri (North Pyongan Province) where a long-range ballistic missile was launched in what North Korea claimed to be a “satellite launching” in December 2012, a larger launching tower was reportedly constructed by around September 2014. This is apparently designed to allow a larger missile than the 30-meter-long Taepodong 2 to be launched there in the future.
- In the meantime, Hwang Pyong So, Director of the KPA General Political Department, told a KPA meeting (July), “Nuclear warhead rockets will be launched to attack U.S. military bases and large U.S. cities.” North Korea’s possession of nuclear warheads was thus indicated for the first time ever. Its nuclear weapon and missile development exerts great influences on Japan’s security and must continue to be watched.



1-2 Deadlocked relations with the U.S., cooled relations with China

- North Korea threatened the U.S. by indicating potential nuclear tests but fell short of breaking through the deadlock.
- North Korea made a cool response to China upon an anniversary and implicitly criticized China.
- North Korea enhanced exchanges with Russia in multidirectional diplomacy.

North Korea launched missiles in response to U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises and indicated a “new type of nuclear tests.”

In 2014, North Korea, while indicating its intention to improve relations with the U.S., reiterated it would never agree to abandon its nuclear program as far as the U.S. continues a “hostile policy” against the North and demanded the U.S. side’s policy change. It also conducted short-range missile firing drills (February-March) to counter U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. In response to a United Nations Security Council statement criticizing the missile launchings, North Korea indicated it could conduct a “new type of nuclear tests” (March). Furthermore, North Korea activated operations at

its nuclear test site in Punggyeri in a manner timed with U.S. President Barack Obama’s Asian tour (April). North Korea also arrested American tourists (April-May), made public their remarks asking the U.S. to send a special envoy (July-September) and released these Americans under what it claimed to be a “special measure” by First Secretary Kim Jong Un. Despite such North Korean approach to the U.S., the Obama administration made no change to its attitude of calling for North Korea’s specific actions for its denuclearization, with U.S.-North Korea talks failing to be resumed.

The absence of high-level personnel and congratulatory message exchanges upon the 65th anniversary of China-North Korea diplomatic relations indicated cool bilateral relations.

Reversing precedents, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited South Korea before North Korea and held summit talks with South Korean President Park Geun Hye (July). Amid the closer exchange between China and South Korea, North Korea’s National Defense Commission issued a statement denouncing the U.S. and South Korean attitude against the North, saying that “a country with no opinion was desperate to blindly follow the U.S. and protect Park Geun Hye.” It thus implicitly criticized China (July). First Secretary Kim and other North

Korean leaders dropped the conventional phrase of “traditional Korea-China friendship” from their congratulatory messages to Chinese leaders for China’s National Day (October), indicating their dissatisfaction with the Xi Jinping administration. Upon the 65th anniversary of China-North Korea diplomatic relations (October), no exchange of senior officials’ visits or top-level congratulatory messages or any celebratory parties were officially confirmed, indicating cool bilateral relations triggered by North Korea’s nuclear test (February 2013).

North Korea sent First Secretary Kim Jong Un’s special envoy to Russia in efforts to enhance external relations and demonstrated initiatives to address human rights.

While relations with the U.S. and China remained stagnant, North Korea gave the foreign minister post to former Ambassador to Switzerland Ri Su Yong, who served as guardian of First Secretary Kim Jong Un during his study in Switzerland and appointed Vice Premier Kang Sok Ju in charge of talks with the U.S. and nuclear

negotiations as WPK Secretary for International Affairs (April). Then, North Korea expanded its multidirectional diplomacy by sending Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong to Africa and the Middle East (May-July), Southeast Asia (August), the U.S. (September) and Russia (September-October), WPK Secretary Kang Sok Ju to Mongolia (September)

and Kim Yong Nam, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, to Africa (October-November). In particular, North Korea attempted to enhance relations with Russia by dispatching Chairman Kim Yong Nam to an opening ceremony for the Sochi Winter Olympics for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin (February) and KWP Secretary Choe Ryong Hae, known as the closest aide to First Secretary Kim, to Russia for a meeting with the president (November) and by inviting such senior Russian officials including Alexander Galushka, Minister for Development of Russian Far East (March, October), and Deputy

Prime Minister Yury Trutnev (April).

In response to a report by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea (February), North Korea released its own human rights report (September), and Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong in his address to the 69th session of the United Nations General Assembly announced North Korea’s intention to accept dialogue with the international community on human rights (September). North Korea thus tried to communicate its position on human rights to the international community.

North Korea may continuously check the U.S. and China by demonstrating progress in nuclear and missile development.

North Korea has retained its “dual policy of economic construction and nuclear development,” indicating that its relations with the U.S. and China calling for the North’s denuclearization will remain stalled. Under such situation, North Korea may explore opportunities to resume talks with

the U.S. and mend relations with China while countering the U.S. and China by demonstrating nuclear and missile development progress and the enhancement of relations with a wide range of other countries, including Russia.

1-3 North Korea relentlessly urged South Korea to change its attitude on the North

- While repeatedly and strongly calling for improving relations between the two Koreas, North Korea continued military provocations in reaction to U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises and the circulation of propaganda leaflets from South Korea.

While attending talks to improve relations with the South, North Korea raised opposition to the Park Geun Hye administration’s unification plan.

In his New Year message given at the outset of 2014, North Korean First Secretary Kim Jong Un stated that “national unification movements should make new progress this year” and that “we would continue efforts to improve north-south relations.” Furthermore, North Korea released the National Defense Commission’s “grave proposal” to the South, calling for terminating mutual accusations and hostile military actions (January). North Korea also vowed to accept a reunion of family members separated between the two Koreas as proposed by South Korean President Park Geun Hye at the beginning of the year (January) and proposed a high-level south-north contact (February), indicating its proactive attitude toward turning around the deadlocked south-north relations.

In the high-level south-north contact (February), North Korea agreed with South Korea to terminate mutual accusations and continue government-to-government talks and implemented the family reunion program (February). When President Park Geun Hye in her speech in the German city of Dresden (March) urged North Korea to abandon nuclear weapons and unveiled her proposal for unifying the two Koreas through humanitarian aid to North Korean residents, private sector exchanges and public welfare infrastructure development, however, North Korea branded her proposal as unification through absorption of North Korea and denounced President Park by name, taking a more adversarial stand against the South.

North Korea took advantage of the Incheon Asian Games to demonstrate its proactive attitude toward dialogue.

North Korea announced the National Defense Commission's "special proposal" (June) and a "government statement" (July), calling anew for ending mutual accusations and hostile military actions. It also released a policy of sending athletes and their supporters to the 17th Asian Games in South Korea's Incheon (September–October). North Korea also reported First Secretary Kim Jong Un as stating (July), "Our athletes' participation in the Asian Games would be a key trigger of the improvement of north-south relations." It thus indicated the attitude of seeking "the improvement of relations" again.

Later, North Korea reacted to the implementation of the Ulchi Freedom Guardian U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises (August) and a breakoff of

working-level talks on costs for sending supporters to the Asian Games, indicating a negative attitude toward South Korea's proposal for the second high-level south-north contact. While North Korean athletes' good records at the Asian Games were reported, North Korea sent KPA General Political Bureau Director Hwang Pyong So, State Physical Culture and Sports Guidance Commission Chairman Choe Ryong Hae and KWP United Front Department Director Kim Yang Gon to the closing ceremony for the Asian Games (October). These North Korean officials told senior South Korean officials that the North would agree to implement the second high-level south-north contact between late October and early November.

North Korea continued missile firing drills and military provocations at the Northern Limit Line.

North Korea, while calling on South Korea to improve bilateral relations, fired short-range ballistic missiles and rockets to counter the Foal Eagle (February–April) and Ulchi Freedom Guardian (August) U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises. Then, small unmanned aircraft were found in the northern part of South Korea and concluded by the South Korean authorities as indicating a North Korean perpetration. In response, North Korea claimed the conclusion as an undue conspiracy and denied its involvement with the aircraft.

Around the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea, North Korea led patrol boats and other vessels to cross the border, conducted firing drills in which it launched some 100 shells into waters south of the NLL (March) and fired two shells into waters near a South Korean naval ship (May), escalating

tensions in NLL waters.

Furthermore, North Korea violated the NLL again and countered South Korean warning shots only three days after agreeing to implement the second high-level south-north contact (October) and fired shots against balloons including propaganda leaflets sent by a private South Korean organization to North Korea (October). Then, North Korea demanded an emergency meeting with the South Korean military authorities and demanded that South Korea at the meeting refrain from passing through a military demarcation line unilaterally set by North Korea in waters south of the NLL and suspend the circulation of leaflets. As the meeting ended without any agreement, North Korea criticized the South Korean response and warned that the fate of the high-level north-south contact would be endangered.

North Korea would continue a carrot-and-stick policy to shake the Park Geun Hye administration to implement the October 4 Declaration.

North Korea apparently aims to implement the South-North Summit Declaration (October 4 Declaration in 2007) that calls for mitigating South-North military tensions and promoting economic cooperation projects in waters around the NLL. In the future, North Korea is expected

to continue a carrot-and-stick policy to shake South Korea in a bid to take leadership in South-North relations, while closely watching the Park Geun Hye administration's North Korean policy as it enters its second half of the term.

1-4 North Korea agreed to investigate "all Japanese" including abductees

- North Korea, though having established a special investigation committee on Japanese, delayed its first report, attempting to obtain effective concessions from Japan through the investigation.

North Korea exploited Red Cross meetings on remains of Japanese to resume director-general level talks with Japan.

Regarding the remains of Japanese nationals left in North Korea after World War II, North Korea has accepted visits to their graves by their relatives since 2012. At bilateral Red Cross meetings on the matter (two meetings in March in China's Shenyang), the two countries' foreign ministry officials held unofficial talks on various bilateral problems and agreed to resume bilateral government-to-government talks. In the meantime, North Korea sent Kim Eun Gyong, the

daughter of Japanese abductee Megumi Yokota, and her family to Mongolia to realize their meeting with Yokota's parents (March).

Through these developments, the Japanese and North Korean governments opened a meeting (at director-general level) for the first time in one year and four months in the Chinese capital of Beijing (March). They then discussed a wide range of matter of concern to both sides and agreed to continue talks.

North Korea agreed to investigate "Japanese nationals" and established a special investigation committee.

Subsequently, Japan and North Korea held their government-to-government meeting in the Swedish capital of Stockholm (May), where the North agreed to "comprehensively and thoroughly investigate all Japanese" including abduction victims and offered to establish "a special investigation committee with special authorities to investigate all organizations" to implement the investigation. In response, Japan offered to lift some of the measures that it independently took against North Korean actions including nuclear tests. Then, North Korea stated that the North would "set up the special investigation committee and launch the investigation on July 4" and that the committee would be "given special authorities

by the National Defense Commission" and chaired by So Tae Ha, Counselor at the National Defense Commission and Vice Minister of State Security, and would have four subcommittees on (1) remains of Japanese nationals, (2) Japanese nationals left in North Korea and Japanese spouses, (3) abduction victims and (4) missing people. In response, Japan decided to (1) lift restrictions on human exchange between the two countries, (2) end a measure to lower the minimum amount of payments for reporting and of payment means and other portable exports for reporting and (3) permit North Korean ships' port calls in Japan for humanitarian purposes.

North Korea accepted visits by Japanese lawmakers, demonstrating "progress in Japan-North Korea relations."

After the agreement between the Japanese and North Korean governments, North Korea tackled personnel exchanges with Japan, accepting a delegation of Japanese lawmakers including House of Counselors Member Kanji Inoki (July) and Yamanashi Prefecture's Japan-

North Korea friendship delegation marking the 100th birthday of the late Deputy Prime Minister Shin Kanemaru (September). Then, WPK Secretary for International Affairs Kang Sok Ju told lawmaker Inoki that "the investigation of Japanese" would "surely make progress." When

lawmaker Inoki visited North Korea again to hold a professional wrestling event (August), Kim Yong Nam, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea, told him, "I thank you for developing an atmosphere for improving Korea-Japan relations through sports exchanges." He thus demonstrated progress

in Japan-North Korea relations. Regarding the remains of Japanese left in North Korea, their relatives visited North Korea twice (June, September). A North Korean official told them (June), "Your visits to Korea will become a key step toward implementing the agreement at Japan-Korea talks."

North Korea failed to make a first report on the "investigation on Japanese," with the future course of the investigation remaining uncertain.

Japan sent a government delegation to North Korea to ascertain the present state of the North Korean special investigation committee's probe on Japanese including abduction victims (October). The committee's Chairman So Tae Ha and other North Korean officials told the Japanese delegation that they would "deepen the investigation from new angles irrespective of past investigation

results." But North Korea has so far failed to make the first report on investigation results, leaving the future course of the investigation uncertain. North Korea is expected to release investigation results bit-by-bit to win effective Japanese concessions including the termination of other measures against North Korea and humanitarian assistance.

Column

North Korea's responses to the problem of abducted Japanese

- In September 2002, North Korean General Secretary Kim Jong Il admitted and apologized for North Korea's abduction of Japanese nationals. Later, Japan sent several delegations to North Korea for an investigation on the abduction problem, conducting interviews with abduction victims and other relevant people. Japan also received relevant materials including what North Korea claimed to be the remains of Megumi Yokota and Kaoru Matsuki.
- After the Japanese side verified these materials in Japan, however, the remains were concluded as those of other persons through DNA and other analyses. Falsification and other problems were also found in what North Korea claimed to be abduction victims' death certificates, patient death records and traffic accident records.
- While the Japanese side has repeatedly asked North Korea to explain these problems, North Korea has made no clear response.

1-5 Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) attempting to drive loyalty to First Secretary Kim Jong Un

- Chongryon held its first general meeting under the Kim Jong Un regime, deciding to give top priority to education for driving loyalty to First Secretary Kim Jong Un.
- Chongryon lost its ownership of the Korea Central Hall despite its approaches to various Japanese quarters to continue using the building.

Chongryon at its Congress emphasized First Secretary Kim Jong Un as the only center for solidarity and leadership.

In a run-up to holding the Congress as its supreme decision-making meeting (to be held every four years to decide operational policies and executive appointments over a period up to the next Congress), Chongryon implemented a popular movement, dubbed the "70-day movement," from March to May to intensively tackle the ideological education of activists, the vitalization of branch operations and other measures for strengthening the organization to raise the morale of activists.

At the 23rd Congress (May) following the movement, Chongryon emphasized the greatness of and its loyalty to First Secretary Kim Jong Un as First Secretary Kim sent his congratulatory message (spelling out achievements and challenges of Chongryon activities) to the first Chongryon Congress under the Kim Jong Un regime.

In his report to the Congress, Chongryon

Chairman Ho Jong Man emphasized, "Chongryon must look up to the congratulatory message from Marshal Kim Jong Un, designate the respectable Marshal as the only center of solidarity and leadership and open its new glory days meeting needs in the Kim Jong Un era." He also cited the enhancement of activities to learn and propagandize the greatness of First Secretary Kim as the top priority challenges for a period up to the next Congress. Furthermore, the Chairman asserted, "Chongryon must be loyal to the Marshal and celebrate its 60th anniversary (May 2015) with glorious achievements." After the Congress, the Chairman held a meeting of regional headquarters leaders (July) to drive the accomplishment of the congratulatory message and Congress decisions throughout the organization.

Chongryong Chairman Ho Jong Man visited North Korea for the first time in some eight years, receiving a letter signed by First Secretary Kim Jong Un.

In response to the Japanese government's lifting of restrictions on human exchange and other measures against North Korea (July), Chongryon sent a delegation led by Chairman Ho Jong Man to North Korea on the occasion of North Korea's 66th national foundation day in September. During his first visit to North Korea in some eight years, Chongryon Chairman Ho Jong Man attended various congratulatory events and the Second Session of the 13th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA). North Korean media reported details of the Chongryong delegation's actions, with Chairman Ho Jong Man seated along with

North Korean executives on the tiered platform at the SPA, indicating close relations between North Korea and Chongryon anew. Chairman Ho Jong Man, though failing to meet with First Secretary Kim, received a letter signed by him emphasizing his deep confidence in Chairman Ho Jong Man. After his reentry into Japan, Chairman Ho Jong Man convened a meeting of central and local executive activists and informed them of First Secretary Kim's letter given to him (October), taking advantage of the letter to give authority to his Chongryon leadership.

The Supreme Court rejected Chongryon's special appeal regarding the Korea Central Hall.

As for an auction of the Korea Central Hall that is home to Chongryon's central headquarters, the Tokyo District Court decided not to permit the Hall's sale to Mongolia's Avar Limited Liability Company, the highest bidder in the second round of bidding (October 2013), because of defective documents submitted by the company for the bidding (January). Reopening the second round, the court decided to sell the Hall to Marunaka Holdings (based in Takamatsu, Kagawa Prefecture), the second highest bidder in the second round (March).

Chongryon, dissatisfied with the decision, filed an appeal against the decision with the Tokyo High Court. But the Tokyo High Court turned down the appeal (May), finalizing the permit for the sale to Marunaka. Then, Chongryon filed a

special appeal and a petition for permission to appeal with the Supreme Court. The top court decided to suspend the validity of the permit for the sale to Marunaka on condition of ¥100 million in deposit (June). As Chongryon deposited ¥100 million, procedures for the sale of the Korea Central Hall were suspended temporarily. As the auction was complicated, Chongryon, while asserting the Korea Central Hall auction as the Japanese authorities' move to crack down on Chongryon, approached various quarters to secure its continuous use of the Hall. But the Supreme Court turned down Chongryon's special appeal and petition (November). As Marunaka made the payment for the Hall, Chongryon lost its ownership of the Hall.

Chongryon continued to tackle the application of the tuition-free senior high school education program and local governments' resumption of subsidies.

Tokyo Korean Junior and Senior High School students filed a state compensation suit with the Tokyo District Court on the government's exemption of Korean schools from the tuition-free senior high school education program (February), following four similar suits filed in Osaka, Aichi, Hiroshima and Fukuoka in 2013. Chongryon, which has long been demanding the application of the tuition-free senior high school education system to Korean schools, mobilized activists at court hearings and report meetings for these suits to shore up the movement for the application. Chongryon also made protests and requests to local governments (including Osaka and Yamaguchi) that have suspended subsidies to Korean schools. Furthermore, it sent a delegation each to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (July) and the United Nations Committee

on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (August) to lobby for the application of the tuition-free senior high school education system to Korean schools and the resumption of subsidies to these schools, attempting to stimulate international opinions for the demand. After the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination released a recommendation for the application of the tuition-free senior high school education system to Korean schools in August, the Chongryon central headquarters instructed local branches to enhance approaches to the political world for the application of the tuition-free senior high school education system and the resumption of local government subsidies and relevant protests and request to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and local governments.

Chongryon attempting to exploit its 60th anniversary to vitalize its organization

Chongryon may attempt to stabilize its Ho Jong Man leadership by leading activists to recognize the importance of the letter that Chairman Ho Jong Man received from First Secretary Kim. It may also attempt to mobilize activities to congratulatory events for its 60th anniversary in May 2015 to vitalize its organization. As for

the Korea Central Hall problem, Chongryon may approach Marunaka and new tenants for the Hall to lease or buy back the building. If a court orders Chongryon to turn the Hall over to anyone, Chongryon may file a complaint against the order and continue refusing to accept the order.

Column

Chronology of the Korea Central Hall auction

- The Korea Central Hall auction problem originated from the Chongryon-controlled Chogin credit union group's failure with massive bad loans. The Chogin group, which had up to 38 credit unions in Japan, saw its unions going bankrupt one after another in the second half of the 1990s due to their financial deterioration amid the expansion of bad loans through loose lending to Chongryon. While Chogin credit unions were integrated into seven unions, public funds totaling some ¥1.34 trillion were injected into failed Chogin unions. Bad loans that the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) bought from failed Chogin unions totaled some ¥1.35 trillion.
- In a process to collect loans from Chongryon, the RCC launched a loan collection suit calling for Chongryon's repayment of all loans (worth some ¥62.8 billion) from failed Chogin unions (November 2005) and an ownership confirmation suit for confirming Chongryon's effective ownership of the Korea Central Hall (registered nominally as owned by limited partnership company Korea Central Hall management association) (December 2007). After winning these suits, the RCC filed an application with the Tokyo District Court for a forced auction of the Hall in July 2012. Later in the month, the court decided to launch the forced auction.
- The RCC has also seized and auctioned Chongryon facilities other than the Korea Central Hall. Among them are multiple prefectural headquarters facilities including those for Tokyo and Osaka.

Date	Bidding for the Korea Central Hall auction
March 26, 2013	Religious corporation Saifukuji Buddhist temple (Kagoshima city) comes out as the successful bidder with the highest bid price at ¥4,519 million. As the bidder fails to make the payment, a decision to permit the sale to the bidder becomes invalid on May 10.
October 17, 2013	In the second round of bidding, Mongolia's Avar Limited Liability Company comes out as the successful bidder with the highest bid price at ¥5,010 million. Because of its defective submitted documents, a decision comes not to permit the sale to the bidder on January 23, 2014.
March 20, 2014	In the reopened second round of bidding, Marunaka Holdings comes out as the successful bidder with the second highest bid price at ¥2,210 million.

External Situation 2 China



2-1 The Xi Jinping administration is desperate to maintain the single-party dictatorship, seeking to reconstruct state management systems


- The Xi Jinping administration expelled opponents in the name of rule-of-law government attempting to promote “reform.”
- Amid decelerating economic growth, China agonized over how to balance “reform” promotion with maintained growth.

“Reform” leading groups headed by General Secretary Xi Jinping launched operations, striving to secure effectiveness.

The Xi Jinping leadership positioned 2014 as the “first year for reform” (February, China Government Net) and launched central leading groups for “reform” (e.g. The Leading Group for Comprehensive Deepening Reform) and a leading group for deepening “reform” on national defense and the armed forces (see Column on Page 23) one after the other, developing arrangements for deepening “reform” in almost all areas for government management through a top-down approach. Behind the Xi Jinping leadership’s determination to promote “reform” may be a frustration that the Chinese Communist Party’s dictatorship cannot be maintained unless “reform” is implemented to resolve people’s mounting discontent and improve the party’s ruling power at a time when economic growth deceleration is inevitable amid economic and social structure distortion that has emerged from rapid economic development and is growing more serious.

The central “reform” leading group, launched in January, held a total of six general meetings by late October to consider the creation of organizations required for the “reform,” their missions and specific reform plans.

Policies’ failure to extend further than Zhongnanhai or the central government to work locally has been cited as a factor behind the absence of progress in China’s “reform” (August, People’s Daily Online). Then, General Secretary Xi Jinping called for securing central government regulations’ spread throughout China so as to have policies rooted deep (October, Xinhua). In the future, “reform” leading groups at local party organizations are expected to play a key role in maintaining the effectiveness of “reform” measures decided on by the central government.



The Xi Jinping leadership forced anti-corruption movement leaving no sacred cows and expelled opponents to “reform.”

The Xi Jinping leadership warned disaffection would endanger the survival of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (June 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping) and tried to recover people’s confidence by promoting the “mass line education and practice movement,” a political campaign to understand people’s feelings and serve people, over a year and a half to September. The leadership also took a strict attitude against the deepening corruption problem. In a series of actions

to crack down on corrupt ones among senior CPC, government and military officials, the leadership expelled Xu Caihou, former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, from the party (June) over his alleged corruption (indicted in October) and announced that it would investigate Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the Politburo Standing Committee, over his suspected breach of discipline (July). The leadership thus cracked down on senior officials in the

posts that had been free from any crackdown.

In an apparent bid to expel opponents to “reform” and pave the way to “reform,” the Xi Jinping leadership implemented anti-corruption enforcement covering senior officials who had been considered “sacred cows.”

China contained harmful speeches for the administration and enhanced anti-terrorism measures in respect to ethnic minority problems.

The Xi Jinping leadership, while emphasizing the significance of public opinion, indicated a tough stance against speeches and actions alleged as harmful to the party and government. In 2014, marking the 25th anniversary of the June 4 Tiananmen Incident, speeches by human rights lawyers and social activities calling for investigations into the incident and expressing discontent with the party leadership attracted attention mainly through Internet media. The Xi Jinping leadership seized these people and indicated a policy of being vigilant against growing consciousness about democracy, freedom and human rights and enhancing media control (August). In Hong Kong, large-scale protests for the democratization of the Hong Kong Chief Executive election in 2017 took place (September–November). Concerned that movements

At the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee, the leadership indicated the promotion of “rule-of-law government” in an apparent attempt to further exclude opponents to “reform” and back up “reform.”

to support the protests could spill over to mainland China, the Xi Jinping leadership seized scholars and intellectuals.

Developments regarding ethnic minority problems included indiscriminate mass attacks by apparent Uighurs that took place in China in and after March. Behind such attacks might have been ethnic minorities’ discontent with the failure of China’s rigid ethnic minority policy and the Han Chinese people’s enhanced rule. The Chinese authorities concluded that these attacks were terrorism. The Xi Jinping leadership convened the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum (May), the first such meeting in four years, and gave immediate priority to a tough blow to violent terrorism. It thus enhanced a crackdown on ethnic minorities while emphasizing the legitimacy of anti-terrorism measures.

China seeks to turn around the social structure while keeping a balance between economic growth and “reform” promotion.

The Xi Jinping leadership pursues “reform” to build a system for distributing benefits controlled so far by vested interest groups to ordinary people to secure economic and social stability. To this end, China will have to promote “reform” while keeping stable economic growth. But China’s gross domestic product growth for the January–September period slipped below the numerical target of 7.5% for 2014 to 7.4%. Premier Li Keqiang admitted that “downside pressure on the Chinese economy is increasing”

(September) and indicated a policy of shifting from an investment-dependent economic development model to stable growth without sticking to achieving numerical targets. In the meantime, China put forward a “reform” policy of promoting economic growth by giving urban resident registrations to migrant workers from rural regions to correct the resident registration system seen as a nest of economic gaps between urban and rural regions and expand urban private consumption.

“Reform” achievements are key to the Xi Jinping administration’s stability.

“We should accurately recognize the gradual characteristics of the Chinese economy, strengthen self-confidence and adapt to new conditions,” General Secretary Xi Jinping stated (July), emphasizing “comprehensive deepening of reform” on precondition of a switch from a high economic growth policy to a stable growth policy. “‘Reform’ would not go smoothly because it conflicts with interests,” Premier Li Keqiang stated (September), indicating his preparedness to take strong actions to promote reform,

while admitting vested interest groups’ resistance.

The Xi Jinping leadership’s anti-corruption crackdown is expected to reduce resistance to “reform” and continue further. If “progress and achievements of ‘reform’” (September, General Secretary Xi Jinping) fail to be gained, however, the Xi Jinping administration may lose its centripetal force and its stability, with the legitimacy of the concentration of power in General Secretary Xi Jinping and the anti-corruption crackdown coming under fire.

Column


The objectives and direction of General Secretary Xi Jinping's armed forces reform

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has steadily modernized equipment, as represented by the deployment of China's first aircraft carrier Liaoning. But software for using such modernized hardware is reportedly still old-fashioned. The "reform of the armed forces" cited as part of the Comprehensive Deepening of Reform as decided on in November 2013 may amount to software modernization including the creation of a joint operations command system. While China has sought to create the joint operations command system since the 1990s, Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping has stated that "the problem of system creation has not been fundamentally solved." Chairman Xi Jinping has headed the leading group for deepening reform on national defense and the armed forces, indicating his attitude of implementing the reform in a top-down manner. His possible creation of a modern joint operations command system, which his predecessors failed to achieve, is expected to affect Japan's national security environment.

"As threats from neighboring regions, particularly from the sea, are growing, the possibility of troubles or fighting at the entrance of our house is increasing," General Secretary Xi Jinping stated (June, General Secretary Xi Jinping lecture series), calling for proactive diplomacy with neighboring regions to create a favorable neighboring environment for China. In implementing such diplomacy, China held a conference on diplomacy with neighboring countries in October 2013 and proposed to build a new security and cooperation framework at the fourth summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) (Shanghai) in May 2014. Based on such situational awareness, the PLA

has reportedly been making strategic adjustments. For example, a relevant argument stated that "inward military strategy principles for mainland defense should be transformed into outward military strategy principles for defense outside the border" (a researcher at the PLA Academy of Military Science). Another stated that a strategic arrangement should be made to effectively control crises in the four seas—the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea—with a view to governing the neighboring environment (Nanjing Military Region Command)."

In line with such strategic adjustments, China plans to fully launch reform of the armed forces from 2015. In developing the joint operations command system, China reportedly plans to set up a Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Center and put "military area joint operations commands" under the center. In this process, the PLA Ground Force that now has an outstanding position in the PLA will be downsized to have an equal footing with the Navy, the Air Force and the Second Artillery Corps so that armed forces and troops will conduct joint operations under each "military area" command. The switch to the "military area" system reportedly takes into account military deployment in "neighboring regions." If the system works well in the future, China may be able to deploy highly ready, well-coordinated military forces in "neighboring regions." The abovementioned article by the Nanjing Military Region Command states that China will "combine military means with political and diplomatic struggles, press Japan to compromise and gradually complete its effective control on island waters." It is a concern that China would increase its military presence linked to diplomacy in Japan's "neighboring regions."



2-2 China promoted the building of new international security and economic cooperation frameworks, seeking to take leadership in Asia

- China advocated its "view on Asian security" to counter U.S. rebalancing to Asia
- While emphasizing "peaceful development," China made hegemonistic moves toward constructing a "maritime power"

China enhanced security functions of a regional cooperation mechanism without official U.S. participation.

While trying to stably develop relations with the U.S. through exchanges of senior official visits, China grew cautious about the U.S.'s Asia-Pacific rebalancing policy. In the meantime, China hosted in Shanghai the fourth summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), in which 26 countries including Central Asian and Middle East nations participate as official members with the U.S. and Japan being observers (May). While the CICA had not been remarkable in the international community since its founding in 1992, China took its host country status as an opportunity to propose developing the

CICA into "a security dialogue and cooperation platform that covers the whole of Asia."

President Xi Jinping advocated a "view on Asian security" featuring dialogue and cooperation, joint development and other pillars and stated that "Asian security must be protected by Asian people." He thus effectively countered the U.S.

China apparently attempts to establish a counter pivot to the U.S. by enhancing the CICA's position and roles to make it an influential security mechanism in Asia and by controlling its members under the concept of the "view on Asian security."

China promoted land and maritime Silk Road economic strategies and international financial organization schemes.

China took advantage of international conferences and bilateral talks to seek relevant countries' proactive cooperation in the "Silk Road Economic Belt" scheme for its closer economic link to Eurasian countries and the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road" scheme for enhancing its economic cooperation with Southeast Asian and other countries, which President Xi Jinping advocated from September to October 2013. China also announced the creation of a \$40 billion "Silk Road Fund" to promote the two schemes (November).

As for international financial cooperation, China enhanced the promotion of its proposal for the early creation of the "Development Bank of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO comprising China, Russia and four Central Asian countries)" and the "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)". China also took the initiative to base in Shanghai the "New Development Bank" that five emerging countries (BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) agreed to found (July) (see Column on Page 26).

China proactively expanded "diplomacy with neighboring countries" while enhancing cooperation with Russia and South Korea.

China tried to enhance relations with neighboring countries that it positioned as a strategic bastion for developing itself and raising its international position.

China appreciated its relations with Russia

as "in the best stage in history" (March, Foreign Minister Wang Yi). A China-Russia joint communique, announced in Shanghai (May), indicated opposition to other countries' intervention in domestic affairs and their

unilateral sanctions in connection with Western economic sanctions over Russia's annexation of the Crimea Peninsula. It also confirmed that the two countries will cohost "events to celebrate the victory in the war against German fascism and Japanese militarism" in 2015, 70 years after the end of World War II.

In promoting relations with South Korea, President Xi Jinping led a large economic delegation to South Korea (July). It was the first time that a Chinese president visited South Korea before North Korea. President Xi Jinping urged South Korean President Park Geun Hye to enhance bilateral political and security cooperation. They agreed to try to complete negotiations on a China-South Korea free trade agreement (negotiations

China made clearer its hardline attitude on South China Sea resources development.

The State Oceanic Administration released its 2014 Official Report on Maritime Development (April) declaring China's attempt to become "a new-form maritime power." It emphasized "China, even though being strong, would not take any hegemonistic approach but retain its basic policy of peaceful development."

Nevertheless, China brought an oil drilling rig into what Vietnam claims as its exclusive economic zone in waters near the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea and unilaterally announced its oil drilling there (May). It then deployed massive ships including China Coast Guard ships to protect the rig. These Chinese

China enhancing efforts to woo neighboring countries to remove U.S. influences in Asia

Following about eight hours of talks with U.S. President Barack Obama in California in June 2013, President Xi Jinping held about 10 hours of talks with Obama, who visited China for an annual summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (November). While they confirmed their countries' cooperation in economy and trade and in international problems, President Xi asked President Obama to respect China's

were completed in November).

After India's new Narendra Modi administration was launched (May), China promptly sent Foreign Minister Wang Yi to India (June). President Xi Jinping also visited India (September), vowing to invest \$20 billion in the country.

Meanwhile, China continued economic exchanges with North Korea in their border region but gave up on sending dignitaries to Pyongyang to celebrate the 65th anniversary of China-North Korea diplomatic relations (October). Its political exchanges with North Korea were thus sluggish. Among Southeast Asian countries, China faced off against the Philippines and Vietnam over their territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

ships repeated water cannon and ramming attacks on Vietnamese patrol boats, injuring crewmembers (as announced by the Vietnamese government). China ended the drilling in more than two months. In the Spratly Islands area, China continued what seemed to be reclamation work for runway construction at South Johnson Reef under its effective control and indicated an ongoing plan to make artificial islands through reclamation work on six of the seven reefs under its control in the area (October). China thus enhanced its effective control on the South China Sea based on its "nine-dotted line" policy.

sovereignty and territorial integrity based on the concept of the "new model of major power relationship."

China is expected to try to remove U.S. influences in Asia and obtain leadership in the region by enhancing economic relations with and political approaches on neighboring countries and by embodying multiple security and economic strategic initiatives mainly for Asia.

Column

China's moves to establish new international financial organizations

Major international financial organizations that China attempts to create are the "Development Bank of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)", the "Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)" and the "BRICS New Development Bank (NDB)." China has proposed the first two and attempted to take leadership in the NDB proposed by India.

Behind China's proposal for these international financial organizations are its dissatisfaction with existing international financial organizations, including the International Monetary Fund, where a plan to increase ownership or voting stakes for China and other emerging countries is frozen due to a delay in approval by the U.S. Congress, as well as the World Bank (or International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), whose respective governorships have been retained by the U.S. and Japan. While the ADB and other development banks adopt poverty reduction as their main objective, the three China-led banks give priority to loans for infrastructure construction to undertake functions that the existing organizations lack. China is expected to take advantage of the three new banks to resolve domestic manufacturers' overcapacity, expand its economic territories, including the Silk Road economic belt, and increase its international financial influences.

China's basic concept for the new development banks is that lending target countries will be free from political requirements including the elimination of human rights violations. If the three new banks create new fund supply routes, therefore, new international lending standards may be built.

"Development Bank of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)"

In November 2010, then Premier Wen Jiabao proposed the bank at a meeting of SCO prime ministers. A joint statement of SCO prime ministers in December 2012 clarified a plan to create the development bank and fund. A joint statement of SCO heads of state in September 2014 called for completing a study on the development bank at an early date.


"Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)"

In October 2013, President Xi Jinping proposed the AIIB in Indonesia. In November 2014, representatives from 22 countries including China signed a memorandum on preparations for the bank's establishment. They plan to create the new bank within 2015. The AIIB would be capitalized at \$100 billion including an initial capital of some \$50 billion. These countries have agreed to base their respective ownership stakes in the new bank on their respective gross domestic product sizes, indicating that China will be the largest investor in the new bank, which will be based in Beijing.

BRICS "New Development Bank (NDB)"

In February 2012, India proposed the BRICS NDB. BRICS leaders at their meeting in July 2014 agreed to create the new bank. The five countries will equally invest in the NDB that will be capitalized at \$50 billion initially and at \$100 billion later. China will provide 40% of \$100 billion in foreign exchange reserves to address financial crises, securing its strong influences on the new bank, which will be based in Shanghai.

SCO and BRICS member countries and signatories to the memorandum on AIIB creation



2-3 China remained alert to Japan's "rightward tilt," expanding international campaigns involving historical recognition

- China is exploiting domestic anti-government criticism in Japan over U.S. bases in Okinawa and collective self-defense to separate Japan from the U.S.
- China has relentlessly sent government ships to waters near the Senkaku Islands in an attempt to change the status quo by force.
- China is taking advantage of the "70th anniversary of the victory in the war against Japan" to further enhance its international propaganda war.

China enhanced anti-Japan criticism focusing on the awareness of a history recognition problem while restricting radical anti-Japan activities.

While China's neighboring countries grew more alert to China's expansion into the South China Sea and its establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (November 2013), China aggressively expanded its international propaganda campaign criticizing Japan's "awareness of history" in an attempt to isolate Japan from the international community. China released what it claimed to be official documents about the now-defunct Imperial Japanese Army from January (see Column on Page 29) and launched campaigns emphasizing Japan's "war crimes" through its Xinhua state-run news agency and others. China also came up with new anti-Japan measures such as the first acceptance of a suit against "Japan's wartime forcible transportation of Chinese workers" (March) and an application for including historical materials on "the Nanjing Massacre" and "comfort women" into the Memory of the World Register (March). This series of moves is one that China has never taken before.

China also adopted a decision to designate September 3 as the "Victory Day of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression" and December

13 as the "National Memorial Day for Nanjing Massacre Victims" for government-sponsored commemorative or memorial events (February). All seven Politburo Standing Committee members attended a ceremony to mark the "69th Anniversary of the Victory Day in the Anti-Japanese War," the first such ceremony after the decision. President Xi Jinping there made an address stating "some Japanese political organizations and politicians still deny brutal criminal acts of Japanese military aggression." He thus countered Japan's moves regarding the awareness of a history problem and tried to stimulate anti-Japan sentiment at home and abroad.

Concerned that such anti-Japan sentiment could lead to criticism against the Chinese government's foreign policy and to anti-Japan demonstrations, however, China took actions to help prevent anti-Japan sentiment from excessively growing within China. Xinhua emphasized the differentiation between Japanese people and rightwing groups, while the China Youth Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Youth League of China, carried an article calling for "addressing problems with Japan in a rational way."

China, while resuming some government-level exchanges with Japan, remained alert to Japan's "rightward tilt" and exploited domestic and external opinions against the Japanese government to check the tilt.

While demonstrating its attitude of declining to talk with Japan's administration since the end of the Second Session of the 12th National People's Congress (March), China accepted a delegation of the Japan-China Friendship Parliamentarians' Union (May), resuming lawmaker and private-level exchanges with Japan. Furthermore, President Xi Jinping held talks with former Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (July, October). In addition, the Japanese and Chinese foreign ministers held unofficial

meetings (August, September) and an official meeting (November). Working-level diplomatic and financial officials from the two countries also implemented talks. Behind these talks might have been China's attempt to grasp Japan's attitude on China and security policy trends through increased bilateral contacts. On the occasion of the annual APEC summit (November), the top Japanese and Chinese leaders held a meeting where they indicated a positive attitude toward improving Japan-China relations

by confirming the promotion of a "Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests," while retaining their respective basic stances on "history and territory."

Meanwhile, China was alert to Japan's national security policy and moves to enhance the Japan-U.S. alliance, describing them as "hostile moves against China." In particular, since the Japanese Cabinet's decision to allow Japan to exercise its collective self-defense rights (July), China called for a warning against

Japan's "rightward tilt" by quoting foreign media reports, including a July 1 New York Times article stating that the decision "fundamentally changes the reading of the postwar Constitution." China also utilized opinions of some Okinawa citizen groups against U.S. bases in Okinawa as "Japanese citizens' criticism of their government" in the international propaganda war and approached a group for the independence of the Ryukyu Islands to divide the Japan-U.S. alliance and shake Japan over the Chinese territorial claim to the Senkaku Islands.

Column

China aims to propose and expand questions on sovereignty over the Ryukyus

- In May 2013, the official CPC newspaper, the People's Daily, carried a commentary by an academic of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences asserting that "sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands is undecided." China explained that its official view was that "Okinawa belongs to Japan" and that "there has been no change to the stance of the Chinese government" (a Foreign Ministry spokesman). Later, however, the same newspaper carried a researcher's article asserting that "the Okinawa Reversion Agreement is illegal" (August). This was taken as a move designed to stimulate public debate on Ryukyu.
- In 2014, the People's Daily overseas edition and other media carried experts' commentaries that also questioned sovereignty over the Ryukyus. In May, parties including a Chinese think tank hosted an academic meeting on the Ryukyus, inviting members of a Japanese group advocating "the independence of the Ryukyus." When the Ryukyu Shimpo carried an article on a Japanese legal scientist's assertion, titled "Ryukyu solution was illegitimate under international law," the Global Times affiliated with the People's Daily carried a relevant article in response, indicating the Chinese side's great interest in the issue. Vigilance is required about China's future moves related to Okinawa.

China attempted to expand its presence in Senkaku waters.

Since the Japanese government acquired ownership of the Senkaku Islands in 2012, China has continuously sent ships of a maritime law enforcement agency to waters around the islet group. In 2014, China repeated such demonstrations by leading these Chinese government ships to enter Japan's territorial waters around the islands.

Furthermore, Chinese military planes approached Japanese Self-Defense Force aircraft in air space over high sea waters in the East China Sea (May, June). In response to Japan's protest against such approach, Chinese government agencies including the Defense Ministry came up with rebuttals or criticisms. By stating "Chinese aircraft necessarily chased and monitored Self-Defense Force planes in reconnaissance flights in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification

Zone," China took a provocative action trumpeting an achievement (August).

In the meantime, the Japanese and Chinese governments held the Second Round Meeting of Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs (September), the first such meeting in about two years, agreeing to resume talks toward launching a "maritime communication mechanism." Referring to this meeting, President Xi Jinping at the Japan-China summit stated that China would like to "continue communications at the working level" (November). While continuing attempts to "change the status quo by force" in waters around Japan, China accepted the resumption of bilateral talks, apparently concerned about any unexpected event developing into a military clash.

Meanwhile, since September, Chinese coral poaching

ships have frequently conducted illegal operations in waters near the Ogasawara Islands and their vicinity, prompting the Japanese government to ask the Chinese authorities to prevent the recurrence of such operations. As a growing number of Chinese fishing

boats are feared to conduct illegal operations due to a decline in fish resources in waters near China, whether the Chinese authorities could take any fundamental measures in this regard is uncertain.

China further enhanced anti-Japan criticism toward “the 70th Anniversary of the Victory Day in the Anti-Japanese War.”

China is expected to proactively build relations with Japan for cooperation in economic and environmental fields, while taking a cautious attitude on bilateral high-level exchanges in consideration of Japan's attitude on China. In the meantime, China is likely to position the year 2015 as marking “the 70th Anniversary of the Victory Day in the Anti-Japanese War” for emphasizing “China's liberation through the victory in the anti-Japan war” and “racial independence and people's liberation in Asia” and further enhance its international propaganda campaign criticizing Japan over the awareness of a “history issue” in order to raise domestic patriotic sentiment, maintain the administration's centripetal force and take advantage of the diffusion of “China's history recognition” in the international community for taking leadership in Asia.

China attempts to maintain its position as a victor country in World War II and improve its international influence by leading the international community to recognize China's contributions in the war again through an assertion that the anti-Japan war was an important component of the world's “anti-fascism war.” Furthermore, China may aim to take advantage of international organizations and frameworks for boosting anti-Japan criticism in the international community, as indicated by its calls for cooperation between victor countries and for joint commemorative events with Russia, Mongolia and South Korea, as well as Foreign Minister Wang Yi's proposal to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki Moon for U.N.-sponsored commemorative events (September).

○ The Xinhua state-run news agency carried video testimony by former members of the Association of Returnees from China on its special page (August), providing their English and Korean versions. This

indicates that China is prepared to exploit “Japanese documents” and “Japanese testimony” as evidence for containing Japanese rebuttals.

Month	Major developments regarding historical materials involving the “anti-Japan war”	Month	Major developments regarding historical materials involving the “anti-Japan war”
January	The Jilin Archives' “Documents about the now-defunct Imperial Japanese Army's invasion of China” are released one after another (January 7, 9, 11 and 12, April 24, etc.).	April	“Tiezhengrushan,” a Chinese language version of “Public Documents on the now-defunct Imperial Japanese Army” at the Jilin Archives, is published.
January	The Chinese Foreign Ministry and other agencies host foreign reporters' tours of local public record offices and facilities related to the anti-Japan war (similar tours are organized in February and April as well).	May	The China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese calls for collecting historical materials and photos on Japanese militarism and invasion.
March	The English version of “Transcripts of the Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East” published by Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press is introduced at an international book fair in France.	July	Upon the 77th anniversary of the Lugou Bridge Incident (July 7), the Central Archives of China releases “handwritten statements” by 45 Japanese war criminals over 45 days (along with their English language version).
March	China applies for including historical materials on the “Nanjing Massacre” and “comfort women” into the Memory of the World Register.	August	The Shandong Archives releases documents about crimes of 10 Japanese war criminals.
		September	The Jilin Archives and others hold an international academic symposium on public documents on the Japanese Army's invasion.

Column

International propaganda campaign using official documents on the now-defunct Imperial Japanese Army

- China has traditionally proceeded with historical research on its “anti-Japan war,” collecting U.S. and other overseas materials as well as domestic ones.
- In the process, China has growingly viewed public record offices at various locations as sources for patriotic education materials. Particularly, the Jilin Archives, which has stored massive documents left by the Kanto army, has accelerated research and translation since around 2012 in a bid to provide the CPC leadership with materials for rebutting “history denying statements” by Japanese government officials and others.
- While the Jilin Archives had never released research achievements in any high-profile manner, Chinese media released

the Archives' “Documents about the now-defunct Imperial Japanese Army's invasion of China” (see the table below on developments regarding historical materials involving the anti-Japan war).

- The CPC leadership likely has given high ratings to the efforts at the Archives. Liu Qibao, Head of the CPC Central Propaganda Department, visited Jilin Province (July) and directly instructed the Archives to steadily explore, compile, translate, publish, advertise and report official documents on the now-defunct Imperial Japanese Army. It is a concern that China would exploit “only parts favorable for China” among those documents for its international propaganda campaign.

2-4 China stumbled in launching political negotiations with Taiwan on opposition from Taiwanese people

- While China and Taiwan exchanged visits of their senior working-level officials, economic talks stagnated.
- The opposition party's victory in Taiwan's local elections worked to enhance resistance to relations with China.

Taiwanese students' occupation of the Legislative Yuan prompted China to revise exchanges with the Ma Yingjeou administration.

China and Taiwan exchanged visits of their senior working-level officials for the first time ever. Zhang Zhijun, Minister of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of China, met with Wang Yuchi, Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council of the Executive Yuan, to discuss economic cooperation under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), striking a deal to conclude a goods trade agreement (February). Later, Taiwan's Ma Yingjeou administration attempted to obtain approval by the National Assembly on a services

trade agreement Taiwan signed with China in 2013 (March).

But students opposed procedures at the assembly and occupied the Legislative Yuan, demanding an ordinance to provide for the assembly's surveillance on and citizens' engagement with the arrangement with China. Assembly discussions on the agreement were thus suspended (March). The occupation ended upon the Ma Yingjeou administration's acceptance of the ordinance (April). The opposition from citizens led to stagnation in deliberations on the

services trade agreement at the assembly and other consultations with China.

China sent Minister Zhang Zhijun to Taiwan for talks on working-level relations including the establishment of Chinese and Taiwanese representative offices (June). Minister Zhang then called for political negotiations (on their respective

political positions), but the Taiwanese side rejected the call. China thus stumbled in implementing its traditional policy of promoting the launch of political negotiations between Chinese and Taiwanese authorities after liaison bodies' signing of an economic cooperation agreement, being forced to revise the policy.

While Taiwan proposed China's democratization, China asserted that they should mutually respect their social systems.

In the meantime, General Secretary Xi Jinping, at a meeting with a Taiwanese group seeking to unify China and Taiwan, stated that "peaceful unification and two systems in one country are the basic policy for solving the Taiwan problem," reaffirming the Chinese stance (September). China rejected Taiwanese President Ma Yingjeou's offer made since the summer of 2013 to attend the APEC summit (November) in Beijing (October).

In an address to a ceremony to mark the anniversary of Taiwan's foundation (October), President Ma Yingjeou stated that "the best time has come for Continental China to go in the direction of democratic constitutional government" and that "Hong Kong should implement democratization ahead of Continental China." The Chinese authorities' response to democratization demand in Hong Kong

may have some impact on future China-Taiwan relations.

After the two sides' remarks on their future pictures, General Secretary Xi Jinping met with former Taiwanese Vice President Siew Wanchang on the occasion of the APEC summit (November) and checked the Taiwanese side by stating that the two sides "should mutually respect their social system choices." "As greater difficulties exist in cross-strait relations, the need for enhancing exchanges is greater," General Secretary Xi also stated, seeking to expand exchanges in economy, culture, science and technology, and education. At the same time, cross-strait senior working-level talks took place in Beijing, producing a deal to promptly complete talks on the "goods trade agreement" and the mutual establishment of liaison offices.

The opposition Democratic Progressive Party won in unified local elections in Taiwan, leading China to prepare a strategy for the DPP.

In Taiwan's unified local elections in November, the ruling Kuomintang Nationalist Party won only six of the 22 city and county head posts, against 13 for the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (independents won the remaining three posts). The Kuomintang garnered 40.7% of votes in the city and county head elections, against 47.6% for the opposition party.

Commenting on the election results, a spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of China stated: "The results are worthy of attention. We hope that people on both coasts of the strait will protect and promote the peaceful development of cross-border relations." The spokesman thus urged Taiwan's ruling and opposition parties to maintain their present relations with China (November).

The DPP's victory in the local elections might have made it more necessary for China to create a strategy for the opposition party's victory in the January 2016 Taiwan presidential election as China views the DPP as independence-oriented. Anticipating that China-Taiwan communications could stagnate if a DPP administration made a debut through the presidential election, China may attempt to develop communications between their liaison organizations through opening of their representative offices before the term for the Ma Yingjeou administration expires. As many DPP municipal and county heads won the elections, China may try to develop working-level contacts with these local heads at private and local levels to enhance relations with the DPP.



3-1 Russia changed the status quo by force to put Ukraine under control

- Russia annexed Crimea and secured an influence on eastern Ukraine.
- Backed by growing domestic nationalism, popularity ratings increased for the Putin administration.
- Even under sanctions by western and other countries, Russia is prepared to make no concessions over the Ukraine problem.

Russia had a strong sense of crisis regarding the Ukraine government change.

In Ukraine, then-President Viktor Yanukovich gave up on signing an agreement with the European Union (EU) on free trade and other matters while people's discontent was growing with his administration's corruption (November 2013). It triggered anti-government demonstrations by pro-Western groups. As the turmoil expanded, the president escaped from Ukraine, leading pro-

Western groups to establish an interim government (February). In response, Russia, which had been alert to Ukraine's approach to Europe, expressed its opposition to the interim government by launching military exercises near its border with Ukraine, while denying the legitimacy of the interim government.

Russia forced the annexation of Crimea, intervening in movements to separate eastern Ukraine.

After the Ukraine government change, Russia indicated its readiness to use force in Ukraine for the nominal purpose of protecting Russian-speaking residents in Crimea, a region which features a large number of residents of Russian origin and is of great military importance. In Crimea, armed soldiers alleged as Russian troops occupied airport, military and other facilities, while local pro-Russian forces put Parliament, and military and security organizations under their control. Subsequently, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Sevastopol City Assembly declared their independence as the Republic of Crimea (March). Furthermore, Crimea implemented a national referendum on its annexation into Russia, where more than 96% of voters supported the annexation (March). Western countries issued a strong warning against the move to break up Ukraine. But Russian President Vladimir Putin declared Crimea's annexation into Russia (March) in a manner to brush off such warning, coming under heavy criticism from Western countries.

Independence movements emerged in eastern Ukraine as well. In the region, pro-Russian armed groups occupied government agency buildings (April),

while the Ukraine government launched military operations. Their face-off thus developed into a battle between pro-Russian forces and the Ukraine government forces, with a Malaysian Airlines plane being shot down (July) and other incidents occurring. Regarding this battle, Russia's assistance to pro-Russian forces was pointed out. Russia then came under further criticism from the international community.



Map of Ukraine/Crimea (Kyodo)

Column

Importance of Ukraine/Crimea for Russia

● History

Kievan Rus' prospered in the Middle Ages in the region stretching over what are now Ukraine, Belarus and Russia and is considered to be Russia's historical roots.

● Ethnic structure

Ukraine has more than eight million Russian-origin residents, mainly in its southeast. Particularly, Crimea, where Russians account for some 60% of residents, had belonged to the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic until Soviet Communist Party then-First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev transferred it to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic during the realignment of the Soviet Union in 1954. President Putin in his speech on March 18 denounced the transfer, stating that "Crimea has always been an indispensable part of Russia in people's hearts."

● Economy

Southeastern Ukraine was a key industrial, agricultural zone of the Soviet Union. Its present steel, shipbuilding and aerospace industries still have close relations with Russia's economy and defense industry. Ukraine has population of more than 45 million and is the fifth largest trading partner for Russia (2013). It has been a key subject to Russia's wooing under the Eurasian economic integration initiative led by President Putin. Furthermore, Russia's mainstay natural gas pipeline for Europe passes through Ukraine.

● Military

Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Black Sea Fleet is based in Crimea's Sevastopol. Russia is apparently concerned that it may lose its right to base the fleet in Sevastopol as well as its buffer zone with the U.S. beyond on its long southwestern border, if Ukraine accedes to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Column

Russia's "hybrid war"

● In dealing with the "annexation" of Crimea and the eastern Ukraine situation, Russia has allegedly implemented a tactic of timely combining various means, including the mobilization of local pro-Russian forces, the justification of separatist movements through a referendum and propaganda campaign, energy supply related pressure, large-scale military exercises near the border, and the deployment of anonymous special troops. NATO countries have paid attention to these tactics and have called the war a "hybrid war" or "ambiguous war."

● Gen. Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, released a discussion paper anticipating such tactics in February 2013. He then stated

that "a wide range of non-military means, including political, economic, information and humanitarian ones, rather than classic military forces, should be used and combined with protests by local residents to achieve political or strategic objectives in a 21st century war." He also stated that "the armed forces' mission is to support non-military means for secret operations by special and cyber forces" and that "any open use of force should be limited to the final phase of any conflict."

● In an apparent background that allowed Russia to implement a "hybrid war," the Putin administration has attempted to utilize the Presidential Administration and the National Security Council to horizontally integrate policies and information.

Russia emphasized diplomatic achievements in relation with other former Soviet republics and China, while its relations with Western countries deteriorated.

Since March, Western countries have denounced Russia's "annexation" of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine, and have successively implemented anti-Russia sanctions including a ban on Russian dignitaries' trips to these countries. In the meantime, Russia held summit talks and "Maritime Cooperation 2014" joint naval exercise with China (May), and it

signed a long-negotiated contract for natural gas supply to China (May). Russia also signed a treaty with Kazakhstan and Belarus to create the Eurasian Economic Union as a new economic integration framework (May). Russia thus domestically and internationally demonstrated its good relations with other former Soviet republics as well as China.

Popularity ratings for the administration rose in response to growing nationalism, while the future of the economy remained uncertain.

President Putin's popularity ratings in Russia had followed a downward trend before rising from below 70% to above 80% as Russian people's nationalism grew in response to the "annexation" of Crimea on the pretext of the will of Russian residents despite opposition from Western countries. Under such situation, the ruling party won a landslide victory in 30 unified gubernatorial elections (September).

Meanwhile, the shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines aircraft in eastern Ukraine led Western

countries to toughen their attitude against Russia and carry out additional anti-Russian sanctions including financial sanctions and restrictions on technology transfers, dealing an additional blow to the Russia economy, which had already been slumping. Russia's year-on-year gross domestic product growth in the first half of 2014 was limited to 0.8%, with massive funds flowing out of the country. Russian economic conditions have gradually grown severe.

Russia's hardline attitude is likely to prolong its confrontation with Western countries.

In eastern Ukraine, where pro-Russian forces continued fighting with Ukraine government forces, the government forces retained an advantageous position from June before the position was reversed on Russia's apparent enhancement of support for pro-Russian forces in August. The change and economic deterioration plunged Ukraine into a difficult position. Under such situation, President Putin proposed a ceasefire to Ukraine and successfully achieved a ceasefire in a manner to benefit pro-Russian forces and Russia through Ukraine's tolerance of an interim autonomy for the region controlled by

pro-Russian forces.

In Russia, popularity ratings for the Putin administration have remained high, though with some antiwar demonstrations seen. Backed by such domestic public opinion, the Putin administration is expected to attempt to protect Russian interests in Ukraine while monitoring Western countries' attitude against itself. In particular, the Putin administration apparently intends to fix the confrontational situation in eastern Ukraine to exert pressure on Ukraine. Such hardline Russian attitude is likely to prolong Russia's confrontation with Western countries.

Column

Has Russia strategically approached China?

As President Putin visited China in May, when a Russia-China agreement on wide-ranging economic cooperation including natural gas supply was announced with a joint naval exercise implemented, there is a growing view around the world that Russia has strategically approached China due to its confrontation with Western countries over the Ukraine crisis.

Given that Europe has already peaked as a major economic partner for Russia, however, Russia has tried to enhance economic cooperation with China to diversify energy export destinations even since before the Ukraine crisis.


Meanwhile, since the Russian-Georgian War (2008), Russia has growingly recognized that the world has been being multipolarized through the fading "U.S.-led unipolar world," Russia's recovery, and the rise of China and other emerging countries. It has also tended to give priority to border defense including maritime operations and to its leadership in Eurasia (the former Soviet bloc). In this respect, China, which neighbors Russia and has risen through aggressive diplomacy with neighboring countries, has grown as a rival to Russia, seeking to secure its position as a major power in the multipolar world under its geopolitical strategy.

Since Putin's visit to China, Russia has increasingly demonstrated its presence to China. In June, when China's tensions with Vietnam in the South China Sea were growing, Russian naval ships

visited Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay, and also Russian and Vietnamese state-run companies agreed to develop continental-shelf resources in the South China Sea. When China's polar research vessel Xue Long conducted an Arctic tour from July through September, the Russian Navy fired missiles from the eastern coast of Kamchatka (while issuing a navigation warning) toward the route of the Chinese vessel and conducted marine surveys in the South China Sea and the Arctic Sea. On September 11, when President Putin ordered the military to carry out a surprise large-scale exercise (surprise inspection) in the Eastern Military District including Russia's border with China and the Arctic pole, an SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) summit took place along with a Russia-China summit in Tajikistan.

In his address to Russian ambassadors to foreign countries in July, President Putin emphasized that Russia and China would not use their friendship to counter anyone or form an alliance or bloc. He also clarified his intention to enhance relations with India, Vietnam, and Japan.

Russia is expected to enhance moves to secure equality and a balance of power with China as it recognizes China's presence and deepens its economic dependence on China more and more. We will have to calmly monitor the effects of Russia-China relations on Japan, considering that Russia and China, though emphasizing their closer political relationship, are geopolitical rivals.



3-2 Russia remained positive about continuing talks with Japan while confronting Western countries over the Ukraine problem

- Russia retained its policy of implementing President Putin's visit to Japan while demonstrating dissatisfaction with Japanese sanctions
- Russia opened a new airport on Etorofu Island in the Northern Territories and sent executives to the territories for the first time in two years.

Russia expects Japan's positive attitude toward developing bilateral relations.

At talks with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who visited Russia on the occasion of the opening ceremony for the Sochi Winter Olympic Games (February), President Putin indicated his intention to visit Japan in autumn and stated that "the way has been paved for solving the difficult problem [Northern Territories problem] through the development of relations in all areas." He thus demonstrated his positive attitude toward enhancing Russia-Japan relations.

Russia criticized Japan's introduction of anti-Russia sanctions in response to rising tensions in the Ukraine situation (March, April, July and September) as "an unfriendly action following U.S. policies" and employed countersanctions (August). But Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov stated that "President Putin has accepted Japan's invitation to visit Japan" (August). He also welcomed the continuation of Japan-Russia exchanges at official and private levels including the "Japan-Russia Forum" (September), continuing to demonstrate Russia's attitude of preventing bilateral relations from deteriorating.

In the meantime, President Putin held telephone talks with Prime Minister Abe (September, October). At a later Japan-Russia summit meeting on the occasion of an Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit in Milan, Italy,

they agreed on the importance of political talks. At a press conference, President Putin stated that Russia was ready to maintain relations with Japan and that the future was up to Japan. He thus indicated his hopes placed on Japan's positive attitude toward bilateral relations (October). At another Japan-Russia summit meeting during the APEC summit in Beijing (November), the Japanese and Russian leaders confirmed bilateral practical cooperation in economic, cultural and other areas and exchanged views on how to proceed with bilateral peace treaty negotiations. They also agree to start specific preparations for President Putin's visit to Japan in 2015.

Russia has been put into a difficult position in the international community due to the Ukraine problem, while Western countries' economic sanctions have made the future course of the Russian economy further uncertain. Under such circumstances, Russia has placed great hopes on Japan, as it is rich with financial and technological resources. In the future, Russia is expected to intensify its approach to Japan in order to enhance economic relations including technological cooperation, while positioning President Putin's visit to Japan as the greatest event for the immediate future.

Russia will continue efforts to develop infrastructure and modernize armed forces in the Northern Territories.

Russia, while indicating its attitude of emphasizing relations with Japan, has maintained its claim that the Northern Territories legitimately became Russian territories as a result of World War II, steadily promoting local infrastructure development and military modernization.

In infrastructure development, Russia completed the construction of a new airport on Etorofu Island as the largest project under a 2007–2015 special federal program for the social and economic development of the Kuril Islands, with Sergei Ivanov, Chief of the Presidential Administration, and others visiting the island upon the new airport's opening (September). On Kunashiri Island, Russia completed the construction of a wind-diesel power plant with foreign building materials introduced within the framework of the federal special program (August) and repaired a geothermal power plant. Regarding military affairs, Lt. Gen. Sergey Surovikihn, Commanding Officer of the Eastern Military District, announced a plan to build new military, housing, cultural and other facilities for troops stationed on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands (April). In response, the Ministry of Defense led construction material shipment to these islands (May) and implemented a military exercise with more than 1,000 troops participating in the Eastern Military District including the two islands (August).

Before the current special federal program ends in 2015, the Ministry of Development of Russian Far East and Sakhalin Province is working out the next special federal program, providing for development targets over the 10 years following 2015. The special program “will give top priority to improving the living environment for residents and developing an environment for attracting domestic and foreign investment” (September, Presidential Administration Chief Ivanov). Industrial promotion and tourism infrastructure development as well as living and transport infrastructure development have been indicated for the program. Therefore, foreign enterprises may participate in Northern Territories development as the special program is promoted.

Senior Russian officials visiting the Northern Territories (since 2010)	
2010 September 2–3	Andrey Krayniy, Head of the Federal Fisheries Agency (Etorofu)
September 9	Viktor Ishayev, Presidential Envoy in the Far Eastern Federal District of Russia (Etorofu, Kunashiri)
September 22	Alexander Beglov, Deputy Chief, Presidential Administration (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan)
November 1	Dmitry Medvedev, President (Kunashiri)
December 13	Igor Shuvalov, First Deputy Prime Minister (Etorofu, Kunashiri)
2011 January 31– February 1	Viktor Vasargin, Minister of Regional Development (Etorofu, Kunashiri)
February 4	Anatoly Serdyukov, Minister of Defense (Etorofu, Kunashiri)
May 15	Sergei Ivanov, Deputy Prime Minister; Viktor Vasargin, Minister of Regional Development; Yury Trutnev, Minister of Natural Resources and the Environment; Elvira Nabiullina, Minister of Economic Development and Trade; Igor Levitin, Minister of Transport (Etorofu, Kunashiri)
September 11	Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council (Kunashiri, Habomais, Suisho)
October 13	Oleg Markov, Presidential Adviser (Etorofu, Kunashiri)
2012 July 3	Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister; Olga Golodets, Deputy Prime Minister; Oleg Govorun, Minister of Regional Development; Viktor Ishayev, Minister for Development of Russian Far East and Presidential Envoy in the Far Eastern Federal District of Russia (Kunashiri)
September 27	Nikolay Fyodorov, Minister of Agriculture (Etorofu)
2014 September 24	Sergei Ivanov, Chief of the Presidential Administration; Yury Trutnev, Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Envoy in the Far Eastern Federal District (Etorofu)

Presidential Administration Chief Ivanov, during his visit to Etorofu, indicated a plan to visit the Northern Territories again and talked about Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu's potential visit. Therefore, Russia is expected to continue sending senior officials to the Northern Territories in line with local infrastructure and military facility development. It is thus feared that the “Russianization” of the Northern Territories will accelerate.



4 The Middle East/North Africa situation deteriorated, with fighting expanding

- Syrian and Iraqi conditions deteriorated rapidly.
- Political, economic, and security turmoil expanded.

Syrian deterioration spilled over to neighboring countries.

In Syria, plagued with continuing turmoil, anti-government forces put the North and East under their control by 2013, while the Assad regime continued to control the capital city of Damascus and the western coastal region. Most of the Kurdish region in the Northeast came under the control of Kurdish forces.

From late January to early February, the first peace negotiations between the Syrian government and an oppositionist organization, the “National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces,” took place under UN mediation in Geneva, Switzerland. But the talks ended with little achievement. In August, the United Nations reported that an estimated 190,000 people were killed in Syria mainly due to the civil war from the March 2011 emergence of anti-government movements and April 2014, with more than 3 million refugees flowing into neighboring countries.

In regions controlled by anti-government forces, the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL), a Sunni extremist organization, repeated

large-scale clashes with other rebel organizations from early January and spread control by obtaining bases of other opposition organizations. From around July, ISIL launched attacks on government forces facilities in various locations. From areas under its control as logistic bases, the ISIL started attacks on neighboring northern Iraq (June). In response, the U.S. and other countries conducted aerial bombings on mainly ISIL-controlled areas in northern Syria as well as Iraq from September.

In Lebanon and Turkey, which neighbor Syria, there were terrorist attacks and armed clashes reported as being related to the Syrian turmoil. As Hizballah, a Shiite group based in Lebanon, stepped up support for the Assad regime from 2013, Sunnis extremists conducted suicide terrorist bombing attacks on the Lebanese capital of Beirut. ISIL and other militants invaded Lebanon from Syria and temporarily occupied a northeastern Lebanon town (August). Around the southern Turk border, armed groups from Syria shot Turkish security units (January, March).

ISIL occupied northern and other parts of Iraq.

When Sunni discontent in Iraq was growing amid political turmoil in late December 2013, the government attempted to arrest a Sunni lawmaker for “fomenting anti-government movements,” prompting Sunni residents to conduct protests in the western province of Anbar and other regions, leading to their clashes with security forces.

In a manner to take advantage of such turmoil, ISIL expanded its influence in Iraq in cooperation

with other armed Sunni forces, including Sunni militants discontent with the Nouri al-Maliki regime, members of the now-defunct “Iraqi Baathist Party,” and former Hussein regime military officials, occupying a wide northern Iraq region including Mosul (June). After occupying northern Iraq, these rebel organizations approached the Iraqi capital of Baghdad and invaded the Kurdish Autonomous Region in northeastern Iraq (August). In response, the U.S.

and other countries conducted aerial bombing attacks on ISIL and other militants mainly in northern Iraq from August.

The Kurdish autonomous government temporarily indicated its intention to become independent from the central government of Iraq as Iraqi security forces withdrew from Kirkuk Province and other regions in northern Iraq due to ISIL and other attacks. In response to the invasion by ISIL and other militants, however, the Kurdish autonomous government began to cooperate with the central government in fighting against them in August.

Turmoil continued in Libya and Egypt as well.

Although Libya implemented elections for the interim parliament (June), turmoil has continued, with some lawmakers boycotting the parliament over election results. In the Libyan capital of Tripoli, conflicting militant organizations intensified their clashes. In the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi, an extreme Islamist organization clashed with forces seeking to eliminate the organization.

Tunisia made progress in implementing a roadmap for democratization through the adoption of a new constitution and the inauguration of a new cabinet (January). Its security authorities enhanced a crackdown on extreme Islamist organizations in western and other parts of the country. But there were a terrorist attack on the house of the interior minister (May) and repeated attacks on security forces.

In Egypt, former Defense Minister Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took up the presidency (June), and took over an interim government founded after the collapse of the Mohamed Morsi administration (July 2013). But there were a terrorist bomb attack on a sightseeing bus with foreigners aboard (February) and a similar attack in front of the Foreign Ministry (September), as well as continued terrorist attacks on security forces and facilities in the capital city of Cairo and the Sinai

In the meantime, a National Assembly election was implemented in Iraq, excluding some part of Anbar Province (April). The “State of Law Coalition,” a Shiite group led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki became the largest group in the assembly through the election. However, he failed to form a cabinet in the face of opposition from Sunni and Kurdish forces. Eventually, Haider al-Abadi, First Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, became prime minister and launched a new administration (September).

Peninsula.

In Palestine, the Palestinian Authority and “Hamas” declared the establishment of a unified cabinet (June). Palestine’s tensions with Israel grew due to the abduction and killing of three Israeli boys (June) and then of Palestinian boys (July). In response to rocket fire from the Gaza Strip to Israel (July), Israel conducted attacks on Gaza.

The two sides agreed to a ceasefire (August). But they have remained wide apart over pending issues including the release of detained Palestinians, and their negotiations are feared to be prolonged.

In Yemen, where political unrest continued even after President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s resignation in 2012, the Houthi Shiites based in northern Yemen conducted large-scale demonstrations in protest against economic and other policies of the Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi administration in the capital city of Sana (August) and occupied government facilities (September). After Prime Minister Mohamed Basindawa’s resignation, the Hadi administration designated a person as new prime minister as recommend by the Houthis. As the Houthis occupied a western port town, however, turmoil continued.



5-1 The establishment of the “Islamic State” has had a great influence on international terrorism

- The “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” declared a “Caliphate state.”
- “Al-Qaida” and its affiliates continued active operations in various locations.
- Returnees from Syria and Iraq managed to conduct terrorist attacks in Western countries.

The “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” expanded its influence rapidly.

The “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) gradually recovered its influence after U.S. troops’ withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011 and intensified clashes with other anti-government forces, such as the “Free Syrian Army,” from early January. Such clashes spread to the whole of rebel-controlled areas in northern and eastern Syria, killing thousands of militants in total by July. The ISIL, though suffering some damage in the initial phase of clashes, defeated and absorbed hostile forces to further expand its strength. In Iraq, the ISIL and other armed Sunni forces occupied a wide northern Iraq area including Mosul (June), advanced southward in the direction of the Iraqi capital of Baghdad and invaded the Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq (August). From September, the ISIL enhanced attacks on Kurd-controlled areas in northeastern Syria. In response, the U.S. and other countries launched aerial bombing on ISIL-occupied and other areas in northern Iraq (August) and northern Syria (September).

When the ISIL and relevant groups occupied Mosul, they seized and detained local Turkish Consulate-General officials, including the consular-general, and looted banks and military facilities for money and military goods. Former ISIL militants and other prisoners broke out of multiple prisons in ISIL-occupied locations in Iraq, including those who joined the ISIL and other groups.

The ISIL, which had described itself as a “state”

since declaring the founding of the “Islamic State of Iraq” (ISI) (October 2006), issued a statement on June 29 announcing (1) the implementation of the Caliphate system (see Note) in the ISI, (2) ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husseini al-Quraishi’s assumption of the Caliph post, and (3) renaming of ISIL as the “Islamic State.” It thus clarified the founding of the “Islamic State” as a “Caliphate state.”

ISIL claimed the region extending from Aleppo Province in northern Syria to Diyala Province in central Iraq as under its control and stated that all Muslims in the world must pledge loyalty to the Caliph (Baghdadi). It thus indicated it would try to further expand its control.

In areas under its control, ISIL has reportedly established effective administrative and judicial organizations to enforce Islamic law under its extreme interpretation. As reported, these organizations administer summary justice and implement punishment against offenders, force non-Sunni people, including Christians, to convert and kill those who decline to do so. The ISIL has also smuggled crude oil from oilfields under its control and collected tax from local residents to obtain funds.

(Note) A Caliphate state in general means a unified state of the Islamic world ruled by a Caliph, or the successor to Islamic prophet Muhammad. Since the post of Caliph was abolished in 1924, no Caliphate state has existed.

“Al-Qaida” striving to maintain influence on affiliates

“Al-Qaida,” headed by Ayman al-Zawahiri, who replaced Osama bin Laden as leader of the terrorist network in 2011, issued a statement on a confrontation between ISIL and “al-Nusra Front,” an al-Qaida affiliate in Syria, vowing to sever its relationship with ISIL (February). In response, ISIL in a statement declared the founding of the “Islamic State” (June), described itself as greater than “al-Qaida.”

In the meantime, al-Zawahiri announced the establishment of “al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent” (AQIS) as a new al-Qaida branch, praising the establishment as an achievement of efforts to be celebrated and calling for “jihad” in Pakistan, India, and neighboring regions (September). The al-Qaida leader also encouraged ISIL and other groups to accept al-Qaida instructions, striving to maintain its influence. Reportedly, al-Zawahiri has sent a group of al-Qaida executives and senior combatants to Syria for local operations. Their main objective is reported to be recruiting foreign combatants operating in Syria. “Al-Qaida” may thus still be willing to conduct terrorist attacks on the U.S. and its allies.

“Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM) attacked Algerian security forces (April), continuing terrorist attacks in Algeria. It also warned it would conduct further attacks. From northern Mali, which had once been occupied by AQIM and other groups, most AQIM members withdrew. But terrorist attacks mainly on security forces occurred continuously. Some AQIM members have reportedly flowed into neighboring countries such as Libya, and built relations with local radical groups, spreading terrorist threats. Some AQIM members vowed to support the “Islamic State” and founded a new group, kidnapping and killing a French national (September).

“Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula” (AQAP) increasingly attacked Yemeni military forces and government agencies as indicated by an assault on a military facility in southern Yemen (April), an attack on an airport in Hadhramaut Province, eastern Yemen (June), and attacks on military and government facilities in the same province (October), although hundreds of AQAP members including local leaders were killed in anti-AQAP military operations by Yemen and the U.S. (April-June). AQAP also conducted suicide bombing and other attacks in southern Saudi Arabia (July) and bombing terror attacks on Houthis at various locations of Yemen (September-October). AQAP explained how to make bombs in the 12th edition of its English journal “Inspire,” calling for terror attacks in Western countries such as the U.S., the UK, and France (March). It also issued statements urging Sunni Muslims to launch armed uprisings (September, October).

“Al-Shabaab” actively implemented terror attacks inside and outside Somalia while receiving military attacks from the Somali government and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In the capital city of Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia, al-Shabaab attacked the Somali Parliament building (May), the presidential palace (July), an intelligence agency (August) and AMISOM facilities (June). During Ramadan, the organization conducted assassination terror against Somali government dignitaries and security officials (June, July). It also conducted attacks outside Somalia, including a suicide bombing attack on foreign troops in Djibouti (May) and a terror attack on police and other facilities in Kenya (June). Although al-Shabaab leader Muktar Abdirahman Abu Zubeyr was killed in U.S. aerial bombing (September), its new leader Ahmed Dirie pledged loyalty to “al-Qaida” anew and conducted a series of retaliatory terror attacks in the capital city of Mogadishu (September).

Western countries enhancing security against terrorism

Among Western countries, Belgium saw a shooting at the Jewish Museum in the capital city of Brussels by a French national who had reportedly participated in operations of some extreme Islamist organization in Syria (May). In the Canadian capital of Ottawa, a converted Muslim committed a random shooting at Parliament Hill (October). Returnees from Syria were charged with planning terror attacks in countries including France (January) and in the UK (October).

As for Japan, a Japanese national alleged to have been seized by ISIL went missing (August). A Japanese university student was suspected as planning to go to Syria to participate in ISIL as a combatant, prompting investigation authorities to interview the student and relevant people on their alleged private war preparation or conspiracy

under the Penal Code, based on their voluntary acceptance of interviews. The authorities also searched relevant locations (October).

Since anti-government movements emerged in Syria in March 2011, more than 10,000 foreign combatants have reportedly participated in anti-government groups in Syria and extreme Islamist organizations in Iraq. They are reported as coming from more than 80 countries in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, the Balkan Peninsula, the former Soviet Union, Southeast Asia, North America, Oceania and other regions. These countries have grown alert, concerned that participants in fighting in Syria and other countries would (1) engage in terror-related operations, (2) bring and spread radical beliefs in these countries, and (3) urge others to go to conflict-stricken areas.

Column

“Al-Qaida” and the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant”

Relations between “al-Qaida” and the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) have deteriorated since ISIL announced a policy of expanding its operations in Syria (April 2013, as described later). From February 2014 onward, the two organizations have issued statements declaring the severance of their relations. ISIL issued statements denouncing the al-Qaida leadership (April, May).

ISIL was called “al-Qaida in Iraq” (AQI) and viewed as an al-Qaida affiliate in Iraq after Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of the ISIL’s predecessor “al-Tawhid wal-Jihad,” issued a statement pledging loyalty to then al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden and launched terror attacks in the name of the “al-Qaida Organization of Jihad in Iraq.”

Reportedly, however, al-Zarqawi did not always bow to the will of the al-Qaida leadership but frequently ignored the al-Qaida leadership’s demands to stop attacks on Shiite residents and Sunni organizations failing to bow to the will of AQI. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husseini al-Quraishi, who became leader of the “Islamic State of Iraq” (ISI) at the time of its founding in October 2006 following the death of al-Zarqawi (June 2006), expressed condolences over bin Laden at the time of his death (May 2011), solidarity with “al-Qaida” and congratulated Ayman al-Zawahiri on his succession to the al-Qaida leadership, while falling short of pledging loyalty to the new al-Qaida leader.

In April 2013, ISIL announced (1) renaming of the ISI as ISIL, (2) its absorption of “al-Nusra Front,” an al-Qaida affiliate in Syria, (3) the expansion of its operations in Syria and other decisions. In response, al-Zawahiri in May called for withdrawing the announcement and provided ISIL and “al-

Nusra Front” leaders with a ruling limiting ISIL operations to those in Iraq and “al-Nusra Front” operations to those in Syria. He also effectively recognized the “al-Nusra Front” as an al-Qaida branch in Syria. In a later statement, however, ISIL condemned the al-Zawahiri ruling as sin, indicating its unwillingness to abide by the ruling.

Since early January 2014, ISIL’s clashes with other rebel groups, including “al-Nusra Front,” have gained momentum. Al-Qaida leader al-Zawahiri called on them to stop clashes. ISIL rejected the call, despite other groups’ attitude of accepting it, prompting al-Zawahiri to issue in February a statement declaring the effective severance of al-Qaida’s ties with ISIL in the name of the al-Qaida general command. Even later, al-Zawahiri issued a statement calling on ISIL to withdraw from Syria.

ISIL for its part denounced the al-Qaida leadership and asserted that it was no longer an al-Qaida branch (April, May). In June, ISIL declared the founding of the “Islamic State” as a “Caliphate state.” Since then, ISIL has positioned Caliph al-Baghdadi as the highest authority in the Islamic world.

Some extreme Islamist groups have supported the “Islamic State.” The “Abu Sayyaf Group” in the Philippines urged the German government to withdraw support for anti-ISIL attacks (September). Pledging loyalty to the “Islamic State” were Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the founder of “Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah” (JI) (July), an offshoot from “al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM) (September), and a part of the “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan” (October).

In Iraq in October 2004, ISIL kidnapped a Japanese national (found dead later in the month).

Column

“Boko Haram” diversifying operations

“Boko Haram,” which denies Western education and seeks to enforce Islamic law in northeastern Nigeria, kidnapped more than 200 women students in the region (April) and issued a statement (May) in which it admitted to the kidnapping and threatened to sell the kidnapped women students to the slave market, attracting global attention.

The group conducted bomb attacks in the Nigerian capital of Abuja (April), Plateau State in the central part of Nigeria (May),

and Kano State in the northern part (June). It also implemented bomb attacks in Lagos State in the southwestern part (June), where the group’s terror operations had not been detected earlier.

The group also attacked Gwaza in Borno State in northeastern Nigeria and declared its occupation of the town and its ruling under Islamic law (August), indicating a will to maintain a stronghold and expand its occupation.

5-2 Afghan and Pakistani security situations remained unstable

- Afghanistan established a new administration as the “Taliban” enhanced an offensive.
- Peace negotiations broke down in Pakistan as the “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan” continued terror attacks

In Afghanistan, the “Taliban” continued terror attacks over the presidential election.

In Afghanistan, the security situation remained unstable due to continued terror attacks by the “Taliban” while the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, implemented the transfer of authority to Afghan security forces toward the completion of its combat mission at the end of 2014.

The “Taliban” conducted terror attacks on the Independent Election Commission (IEC) (March) and other targets at various locations to sabotage the presidential election (April) and the relevant runoff (June). In the capital city of Kabul, the “Taliban” also attacked a restaurant (January) and a luxury hotel (March), targeting foreigners. As political turmoil continued even after the runoff, the “Taliban” enhanced an offensive in suburban

Kabul and other areas.

Under such situation, Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai assumed the presidency (September), with his rival presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah becoming Chief Executive Officer, inaugurating a unity government. Afghanistan signed a security agreement to allow U.S. and other forces to be stationed in and after 2015, indicating that the country may avoid rapid security deterioration through the withdrawal of U.S. forces for the immediate future. But the “Taliban” raised opposition to the agreement and issued a statement vowing to continue combat. As the U.S. has pledged a policy of withdrawing forces completely by the end of 2016, the restoration of security before the withdrawal is viewed as a key challenge.

In Pakistan, the “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan” attacked an international airport.

In Pakistan, amid the government’s call for peace negotiations, the Taliban-supported “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan” (TTP) bombed and killed a senior police officer known for cracking down on terrorists in Sindh Province (January), indicating its readiness to continue terror attacks. In response to aerial bombing by the military, however, the TTP launched peace negotiations with the government (February). At the negotiations, the TTP demanded the release of “non-combat” TTP members in custody and temporarily declared a ceasefire (March). But no agreement was reached during the negotiations, which broke down due to the TTP’s terror attack on Jinnah International Airport in Karachi (June). Later, Pakistani forces launched an anti-TTP operation at what was viewed as a major stronghold of the TTP and other extreme Islamist groups in North Waziristan of the Federally

Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (June). The forces announced that they had expelled TTP and other combatants from major towns by early September. But the TTP conducted terror attacks on the military and security authorities, demonstrating its presence. But the death of TTP supreme leader Hakimullah Mehsud (November 2013) and the peace negotiations with the government caused internal conflicts within the TTP over operational policies and leadership, prompting Omar Khalid Khorasani reported as a senior hardline member and his followers to leave the TTP. This incident indicated disarray within the group.

In Karachi, an armed group attacked a naval shipyard (September). The TTP as well as the just-founded “al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent” (AQIS) claimed responsibility for the attack.

In Australia, 15 people alleged as supporting the ISIL were seized over terrorism-related suspicions (September). They are suspected of having planned to indiscriminately kidnap and behead citizens in Sydney and other locations and release video footage of such actions under telephone instructions from a senior Australian

ISIL member in the Middle East. An alleged ISIL-supporting boy attacked two police officers with a knife and was shot to death by them (September). Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop noted that some 150 Australians had combatted or were combating together with radical groups in Syria and Iraq (June).

Armed groups continued terror operations in the Philippines and southern Thailand as well.

In the Philippines, the “New People’s Army” (NPA), the military division of the “Philippine Communist Party,” attacked a plant of a Japanese fruit company (January) and later continued terror attacks on private enterprises and security forces. While the “Moro Islamic Liberation Front” (MILF) operating in the southern Philippines signed a comprehensive peace agreement with the Philippine government (March) and went ahead with a Mindanao peace process, the “Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters” (BIFF) opposing the peace agreement continued attacks on security

forces, with the “Abu Sayyaf Group” (ASG) taking foreigners hostage frequently. The BIFF and ASG have pledged loyalty to the “Islamic State.”

While the Prayuth Chan-ocha administration came into being after a coup, simultaneous terror attacks allegedly by armed separatist forces occurred at a few dozen locations in the southern Thai province of Pattani (May). The administration is prepared to resume peace talks with armed separatist forces, while terror operations have continued in the south.

5-3 Extreme Islamist groups’ threats remain in Southeast Asia

- In Indonesia and other countries, the influence of the founding of the “Islamic State” expanded among extreme Islamist groups.
- In the Philippines, the “New People’s Army” and other radical groups continued to be active.

Indonesian and other extreme Islamist groups pledged loyalty to or support for the Islamic State.

In Indonesia, small groups under the influence of the “Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid” (JAT), an open organization founded by “Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah” (JI) and former JI leader Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (in prison), have been active. As the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) declared the founding of the “Islamic State” (June), Santoso, a former JAT member and the leader of the “Eastern Indonesia Mujahideen” (MIT), pledged loyalty to the “Islamic State” (June). Ba’asyir, in prison, also offered to pledge loyalty to the “Islamic State” (July), indicating ISIL’s growing influence in Indonesia. As an ISIL-made video footage was released to show Indonesian combatants calling for participating in the

“Islamic State” (July), the Indonesian government announced a ban on supportive activities for the “Islamic State” and warned the people not to participate in battle in Syria or Iraq (August). According to the Indonesian National Police, the number of Indonesians who went to Syria and participated in the ISIL as combatants totaled 97 including 10 who already returned home (November).

In Malaysia, suspected terrorists were detected one after another. Multiple Malaysians reported as having pledged loyalty to the “Islamic State” were found to have planned attacks on targets such as a plant of a foreign company in suburbs of the capital city of Kuala Lumpur (August).

Column

Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah

"Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah" (JI) is an extreme Islamist group that radical Muslim activist Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir founded in 1993 for the purpose of founding an "Islamic state" in Southeast Asia. In the early 2000s, the JI conducted terror attacks on Indonesian and other Southeast Asian governments and Christians. After the JI conducted the first Bali bombing attack (killing 202 people including two Japanese) in 2002, however, it repeated large-scale terror attacks mainly on U.S. and other foreign interests. Since Noordin Top, a hardline leader of a terror attack group, died with other major group members killed or arrested in raids by Indonesian authorities, no major terror attacks have been identified as conducted by the JI. Senior hardline JI members were seen trying to reconstruct the organization as an Aceh armed group at a military training camp in the western Indonesian province of Aceh in 2009. However, the group is believed to have collapsed through comprehensive raids by authorities. Ba'asyir and his

supporters inside and outside the JI founded the "Jamaah Ansharut Thauhid" (JAT) as an open organization seeking to enforce Islamic law in Indonesia in 2008. In 2011, when the "Aceh armed group" was charged, however, Ba'asyir was sentenced to a 15-year prison term for inciting terror attacks and put into prison. Though imprisoned, Ba'asyir later continued propaganda through his supporters. In July 2014, Ba'asyir and his comrades in prison pledged loyalty to the "Islamic State" as a "Caliphate state" and ordered JAT members to follow suit. However, many JAT members, including his son and other major members, opposed the order and seceded from the JAT, founding a new organization named "Jamaah Ansharusy Syariah" (JAS).

In Indonesia, individuals and small groups allegedly influenced by the JI or JAT have continued terror attacks. Given that some 200 prisoners including JI members were expected to come out of prison in two years from 2014, continued vigilance will be required.

External Situation

6 Adverse Activities against Japan



6

Activities aimed at acquiring materials/technology that could be repurposed for military use or important information

- North Korean and other procurement activities remained a matter of concern.
- A deep-rooted sense of caution against China's illicit acquisition of materials/technology that could be repurposed for military use.
- Frequent cyberattacks to steal key information have occurred around the world.

North Korean and other procurement activities remained a matter of concern.

While North Korea retained its attitude of nuclear and missile development, a final report by the Panel of Experts assisting the UN Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee (March) pointed out that products of six countries, including U.S. electronic components, had been used for a missile that North Korea claimed as "a satellite" in December 2012. North Korea is still gravely feared to have procured or to be procuring materials related to weapons of mass destruction. In the meantime, "Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited" (OMM) related to the operation of the Chong Chon Gang, a North Korean ship seized by Panamanian authorities for carrying massive military goods, was subjected to

sanctions by the UN Security Council (July) and many countries (July–October). Severe measures against North Korean weapon procurement and proliferation activities were thus taken internationally.

A final report by the Panel of Experts assisting the UN Security Council's Iran Sanctions Committee (June) noted that a case in which Iran attempted to procure products falling short of meeting standards for other countries' export restrictions indicated that these products could be technologically modified into substitutes for restricted products for developing weapons of mass destruction.

A deep-rooted sense of caution against China's illicit acquisition of materials/technology that could be repurposed for military use

While China, though expanding its defense budget to modernize military potential, still depends on some foreign military technology and imports aircraft engines, guidance systems, semiconductors and other military-related goods, it is pointed out that China utilizes intelligence

organizations, government-run enterprises, research institutes and overseas Chinese people to illicitly acquire materials and technology that could be repurposed for military use (June; an annual report by the U.S. Department of Defense to Congress).

Frequent cyberattacks to steal key information have occurred around the world.

As indicated by reports that the Belgian Foreign Ministry (May) and U.S. financial institutions (August) underwent cyberattacks to steal inside information, frequent cyberattacks allegedly aimed at obtaining key information from government organizations and private enterprises have occurred at various locations around the world.

Some cyberattacks' links with foreign countries were pointed out. The U.S. Department of Justice announced that a federal grand jury indicted five officers at the Third General Staff Department

of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) for conducting cyberattacks on U.S. enterprises (May). A research report by the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee noted that hackers linked to the Chinese government penetrated networks of U.S. defense contractors (September). Furthermore, it was reported that a hacker group allegedly linked to the Russian government breached a U.S. White House computer network and suspended some functions of the network (October).

Vigilance against espionage is required in Japan.

The final report by the Panel of Experts assisting the UN Security Council's Iran Sanctions Committee noted that Iran attempted to procure carbon fiber made by a Japanese company (June). A report pointed to China's move to obtain Japanese information and communications technology (August). Foreign countries, including those subject to concern over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, are feared to illegally acquire Japanese materials and technology that could be repurposed for military use.

Cyberattacks on government and other Japanese organizations have also become a matter of concern. It was found that some data leaked from a personal computer at the prototype fast breeder reactor MONJU when some free

software was updated (February). Cyberattacks had hit about 30 Japanese organizations including central government agencies, overseas diplomatic establishments and defense contractors since May 2009, reports said (June). A report by a U.S. security company pointed out that an organization allegedly linked to the Chinese PLA Third General Staff Department could have tried to collect information from Japanese information and communications companies (June).

Under such situation, more vigilance is required against the intensification of cyberattacks and other espionage operations to steal information and materials/technology that could be repurposed for military use from Japanese government agencies and private enterprises.

Column

U.S.-China interaction over cyberattacks

The U.S. has long indicated vigilance against Chinese cyberattacks, with senior U.S. government officials pointing to the matter frequently, while China has reiterated that it has been a "victim of cyberattacks."

The U.S. Department of Justice on May 19 announced that five officers of the Chinese PLA's Third General Staff Department (Unit 61398 based in Shanghai) were indicted for conducting cyberattacks on energy/metal and

other U.S. companies to steal business secrets.

In response, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official issued a statement protesting against the U.S. action on the same day noting that the ministry was approaching the U.S. to have the indictment withdrawn. It also asserted that China was a serious victim of U.S. cyber espionage, wiretapping and surveillance. Confrontation between U.S. and China in the cyber area will likely continue in the future.

(Recent U.S.-China interaction over cyber problems)

2013 May 6	The Department of Defense in a report to Congress notes that China was involved in some cyberattacks.
June 7-8	The U.S. and Chinese leaders agree to cooperate in addressing cyberattacks.
July 8	The U.S. and Chinese governments hold the first meeting of the working group on cyber security
2014 May 19	The U.S. government announced five Chinese PLA officers were indicted for suspected economic espionage act and other violations. The Chinese government condemns the U.S. indictment and announces it was asking the U.S. side to withdraw the indictment. The Chinese government announces the suspension of activities of the U.S.-China working group on cyber security.

Column

North Korea's network for procuring and proliferating military-related materials

While North Korea was suspected of attempting to procure military-related materials, exporting them and being involved in their proliferation, the final report by the Panel of Experts assisting the UN Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee (March) pointed out North Korea's continued trade in military-related materials even after the UN Security Council's resolution against such trade and provided specific cases indicating North Korea's violation of an arms embargo.

The report also explained such trade as a major source of income for North Korea, indicating that its network for procuring and proliferating military-related materials was expanding.

[Major cases in the above report]

- Rocket fuses similar to North Korea-made ones were found on the Francop freighter seized by the Israeli Navy in November 2009 for its alleged transportation of weapons from Syria to Iran.
- A former Mongolian Air Force commander signed an arrangement with North Korea to provide North Korea with engines and other parts of 20 retired Mig-21 fighter aircraft.
- A former Eritrean soldier in 2013 testified that machine tools exported from North Korea to a government-run plant in Eritrea (May 2011) were used at a weapons system plant.



Focal Issues of the Domestic Public Security Situation in 2014



1-1 Aum Shinrikyo still firmly maintains dangerous traits


- The PSIA requested the extension of the surveillance period (fifth time).

The cult has engaged in systematic recruitment and fund-raising activities, resulting in an increase in its funds.

Aum Shinrikyo (hereinafter referred to as “the cult”) acquired new followers through engaging in systematic recruitment activities, and reported 130 new followers in the reports submitted by the cult to the PSIA regarding the current status of the organization and activities during 2014. However, the cult has not yet led to settlement of all the followers acquired in the organization, as some of them withdrew from the cult in a relatively short time. As a result, the number of followers within Japan as of the end of November was about 1,650, being almost the same as that in 2013.

In addition, the cult has also engaged in fund-raising activities continuously and actively, through holding seminars for lay members, with the assets held by the cult showing an upward trend since 2000, when the decision to conduct surveillance was made. At the end of October, the total amount of cash, deposits, savings and loans reached about 690 million yen, more than

a 17-fold increase compared with the total in 2000. On the other hand, the cumulative amount paid for compensation to the victims and the bereaved families of the sarin attacks in Matsumoto and the Tokyo subway system between January and the end of October was about 33 million yen, remaining at a tiny amount of money.



Changes in the amount of the cult's assets and compensation paid

The PSIA submitted an application for extension to the Public Security Examination Commission.

Following the decision to extend the surveillance period over the cult (fourth time) made by the Public Security Examination Commission in January 2012, the PSIA judged that it is necessary to continue to clarify the activities of the cult by finding the following facts.

- Asahara, the mastermind of both sarin attack in Matsumoto and the sarin attacks in the Tokyo subway system, still has influence on the activities of the cult;
- Asahara and other members who were involved in the sarin attacks remain as members;
- Asahara, Joyu, and other officers at the time of

the sarin attacks remain as officers;

- The cult retains the “Code,” encouraging homicide as preached by Asahara;
- The cult retains dangerous traits as an organization;
- The cult still maintains closed and delusive organizational traits.

Consequently, the Director-General of the PSIA requested the Public Security Examination Commission to extend the surveillance period by three years (fifth time) in accordance with the Act on the Control of Organization Which Committed Indiscriminate Mass Murder (Organization Control Act) on December 1.

The PSIA conducted on-site inspection at a cumulative total of 51 sites in 15 prefectures including simultaneous on-site inspections.

The PSIA mobilized a cumulative total of about 800 public security intelligence officers to carry out on-site inspection at a cumulative total of 51 of the cult's facilities in 15 prefectures from January to the end of November in accordance with the Organization Control Act, which includes simultaneous on-site inspections of 24 of the cult's facilities nationwide, conducted by about 260 public security intelligence officers in August. At the facilities of the mainstream group, portraits of Asahara and altars bearing a painting of Shiva (cult members believe Asahara to be an avatar of the deity) were found, while at the facilities of the Joyu group, altars bearing paintings of "three Buddhist images" of Shakyamuni, Kannon, and

Maitreya, which are identified with Asahara, were found.

The PSIA also received four reports (one every three months) from the cult, concerning the current status of the organization and its activities during 2014. The PSIA provided information to 4 prefectures and 16 municipalities on a total of 44 occasions regarding the contents of these reports together with the outcomes of on-site inspections. Furthermore, in order to help to alleviate the fears and anxieties of local residents, the PSIA held sessions for the exchange of opinions with residents on a total of 41 occasions in 19 areas, at which the PSIA explained the current status of the cult and surveillance status.

Column


Twenty years has passed since the occurrence of the subway sarin gas attacks

The cult released sarin gas at three subway lines in Tokyo on March 20, 1995, wreaking tremendous damage that killed 12 people and injured more than 3,000 people. It is almost 20 years since the case occurred, but victims of a series of cases by the cult have still suffered from aftereffects. The bereaved families of victims also expressed lasting strong resentment such as "although 20 years have passed since the case, I have a lingering sense of hate toward the cult, and I will never forget the case," or "frustration, sadness, and psychological trauma that I have as an immediate family member will never disappear."

In addition, citizens living in the vicinity of the cult's facilities express fear and anxiety toward the cult such as "I don't know what the cult members do in the facility," and have still continued protest movements throughout Japan.

On the other hand, the cult officially emphasizes on an attitude of remorse and apology for a series of cases, but in practice, a follower made a statement justifying the sarin gas attacks such as "mere murder is a crime, but the Holy Master ordered murder for disciple's achievement of enlightenment," still showing antisocial and dangerous traits of the cult.

Facilities where on-site inspections were carried out (January-end of November 2014)



1-2 The mainstream group tried to enlarge the organization with thorough commitment to “absolute faith in Asahara”

- The mainstream group ran the organization with more apparent absolute faith in Asahara.
- The mainstream group recruited followers targeting young adults and strengthened guidance for minors.

The mainstream group implemented strict guidance aimed at establishing absolute faith in Asahara, through “Birth Festival” and “seminars.”

Following on from 2013, the mainstream group implemented strict guidance aimed at establishing absolute faith in Asahara, through events such as the “Birth Festival” to celebrate Asahara’s birthday and intensive seminars for lay members. In Asahara’s “Birth Festival” held in various locations gathering a record number of more than 700 people, senior followers gave sermons that established absolute faith in Asahara including such statements as “You have to proceed with the relief plan developed by the Holy Master by obeying his every whim” (March). In the

intensive seminars held three times each year, the group made its followers pursue round-the-clock training for a few days including repeated throwing down of their bodies on the ground while chanting absolute faith in Asahara (standing worship) and reading aloud and memorizing Asahara’s preaching. As a result, some participants pursued training with bleeding knees or passed out from breathing difficulties, while some showed deepened faith in Asahara such as “I’m pleased to reencounter the Holy Master” even after experiencing such harsh training.

The mainstream group vigorously developed recruitment activities through various events and guidance to elementary and junior high school students.

Toward expanding the organization, the mainstream group, just as before, developed recruitment activities to invite people who were subject to be recruited mainly targeting young adults and students by striking up conversations on downtown streets or in bookstores, or holding events concealing a religious ambiance such as running a yoga experience booth at general event sites, and having people participate in yoga classes without mentioning the cult’s name.

In these yoga classes, followers who played the role of instructors preached to the recruitment targets the teaching of Asahara without mentioning his name or words that evoke the cult in, and persuaded them to believe in conspiracy theories such as “the subway sarin gas attacks were fabricated by the government.” In this way, the group lowered the resistance of the recruitment targets to Asahara and the cult, and then made them join the cult after informing them that the classes were held by Aleph. As a

result, the group acquired a lot of new followers during 2014, with the largest number in Hokkaido, followed by Kinki by region.

In addition, the mainstream group established faith in Asahara among minors, including elementary and junior high school students, like adults by making them engage in learning and training of teaching materials featuring recordings of Asahara’s sermons, or participate in “intensive seminars” for lay members. In particular, for children and elementary school students who visited training facilities with their parents, the group aimed at indoctrination by using teaching materials for elementary school students and preschool children to awaken their interests in training. Under this situation, some elementary and junior high school students pursued training until midnight; furthermore, some were strongly subject to the influence, with such feelings as “I have no choice but to become a priest.”

Column

Confusion in operation of the cult over Asahara family

The cult had announced a new structure making Asahara’s eldest son and second son the “leaders” (June 1996), but in accordance with the change of its name to “Religious Organization Aleph” (February 2000), it made them objects of worship but not positioned as leaders officially based on the provisions that the “new organization has no leader.” However, since October 2013, Asahara’s wife had plotted to make the second son return to the cult’s activities together with some senior followers. Asahara’s third daughter knew this plan and told some senior followers that she was against the second son being involved in the operation of the cult under surveillance via senior followers of the mainstream group, as well as sent senior followers nationwide a document criticizing followers who intended to proceed with this plan (mid-January and mid-February).

Amid this situation, the “joint meeting,” the decision-making body of the mainstream

group, expelled senior followers who acted in synchrony with the third daughter’s intention by regarding their act as splitting the cult (May). Some followers argued over the punishment, causing friction among followers divided into opponents and supporters of expulsion. In addition, opposition senior followers were ordered to participate in long-term training or were expelled one after another, resulting in the situation in which confusion triggered by involvement of the Asahara family in the operation of the cult spread throughout the whole cult.

Furthermore, as for the event held by the mainstream group to coincide with the birthday of the eldest son, he filed a lawsuit against the mainstream group to stop the use of his name and photographs and for damages totaling 40 million yen (October). Acts by the Asahara family, which had influence on the operation of the cult, will attract attention in the future.

1-3 The Joyu group adopted a more thorough stance of “hiding the influence of Asahara”

- There is no change in the fact that the Joyu group retains the influence of Asahara.

The Joyu group continued its efforts to strive to evade surveillance by dispelling a religious ambiance.

The Joyu group conducted propaganda activities to claim a stance of “breaking away from Asahara” by utilizing various media during 2014, such as making a strong appeal of not bearing a painting of a specific Buddhist image or having no altar through disclosing the interior of the facilities to the media (October), after Joyu explained that “Hikarinowa is not a religious organization” in his lectures and gatherings at which he preaches.

In addition, the group had held paintings of “three Buddhist images” of Shakyamuni, Kannon, and Maitreya that were deemed avatars of Asahara according to the preaching of Asahara and Joyu since the foundation of “Hikarinowa” in 2007, it changed to hang only Shakyamuni among the “three Buddhist images” on the back wall when Joyu preaches (March).

However, the “three Buddhist images” were found to be held at the facilities of the group where lay members visited and borne on “pilgrimages to holy places” that visit shrines and temples deemed “holy,” revealing that efforts of “breaking away from Asahara” made by Joyu group were “hiding the influence of Asahara” in pretense of dispelling the influence of Asahara just as before.

Furthermore, a religious ceremony that Joyu has introduced and performed since the foundation of “Hikarinowa” while stating that he would inherit the initiation of Asahara remains to be the initiation of Asahara aimed at energy transfer despite external changes Joyu added. Thus, there was no change in the fact that the group remains under the influence of Asahara.

The Joyu group conducted organization activities exposing delusive traits.

The Joyu group urged that it was under adequate organizational operation by using media, etc., but in fact, the situation of maintaining the cult-specific live-in system was found, in which wages from external work or retirement incomes of the elderly are siphoned from live-in members and cash of only several thousand yen are paid to them. In addition, activities claiming to be an “external audit” introduced by the Joyu group did not actually have any audit function, not even book checking. Moreover, it became obvious that the group had used the facility of its base of operation posing as an individual’s home to the local residents (February). Thus, the traits of

the group’s organization were found to remain delusive.

Furthermore, as for organized tours claimed to be “pilgrimages to holy places,” which the group had placed as a funding source, the group conducted them more than 50 times, aiming at expansion of the business by recruiting general participants on the website. However, the group was subject to search and seizure by the Metropolitan Police Department on suspicion of violation of the Travel Agency Act on the grounds that the group conducted organized tours without obtaining registration with the Commissioner of the Japan Tourism Agency (August).

Domestic Situation

2 Moves of domestic groups concerning events that drew attention from society



2-1 Movements calling for halting the construction of an alternative facility of the Futenma base were developed

- Opponents developed cross-party protest movements, seeking to raise anti-base public opinions.

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) and radical leftist groups held protests including interference with submarine boring exploration.

In connection with the relocation of U.S. Futenma base to Henoko in Nago City, the Okinawa Defense Bureau started submarine boring exploration at the planned site for construction of an alternative facility (August). In response, the JCP and radical leftist groups criticized it as “a barbarous act that suppresses the voice of protect,” and mobilized their members and activists from across Japan for protest movements including opposition rallies and a sit-in held by opponents around Henoko. In particular,

radical leftist groups including “Kakumaru-ha,” together with opponents from inside and outside of Okinawa Prefecture, went to Henoko calling for “forced prevention” of the exploration, and developed protest behaviors such as repeated incursions into the planned site for the relocation and its surrounding restricted water areas by small boats, ignoring warnings from the Japan Coast Guard, and standing to block operating vehicles in front of the gate of U.S. Camp Schwab leading to the planned site for the relocation.

The JCP fostered anti-base public opinions through efforts for elections in Okinawa Prefecture.

In a series of local elections held in Okinawa Prefecture, the JCP supported anti-relocation candidates by placing “the construction of a new base in Henoko as the biggest issue.” In Nago mayoral election (January) and Okinawa gubernatorial election (November), the JCP mobilized its members from across Japan, and its Diet members who made a campaign speech appealed to voters with such statements as “Democracy in Japan would be shaky if a candidate explicitly promoted the construction wins,” or “U.S. bases are impediments to economic development in Okinawa.” In particular, in the

gubernatorial election in which the JCP supported the former Naha mayor, the JCP made an effort to foster anti-base public opinions by claiming the existence of “a battle between the ‘all Okinawa’ power calling for the abandonment of the relocation beyond the framework of conservatism and reformism and the power promoting the construction.”

In these elections, the candidates whom the JCP supported won the seats, thus the JCP called for the government “to abandon the construction in acceptance of this result.”

2-2 Responses of the government to the comfort women issue were grilled

- The JCP and radical leftist groups developed activities in cooperation with internal and external powers citing responses to the “Kono Statement.”

The JCP emphasized the necessity to inherit the “Kono Statement.”

Regarding the comfort women issue, South Korean groups supported by South Korean government-affiliated foundations called for “apologies and compensation” to former comfort women in the international conference in which domestic and overseas support groups participated (the end of May-early June, Tokyo), also rallies (August) and symposiums (November) that grilled responses of the Japanese government were held in various regions.

Under these situations, following the government pronouncement of the experimenting process of making the “Kono Statement” (February), the JCP announced its view such as “to revise the ‘Kono Statement’ is to fabricate history”

Radical leftist groups developed criticism of the government in cooperation with overseas groups for the comfort women issue.

The mainstream faction of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association used its organ paper to criticize the government, claiming “Abe must not be allowed to erase the exertion of sexual violence from history,” and “Kakumaru-ha” criticized the government as “taking an aggressive attitude in committing the war crime of using comfort women” in a rally held in Tokyo (October). The Asia-Wide Campaign against U.S.-Japanese domination and aggression of Asia-Japan (AWC-Japan) initiated by the Japan Communist League (Unified Committee)

(March), as well as grilling responses of the government to the comfort women issue by citing the issue of whether or not the former Imperial Japanese Army forcibly took women away at the Diet (April). Moreover, JCP Chairperson Kazuo Shii attended the international conference described above to call for solidarity toward solving the comfort women issue. In addition, at the talks with South Korean President Park Geun Hye as a member of the delegation of the Japan-Korea Parliamentarians’ Union (October), he showed the party’s position with such statements as “It is necessary to inherit the ‘Kono Statement’ and take the right action.”

dispatched activists to the international conference against wars and bases held in South Korea (May) to argue that “Prime Minister Abe got into the action of revising the ‘Kono Statement.’ Japan is becoming a war state,” and agreed with the “special resolution on impeachment of the Abe administration hostile to Asian people.” Moreover, AWC-Japan invited South Korean activists to antiwar rallies held at various locations in Japan (June) to urge people to adopt attitudes to work on the comfort women issue with overseas groups, as well as criticizing the government’s responses.

2-3 Ongoing activity by the anti-nuclear power movement, with the goal of “blocking the restarts”

- The JCP and radical leftist groups conducted protest actions in front of the Prime Minister’s Office and large-scale rallies against the Strategic Energy Plan and the restart of the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant.

The JCP criticized the government’s energy policy and called for “immediate zero nuclear power.”

Regarding the restart of nuclear power plants, opposing movements including rallies, demonstrations, and protest actions to the government and power companies were held at various locations against the cabinet decision on the Strategic Energy Plan (April) and the movement toward restart of the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant in Kagoshima. Amid this situation, the JCP had its Diet members participate continuously in protest acts in front of the Prime Minister’s Office and the Diet (from the end of March 2012) to call for a joint struggle, as well as holding a large-scale rally (about 4,500 participants) hosted by its affiliated organization “Nonukes Zenkoku Network” together with anti-nuclear power groups in Tokyo in March, three years after the

Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident, to appeal for “immediate zero nuclear power.” In addition, the JCP demanded a retraction of the cabinet decision on the Strategic Energy Plan deemed as a “de facto ‘declaration on nuclear perpetuation,’” and called on its local organizations to send opposing opinions in the public comment offering regarding the screening of the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant (July–August). Furthermore, after the Nuclear Regulation Authority approved the screening report certifying that the Nuclear Power Plant conforms with the new control standard (September), the JCP had its Diet members participate in a rally held in Kagoshima City by anti-nuclear power groups (September) to appeal for “blocking the restarts.”

Radical leftist groups mobilized activists to anti-nuclear power rallies arguing for the immediate shutdown and decommissioning of all reactors.

As well as criticizing the Strategic Energy Plan as “being nothing less than a declaration of a vigorous rush toward nuclear development,” radical leftist groups continued to have activists participate in rallies and demonstrations organized by anti-nuclear power groups and called for immediate shutdown and decommissioning of all reactors by distributing their own group’s newspapers and pamphlets. In addition, an anti-nuclear power group supported

by radical leftist groups continued to illegally pitch a tent in a corner of the grounds of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry building and occupy it (from September 2011), while it also continued to illegally pitch a tent on the coast (state-owned land) adjacent to the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant (from September) and occupy it while rejecting repeated requests from the prefectural government to remove it.

2-4 Criticism of the administration over important political issues promoted by the government

- The JCP and radical leftist groups focused on expanding public opinion against allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense and the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets.

The JCP and radical leftist groups took a clearly adversarial stand against the government following the cabinet decision to allow the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.

Anti-war and pro-constitution rallies and demonstrations were repeatedly held over allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense in accordance with the change of the interpretation of the Constitution. The JCP worked toward expanding public opinion against it, with JCP Chairperson Kazuo Shii calling for the formation of a wide-ranging coalition beyond the framework of conservatism and reformism to “cooperate for a point of ‘protecting constitutionalism’” at a rally organized by its affiliated groups on Constitution Day (May), as well as Shimbun Akahata carrying an anonymous interview purported to be that of an active Self-Defense Forces personnel claiming opposition to allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense. In addition, at the cabinet decision on allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense (July), the JCP aimed at boosting opposite movements by mobilizing its members to continuous protest acts in front of the Prime Minister’s Office (maximum participants of about 6,000 people, June 30), and laying siege to

the Diet.

Furthermore, the JCP saw the results of opinion polls conducted by major newspapers in which the answer of “I do not agree with the cabinet decision” was the majority response as a chance to bring down the Abe administration. Thus, the JCP strengthened its adversarial stand against the government by claiming “Let’s bring down the Administration which dissenting public opinions” in meetings held throughout Japan, as well as holding events setting a goal of “bringing down the administration” in collaboration with civic groups centered on the young generation.

Radical leftist groups claimed that “the Abe administration rushed headlong on the path to ‘a country that can wage war’” (“Chukaku-ha”) in their newspapers, and called for blocking and retracting the cabinet decision by having activists participate in opposition rallies and demonstrations or carrying out a signature-collecting campaign.

The JCP and radical leftist groups continued activities against the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets even after it came into effect.

The JCP and radical leftist groups claimed that the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets (enacted in December 2013) is “an evil law of the government that deprives the people of their right to know” (the JCP), and continued a campaign for repeal of the law even after it came into effect. The JCP mobilized its Diet members to protest acts repeatedly conducted by the nonpartisan executive committee in front of the Prime Minister’s Office to call for the formation of a wide-ranging joint struggle, and submitted a

bill to repeal the law to the House of Councillors during the 186th ordinary session of the Diet jointly with the Social Democratic Party and other parties (June). In addition, following the cabinet decision on guidelines for the interpretation of the act (October), the JCP and other parties argued that “the government resorted to enforce the law with only slight amendment after discarding the public concerns provided through the public comment system,” and once again called for an ongoing campaign to repeal the law.

3 Radical Leftist Groups



3-1 The anti-mainstream faction of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association caused a guerrilla incident

- An attack aimed at contractors of the construction of an alternative facility to U.S. Futenma base.
- The first guerrilla incident aimed at private groups in 13 years.

Radical leftist groups once again exposed dangerous traits of the organization that were willing to make an attack on private groups.

The anti-mainstream faction of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association caused a guerrilla incident that shot a metal projectile at the building of a private company located in Kawaguchi City, Saitama Prefecture early on October 20, and claimed responsibility for the incident in its newspaper Kaiho (October).

The faction admitted to causing the guerrilla incident aimed at blocking the construction of an alternative facility to U.S. Futenma base in the claim of responsibility, and emphasized that “We would make sure to blow up the construction of new Nago base by all possible means.” It was the first guerrilla incident caused by the faction since

the one that shot metal projectiles at U.S. Yokota base in November 2013.

It was the first guerrilla incident caused by radical leftist groups targeting private groups since the arson guerrilla incident caused by the anti-mainstream faction of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association aimed at the office of the “Japan Society for History Textbook Reform” in August 2001, and the first such incident targeting contractors since the arson guerrilla incident caused by “Chukaku-ha” aimed at vehicles related to contractors of the construction of Narita Airport in September 1991.

3-2 Radical leftist groups focused energy on attracting laborers aiming for expansion of the organization

- Radical leftist groups focused on approaches to civil servants and labor union members in key industries.

“Chukaku-ha” formed a new movement body to aim for strengthening of mass movements and drawing in various segments.

“Chukaku-ha,” on the axis of expansion of the organization through labor movements, regarded the cabinet decision on allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense by the Abe Cabinet (July) as a “shift to a country that could wage war,” and formed a new movement body “large action disallowing amending the Constitution, wars, nuclear powers, and poverty” (August), aiming for strengthening of mass

movements with a goal of anti-amending the Constitution, anti-war, and anti-nuclear power and drawing in various segments other than the group. In particular, as for the right of collective self-defense, it emphasized that “a situation of soldier acquisition reached maturity rapidly due to the cabinet decision on July 1” in its newspaper Zenshin, and called on Self-Defense Forces personnel for “join and union” for the

purpose of using them in the group's opposition movements. In its anti-nuclear power campaigns, it sought to attract disaster victims by holding health consultations and "debriefing meetings" (February, September, and October) that asserted

health damage caused by the Fukushima Nuclear Power accident, organized by its affiliated medical institution "Fukushima Collaborative Clinic" aimed at disaster victims living in temporary housing in Fukushima Prefecture.

"Kakumaru-ha" focused energy on acquiring labor union members in key industries, including the Japan Confederation of Railway Workers' Union.

Based on its policy of prioritizing efforts to build up the organization, "Kakumaru-ha" focused energy on acquiring members of Japan Public Sector Union such as the All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union and labor union members in key industries, including the Japan Confederation of Railway Workers' Union, as well as attracting civic segments through activities against government measures including the relocation of Futenma base and cabinet decision on allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.

Among them, as for acquiring labor union members, it mobilized activists around the venue of the Central May Day event (April) and venues at which labor unions were holding their regular conferences, such as the Japan Postal Group Union Conference (June) to assert its opposition to the bill to amend the Act for Securing the Proper Operation of Worker Dispatching Undertakings and Improved Working Conditions for Dispatched

Workers and "relaxation of regulations on working hours." Following this, it repeated the criticism of the executives of labor unions stating "Let's resist abandonment of the struggle by the executives of RENGO (Japanese Trade Union Confederation)," and called for people to join the group. Under these situations, the group criticized the management of JR Hokkaido, stating that "abandonment of safety traffic control by the management caused railway accidents one after another" in its newspaper Kaiho, and exclaimed "Let's fight with fellow members of JR."

In addition, as for drawing in civic segments, activists participated in a nonpartisan rally against the cabinet decision on allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense (June), appealed to participants by stating "Let's bring down the Abe administration aiming for taking a leap to a country that can make war," and called for joining the group.

The "Kaiho-ha" group of the Revolutionary Workers' Association focused on attracting day laborers and nuclear power plant workers

The mainstream faction and anti-mainstream faction of the "Kaiho-ha" group of the Revolutionary Workers' Association strove to attract workers, placing their respective labor unions for day laborers at the forefront.

The mainstream faction mobilized such workers in the "Narita struggle" and joined forces with anti-airport alliances and other radical leftist groups to hold national rallies at Narita Airport

(March, October).

On the other hand, the anti-mainstream faction repeatedly held demonstrations by mobilizing workers with the goal of "disrupting the construction" of the Oma Nuclear Power Plant (Aomori) (March, August), and appealed for "organizing a strike by nuclear power plant workers" in its newspaper Kaiho to penetrate among the workers.

3-3 Developments relating to the Japanese Red Army and the "Yodo-go" group

- The Japanese Red Army continued activities maintaining a dangerous nature.
- The "Yodo-go" group focused on galvanizing public opinion for the retraction of the arrest warrants on charges of abducting Japanese nationals.

The Japanese Red Army announced the dissolution of the avowed succession group, but indicated a policy of maintaining collaboration with various domestic and foreign powers.

The leader of the Japanese Red Army, Fusako Shigenobu (currently serving a prison sentence), on the occasion of a rally to commemorate the Lod Airport massacre (May 30, 1972) (May), issued a statement seeking to justify the massacre. In the rally, the Japanese Red Army announced the dissolution of the group deemed as its avowed succession group, but its members asserted that it would continue to work

with various domestic and foreign powers as before through solidarity with the Palestinian people and activities such as the anti-nuclear power campaign.

In addition to continuing to justify the massacre, seven members who have previously committed heinous crimes are currently on the Interpol wanted list. Thus, there has been no obvious change in the danger posed by the Japanese Red Army.

The "Yodo-go" group denied the charges of abducting Japanese nationals by using various media.

The "Yodo-go" group, including the hijackers of the Japan Airline "Yodo-go" hijack incident (March 31-April 3, 1972), who remain in North Korea, has sought to galvanize public opinion in defense of the group, toward the retraction of the arrest warrants for their arrest on charges of the abduction of Japanese nationals, as a prerequisite for their return to Japan. Specifically, the group engaged in the suit for state compensation against the Tokyo Metropolitan Government claiming that "the charge

on the arrest warrant is illegal" (lost the first trial in March, lost the second trial in August, currently in litigation), as well as disclosed some of the facilities in which they have stayed (May), followed by frequently granting media interviews and establishing a Twitter account (October). In addition, the group made it clear in a media interview on the telephone that it accepted a hearing investigation by North Korea's Special Investigation Committee on abduction of Japanese nationals (December).

Column

A member of the Japanese Red Army, Tsutomu Shirosaki, is in jail in the United States

Members of the Japanese Red Army had perpetrated many heinous crimes since the Lod Airport massacre in 1972 up to 1988. Among them, Tsutomu Shirosaki was wanted internationally by the U.S. for the Jakarta incident (see note) perpetrated in 1986, was arrested in Nepal, and was transferred to the United States in 1996. He was tried in the United States in 1997, and is

currently jailed in a correctional institution in the country, and will complete his full sentence on January 16, 2015 (according to the website of the Federal Bureau of Prisons). The Metropolitan Police Department wanted him internationally in 1992 for the Jakarta incident, therefore, he is expected to be transferred to Japan and be arrested after his sentence in the U.S is completed.

(Note) An incident that occurred on May 4, 1986, when several mortar rounds were shot at the Embassy of Japan and the Embassy of the United States in Indonesia

4 The Japan Communist Party (JCP)



4 The JCP adopted a more confrontational stance toward the Abe administration

- A new regime of “Chairperson Kazuo Shii-Head of the Secretariat Yoshiaki Yamashita” was inaugurated at the 26th Party Congress.
- The JCP promoted activities of expanding support for the party with a goal of “bringing down the Abe administration.”

Despite the transition to the new “Shii-Yamashita” regime, “delay in generational change” was highlighted.


The JCP held the 26th Party Congress for the first time in four years since 2010 (January). At the congress, the party demonstrated the recognition of “entering the full-scale beginning of an era of the confrontation between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the JCP,” and decided on a policy aiming for an increase in seats in the next national election and the nationwide local election (April 2015), as well as emphasizing “confrontation with the Abe administration” with a goal of blocking the allowing of the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.

As for personnel in the party leadership, acting head of the secretariat Yoshiaki Yamashita assumed the head of the secretariat, inaugurating a new regime of “Chairperson Kazuo Shii-Head of the Secretariat Yoshiaki Yamashita.” In addition, the Central Committee appealed for the appointment of young people by electing Yoshiko Kira (31 as of the time of inauguration; ages hereinafter are all as of such time) and Kotaro Tatsumi (37), who were first elected to the House of Councillors (July 2013). However, the Standing Executive Committee, which is the de facto leading organization just made a slight personnel

change (newly appointed two people), and senior executive members including Tetsuzo Fuwa (83, reappointed as a member of the Standing Executive Committee) remained as executives. Thus, the average age of members became older (55.7→57.2), and the current condition of the delay in generation change to successors was highlighted.

The number of party members was reported as “becoming about 305,000 people as a result of working for resolving the problem of members who conducted no activities.”

Changes in the number of party members and the average age of central executive members



* The number of party members is rounded off to the nearest 10,000.

The JCP raised a movement of “bringing down the Abe administration” while criticizing the right of collective self-defense issue.

At the general meeting of party Diet members held on the occasion of the ordinary Diet session (January), the JCP expressed its intention to “confront the Abe administration head-on to derail ‘abuses’ including the consumption tax hike and

allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense.” As for the rise in the consumption tax to 8% (April), the JCP submitted a motion to revise budget proposals for FY2014 (February) and worked for propaganda activities and signature

campaigns with a goal of abandoning a rise in the consumption tax.

In particular, the JCP assumed the issue of allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense as “turning Japan into a nation that can wage war overseas,” and grilled the government based on materials that were thought to be prepared inside the Ministry of Defense and Japan Air Self-Defense Force at the Committee on Foreign Affairs (June). After that, at the lecture held to commemorate the 92nd anniversary of its foundation (July), the JCP adopted a more confrontational stance, such as “calling for national mass movements toward bringing down the Abe administration in every field,” and at the

The JCP promoted activities to expand its support with an emphasis on approaches to young adults, students, and non-partisans.

The JCP, under the policy of the Party Congress of “aiming to double party strength in the 2010’s,” worked for activities of propaganda and expanding its support with emphasis on approaches to young adults, students, and non-partisans.

To young adults and students, the JCP prepared and distributed the student version of Shimbun Akahata, covering a tuition issue in recruiting new students for the first time (April), and announced recommendations on regulation of “black’ part-time jobs” (June), working for the policy propaganda of the party. To non-partisans, it called for participation in speech meetings by its senior members toward the nationwide local election held in various areas since May and interactive “gatherings” on the theme of consumption tax, nursing issue, and other issues of deep concern to local residents to work for expanding its support from participants who had not been connected to the party. In addition, its Diet members and local assembly members conducted victims support activities of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the landslide disaster in Hiroshima (August), and participated in protest

extraordinary Diet session in the autumn, it called for retracting the cabinet decision on allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense force (July) and abandoning a rise in consumption tax to 10%.

Amid this situation, while the JCP criticized the verification of the Kono Statement conducted by the government over the comfort women issue, as for the testimony regarding the comfort women issue, in relation to which Asahi Shimbun announced it would retract an article (August), it apologized for carrying the testimony in Shimbun Akahata after a delay of more than one month and retracted it (September).

demonstration with a goal of “bringing down the Abe administration” organized by civic groups in which many young adults and non-partisans participated (August), showing its presence.

Based on these measures, at the meeting of senior members (August), they emphasized effects such as “more than 80,000 people participated in speech meetings, resulting in more people participating in them compared with the last nationwide local election, general election, and House of Councillors election,” and “new young adult and student members were welcomed in 58% of areas,” and then spurred members to further expand their support through the “Akahata Festival,” held for the first time in four years (November) and other events.

The JCP is expected to continue to expand its support from young adults, students, and non-partisans toward the nationwide local elections and other elections, and show its presence by making counter proposals to various policies, while repeating criticism of the administration with a goal of “bringing down the Abe administration.”

5 Right-wing Groups, etc.



5-1 Right-wing groups repeated criticism of neighboring countries on territorial and historical issues

- Right-wing groups mainly engaged in activities criticizing China over the Senkaku Islands.
- Activities raising the comfort women issue intensified.

Right-wing groups continued to protest against incursions into territorial waters by Chinese surveillance ships around the Senkaku Islands.

To protest against repeated incursions into territorial waters by Chinese surveillance ships around the Senkaku Islands and cases in which aircraft of the Self-Defense Force had a near-midair collision with a Chinese military fighter jet in air space over high sea waters in the East China Sea (May, June), many right-wing groups carried out propaganda activities near Chinese diplomatic offices across Japan, during which they called for China to “get out of the Senkaku Islands,” and submitted petitions demanding that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other organizations adopt an uncompromising diplomatic posture.

Moreover, when President of the China-Japan Friendship Association, Tang Jiaxuan, came to Japan (June, Nagasaki and Fukuoka), they carried out propaganda activities criticizing China near Chinese diplomatic offices in Japan.

In addition, among activities carried out on their annual “September 29th Anti-Chinese Communist Day” (marking the date on which the Joint Communiqué was signed by Japan and China in 1972), they engaged in propaganda activities, rallies and demonstrations criticizing China across Japan, focusing on cities where Chinese diplomatic offices are located.

Right-wing groups carried out activities at various locations calling for the revocation of the “Kono Statement,” etc.

Right-wing groups, to protest against the South Korean government criticizing the Japanese government’s responses to the so-called “military comfort women” issue in international organizations and countries in Europe and the United States, carried out propaganda activities around South Korean diplomatic offices in Japan calling for “breaking off of diplomatic relations with South Korea that fabricated the ‘military comfort women’ issue.” At the same time, they called on the government and the LDP to revoke the “Kono Statement,” deeming it as “the villain of the ‘military comfort women’ issue.” Under

these situations, after Prime Minister Abe responded to Diet questions rejecting a revision of the statement (March), they carried out protest activities at LDP headquarters across Japan stating that “rejecting a revision of the statement was a betrayal of the public.”

In addition, after Asahi Shimbun carried articles of verification and admitting partial mistakes regarding “military comfort women” reports (August), right-wing groups responded by intensifying protest activities against it, and called for a boycott of Asahi Shimbun, and the “carrying of an article of apology.”

Column

Domestic and overseas activists showed an appetite for activities in Senkaku waters

Amid continuous incursions into territorial waters surrounding the Senkaku Islands by Chinese surveillance ships, domestic activists calling for the strengthening of effective control over the Senkaku Islands and activist groups in Hong Kong claiming sovereignty over the islands aimed at sailing into the waters surrounding the islands.

From Japan, members of right-wing groups aimed at landing on the islands. In addition, members of local assemblies and conservative groups repeatedly sailed from islands in Okinawa Prefecture on chartered fishing boats, and carried out fishing activities in the waters surrounding the islands. On the other hand, an activist group in Hong Kong, “Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands,” repeatedly sailed since May with the aim of landing on the Senkaku Islands on Bao Diao II, a ship which the group uses in protest activities. However, Hong Kong’s authorities blocked a voyage of the protest ship to the Senkaku Islands in any case, stating that “the ship is only allowed to operate within Hong Kong’s waters.”

5-2 Right-wing-affiliated groups engaged in movements centered on “anti-South Korean” activities

- Right-wing-affiliated groups intensified activities calling for the “break-off of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea.”

Right-wing-affiliated groups engaged in protest activities against South Korean diplomatic offices in Japan and the Tokyo metropolitan governor.

In response to mounting social criticism that activities arguing for exclusion of foreign residents in Japan using racist behavior are “hate speech,” right-wing-affiliated groups intensified activities calling for “break-off of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea” but avoided such behavior.

The groups carried out propaganda activities and demonstrations with calls to “break off diplomatic relations with South Korea” around South Korean diplomatic offices across Japan, as well as held lecture meetings criticizing South Korea’s responses to historical, territorial and other issues.

Moreover, after the Tokyo metropolitan governor, Yoichi Masuzoe, visited South Korea to meet President Park Geun Hye (July), the groups responded by carrying out propaganda activities criticizing the governor, stating “As the governor tried to gain favor of South Korea, he should resign,” in front of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Building. In addition, after Asahi Shimbun carried articles of verification regarding “comfort women” reports (August), the groups carried out propaganda activities and demonstrations with calls to “cease publication of Asahi Shimbun” around the Asahi Shimbun Company across Japan.

Column

A wave of illegal cases occurred with “counter-demonstrators”

“Counter-demonstrators” criticizing right-wing-affiliated groups as “racist” and their calls as “hate speech” continued to carry out protest and obstructive activities against propaganda activities and demonstrations organized by right-wing-affiliated groups following 2013. Some participants in protest and obstructive activities shouted abuse at and provoked activists of right-affiliated groups, resulting in repeated scuffles with the right-wing-affiliated group at various locations. Under these situations, various people from “counter-demonstrators” as well as the right-wing-affiliated groups were arrested for assaulting activists of the right-wing-affiliated groups and obstructing police officers from performing their duty (Tokyo, Saitama, etc.).

Appendix (January–November: Major security developments in Japan and overseas)

Jan. 1st (Wed)	North Korean First Secretary Kim Jong Un releases his New Year's speech emphasizing initiatives for the 70th anniversary of the Korean Workers' Party in 2015 (October) and the establishment of “the monolithic leadership” in the party and calling for the “improvement of North-South relations.”	21st (Fri)	The China State Oceanic Administration's Y-12 plane and the China People's Liberation Army's TU-154 intelligence gathering aircraft fly over waters off the Senkaku Islands, Okinawa Prefecture.
	The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its year-end and new year intensive seminars (December 27, 2013–January 5, 2014; Saitama and other locations).	22nd (Sat)	In Ukraine, anti-government demonstrators occupy the presidential office and other facilities. The Verkhovna Rada parliament passes a resolution for impeaching President Viktor Yanukovich, deciding to implement a presidential election in May. The president later flees to Russia.
	The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its year-end and new year intensive seminars (December 21–22, December 29, 2013–January 5, 2014, January 12; Tokyo and other locations).		Right-wing groups and right-wing-affiliated groups mark Takeshima Day (prefectural ordinance of Shimane Prefecture) by engaging in propaganda activities calling for the “recapture of Takeshima” (Tokyo, Shimane, and other locations).
2nd (Thu)	Right-wing groups carry out a “visit of the general public to the Palace for the new year greeting” activity (Tokyo).	27th (Thu)	The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of China adopts bills to designate September 3 as the “Victory Day of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression” and December 13 as the “National Memorial Day for Nanjing Massacre Victims.”
9th (Thu)	As a convoy including a car with the top police investigator for Sindh Province in southern Pakistan aboard drives through Karachi Province, bombs explode, killing three police officials including the top investigator. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claims responsibility for the bombing.	28th (Fri)	Japan Atomic Energy Agency announces that when updating free software for video replay using a computer for paperwork of fast breeder prototype reactor Monju, data including screen captures were sent outside, guided by a false server.
15th (Wed)	Right-wing groups carry out a protest activity against the “Japan Communist Party (JCP) 26th Party Congress” (Shizuoka).	Mar. 1st (Sat)	At the Kunming Railway Station Square in Kunming, Yunnan Province, China, eight attackers armed with knives stab passers-by, killing 33 people and injuring 143 others.
	The JCP holds the 26th Party Congress (until the 18th; Shizuoka).	7th (Fri)	A former senior follower of Aum Shinrikyo, Makoto Hirata, who was involved in the case of unlawful capture and confinement causing death of a chief manager of a notary public office, is given a nine-year prison sentence (demanded 12-year prison term) from the Tokyo District Court (appeals to the Tokyo High Court on the 20th).
16th (Thu)	North Korea's National Defense Commission announces a “grave proposal” to South Korea calling for terminating mutual accusations and hostile military actions from the Lunar New Year day (January 31) and cancelling U.S-South Korea joint military exercises from late February.	8th (Sat)	The JCP and radical leftist groups mobilize party members and activists for anti-nuclear power rallies and demonstrations to mark the 3rd anniversary of the nuclear power plant accident (until the 16th; various locations nationwide).
	The first hearing of a trial of the former senior follower of Aum Shinrikyo, Makoto Hirata, is held, who was charged with crimes of unlawful capture and confinement, violation of the Criminal Regulations to Control Explosives, and violation of the Act on Punishment of Use and Others of Molotov Cocktails for his involvement in the case of unlawful capture and confinement causing death of a chief manager of a notary public office, the case of paper tube bombs thrown at a religious scholar's house, and the case of fire bombs thrown at a facility of Aum Shinrikyo.	10th (Mon)	The United Nations releases a final report by the Panel of Experts assisting the Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee, pointing out that North Korea still engages in procurement of materials related to weapons of mass destruction and trade in military-related materials.
17th (Fri)	In Bukidnon Province, Mindanao, the southern Philippines, an armed group attacks a fruit warehouse owned by a Japanese company, deprives security guards of weapons, radios and other goods, and sets fire to the facility before fleeing. On the 23rd, the New People's Army (NPA) claims responsibility for the attack.	18th (Tue)	The Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People's Court accepts a February 26th suit by “Chinese citizens forced into wartime labor in Japan and their relatives,” demanding an apology and damages payments by two Japanese companies, the first such suit accepted by the court.
23rd (Thu)	As for a forced auction of the Korea Central Hall (Chongryon's central headquarters) (bidding period: October 3–10, 2013), the Tokyo District Court decides not to permit the hall's sale to Avar Limited Liability Company, Mongolia, the highest bidder in the bidding (on the 17th).		In Taiwan, a large number of students occupied the Legislative Yuan, asking the Ma Ying Jeou administration to withdraw the China-Taiwan services trade agreement.
24th (Fri)	Right-wing groups carry out protest activities against “Japan Teachers' Union's 63rd National Conference on Educational Research” (until the 26th; Shiga)		In response to the results of a referendum (16th) in which more than 96% of voters in the Crimea Autonomous Republic and Sevastopol, southern Ukraine, supported Crimea's annexation into Russia, Russian President Vladimir Putin delivers an address on the annexation of Crimea and signs a treaty for the Crimea Republic's annexation into the Russian Federation at the Kremlin in Moscow.
Feb. 2nd (Sun)	An extreme Islamist website carries a written al-Qaida statement vowing to sever its relationship with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).	24th (Mon)	As for a forced auction procedure of the Korea Central Hall, the Tokyo District Court decides to sell the Hall to Marunaka Holdings (based in Takamatsu, Kagawa Prefecture), the second highest bidder in the bidding (on the 20th). Chongryon, dissatisfied with the decision, files an appeal against the decision with the Tokyo High Court.
7th (Fri)	Right-wing groups mark Northern Territories Day by engaging in propaganda activities calling for the “recapture of the Northern Territories” (various locations nationwide).	26th (Wed)	North Korea fires Nodong ballistic missiles for the first time in five years in protest against U.S-South Korea joint military exercises. The missiles fly more than 600 kilometers before falling into the Sea of Japan.
8th (Sat)	Prime Minister Shinzo Abe holds talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin during a visit to Russia's Sochi for attending an opening ceremony for the Sochi Winter Olympics. On the pending bilateral peace treaty problem, the president emphasizes that “it is important to continue contacts between the top leaders and proceed with economic and other exchanges.”	30th (Sun)	North Korea's Foreign Ministry releases a statement condemning the UN Security Council's press statement (March 27) on the North's ballistic missiles firing, noting that “a new type of nuclear tests would not be excluded.”
9th (Sun)	“Kakumaru-ha” holds “The Great Rally of Workers' Anger” (Tokyo).		North Korea and Japan open a government-to-government meeting (lasting until the 31st, Beijing in China).
11th (Tue)	Right-wing groups mark National Foundation Day by engaging in celebration activities (various locations nationwide).	Apr. 2nd (Wed)	In Aden State, southern Yemen, an armed group conducts a suicide bombing attack on a Yemeni military facility, killing six soldiers. On the 3rd, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) claims responsibility for the attack.
14th (Fri)	North Korea and South Korea hold a high-level contact (Panmunjom), agreeing to implement an event for the reunions of separated families (February 20–25, Mt. Kumgang in North Korea), suspend mutual accusations, and continue the high-level contact.	5th (Sat)	Throughout Afghanistan on the presidential election day, Taliban carries out attacks to sabotage the election, killing more than 20 people and injuring more than 40 others.
15th (Sat)	Right-wing groups conduct protest activities against “ZENKYO 31st Regular Conference” (until the 16th; Tokyo).		

8th (Tue)	The JCP and radical leftist groups mobilize activists and party members for rallies against allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense (Tokyo).
9th (Wed)	North Korea holds the First Session of the 13th Supreme People's Assembly, which reappoints First Secretary Kim Jong Un as the First Chairman of the National Defense Commission and elects state leadership executives. The assembly also adopts the fiscal 2013 settlement of government accounts and the fiscal 2014 budget (Mansudae Assembly Hall, Pyongyang).
14th (Mon)	An armed group attacks a school in Borno State, northeastern Nigeria, kidnapping at least 200 female students. On May 5, Boko Haram, an extreme Islamist organization based in northeastern Nigeria, claims responsibility for the attack.
18th (Fri)	The Russian Eastern Military District Commanding Officer announces a plan to build more than 150 troop housing, cultural and other facilities by 2016 in the military district including Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands.
19th (Sat)	The Shanghai Maritime Court seizes at a Zhejiang Province port the Baosteel Emotion ship owned by Japan's Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd., which was ordered to pay some ¥2.9 billion in damages to a Chinese ship owner (plaintiff) in a ruling on a suit over the violation of a 1936 regular charter contract and rights infringement. An extreme Islamist group ambushes an Algerian military convoy near the village of Iboudraren in Tizi Ouzou Province, northern Algeria, killing 14 troops. On the 30th, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claims responsibility for the attack.
26th (Sat)	The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its Golden Week intensive seminars (until May 6; Tokyo and other locations).
29th (Tue)	Right-wing groups mark Showa Day by engaging in propaganda activities (various locations nationwide).
30th (Wed)	A bomb explodes near South Urumqi train station in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, China, killing three persons and injuring 79 others. Police authorities allege the explosion as a "violent terror attack." Chinese President Xi Jinping immediately orders an early solution to the incident and the enhancement of anti-terror measures.
May 1st (Thu)	The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its Golden Week seminars (Until May 6, May 17-18; Tokyo and other locations).
2nd (Fri)	Two Chinese naval ships navigate in high sea waters off Miyako Island, Okinawa Prefecture, from the East China Sea to the Pacific.
3rd (Sat)	China unilaterally notifies Vietnam of a plan to conduct drilling operations in waters near the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. Japanese Communist Party-related and other groups carry out rallies and demonstrations on the Constitution Memorial Day (various locations nationwide). Right-wing groups mark Constitution Day by engaging in propaganda activities (various locations nationwide).
8th (Thu)	The first hearing of a trial of the former live-in members of Aum Shinrikyo, Naoko Kikuchi, is held, who was charged with crimes of providing aid in violation of the Criminal Regulations to Control Explosives and providing aid to attempt homicide, for her involvement in the case of a parcel bomb sent to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government building.
16th (Fri)	Chongryon, dissatisfied with the decision of the Tokyo High Court turning down the appeal which it filed regarding the forced auction of the Korea Central Hall (on the 12th), files a special appeal and a petition for permission to appeal with the Supreme Court.
19th (Mon)	The U.S. Department of Justice announces that a federal grand jury has indicted five officers of Unit 61398 (the Third General Staff Department) of the China People's Liberation Army for their alleged economic espionage and other violations, suspecting they breached computer systems to steal information from five U.S. companies, including major nuclear plant maker Westinghouse Electric Co. in the Toshiba group and major steelmaker United States Steel Corp., and the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union.
20th (Tue)	Russian President Vladimir Putin makes an official visit to Shanghai, China, (until the 21st), holding a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and attending an opening ceremony for the "Maritime Cooperation 2014" China-Russia joint naval exercise and the fourth summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). The China-Russia joint communique calls for "countering the distortion of history."

20th (Tue)	Two bombs explode in the Plateau State capital city of Jos in central Nigeria, killing at least 118 people. On July 13, Boko Haram claims responsibility for the bombs.
24th (Sat)	Chongryon holds the 23rd Congress (until the 25th; Tokyo Korean Cultural Hall, Tokyo). It raises ideological education for driving loyalty to First Secretary Kim Jong Un, promotion of generation change by fostering young activists, etc. as action policies for the next four years. It also criticizes the auction of the Korea Central Hall as "cracking down on Chongryon." Right-wing groups and right-wing-affiliated groups conduct protest activities against "the 23rd Chongryon Congress" (until the 25th; Tokyo). Two fighter aircraft of the China People's Liberation Army make unusually close approaches to two Japanese Self-Defense Forces aircraft in warning and surveillance missions over high sea waters in the East China Sea.
26th (Mon)	North Korea and Japan hold a government-to-government meeting (lasting until the 28th in Stockholm, Sweden). North Korea agrees to "comprehensively and thoroughly investigate all Japanese" including abduction victims, while Japan offers to lift some of the measures against North Korea when the investigation starts.
31st (Sat)	Various supporters from Japan and overseas participate in the international conference on the comfort women issue (until June 2; Tokyo).
Jun. 2nd (Mon)	JCP Chairperson Kazuo Shii attends the international conference seeking a solution to the comfort women issue (Tokyo).
5th (Thu)	The U.S. Department of Defense releases an annual report to Congress on China's military and security trends, pointing out that China is modernizing military potential and could illegally acquire materials and technology that could be repurposed for military use, utilizing intelligence organizations, government-run enterprises and overseas Chinese people.
8th (Sun)	An armed group attacks Jinnah International Airport in the Sindh Province capital of Karachi in southern Pakistan, killing at least 26 people and injuring 29 others. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) respectively claim responsibility for the attack.
9th (Mon)	A U.S. security company releases a report on operations of a hacker organization allegedly linked to the China People's Liberation Army Third General Staff Department, pointing out that the hacker organization could have tried to collect information from Japanese information/communications and other companies.
11th (Wed)	Two fighter aircraft of the China People's Liberation Army make unusually close approaches to a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force plane and a Japanese Air Self-Defense Force aircraft over high sea waters in the East China Sea.
13th (Fri)	The United Nations releases a final report by the Panel of Experts assisting the UN Security Council's Iran Sanctions Committee, noting that a case in which Iran attempted to procure products falling short of meeting standards for other countries' export restrictions indicated that these products could be technologically modified into substitutes for restricted products for developing weapons of mass destruction.
16th (Mon)	The JCP submits a bill to repeal the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets to the House of Councillors jointly with the Social Democratic Party and other parties (Tokyo).
29th (Sun)	The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) declares the founding of the Islamic State as a Caliphate state.
30th (Mon)	Following the decision of the Supreme Court to suspend the validity of the permit for the sale of the Korea Central Hall to Marunaka Holdings (based in Takamatsu, Kagawa Prefecture) on condition of ¥100 million in deposit (on the 19th), Chongryon makes the deposit. The procedures for the sale of the hall are suspended temporarily. A former live-in member of Aum Shinrikyo, Naoko Kikuchi, who was involved in the case of a parcel bomb sent to the Tokyo Metropolitan Government building, is given a five-year prison sentence (demanded 7-year prison term) from the Tokyo District Court (appeals to the Tokyo High Court on the same day). The JCP and radical leftist groups, in response to the cabinet decision to allow the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, mobilize party members and activists to protest acts conducted in front of the Prime Minister's Office (Tokyo).

Jul. 1st (Tue)	North Korea and Japan open a government-to-government meeting (Beijing). North Korea explains the organization of a special investigation committee to comprehensively and thoroughly investigate all Japanese nationals thought to have been in the country. On the 4th, North Korea announces the inauguration of the special investigation committee and Japan lifts some of the measures against North Korea. The JCP and radical leftist groups mobilize party members and activists to protest acts against the cabinet decision to allow the exercise of the right to collective self-defense (various locations nationwide).
3rd (Thu)	Chinese President Xi Jinping visits South Korea, leading a large economic delegation. He is the first top Chinese Communist Party leader to visit South Korea before North Korea.
5th (Sat)	A bomb set in a car explodes near the Parliament building in the Somali capital of Mogadishu, killing four people. Al-Shabaab claims responsibility for the attack the same day.
7th (Mon)	Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers a key address at a ceremony to mark the 77th anniversary of the Lugou Bridge Incident (at the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Aggression War Memorial Hall in Beijing), pointing out that "even nearly 70 years after the victory in the Chinese people's fight against the Japanese war of aggression and the global anti-fascism war, a small number of people ignore historical facts and glorify the history of aggression."
17th (Thu)	A Malaysia Airlines plane on a flight from Amsterdam is shot down in an area close to the Russian border in the eastern Ukraine province of Donetsk controlled by pro-Russian armed forces, with all 295 passengers and crewmembers killed.
28th (Mon)	The UN Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee subjects Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited (OMM), the operator of North Korea's Chong Chon Gang ship, to sanctions for its key role in transporting weapons with the North Korean ship, which was seized by Panamanian authorities in July 2013.
Aug. 1st (Fri)	The PSIA carries out simultaneous on-site inspections of 24 Aum Shinrikyo's facilities nationwide (on the 1st and 3rd).
3rd (Sun)	Right-wing groups conducted protest activities against "Zenkyo National Conference on Educational Research 2014" (Kagawa).
6th (Wed)	The facilities of the Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo are searched by the Metropolitan Police Department on suspicion of violation of the Travel Agency Act on the grounds that the group conducted organized tours without obtaining registration (8 locations nationwide).
7th (Thu)	The Chinese Ministry of Defense in its website announces that "the Chinese Air Force addressed air threats by chasing and monitoring Japanese Self-Defense Forces aircraft in reconnaissance flights in the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone on the 6th."
9th (Sat)	The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its summer intensive seminars (until August 10, 12-17, 31, and September 7; Tokyo and other locations). Right-wing groups dub the day "Anti-Russia Day" and conduct protest activities around Russian diplomatic offices in Japan (various locations nationwide).
13th (Wed)	In response to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's remark that a military exercise (from the 12th to 16th) of Etorofu Island-based forces on the island would be "absolutely unacceptable," the Russian Foreign Ministry states that "the southern Kuril Islands belong to Russia as a result of World War II" and that "Russia determines the location of any military exercise within its territory on its own."
15th (Fri)	In response to Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited (OMM)'s becoming subject to sanctions by the UN Security Council (July 28), the Japanese government adds the company to the list of those subject to measures such as freezing on assets. Right-wing groups attend Yasukuni Shrine, their local Gokoku Shrine, or memorial services for the war dead to pay homage (various locations nationwide).
17th (Sun)	Media reports quote a source close to the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a unified organization of anti-government armed groups in Syria, as stating that a Japanese national accompanying the FSA and other groups was kidnapped by an armed group suspected as being the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a Sunni extremist organization, near Aleppo in northern Syria. "Chukaku-ha" holds a "large rally; let's bring down the Abe administration allowing wars, nuclear power, and dismissal together!" (Tokyo)
18th (Mon)	The Okinawa Defense Bureau starts submarine boring exploration in the waters off Henoko in Nago City, the planned site for relocation of U.S. Futenma base (Okinawa).

24th (Sun)	Boko Haram, active mainly in northeastern Nigeria, declares rule under Islamic law.
Sep. 3rd (Wed)	All seven members of the Communist Party of China Politburo Standing Committee attend a ceremony to mark the "69th Anniversary of the Victory Day in the Anti-Japanese War" (at the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Aggression War Memorial Hall in Beijing). At a later forum to mark the "69th Anniversary of the Victory Day in the Anti-Japanese War" (at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing), President Xi Jinping delivers a speech criticizing Japanese politicians' visits to Yasukuni Shrine. An extreme Islamist website carries a video statement by a person described as al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, announcing the creation of al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent as a new al-Qaida branch.
5th (Fri)	The Ukraine government and a pro-Russian armed group controlling eastern Ukraine sign a document in the Belarus capital of Minsk on 12 measures including an immediate ceasefire and an exchange of prisoners.
6th (Sat)	Chongryon sends a delegation of Korean residents in Japan led by Chairman Ho Jong Man to North Korea on the occasion of North Korea's 66th national foundation day on September 9 (until October 7). This is his first visit to North Korea in some eight years.
12th (Fri)	The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its autumn intensive seminars (until the 15th, and 19th-23rd; Tokyo and other locations).
17th (Wed)	The U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee publishes a research report finding that hackers linked to the Chinese government penetrated networks of U.S. defense contractors at least 20 times between June 2012 and May 2013.
18th (Thu)	Australian federal police raid facilities at various locations including Sydney and seize 15 people for their alleged involvement in a plan to indiscriminately kidnap and behead ordinary citizens and publish video footage of the attack. Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott states that these suspects received telephone instructions from a senior Australian member of the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL).
23rd (Tue)	Right-wing-affiliated groups conduct the "Nationwide Simultaneous Action for Breaking-off Relations between Japan and South Korea."
24th (Wed)	Sergei Ivanov, Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration, and other Russian officials visit Etorofu Island of the Northern Territories to inspect a new airport that opened on the 22nd. In response to the Japanese government's protest against the visit, he likens the protest to "a ceremonial dance" and vows to visit the island again.
25th (Thu)	North Korea opens the Second Session of the 13th Supreme People's Assembly, recalling Choe Ryong Hae (a former Director of the General Political Department of the Korean People's Army) from the post of Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission and appointing Hwang Pyong So, Director of the General Political Department of the Korean People's Army, to the post (Mansudae Assembly Hall, Pyongyang). Those attending the session include Ho Jong Man, Chairman of Chongryon.
27th (Sat)	North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong in his address to the United Nations General Assembly indicates North Korea's intention to accept a dialogue on human rights with the international community.
28th (Sun)	In Hong Kong, pro-democracy people including students start demonstrations, demanding a "truly free election" for the Hong Kong Chief Executive in 2017. The JCP and radical leftist groups mobilize party members and activists for rallies and demonstrations calling for "opposition to the restart" of the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant (Kagoshima).
29th (Mon)	North Korea and Japan hold a meeting of diplomatic authorities (Shenyang, China). North Korea explains the state of the special investigation committee's investigation on Japanese nationals. Right-wing groups dub the day "September 29th Anti-Chinese Communist Day" and engage in propaganda activities calling for "severing of diplomatic relations between Japan and China" (various locations nationwide).
Oct. 3rd (Fri)	The China People's Liberation Army's Y-9 intelligence gathering aircraft flies over waters off the Senkaku Islands, Okinawa Prefecture.
4th (Sat)	North Korean officials including Hwang Pyong So, Director of the General Political Department of the Korean People's Army, attend the closing ceremony for the 17th Asian Games in Incheon, South Korea. During the South Korean visit, he meets with South Korean officials including Kim Kwan Jin, Chief of the National Security Office.

6th (Mon)	Japanese investigation authorities interview a Hokkaido University student on his alleged private war preparation or conspiracy under the Penal Code, based on his voluntary acceptance of such interview, suspecting him as having planned to go to Syria to participate in the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) as a combatant. They also search relevant facilities including his accommodation in Tokyo.
12th (Sun)	In the Canadian capital of Ottawa, a Muslim convert commits a random shooting at Parliament Hill.
20th (Mon)	The Communist Party of China (CPC) opens the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee (lasting until the 23rd, Beijing), adopting a decision on the comprehensive promotion of national governance by the CPC Central based on rule of law, which calls for such measures as the establishment of a socialistic rule of law system, the improvement of judicial agencies' authority/systems and reliability, and the enhancement of the rule of law concept with Chinese characteristics. The anti-mainstream faction of the "Kaiho-ha" group of the Revolutionary Workers' Association caused an incident that shot a metal projectile at the building of a private company (Saitama).
27th (Mon)	Japanese government delegation visits North Korea (until 30th). On the 28th and 29th, the North Korean "special investigation committee" explains the current status of the "investigation on Japanese."
28th (Tue)	Right-wing groups dub the day "Recapture Takeshima Day" and engage in protest activities near South Korean diplomatic offices in Japan (various location nationwide).
29th (Wed)	U.S media reports that a hacker group allegedly linked to the Russian government breached the unclassified network of the White House and some functions of the network were suspended.
Nov. 2nd (Sun)	A suicide bombing attack near a check point in Wagah, Punjab State, Eastern Pakistan, facing the border with India, kills at least 55 people and injures more than 120 others. The "Jamaat-ul-Ahrar," an offshoot of the "Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan" (TTP), the Jundallah and others claim responsibility for the attack. Chukaku-ha holds the annual National Workers' Rally (Tokyo).
4th (Tue)	The Indonesian State Police chief states that the number of Indonesians who went to Syria and participated in the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) as combatants totals 97, including 10 who have already returned home.

4th (Tue)	Japanese Supreme Court turns down Chongryon's special appeal and petition regarding the auction of the Korea Central Hall (May 16). As Marunaka (based in Takamatsu, Kagawa Prefecture), the winning bidder, makes the payment for the hall, Chongryon lost its ownership of the hall (November 21).
7th (Fri)	The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo files a libel suit against the state for an act of tort in which public security intelligence officers submitted a distorted and fabricated report on the occasion of requesting the extension of the surveillance period (fourth time).
9th (Sun)	China's General Secretary Xi Jinping and Taiwan's former Vice President Stew Wanchang hold talks in Beijing, reaffirming that China and Taiwan will promote the peaceful development of their relations based on the 1992 consensus (on the treatment of "One China"). General Secretary Xin calls for expanding exchanges in economic, cultural, science and technology, and education areas. Russian President Vladimir Putin visits Beijing to attend an annual summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and holds talks with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The Japanese and Russian leaders exchange views on how to go ahead with bilateral peace treaty negotiations and agree to start specific preparations for President Putin's visit to Japan in 2015.
10th (Mon)	Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visits Beijing to attend an annual summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and hold talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The Japanese and Chinese leaders agree to promote a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests and go ahead with working-level talks toward starting the operation of a maritime communication mechanism.
12th (Wed)	Chinese President Xi Jinping holds talks with U.S President Barack Obama visiting Beijing, agreeing on confidence-building measures for the prevention of accidental clashes between U.S and Chinese forces, the acceleration of investment agreement negotiations, the establishment of new targets for greenhouse gas emission reduction, and other matters.
13th (Thu)	The Houthis and the Ansar al-Sharia (AAS), an affiliate of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), clash in Rada, al-Baidah Province, Yemen, with at least 35 people killed.
17th (Mon)	North Korean Workers' Party Secretary Choe Ryong Hae visits Russia as special envoy of First Secretary Kim Jong Un (until the 24th), meeting with President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials.
Dec. 1st (Mon)	The PSIA requests the Public Security Examination Commission to extend the surveillance period (fifth time) in accordance with Article 12, Paragraph 1 of the Act on the Control of Organization Which Committed Indiscriminate Mass Murder (Organization Control Act).



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内外情勢の回顧と展望

内外の公安動向について取りまとめた資料です。

国際テロリズム要覧 (Web版)

オウム真理教に関するページ

新着情報

- 立入検査の実施結果について (平成26年12月)
- オウム真理教に対する観察処分期間の更新 (第5回目) を請求しました (平成26年12月)
- 人事院主催「公務研究セミナー」に参加します (平成26年12月)
- 12月9日(火) 中央大学で業務説明会を開催 (平成26年12月)



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