

# **Annual Report 2017**

## **Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations**

**January 2018**

Public Security Intelligence Agency



# On the Publication of the Review and Prospects of Internal and External Affairs (2018 Edition)

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Every January, the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) publishes the “Review and Prospects of Internal and External Affairs” which provides a summary of domestic and overseas state of affairs of the past year relating to the public security of our country. This is the 2018 edition of the report.

PSIA is tasked to ensure the public security of our country and carries out surveillance disposition against Aum Shinrikyo in an appropriate and strict manner under the Subversive Activities Prevention Act and the Act on the Control of Organizations Which Have Committed Acts of Indiscriminate Mass Murder. In addition, PSIA, as a core member of our country’s intelligence community, gathers and analyzes information on domestic and external affairs that could have adverse effects on the public security of our country such as international terrorism, situations of neighboring countries and movements of various domestic groups, thereby striving to contribute to policymaking of our government by providing intelligence.

In review of internal and external affairs of 2017, we recognize serious and grave threats to our national security; for example, with North Korea’s successive launches of various ballistic missiles and nuclear testing as well as a series of major terrorist attacks which took place in Western countries and Southeast Asia. In addition, in China, the Xi Jinping administration set its aim of becoming a “major power” and showed its stance to expand its influence overseas during the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, with the impact and relevance of such developments on our country drawing our attention. Even within Japan, vigilance is required as Aum Shinrikyo strives to expand its organization, which continues to maintain dangerous characteristics, and as radical leftist groups take various opportunities to approach the public. Furthermore, it has continuously been observed that cyberattacks aim at stealing critical information; therefore, it must be stated that the domestic and foreign situations surrounding our country are still dire.

Under these circumstances, our country will be hosting high-profiled events that will draw international interest such as the Rugby World Cup and the G20 Summit in 2019 and the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2020. For these events to be held safely and smoothly, PSIA is fully committed to gathering and analyzing relevant information to prevent any harmful acts such as terrorism.

As the threat to our country has diversified in recent years, strengthening cooperation between the public and private sectors is paramount to ensure public security. With publications such as this, PSIA will strive to make further efforts in disseminating information to the people of Japan. I take this opportunity to express my sincere hope that readers find the information outlined in this publication useful and that it may provide a deeper understanding of PSIA’s work which may lead to your support.

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# External Affairs in 2017



1-1

## Threat to Japan further intensified as North Korea inched closer to the completion of their nuclear weapons capability



**North Korea displayed its reinforced nuclear deterrence against the US through “H-bomb” test and successive launches of new missiles including ICBMs**

Entering 2017, North Korea continued its testing of ballistic missiles through repeated launches such as the “Pukguksong-2,” a new solid-fuel ballistic missile based on its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM; in February), and the quadruple launch of the “Scud-ER” (Scud-Extend Range; in March).

Also, in its development towards intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), Party Chairman Kim Jong-un announced in his “New Year’s speech” that North Korea was “entering the final stages of its preparation in test-launching intercontinental ballistic missiles,” and North Korea later launched the “Hwasong-12,” a liquid-fuel based intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) at a lofted trajectory (launched at greater angle than normal achieving higher apogee) reaching an altitude above 2,000 kilometers (in May). On top of that, North Korea launched two “Hwasong-14” ballistic missiles, both at lofted trajectories with apogees above 2,500 km and 3,500 km, respectively (in July), claiming them to be “intercontinental ballistic missiles” – likely based on “Hwasong-12” – that can reach the US mainland. In addition, after its warnings of “enveloping the Island of Guam in flames,” in which North Korea announced the possible launching of “Hwasong-12” using a route over Chugoku and Shikoku regions, it showed that the US army base stationed in Guam was within its range through two of its launches in August and September over Hokkaido that plunged into the Pacific, east of Cape Erimo, with launching distances of approximately 2,700 km and 3,700 km, respectively. In this manner, the threat to the US and Japan has further escalated with

North Korea’s possession of various types of ballistic missiles and its pursuit in developing ICBM-class ballistic missiles that can achieve longer range, as well as by launching solid-fuel based ballistic missiles – which are said to be capable of immediate launch and excellent in surprise attack capability – from mobile launchers that can hinder detection from notifications of missile launches.

Moreover, in September, North Korea released a picture through its media of Chairman Kim Jong Un inspecting the warhead of a hydrogen bomb, and soon after, it conducted its 6th nuclear test at the Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site claiming it “successfully conducted its test of an H-bomb that can be loaded onto an ICBM.”

Following the series of missile and nuclear tests, Chairman Kim Jong Un clearly showed North Korea’s stance to push towards the completion of its nuclear power, stating that “we have nearly reached the terminal of our goal to complete the state nuclear force,” and expressing that “the government must do everything in its power to ensure its completion” (in September). In addition, after the UN General Assembly (in September) where US President Donald Trump said, “If (the US) is forced to defend itself or its allies, we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea,” Chairman Kim Jong Un fired back (in September) declaring “we will carefully consider exercising of a corresponding, highest level of hard-line countermeasure in history,” and its foreign minister Ri Yong Ho dissuaded the US by suggesting that it might consider conducting a “test of its hydrogen bomb over the Pacific.”

In this way, North Korea forced its nuclear

tests and missile launches heightening tensions with the US, yet on the other hand, held unofficial meetings between senior officials of the North Korean foreign ministry such as Choe Son Hui, the ministry's US bureau head, and former US government officials during seminars sponsored by foreign think tanks (in May and September), and released detained Americans by inviting Joseph Y. Yun, the US Special Representative

for North Korea Policy of the State Department (in June). North Korea also suspended its military provocation after the launch of "Hwasong-12" in September. It is assessed that behind these actions lay North Korea's intent to carefully assess the Trump administration's policy vis-à-vis North Korea – which does not exclude military force– and to seek for the possibility of dialogue.

## COLUMN

### North Korea's Nuclear Tests

Sequence	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	6th
Date	Oct. 9, 2006	May 25, 2009	Feb. 12, 2013	Jan. 6, 2016	Sep. 9, 2016	Sep. 3, 2017
Seismic Magnitude*	M4.1	M4.52	M4.9	M4.85	M5.1	M6.1
Yield Estimates**	0.5 – 1kT	2 – 3kT	6 – 7kT	6 – 7kT	11 – 12kT	160kT
N. Korea's claim	Nuclear test	Nuclear test	Nuclear test	Hydrogen bomb test	Test of mounted nuclear warhead	Test of mounted H-bomb on ICBM

\*As reported by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO)

\*\*Estimates by the Ministry of Defense of Japan

Compared to its previous 5 tests, the seismic magnitude of North Korea's 6th nuclear test was the largest, and from its estimated yields, the possibility of it being a hydrogen-bomb (H-bomb) cannot be ruled out. With 6 nuclear tests, North Korea is presumed to have achieved technical advancements, and based on this, there is a possibility that North Korea has made significant progress in its development of nuclear weapons and has

miniaturized them to load onto warheads.

Further, when announcing the H-bomb warhead prior to the 6th nuclear test, North Korea claimed the possibility of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks with the detonation of these bombs being able to generate electromagnetic waves that can impair or destroy various electronic devices. With this, North Korea is assessed to have intent to amplify its threat.

However, the US renamed North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism (in November) after it being off the list for 9 years, wherein North Korea launched a purported new ICBM, "Hwasong-15," at a lofted trajectory

reaching altitudes over 4,000 kilometers stating its capability of reaching the whole US mainland and declared the "completion" of its nuclear force (in November).

## North Korea's Missile Development: "Hwasong" and "Pukguksong" missiles

Currently, North Korea has two significant types of ballistic missiles, "Hwasong" and "Pukguksong." The "Hwasong" missiles, which North Korea has publically announced, include IRBM types – "Hwasong-10" (Musudan) and "Hwasong-12," ICBM types – "Hwasong-14" and "Hwasong-15," and "No Dong" and "Scud" missiles are also said to be named as "Hwasong" types. On the other hand, the "Pukguksong" types include "Pukguksong," an SLBM, and "Pukguksong-2."

North Korea has not clearly defined the difference between the "Hwasong" and "Pukguksong" missiles; however, as "Hwasong" types can be seen to have a linear missile flame, they are presumed to use liquid fuel propulsion systems. Regarding "Pukguksong" types on the other hand, the SLBM "Pukguksong" missile launched in May 2015 was also presumed to use a liquid fuel propulsion system due to the qualities of its

flarebacks; however, technical modifications appeared to be made, and the subsequent launchings of "Pukguksong-1" and "Pukguksong-2" after 2016 all displayed radial smoke presuming the use of solid-fuel rockets. Unlike liquid based systems, solid-propellant systems do not require fueling at launch, offering excellence in readiness and mobility, thus making it likely that North Korea would aim to develop ICBMs using solid-fuel propellant systems.

During Kim Jong Un's reported visit to the Chemical Material Institute of the Academy of National Defense Sciences (in August), North Korea released photographs which suggested its development of the alleged new ICBM "Hwasong-13" and SLBM "Pukguksong-3," making its future test launches of ballistic missiles such as "Hwasong-13" and "Pukguksong-3" a likely possibility.



## North Korea dissuaded China amid sanctions and looked to strengthen ties with Russia to emerge from isolation in the international community

Regarding North Korea's relations with China, the US and China agreed to strengthen cooperation in defusing North Korea's nuclear threat at the US-China summit (in April), and after the summit, Chinese media repeatedly carried articles that supported strict UN sanctions including halting oil supplies. With such developments, North Korea took an unusual response, accusing China by name, saying, "it was not our side that crossed a 'red line' in terms of the DPRK-China relations. It was the Chinese side that roughly violated and crossed the line without hesitation" (in May). Following that, amid the US and China-led UN Security Council Resolution and with China showing a more cooperative stance toward the US, North Korea further constrained China accusing "both countries (the US and China) drafted (the resolution) in the backroom at their own pleasure" and "the US and one of

our neighboring countries whose territory is as large as the US are together barking" (in June and August). On the other hand, vice chairmen of the WPK Central Committee Choe Ryong Hae and Ri Su Yong met with the head of the International Department of the Communist Party of China, Song Tao (in November), who visited North Korea as a special envoy to General Secretary Xi Jinping, and discussed on the development of bilateral relations; however, Song Tao's meeting with Chairman Kim Jong Un was not reported.

As the US asked the international community to re-examine relations with North Korea, North Korea sent delegates to Iran and African nations to maintain its relations with traditionally friendly nations; however, its nuclear tests and flurry of ballistic missile launches led Mexico, Peru, Kuwait, Spain, and Italy to expel North

Korean ambassadors to their countries inducing further isolation from the international community.

In relations with Russia, North Korea dispatched a delegation from its Ministry of Foreign Affairs (in June) to discuss improving Russia and North Korea relations as well as sending head of its Foreign Ministry's North America Bureau, Choe Son Hui (in September and October) to engage in dialogue regarding nuclear issues. Also, North Korea invited Russia's ambassador-at-large, Oleg

Burmistrov (in July), as well as, a delegation from TASS Russian News Agency (in October), thereby striving to strengthen its communications with Russia. In addition, North Korea strived to maintain economic ties with Russia by, among other things, embarking on its cargo and passenger ferry service with "Man Gyong Bong (-I)" vessel between the Port of Rajin and Russia's Vladivostok (in May), looking to maintain economic ties with Russia.

### **With increased disapproval of South Korea's cooperation with the US, North Korea snubbed calls for dialogue stirring unrest**

In South Korea, after the impeachment and dismissal of President Park Guen-hye (in March), former candidate of the Democratic Party and chief presidential secretary to then-President Roh Moo-hyun, Moon Jae-in was elected as president (in May), and through its state media, North Korea reported the similarities of the "election of the 19th President" with Roh's presidential election and anticipated that the new administration would adopt similar North Korea policies as the Roh administration.

However, since its inauguration, as the Moon administration showed its stance to support and follow the US' push for stronger pressure against North Korea, North Korea harshly accused the South of being subservient to the US and denied aid from private organizations allowed by the South Korean government (in June) as well as refusing the South's proposal of military and

Red Cross talks. Furthermore, after North Korea's launch of "Hwasong-14" (in July), the South Korean government decided (in July) to deploy additional launch pads for the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system in support of US forces stationed in South Korea. Following that, North Korea repeatedly criticized President Moon, further accusing him as "the worst pro-US, sycophantic and traitorous figure."

In these circumstances, the 10th anniversary of the October 4th joint declaration (declaring the development of North-South relations for peace and prosperity), agreed in an Inter-Korean summit in 2007 between General Secretary Kim Jong-il and President Roh, approached but there were no joint commemorative events, and no change was seen in North Korea's attitude towards South Korea.

### **Stance seeking for dialogue is possible, but further military provocations are likely in case North Korea fails to receive concessions from the US**

After declaring the "completion" of its nuclear force and with the PyeongChang Winter Olympics (in February 2018) and the Paralympics (in March 2018) in mind, North Korea is presently considered to emphasize the importance of dialogue and strive to gain achievements such as the suspension and/or reduction of US-South Korea joint military drills, which are held yearly around the same time as the PyeongChang Games. On the

other hand, if North Korea does not achieve desired results, it may be considered that North Korea would stir tensions with the US and other concerned states by heightening military provocations such as ICBM ballistic missile launches over the Pacific, test launches of "Pukguksong" which is seen to be in its development stages, and other nuclear tests for the enhancement of its nuclear force.



## North Korea used its standoff with the US as leverage to maintain stability of its regime



### Maximized the “success” of successive missile launches for raising Kim Jong Un’s authority and enhancing national prestige

Amid escalating military tensions through its successive missile launches, North Korea commemorated the 105th anniversary of former President Kim Il-sung’s birth (in April) and held a ribbon-cutting ceremony for “Ryomyong Street,” a residential high-rise project, stating that “it was a display of invincible national power of Socialist Korea,” while also holding a large-scale military parade in which it displayed what looked to be a new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), thereby showing off its enhanced military power to every person in and out of Korea.

Even afterwards, when North Korea launched “Hwasong-14,” a purported “intercontinental ballistic rocket” (in July) and conducted its 6th nuclear test (in September), it invited nuclear scientists, who contributed to its development, to the capital city of Pyongyang where it successively hosted celebratory events such as artist performances and lavish banquet, as well as other large scale celebratory functions nationwide, staging an atmosphere of a “great auspicious event in its national history,” and boasted the “greatness” of Party Chairman Kim Jong Un for supervising its

nuclear and missile development.

In addition, under its government statement criticizing the UN Security Council Resolution (in August) and also the “Statement of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission” which was issued to oppose President Trump’s statement of the “total destruction” of North Korea at the UN General Assembly (in September), North Korea made efforts to strengthen the unity of its regime centered on Kim Jong Un by convening extensive mass meetings to support these statements in provinces, cities, plants and company offices starting with Pyongyang City – where it advocated antipathy towards the US and hailed to protect Kim Jong Un at all cost.

In these circumstances, North Korea held the 2nd plenary meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (in October) where the delegates discussed “challenges for the moment to cope with the prevailing situation” and came up with the “revolutionary responding strategy,” again emphasizing the importance of “self-reliance” (overcoming difficulties through one’s own efforts without external help).



### Despite growing sanctions from the international community, North Korea struggled to evade negative impact by taking various measures

Economically, North Korea’s successive missile launches and nuclear tests further intensified sanctions from the UN Security Council Resolution where the export of its main exports such as coal, iron ore, fishery products, and textiles were fully prohibited, while limitations were placed on the import of crude oil and petroleum products as well as the dispatch of its laborers overseas (in August and September). If these measures were strictly implemented, the estimated loss for North Korea would have been

approximately 90% of the value of foreign exports (roughly 2.4 billion USD), and 30% of yearly import volumes of crude oil and petro-products (roughly 2.5 million barrels), and it was reported that business activities relating to the embargoed goods stagnated and gasoline prices skyrocketed.


In these circumstances, North Korea slipped through these sanctions and attempted to export coal while undertaking businesses that utilize coal as raw material for chemical products and displayed efforts

to boost its domestic consumption of coal. In addition, North Korea pushed a number of businesses from its homeland to participate in the yearly International Trade Exhibitions, held in Pyongyang and Rason, making efforts to acquire foreign currency through marketing its products to foreign businesses.

Moreover, in relations with China, as exports with China experienced a significant decline from embargoes on goods such as coal (there was a 28.1% drop from previous year in period of January to October), North Korea strove to secure much needed machinery, electronics, and food supplies by increasing its imports from China (11.1% increase in same period from previous year). Besides these, North Korea strove to overcome negative impacts from these sanctions by directing its people to strengthen its “economic autonomy and self-reliance,” and to rejuvenate activities in each economic sector.

## ■ Trade value of imports and exports between China and North Korea

(USD 100 million)



\*The red dotted line indicates the projection for the whole year, based on the rate of increase during January-October.

Source: China Customs Statistics

## ▶▶▶ Continued efforts to maintain and strengthen its regime towards the 70th anniversary of its founding

Following toughened sanctions by the international community, effects considered to be caused by these sanctions have gradually emerged in North Korea; for example, several of North Korean businesses relating to embargoed goods reportedly became stagnant. In this regard, the possibility of North Korea's domestic economy falling into stagnation while lengthening the sanctions in the coming years cannot be ruled out.

Under these circumstances, with the

milestone of the 70th anniversary of its national founding approaching, North Korea is assessed to accelerate ideological education and publicity activities toward the anniversary and urge senior officials and residents to rouse and strengthen their union by, among other things, calling plants and businesses for attaining their achievements such as increased production, thereby continuously striving to maintain and strengthen its regime.

## Noted points seen in the reshuffling of its leadership in the “2nd Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea”

At the 2nd plenary meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (in October), in addition to the adoption of a decree, titled “On challenges for the moment to cope with the prevailing situation” which stipulated measures in response to sanctions against North Korea, a reshuffling of the Party leadership was made where five members were appointed to the WPK Political Bureau as full members, four were appointed as candidate members of the WPK Political Bureau, six were appointed as vice chairmen to the Central Committee, four were appointed as members of the Central Military Commission of WPK, and seven were appointed as directors of the Central Committee.

In this reshuffling of personnel, a member of the Presidium of the WPK Political Bureau and concurrently Vice Chairman of the Central Committee, Choe Ryong Hae, who had been previously the 5th highest ranked official, was also appointed as a member of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the WPK and a director of the Central Committee, thereby surpassing Premier Pak Pong Ju and Hwang Pyong So, General of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), to become the 3rd highest ranking official just behind

President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea, Kim Yong-nam. As the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) holds strong authority in controlling organizational and personnel matters in North Korea, General Secretary Kim Jong Il and Chairman Kim Jong Un reportedly served as Director of the OGD; however, with the aforementioned ascension in the North Korean hierarchy, there is a possibility that Choe Ryong Hae was appointed as Director of the OGD. If Choe, who earlier took charge of youth organizations, was appointed as Director of the OGD, he would be on par with other members of the Presidium of the WPK Political Bureau representing each major sector; namely, Kim Yong Nam, representing Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA: Parliament) as President of the Presidium of the SPA; Pak Pong Ju, representing the Cabinet as the Premier; and Hwang Pyong So, representing the military as Chief of the General Political Bureau of KPA. In such a case, it may be said that with this personnel reshuffle, arrangements to the Presidium of the WPK Political Bureau under Kim Jong Un’s regime was complete.

### ■ The Presidium of the Political Bureau of the Workers’ Party of Korea (excluding Kim Jong Un)

Name	Kim Yong Nam	Choe Ryong Hae	Pak Pong Ju	Hwang Pyong So
Main title\ Concurrent position	President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly	Vice Chairman of the WPK Central Committee Director of the Organization and Guidance Department (estimated)	Premier of the Cabinet	Director of the General Political Bureau of KPA
Member of Presidium of the Politburo of the WPK	○	○	○	○
Member of Central Military Commission (CMC) of the WPK		○	○	○
Vice Chairman of State of Affairs Commission (SAC) of North Korea		○	○	○

Also, it is assessed that Kim Jong-un’s younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, whose deeds of giving assistance to Kim Jong Un have been occasionally reported by media, was appointed to an alternate member of WPK Political Bureau and was elected from her previously held position of vice director to a more senior position such as First Vice Director of the WPK. On top of that, regional Party leaders, such as, Pak Thae Song (alternate member of the Politburo, and Chairman of South Pyongan Provincial Party Committee), Choe Hwi (Vice Chairman of

Hamgyong Provincial Party Committee, former First Vice Director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department), and Pak Thae Dok (Chairman of South Hwanghae Provincial Party Committee) were appointed as members or alternate members of the Politburo, while prominent figures from Kim Jong Il’s rule, namely Kim Ki Nam and Chae Thae Bok, both Vice Chairman of WPK Central Committee, were believed to have retired, indicating a passing of the torch of its leadership to a new generation.

## North Korea disapproved of Japan's attitude towards it and indicated its intention to improve relations but showed no action in implementing agreements with Japan



### North Korea intimidated Japan amid intensified pressure

North Korea strongly accused Japan by repeatedly issuing statements and commentaries strongly opposing Japan's moves of using the international stages of the G7 Summit in Taormina (in May) and UN General Assembly (in September) to intensify pressure on North Korea.

It especially stated that "if Japan were to

take hostile action, our targets (besides US forces in Japan) would have to change" (in May), and "if nuclear war were to break out, the Japanese territories would be its first targets" (in October), intimidating Japan of possible nuclear attacks with repeated missile launches and nuclear tests.



### North Korea brought up the "humanitarian issues" to Japan, yet avoided the abduction issue

Regarding the abduction issue of Japanese citizens, North Korea showed no intention in implementing the 2014 Japan-North Korea Inter-governmental Agreement (Stockholm Agreement) on the reinvestigation of Japanese citizens in North Korea including the abductees, by repeating its past line of insistence; for example, Ambassador of North Korea's Foreign Ministry Song Il Ho said, "No one is interested (in the issue of past abductions)" (in April), and Ja Song Il, the Director of Japan Institute stated the issue "was resolved" (in July).

On the other hand, North Korea publicized

accounts of Japanese citizens who were still alive in its country and so-called "Japanese wives" (who went to North Korea with their North Korean husband) through the Japanese media (in April); and when Japanese media reporters visited North Korea, officials from North Korea's Foreign Ministry told these reporters that "we are ready to work this out as a humanitarian issue if Japan wishes for it." It is believed that behind this lay North Korea's intention to gauge response in Japan by impressing on the Japanese side the existence of Japanese citizens residing in North Korea.



### North Korea continuously seems to wait for Japan to change its policy vis-à-vis North Korea

It is believed that for the moment, North Korea is placing its highest priority on breaking through with its relations with the US and that North Korea would maintain its stance to wait for change in Japan's internal attitude regarding the pending issues

between Japan and North Korea. In the meantime, it is assessed that North Korea intends to improve its image and build new human networks through exchanges with Japan's entities, including private organizations and research institutions.



## ≡ COLUMN ≡

### Matters surrounding the “Yodo-go” hijacker group

Regarding the “Yodo-go” hijacker group\* – allegedly involved with cases of Japanese abductees in Europe – North Korea appeared to conduct several rounds of interviews on the abduction issue with the group’s members still alive in North Korea, based on the Japanese-North Korea Inter-governmental Agreements of 2014; however, the group has insisted it has been falsely accused and has demanded the Japanese government revoke arrest warrants on suspicion of kidnapping Japanese citizens.

In these circumstances, “Yodo-go” supporters in Japan – centered on “Center for Providing Support for the Return of ‘Yodo-go’ Members to Japan” connected to the support group, “Kari-no-kai” – visited North Korea several times to discuss a policy for future campaigns leading to the return of all group members. Based on these results, a book titled, “False Accusations of Abductions in

Europe – Media reports pertaining to abductions by ‘Yodo-go’ group and state compensation suit” was published (in March) and a website called. “Welcome to Japanese Village of Yodo-go” was launched (in November) amongst other activities to raise public awareness about the group.

*\* Refers to nine members of the Red Army Faction of the Communist League and their wives, who hijacked Japan Airlines Flight 351 (nicknamed “Yodo-go”) on March 31, 1970, and later took the plane across the border into North Korea on April 3 of the same year. Currently, a total of eight people, including five hijackers and three wives, remain in North Korea (among the eight, two are allegedly dead, but its authenticity cannot be confirmed), living in the outskirts of Pyongyang in the residential complex known as “Japanese Village.”*

1-4

### Chongryon strove to establish and expand its members’ loyalty to Party Chairman Kim Jong-un and strengthen their unity



#### Commitment to strengthen ideology and organization through repeated implementation of “intensive campaigns”

In 2017, the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) specified that “this year will be a year of transformation for North Koreans living in Japan to develop their movements to reach higher levels matching the new age of the revolutionary ideology of Juche,” and it conducted activities that were assigned and presented by North Korea’s Party Chairman Kim Jong Un. Namely, based on Kim Jong Un’s request in his letter that was sent at the 60th anniversary of the founding of Chongryon (May 2015) to establish the ideological system within the organization and strengthen its grass-root organs, Chongryon implemented the “50-day intensive battle” (from February to March) with the aim to vitalize activities at its

branches, and successively conducted the “100-day campaign” (May - August) and “90-day campaign” (September to November) in which Chongryon focused on five “enhancements,” namely, 1) strengthen its ideological education, 2) strengthen the foundations of its branches, chapters and grass-root organs of relevant organizations, 3) strengthen activities of ethnic education, 4) strengthen service to the lives of its compatriots, and 5) strengthen the campaign to unite the Koreans under the North Korean flag. These “intensive campaigns” were a continuation of the “60-day intensive battle” held in 2016 (May - July) and the “100-day intensive battle” (August - November), which made it rare to hold five series of campaigns within a 2-year period indicating that

Chongryon's Central Headquarters strove to enhance its overall organizational activities

and to achieve such results it could show off to Pyongyang.

## Chongryon insisted on the “legitimacy” of North Korea’s missile launches

In response to the launch of ICBM “Hwasong-14” (in July) by North Korea, Chongryon sent a congratulatory letter to North Korea in the name of its Central Standing Committee, praising it for “sorting the confrontation with US imperialism and bringing the final victory,” and issued a comment by Chongryon’s Vice Chairman (dated August 9) supporting the statement given by the North Korean government (on August 7) of criticizing the UN Security Council’s decision to adopt Resolution 2371, thereby emphasizing the “legitimacy” of the missile launch. Also, regarding North Korea’s nuclear test (on September 3), in a letter commemorating the 69th anniversary of the founding of North Korea (on September 9), Chongryon praised Chairman Kim Jong Un as a “great man and commander from heaven” who guided the nuclear tests. Furthermore, after Chairman Kim Jong Un gave the “Declaration from the State Affairs Commission of North Korea” (on September 21) reproaching President Trump’s remarks at the General Debate of the UN General

Assembly, Chongryon completely embraced Kim’s action with its Central Standing Committee declaring that it “will devotedly safeguard Kim Jong Un and defend the homeland to the last” (on September 22), as well as, holding a meeting of Chongryon activists (on September 28) supporting the statement of the Chairman of the State Affairs Commission by claiming that it “will solidify its ranks by ‘uniting in one heart’ amidst the whirlpool of ‘anti-DPRK and anti-Chongryon schemes.’”

Regarding these situations, Chongryon advocated that “a volatile and edgy situation has been created that will bring either war or peace on the Korean Peninsula,” and through protest activities at the US Embassy in Japan (on August 22) opposing the joint military exercises (during August 21 - 31) and an emergency meeting (on August 23), it criticized the joint drills as “a reckless act of military provocation” and called on its internal organs to “safeguard the homeland and defend Chongryon.”

## Conducted active push for South and North Korean residents in Japan

After the inauguration of the Moon Jae In administration in South Korea (in May), Chongryon urged a return to “harmony” with the Korean Residents Union in Japan (Mindan) by issuing a statement, titled “Appeal to all compatriots living in Japan” as the timing coincided with the 11th anniversary of the 5.17 Joint Statement declaring “concord” between Chongryon and Mindan (on May 17, 2006). Also, marking the 17th anniversary of the June 15th North-South Joint Declaration (on June 15, 2000), Chongryon announced remarks in the name

of its Vice Chairman (in June) designating the period between June 15 and October 4 as the “anniversary period for the North-South Joint Declaration” (on June 15, 2007, the “Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and the Development of South-North Relations” was announced), and strove to promote the sense of North-South unification and ethnic unity by inviting both North and South Korean residents to attend commemorative events such as lectures and social gatherings in various cities in Japan.



## **Focused on activities for applying a system of “tuition-free education in public senior-high schools” to North Korea-aligned Korean schools**

In pursuit of “tuition-free education” for North Korea-aligned Korean schools in Japan, Chongryon held periodic protests and requesting activities, and as court decisions were passed down in lawsuits it filed in 5 locations nationwide that were in dispute of “tuition-free high school education” (in July: Hiroshima District Court denied their claim, Osaka District Court ruled for their claim; in

September: Tokyo District Court ruled against their claim; and cases are still pending in Aichi and Fukuoka District Courts), many activists attended court hearings and report meetings held by people concerned with North Korea-aligned Korean schools eliciting public opinion towards “tuition-free high school education” for these schools.



## **Attempts to further invigorate internal campaigns in light of the 24th Congress of Chongryon**

As Chongryon is expected to convene the 24th Congress in 2018, attention will be placed on the reshuffling of its central leadership, such as, how Chongryon would strengthen the current regime under Chairman Ho Jong Man, who is over 80 years old, and also how it would solidify its system of succession. Looking towards the

event, it is likely that Chongryon will intend to further invigorate publicity and local branch activities by carrying out new “intensive campaigns” in the beginning of 2018 in its aim to show off efforts of Chongryon’s central leadership, centered on Ho Jong-man, to North Korea.

## **Trends in the 60th anniversary of North Korea's educational grants & scholarships to Chongryon**

Since 1957, North Korea has set up an allocation of their state budget for “educational grants and scholarships” towards the “democratic and ethnic education of Korean compatriots and their children in Japan,” which it has been sending to Chongryon every year. According to announcements made by North Korea, it has sent a total of 48,005,990,390 Japanese Yen over 163 installments up to April 2017 (JPY 218 million sent in 2017), which Chongryon claimed it spent for the construction of Korea University (in Tokyo) and operation fees for each of North Korea-aligned Korean schools, as well as scholarships for its youth residing in Japan.

As the year 2017 marked the 60th anniversary since it has been receiving aid for “educational grants and scholarships,” Chongryon held various events commemorating this year and focused on activities to gain publicity, hailing the greatness of the leader of North Korea.

In April, senior officials from Chongryon's Central Headquarters as well as its regional headquarters and principals of North Korea-aligned Korean schools attended the central convention held at the Tokyo Korea Cultural

Center (Kita Ward, Tokyo) commemorating the 60th anniversary of the “educational grants and scholarships,” where students of these Korean schools gave performing arts performances. At the convention, Chairman Ho Jong Man gave the welcoming address, saying, “As the bearers of Chongryon's great undertakings of love of our compatriots and love of our country, as many as 110,000 graduates of our Korean schools, who received and were raised by the grace of the educational grants and scholarships, have grown to become fine and capable people for the prosperity of the homeland (North Korea) and the peaceful unification.” In addition, Chongryon organized sports festivals for students of North Korean schools in Kanto, Tokai and Kinki regions (in September). Moreover, Chongryon's regional headquarters and its affiliate groups, as well as North Korea-aligned Korean schools including Korea University, sent letters of gratitude to Chairman Kim Jong Un, expressing their loyalty, stating, “We will continue, without change, activities of educating our Korean people as the main objective of Chongryon in accordance with the noble will of Marshal Kim Jong Un.”



2-1

## The 2nd Xi Jinping's leadership was inaugurated, establishing power base over both personnel and political thought



### National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held and Xi Jinping given 2nd term as leader

The Communist Party of China held its National Congress (19th National Congress of the Communist Party) for the first time in five years (October 18 - 24) and immediately after that, the first plenary session of the 19th Central Committee (First Plenum of the Central Committee) was held where future policies and top leadership of the Communist Party were decided. Regarding personnel matters, General Secretary Xi Jinping was reelected as General Secretary and five of the seven members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, which constitutes the party's top leadership, were replaced. Many of the newly elected members of Political

Bureau, including Standing Committee members, reportedly have close ties with Xi Jinping, which appeared to lead to his enhanced power base. (Refer to graph on right.)

In addition, without a possible successor being elected as a member of the Standing Committee at this time, Xi Jinping's administration has avoided becoming a lame duck during the 2nd term and has maintained its centripetal force within the Party leadership (Refer to the Column below).

Furthermore, with personnel changes to the Central Military Commission (CMC) at the First Plenum of the Central Committee,

### Members of the 19th Political Bureau

		Name	Contact with General Secretary Xi Jinping
<div>Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (7 members)</div> <div>Members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (25 members)</div>	Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (7 members)	Xi Jinping	-
		Li Keqiang	-
		Li Zhanshu	Regional (Hebei Province)
		Wang Yang	-
		Wang Huning	-
		Zhao Leji	Other
		Han Zheng	Regional (Shanghai City)
	Members of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (25 members)	Ding Xuexiang	Regional (Shanghai City)
		Wang Chen	Other
		Liu He	Other
		Xu Qiliang	Regional (Fujian Province)
		Sun Chunlan	-
		Li Xi	Other
		Li Qiang	Regional (Zhejiang Province)
		Li Hongzhong	Other
		Chen Quanguo	-
		Chen Min'er	Regional (Zhejiang Province)
		Yang Jiechi	-
		Yang Xiaodu	Regional (Shanghai City)
		Zhang Youxia	Other
		Chen Xi	Other
		Hu Chunhua	-
		Guo Shengkun	-
		Huang Kunming	Regional (Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces)
		Cai Qi	Regional (Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces)

Regional: People who reportedly came in contact with Xi Jinping while he served in regional offices.

Other: People with ties to Xi Jinping apart from his time in regional offices such as university and local ties.

which was downsized from 11 members to seven, the position of Xi Jinping, who was re-elected as Chairman of the CMC, has relatively increased. With this downsizing, commanders of the Ground Force, Navy, Air

Force and other forces were dropped, and an unified leadership structure of its armed forces under the CMC was put in place, thereby enhancing Xi Jinping's control of the armed forces as Chairman of the CMC.

## General Secretary Xi Jinping's authority further increased with establishment of a guiding thought


At the National Congress, revisions were made to the Party's constitution as the governing idea that had been advocated by General Secretary Xi Jinping were specified as the Party's guiding thought and became known as, "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era." By having his name attached puts this guiding thought on the same level as Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, which appears to indicate Xi gaining further power putting him on equal footing with Mao and Deng.

In addition, in his political report at the National Congress, Xi Jinping announced that China has entered the stage of "becoming strong" from the developmental stages of "stand up" and "grow rich" since his inauguration in 2012 and posited it as a "New Era." Moreover, he presented a roadmap of China becoming a global "strong state," setting, among other things, a new goal to realize a "socialist modern strong state" in which China will have world-class national power, international influence, and military by the mid-21st century after attaining the "overall completion of a moderately prosperous society" in 2020 and realizing the "socialist modernization" in 2035.

It is assessed that behind the plan of

this long-term vision lay his aim to strengthen the domestic centripetal force towards the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." In addition, the emphasis on the "new era" indicated China's intention to raise Xi Jinping as a historical leader of the Party who would be able to put into motion the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" ("become strong") with the same status as Mao Zedong, who achieved the founding of the nation ("stand up"), and Deng Xiaoping, who realized a high level of economic growth ("grow rich").

## Classification of development stages and new goals set at the 19th National Congress of the Party



## Efforts made towards domestic stability while enhancing the centripetal force of the Communist Party

Looking towards the National Congress, the Xi Jinping's administration carried out educational activities to study the governing idea of General Secretary Xi Jinping, as well as strived to increase the Communist Party's centripetal force by enhancing national prestige with, among other things, the launch of China's first domestically-built aircraft

carrier (in April), the "20th Anniversary of Hong Kong's Return to Motherland" (in July), and the "Ceremony of reviewing troops commemorating the 90th Anniversary of Jianjun Parade" (in July).

In addition, in anticipation of the National Congress, moves that further tightened control over society were also observed. In

the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, where 60% of residents are reportedly followers of the Islamic faith, “regulations for de-radicalization” was enacted (in April), and regulations of religious customs of its residents were strengthened in the name of the fight against terrorism. Oppression relating to the Chinese democracy movement also continued as China did not permit overseas treatment of literary critic and 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Liu Xiaobo (died in July) which he and his family reportedly requested during his imprisonment.

Further, the Xi Jinping administration showed its stance to strengthen its management and control of information viewed as harmful to the Party and the government by, among others, enacting and putting into effect the “National Intelligence Law” (in June), which authorizes the obligations of cooperation and the confidentiality of intelligence activities from its citizens, and putting into effect the Cybersecurity Law (in June) that grants authorities to oversee and manage internet usage of businesses and internet users.


## Public investments showed stable business conditions, but economic reform stagnant

The Xi Jinping administration announced that “in light of the National Congress, 2017 will be a year of great significance for the development of undertakings of the Communist Party and nation” (in March: 2017 Report on the Work of the Government) and looked to provide economic and societal stability through “stable growth, security of employment, and risk prevention.”


At the Fifth Session of the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC) of China (in March), the delegates showed an economic policy attaching importance to stability, in which they would uphold a “proactive fiscal policy” and a “moderate and neutral monetary policy” by increasing public investment to deter the adverse economic conditions and avoid overheating the real estate market. Concerning the government budget for 2017, the amount to be issued for local government special bonds, used mainly for public investments, doubled from the previous year, and by forecasting the M2 money supply to increase by 12% in 2017, an increased figure from 2016 (11.3%), China’s GDP attained a 6.9% growth in the first half of the year, largely reaching its yearly target (roughly 6.5%) before the 19th National Congress. On the other hand, as it emphasized economic stability, it made strides to maintain the exchange rate concerning the depreciation of the yuan by such measures as strengthening capital control, and the foreign exchange reserves headed for a rise after hitting the 3 trillion-dollar mark in January. From around April, regulations of bank financing based on

credit were strengthened leading to restraint of the financial landscape. Further, the Xi Jinping administration announced the move to establish a “Financial Stability and Development Commission” (in July) as a

### ■ Movement and targets for growth rate of China’s gross domestic product (GDP)



### ■ Movement of debts and balances of non-financial businesses of principal nations and areas



unified body to guide the banking, securities, and insurance sectors, and indicated that the central government would collectively control financial risks.

In regards to economic reform, under the directives of deepening structural reform, goals were raised to reduce corporate debt, eliminate “Zombie companies” (state-owned companies that failed in their businesses but remain in existence with assistance from institutions such as banks), and resolve overcapacity in order to maintain sustainable growth.

Regarding the reduction of corporate debt,

a certain amount of effort was seen as there was a halt in the rise of debt in relation to GDP, but progress was not really made in the elimination of large “Zombie companies;” and although numerical figures showed that resolving overcapacity was a “success,” there were indications that what had been disposed were only idle facilities, and in actuality, there have been months where the monthly steel production was recorded as the highest ever, indicating that such disposals did not lead to the reduction of production capacity.



### **Facing difficulty balancing economic growth with control of financial risk and structural reform towards the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Party**

In the 2nd term of Xi Jinping’s administration, it is likely that Xi’s leadership would strive to make achievements such as increasing lower class incomes for the time being by accomplishing the “overall completion of a moderately prosperous society” in anticipation of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC (in 2021) and towards the future establishment of a “socialist modern strong state” with its centralized regime in the background. During the process, its goal is reportedly to double

2010’s GDP by 2020, by which an annual economic growth of 6.5% is required in order to do so. On the other hand, in the “government report” (in October at the 19th National Congress), the goal of structural reform was also upheld; therefore, it is assessed that the Xi Jinping administration would be faced with handling a challenging economy, restraining financial risk by, among other measures, lowering corporate debt which still remains at a high level, while striving to sustain economic growth.

## Uncertainty mounted surrounding “post-Xi Jinping regime”

By fixing the retirement practice of both Standing Committee and Political Bureau members over 68 years of age at a National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the Party has attempted generational transfer its top leadership. However, prior to the 19th National Congress, the 69-year-old Wang Qishan, who acted as General Secretary Xi Jinping’s right-hand man in propelling the anti-corruption campaign, was viewed as a likely candidate to remain in office which would break the practice and open the way for Xi Jinping, who will be 69 and would have been required to step down at the 20th National Congress of the Party (in 2022), to remain in office, drawing considerable attention. Ultimately, Wang Qishan stepped down from the Standing Committee and the practice was upheld.

On the other hand, the “post-Xi Jinping” regime has grown increasingly uncertain. The succession of power of the Party’s top leadership until now has been carried out by electing an heir candidate of General Secretary and President among the next generation as a member of the Standing Committee before the retirement of the current General Secretary and President; with former General Secretary Hu Jintao and current General Secretary Xi Jinping both having experienced top leadership as Standing Committee members before assuming the

Rank	Name	Age
1	Xi Jinping	64
2	Li Keqiang	62
3	Li Zhanshu	67
4	Wang Yang	62
5	Wang Huning	62
6	Zhao Leji	60
7	Han Zheng	63

Current members of the Standing Committee of the CPC (Names in red indicate newly appointed members. Ages are as of the end of 2017)

posts of General Secretary and President. (Refer to table below). According to the aforementioned retirement practice in the succession of power, a possible successor to Xi Jinping – who would have the possibility of serving two 5-year terms as General Secretary and President after the 20th National Congress of the Party – should have been 57 years or younger at the time of the 19th National Congress. However, no heir candidate under 57 was elected to the Standing Committee overriding past precedents in terms of succession of power.

With the absence of “post-Xi Jinping” candidates within the Standing Committee, Xi Jinping has gained unprecedented power and authority never before seen. Under these circumstances, a view has been emerged that Xi Jinping’s term would be extended.

## Succession of power in the Party after the Jiang Zemin administration

Party Congress	General Secretary	Successor (Standing Committee)	Notes
14th (Oct. 1992)	Jiang Zemin (66)	Hu Jintao (50)	Hu Jintao was elected to Standing Committee from Central Committee.
15th (Sep. 1997)	Jiang Zemin (71)	Hu Jintao (55)	
16th (Nov. 2002)	Hu Jintao (60)	—	Retirement of Standing Committee members over age 68 became precedent.
17th (Oct. 2007)	Hu Jintao (65)	Xi Jinping (54)	Xi Jinping was elected to Standing Committee from Central Committee.
18th (Nov. 2012)	Xi Jinping (59)	—	
19th (Oct. 2017)	Xi Jinping (64)	—	No Standing Committee member under age 57, eligible to remain as a member for in two consecutive 5-year terms after the 20th National Congress of the Party, was elected

Number in parenthesis indicate age at the time of Party Congress. After Zhao Ziyang was dismissed as General Secretary during the 4th Plenary Session of the CPC 13th Central Committee (Jun. 1989), former General Secretary Jiang Zemin was elected to the Standing Committee from the Political Bureau of CPC and ultimately to General Secretary.



## Despite struggling to stabilize its external environment in the preparation for its Party congress, China showed clear stance to lead global order



### China struggled to restrain tension over issues such as change in US administrations and North Korea


From its aim to “do everything it can to bring about good foreign relations in order to hold a successful 19th National Congress” (in January: Spokesperson of China’s Foreign Ministry), China was intent on a building stable foreign environment and struggled to prevent tensions from rising on various diplomatic issues.

Regarding the relations with the US, China pursued building stable relations with the Trump administration, who originally showed a hardline stance against China before his inauguration, through measures such as meetings between both heads of state (in April and November) and establishing and putting into practice a framework of dialogue and resolving trade issues (Refer to the Column below).

In addition, China showed a cooperative stance with the international community by showing support of UN Security Council resolutions regarding North Korean affairs (in June, August, and September) and taking a series of actions towards its implementation, while giving caution to the US which applied its own pressure on North Korea, such as reiterating that it will “resolve issues through dialogue and talks” with North Korea. On the other hand, a sluggish situation persisted with China’s relations with North Korea as a war of words through the press and media over the issues of the latter’s nuclear and ballistic missiles was observed between them. Relations with South Korea remained stagnant as China took measures to deal a blow in South Korea’s economy by, for example, suspending South Korean businesses in China for “reasons of safety” in retaliation to those South Korean companies which offered their lands as sites for the deployment of the US’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the US Armed Forces in South Korea. However, after the 19th Party Congress, diplomatic authorities of both countries

agreed to let bilateral relations “expeditiously bring back on a normal development track” (in October), and convened a summit meeting (in November), showing moves to repair its relations with South Korea. China emphasized its stance of strengthening its relations with Russia opposing the US on North Korea issues, by holding a string of summits (in May, June, July, September, and November) and announcing a joint statement confirming “peaceful solutions” to the North Korea issue (in July).

### ■ Correlation diagram of China and other countries over the recent situation in North Korea



Regarding the South China Sea issue, China maintained an unwavering stance to defend its “sovereignty and interests” in the region and steadily pushed forward the promotion of artificially constructed islands there as military sites. On the other hand, in relations with member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), China stressed its stance of pursuing dialogue and cooperation with countries in the region by, for example, propelling talks on the enactment of the South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC) in deterring new conflict and confrontation, showing its intention to conciliate with other competing nations and inhibit intervention from the international community.

In relations with India, China’s

roadbuilding in the border region of China, India and Bhutan triggered disputes involving troops of both armies (in June). China accused Indian forces as illegally “violating the border” (in June: Spokesperson of China’s Foreign Ministry), and the

confrontation lasted over 2 months; however, with the 9th BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) summit (in September, Xiamen) chaired by China approaching, that both countries reached terms and settled the matter (in August).

## COLUMN

### China’s perception of the new US administration and its response

Not only did President Donald Trump criticize the US trade deficit with China during his election campaign, he made phone conversations with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen (in December 2016) revealing his doubts about the “One-China” policy (in the same month), with these moves increasing a sense of caution in China about the “possibility of damaging the existing framework of US-China relations,” and this possibly led to President Xi Jinping’s early visit to the US and meeting with Trump (in April). During the summit meeting, they agreed to formulate the “100-Day Action Plan” to jointly tackle economic and trade issues and establish four frameworks of bilateral dialogues (refer to graph on right), but it coincided with the air strikes by US forces in Syria, leaving China unsure of Trump’s unpredictability. In addition, China was bombarded with pressure from the US which gave priority to solving North Korea’s nuclear and missile issue. Under these circumstances, China – while trying to ease pressure from the US – initiated the frameworks of dialogue agreed upon at the

summit and prevented differing opinions from deteriorating its relations with the US, thereby showing its stance of deepening and strengthening a cooperative relationship. Moreover, it urged “overall” stability in US-China relations by signing business deals in total of \$250 billion (roughly ¥28 trillion as of November) during Trump’s visit to China (in November), and emphasized the “significance of a mutual relationship of the two major economies of the world” (President Xi).

#### ■ Plan and frameworks of dialogue agreed at the US-China summit (in April)

##### 100-Day Action Plan

- Agreed to lift China’s ban on imports of US beef and to promote imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US (in May).

##### Four Frameworks of Dialogue

- US-China Diplomatic and Security Dialogue (held in June)
- US-China Comprehensive Economic Dialogue (held in July)
- US-China Social and Cultural Dialogue (held in September)
- US-China Law Enforcement and Cybersecurity Dialogue (held in October)



### Emphasized its stance to tackle global issues, showing moves opposing protectionism in Europe and the US

With the rise of protectionism in Western countries, including the new US administration setting up the “America First” policy, China urged for the “opposition of protectionism” and the “firm development of an economy with free trade” (in January: President Xi Jinping) making an appeal to the international community, claiming “China is the country that is supporting a system of free trade.” China also emphasized its

intention to take an initiative role in dealing with global issues such as improving climate change and poverty.

It is assessed that behind these activities lay China’s aim to improve its image as a “major power” and to strengthen its soft power by showing off its presence as a player of a new “global governance,” thereby steering the existing international order to its favor.



## The first “Belt and Road” Forum for International Cooperation convened with intention to expand China’s global sphere of influence and military purpose

China hosted the first “Belt and Road” Forum for International Cooperation (“Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”) in Beijing (in May), positioning itself as one of China’s “major home-ground diplomacies.” At the forum, China made appeals for the initiative’s expansion and development (refer to Column on p26), expanding its target areas including Latin America, and emphasizing it as a public good to the international community, while announcing a list of over 270 concrete results for the “vision to become reality” (in May: President Xi Jinping).

It is assessed that behind the aforementioned Forum lay China’s intention to generate momentum for the initiative which China positioned as a “new platform for international cooperation,” expand China’s sphere of influence including military

elements with the formation of China-led global order as its focus, and increase President Xi’s authority who was the initial advocate of the initiative.

Regarding its maritime front, China presented its “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative” (in June), substantiating its maritime strategies for the initiative. In addition, relevant moves were observed indicating that China intended to establish bases as a foothold for its maritime advancement along corridors in the aforementioned “Vision” as, for example, China began operations of a “support base” in Djibouti in the eastern part of Africa that became the first overseas military base of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and an agreement was struck with Sri Lanka allowing Chinese firms to take over control of Hambantota Port on a 99-year lease (in July).

### ≡ COLUMN ≡

#### Details on the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation

Approximately 1,500 participants, which included heads of states and top government officials from 29 nations as well as officials from over 130 nations and 70 international organizations attended China’s first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (during May 14 – 15, in Beijing).

China called it a “great success” with the number of participating nations including Japan and the US; however, the forum became yet another place where concern over the Belt and Road initiative came to light as India, with worries about the impact of the initiative over its territorial sovereignty, decided not to send government representatives, and some of the Western countries reportedly voiced their concerns over the initiative’s transparency.

At the 19th Party Congress (in October), China added the initiative into the constitution of the Party, and it is likely China would further push the initiative to gain concrete achievements by accelerating loans and investments to countries along the initiative’s corridors through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which supports the initiative from a financial aspect.

#### ■ List of 29 nations that sent their heads of states and other top officials

Asia (14 nations)	Indonesia Uzbekistan Kazakhstan Cambodia Kyrgyzstan	Sri Lanka Turkey Pakistan Philippines Vietnam	Malaysia Myanmar Mongolia Laos
Europe (10 nations)	Italy Greek Switzerland Spain	Serbia Czech Republic Hungary Belarus	Poland Russia
Africa (2 nations)	Ethiopia	Kenya	
South America (2 nations)	Argentina	Chile	
Oceania (1 nation)	Fiji		



## Active diplomacy towards becoming a “strong state with global influence” is expected

At the 19th National Congress of the CPC, the Xi Jinping administration presented its diplomatic goal to “build a community with a shared future for mankind” based on China’s rhetoric such as “non-intervention of internal affairs,” “post-Cold War mentality” and “post-alliance.” In addition, it presented a roadmap towards “becoming a state possessing top-level global influence” and a “strong state” by mid-century. Furthermore,

regarding personnel matters, the 2nd term of the Xi Jinping administration indicates a stance to attach importance to diplomacy, with, for example, a member of the Political Bureau of the Party in charge of diplomatic affairs being appointed for the first time in the past 15 years, making it likely that they would actively pursue further achievements towards the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

**2-3**

## China aimed for stable relations with Japan, but showed distrust towards Japan on historical awareness and issues related to its core interests



## China used the 45th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China as an opportunity to promote exchange and strengthened its economic approach under the “Belt and Road” initiative

As the year 2017 marked the milestone of the 45th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, by taking this opportunity to hold commemoration events and promote exchange at both government and civilian levels, China showed its stance to create an environment to improve relations vis-a-vis Japan, by, for

example, releasing a message that “each of us is an important neighboring country” to each other (in July: President Xi Jinping). Both countries repeated intergovernmental exchange; for example, during the summit meeting between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Xi Jinping (in July, Germany), they agreed to “move ahead to establish

Main lectures relating to the “Belt and Road” initiative

Date	Target group	Lecturer
May.14	Local Assembly members, Japan-China friendship and exchange organizations	Counsellor of Chinese Embassy in Japan Wang Wan
May.19	Japan-China friendship and exchange organizations	Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua
May.27	Japan-China friendship and exchange organizations	Counsellor of Chinese Embassy in Japan Wang Wan
Jun. 1	Local Assembly members	Chinese Consul General in Osaka, Li Tianran
Jun. 6	National Diet members	Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua
Jun.13	Local government officials, Local Assembly members	Chinese Consul General in Osaka, Li Tianran
Jun.14	Economic organizations	Chinese Consul General in Osaka, Li Tianran
Jun.22	Local government officials, economic organizations, etc.	Chinese Consul General in Sapporo, Sun Zhenyong
Jun.22	Local government officials, local Assembly members, etc.	Counselor of Chinese Embassy in Japan Wang Wan
Jun.29	Economic organizations, research institutes, etc.	Ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua
Jul.20	Economic organizations, research institutes, etc.	Chinese Consul General in Sapporo, Sun Zhenyong
Aug.29	Private sector groups	Chinese Consul General in Nagasaki, Liu Yaming
Sep. 5	Japan-China friendship and exchange organizations	Chinese Consul General in Nagoya, Deng Wei
Sep. 8	Local Assembly members	Counsellor of Chinese Embassy in Japan Wang Wan
Sep.27	Media, research institutes, etc.	Counsellor of Chinese Embassy in Japan Wang Wan

\*Composed from information provided by websites of the Embassy of China and its Consulate Generals in Japan



stable relations.” Under these circumstances, prime ministers of both countries exchanged congratulatory telegrams for the first time in the past 10 years on the date that the joint statement between both governments was signed (Sep. 29). From the point of improving relations, dialogue was also carried out on issues such as mutual visits by heads of states at November’s summit meeting (in Vietnam).

Further, China welcomed Abe’s indication of Japan’s intent in cooperating with China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative (in June), and with China’s government agencies holding lectures and business seminars about the initiative in different regions in Japan, China displayed moves to strengthen its promotional activities to various sectors of Japan (refer to graph on right).

### **Repeatedly dissuaded Japan on historical awareness, Taiwan, and maritime interests, and continued efforts to change current state in the East China Sea by force**

On the other hand, China continued to show a hardline stance on issues of concern between China and Japan. Regarding historical awareness, Chinese government agencies and state-run media conducted a campaign criticizing Japan over the issue caused by books relating to the “Nanjing massacres” which were placed in guest rooms of a hotel group in Japan (in January). China also demanded “correct historical awareness” from Japan by taking the opportunity of commemorating dates related to the “anti-Japanese war,” such as the “80th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident” and the “80th year of the Nanjing Massacres.” Regarding the Taiwan issue, China responded delicately to the name change of organizations representing the interests of Japan in Taiwan into the “Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association” (in January) and Senior Vice Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications, Akama Jiro’s visit to Taiwan (in March), repeatedly criticizing these

moves as “impeding on” Japan-China relations. In addition, regarding the South China Sea issue, China dissuaded Japan against certain moves, claiming the deployment of the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s naval escort “Izumo” (in May) was an act of “intervention.”

In these circumstances, China continued its public vessels’ intrusion of territorial waters in surrounding waters of the Senkaku Islands and the development of resources in disputed maritime boundaries in the East China Sea, while flying crafts that appeared to be drones were observed near these vessels (in May). Furthermore, China unilaterally escalated activities in surrounding waters of Japan, with its public vessels being found navigating in Japanese territorial waters south of Tsushima Island and near the Tsugaru Strait (in July) as well as Chinese naval vessels entering territorial waters (in July). It is assessed that these actions aimed to probe Japan’s response, and these are matters of strong concern.

### **China is expected to keep a cautious stance in assessing “concrete actions” of Japan during political exchange**

While China seeks to establish a stable relationship with Japan on one side, China denounces Japan’s stance vis-à-vis China, claiming the stance as a “mental illness” (in March: Foreign Minister Wang Yi) and continues its demand of Japan to “put its intention of improving relations into action” (in July: President Xi Jinping). Particularly, China has increased its caution against Japan’s moves – like the recent constitutional amendment strengthening the structure of its national security – indicating that China has

not dispelled its distrust with Japan. Regarding future political exchange, China is expected to take a cautious stance in determining “concrete actions.”

In contrast, in regards to bilateral exchange in the private and economic sectors, it is assessed that China would pursue wide-spread exchange in 2018 by hosting commemorative events and promoting mutual visits of relevant persons in various circles and levels. Especially, in the economic and trade sectors, China is assessed to strengthen its approach to Japan



by calling on investments and joint ventures relating to the “Belt and Road” initiative, and

also strengthen its activities to improve relations by using economy as leverage.

2-4

## Tensions gradually increased while cross-strait relations became stalemate



### China deployed both hard and soft policy towards Taiwan and applied pressure on the Tsai Ing-wen administration


China continued to suspend dialogue between authorities of both parties and reinforced pressure in various sectors on the Tsai Ing-wen administration of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has refused to affirm the “1992 Consensus” that China has positioned as a “political base in cross-strait (China-Taiwan) ties.”

Regarding the diplomatic front, China increased its attempts to lessen Taiwan’s sphere of international activities (refer to Column on p30) by blocking Taiwan’s attendance at the World Health Assembly (in May) and the 23rd annual Conference of the Parties (COP23: in November), while also establishing diplomatic relations with Panama (in June), which had maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Regarding the economic front, China reduced the visits of its people to Taiwan, causing a decline of 1.5 million Chinese visitors to Taiwan since the inauguration of the Tsai Ing-wen administration (in May, 2016).

On the other hand, China deployed hard and soft policy to diminish the centripetal force of the Tsai Ing-wen administration and

to drive it into isolation by such means as calling for a coalition with Taiwan’s main opposition party, the National People’s Party or Kuomintang (KMT), to “oppose Taiwan’s independence” – showing its stance to reinforce exchange with KMT – and announcing to ordinary Taiwanese people that China would extend affirmative measures to them for entering schools, business start-ups, and housing in China (in May).

### ■ Yearly figures of Chinese visitors to Taiwan before and after the inauguration of the Tsai Ing-wen administration



### The Tsai Ing-wen administration confronted difficult challenges with both internal and foreign policy and its approval ratings dipped

The Tsai Ing-wen administration tackled domestic issues that had been left behind by the previous administration, including “pension reform,” but the administration faced opposition from different fields due to complicated interests over these issues. On the diplomatic front, the “New Southbound Policy” of the administration, which looked to enhance relations with countries of Southeast Asia, attained limited achievements. With this, the approval rating of the administration dropped from 47% at

the time of inauguration to 21% in just one year. (On June 20: survey conducted by Taiwan’s TVBS). In anticipation of the Taiwanese local elections forecasted in November 2018, President Tsai Ing-wen strived to regain public approval by replacing Head of the Executive Yuan (in September), among other things. In its relations with China, the administration – while maintaining its early stance of refusing to affirm the “1992 Consensus,” saying “there is no need to bow down to their pressure” –

called for the transitioning of its stance towards China, saying “we should seek a

new model for cross-strait mutual exchange” (in October).

## ►►► Tension increased in Taiwan Strait with China’s military threat

With the deadlock in cross-strait relations, China increased its military threat by, for example, navigating its aircraft carrier “Liaoning” in the Taiwan Strait (in January and July), as well as increasing the number of flights of its H-6 Bombers around Taiwan’s main island from several times a year to multiple flights a week after the inauguration of the Tsai Ing-wen administration, and

expressed a plan to “continue similar military drills in the future” (in September: spokesman of the Defense Ministry of China). In response, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense expressed a sense of caution, saying “it is clear that China is strengthening its preparation to use military force against Taiwan” (in October). With these developments, tension has gradually mounted over the Taiwan Strait situation.

## ►►► China’s reaction to be a focal point in anticipation of growing US-Taiwan military relations

In the US, moves were observed to increase its military commitment to Taiwan; for example, President Trump decided to sell arms equivalent to US \$1.42 billion to Taiwan for the first time after his inauguration (in June), and the “Draft on National Defense Authorization Act for the 2018 Fiscal Year” was passed by the House of Representatives (in July) and Senate (in September), which stipulated mutual visits by navy vessels between Taiwan and the United States. In addition, there were moves in the US Congress to seek an enhanced US-Taiwan relationship as the Congress discussed (a draft of) “Taiwan Travel Act” (in October)

which allows mutual visits of government officials from both sides. In response, President Xi Jinping restrained the US commitment to Taiwan, saying China “would not tolerate any attempt to split its territorial integrity” in his speech given at the 19th Party Congress (in October), and said, “Taiwan is the most important and sensitive issue in Sino-US ties, which concerns the political foundation of bilateral relations” (in November), giving impedance to such US moves. As China responded delicately to the aforementioned buildup of military ties between the US and Taiwan, China is expected to further rise tensions in China-Taiwan relations in the future.

## ≡ COLUMN ≡

### Countries with diplomatic ties with Taiwan and their relations with China

With China restoring diplomatic relations with São Tomé and Príncipe (in December 2016) and establishing diplomatic relations with Panama (in June) after the inauguration of the Tsai Ing-wen administration, Taiwan’s diplomatic allies decreased from 22 to 20. China’s influence over these countries may be measured by their support, or lack thereof, of Taiwan becoming a member of the UN at the UN General Assembly. Among those countries which did not express support of Taiwan in 2016, the 2 nations mentioned above broke

diplomatic ties with Taiwan within the year. In 2017, five countries (see the List below) did not voice support, making the state of China’s penetration toward these countries a matter of attention.

#### ■ List of countries out of Taiwan’s 20 diplomatic allies that did not speak for Taiwan at the 2017 UN General Assembly

Europe	Vatican
Central America	El Salvador, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Honduras

**3-1**

**Failed to breakthrough in its diplomatic environment despite the opportunity of change in the US administration and strove to ensure heavy turnout and majority of votes in next presidential election**



**Russia aimed to establish a relationship with Trump, but failed to push forward in expected manner as anti-Russia sentiments rose in the US**

Following the inauguration of US President Trump (in January), who showed a positive outlook in improving relations with Russia during the US presidential elections in 2016, President Putin expressed his desire to hold a summit in the early stages of Trump's presidency at a press conference (in February) to improve US-Russia relations. However, with increased anti-Russia sentiments caused by suspicions of Russia's interference in the US Presidential elections ( "Russia-gate"), an environment to improve US-Russia relations was not laid out.

The first meeting between the Presidents of Russia and the US took place at July's G-20 Summit (in Hambury, Germany) on Financial Markets and World Economy. At the summit, President Putin displayed the formation of a good personal relationship with President Trump, but this, coupled with the "Russia-gate" investigation which even led to probes of Trump's family members, became constraining factors for the Trump administration's policy vis-à-vis Russia.

Under these circumstances, with initiatives by the US Congress, a bill to toughen economic sanctions on Russia was enacted

(in July), which Trump also signed (in August). As a countermeasure, Russia cut 755 US embassy workers in Russia, ordering the number of personnel to not exceed 455 (in July), and in response, the US ordered the closure of 3 Russian diplomatic offices (in August), leading US-Russia relations to be called "the worst it has been" (in September: Foreign Minister of Russia Sergey Lavrov). Afterwards, coordination was made for a meeting between the two heads of state at November's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit (Da Nang, Vietnam) only led to a brief chat between the two Presidents.

Regarding its relations with Europe, the European Union (EU) decided to extend sanctions (in September) against Russia until March 2018 with Russia's continued violation of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In addition, with suspicions of Russia meddling with the French Presidential election (in April and May) and the large-scaled joint military exercises between Russia and Belarus (in September), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not ease its sense of caution against Russia.



**Promoted close ties with China**

Without being able to improve relations with Western countries, by holding 5 summits with China (in May, June, July, September, and November) as well as conducting the "Joint Sea 2017" naval drills (in July and September), Russia displayed its cooperation and close relations with China in various sectors such as the political, economic and security fields.

In addition, Russia released a joint statement with China (in July) over the tense situation in the Korean Peninsula with North Korea's ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests, opposing the use of force and insisting on resolving the issue through dialogue and talks. With this, Russia showed its growing ties with China, while restraining the US, which did not rule out the possibility of

using force to solve the crisis.

Moreover, Russia took its own initiative surrounding issues on the Korean Peninsula by using the opportunity of hosting an international conference, where representatives of both North and South Korea attended, and encouraged dialogue between both parties (in October).

Furthermore, regarding the situation in Syria, Russia showed actions opposing Western countries by, for example, maintaining and deepening ties with Iran and Turkey.

Russia and China appear to be potential geopolitical rivals; however, under the current situation where no signs of diffusing tension with Western countries has been emerged, it is expected that Russia would strive to increase its presence in world politics as “a major center of influence in the modern world,” by showing its stance to strengthen bilateral relations with China, restraining relations with the US, and actively involving itself in regional issues such as the North Korean and Syrian crises.

## Intended to increase the centripetal force of President Putin in anticipation of the next Presidential election

On the domestic policy front, activities of both the Putin administration and its opposition increased in anticipation of the presidential election in March 2018.

In March, Alexei Navalny, a political activist and a promoter of the “anti-Putin rallies” in the previous presidential elections (in March 2014), released a video accusing Prime Minister Medvedev of “corruption,” while holding “anti-corruption rallies” (in March and June) where many young people gathered.

In response, the government took measures in undermining his influence making a statement that Navalny would be ineligible from running in next year’s election (in June) and taking him into custody (in March, June, September) for reasons of holding unauthorized rallies. In addition, President Putin conducted local inspections of regions centered around the Federal subjects of Russia (republics, krais, etc.) where gubernatorial elections were to be held during the nationwide local elections (in September) and made full efforts to support the candidates from the ruling political party “United Russia,” and as a result, the ruling party was able to sweep the gubernatorial elections which was a big boost to the Putin administration for the upcoming Presidential election. During this process, Putin said he would give instructions on a local-level to solve issues regarding the livelihood of residents, which were raised in the customary TV program, “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin” (in June), where Putin directly answered

questions from the people of Russia, which was one of the activities to help increase his popularity.

As influential candidates who have a chance against Putin are unlikely to emerge, domestically it should come as no surprise if Putin is reelected in the upcoming presidential election. In order to stave off “anti-Putin rallies,” which took place during the previous election, the Putin administration is assessed to focus on controlling public opinion through means such as strengthening internet regulations (refer to Column). On the other hand, with many of its citizens seeming to have grown tired of President Putin because of the prospect of his extended term and a stagnant domestic economy, in order to secure a solid government foundation for its next term in office, the Putin administration is assessed to increase publicity to mobilize voters aiming to ensure a win in the election race with a higher voter turnout and share of votes than in previous elections.

**Voter turnout and share of votes for each winner of the presidential elections after 2000**

Year	Turnout	Winner	Share of votes
2000	68.65 %	Putin	53.00 %
2004	64.38 %	Putin	71.31 %
2008	69.81 %	Medvedev	70.28 %
2012	65.34 %	Putin	63.60 %

\*Based on information from the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation



## **President Putin's "strategy to raise public image" in anticipation of the presidential election**

The Presidential Executive office of Russia posted an image on its website of President Putin fishing shirtless during his holiday in Siberia's Tuva Republic (in August).

The sight of President Putin enjoying the outdoors has been shared several times in the past, but considering this in a context that the period of Putin in office including one as Prime Minister has been extended as long as 17 years and that his standing for the next Presidential election seems likely, it can be seen as a move aiming to show the public that he is still healthy and capable of running for the next term.

In Russia, many of its previous leaders such as Boris Yeltsin, the first Russian President, and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev ruled for lengthy periods of time, but with less public appearances due to deteriorating

health in their last days of rule, a long-standing administration is regarded with a negative image of "the old," "the sick," and "the stagnated." Because of this, it is thought that Putin is striving to wipe out any concerns of his long-standing administration, instead showing its citizens that he is full of "youthfulness," "good health," and "vitality."

Furthermore, some Russian media outlets have speculated that Putin sought to display a "new image of Putin," in addition to his existing image. In this regard, remarks by Putin during the event, "Direct Line with the President" (in June), revealing that he had two grandchildren, was especially noteworthy. As Putin had been reluctant about mentioning his family in the past, it was said that the remarks were estimated as an attempt to "change his image."

## **Russia strengthening its internet regulations**

In addition to growing internet users with the expansion of the internet and its diversified uses with the spread of smartphones, the Russian government is making effort to toughen regulations against internet usage, as it was used in plotting and preparing for terrorist attacks in Russia by keeping one's identity anonymous.

In July 2016, an amended law to the criminal code and relevant laws were enacted requiring communication providers to store voice calls, images, and other telecommunication data for a duration of time in which they are obligated to disclose these data to security agencies such as the Federal Security Service (FSB) upon request (the law is publicly known under the last name of a State Duma member who submitted the law, the Yarovaya law, and will come into effect

in July 2018). Furthermore, amendments were also made to the federal law, "On Information, Information Technology and Information Protection" in July, which authorized the ban on internet access using social networking services (SNS) and virtual private networks (VPN) to anonymize internet usage.

The Russian government stated the main purpose of reinforcing these internet regulations was as a means to counter terrorism; however, the possibility cannot be denied that it is looking to regulate activities that criticize the government in the upcoming presidential election, such as moves of political activist Navalny in organizing demonstrations and rallies throughout the country by using video sharing websites, which has gained much approval of the younger generation.



## Russia aimed to expand economic cooperation with Japan while propelling developments in the Northern Territories

### Russia anticipated the expansion of bilateral economic cooperation after Putin's visit

In December 2016, President Putin made an official visit to Japan, which was the first by a Russian head of state in the past 11 years, where he agreed with Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, to start talks on joint economic activities in the Northern Territories. In 2017, Russia continued to show moves seeking growing cooperation with Japan through political dialogue.

Putin stated Japan as a “good neighbor and very promising partner,” appraising the progress of bilateral relations (in April: Japan-Russia summit). Also, Russia showed high expectations of economic cooperation with Japan as, for example, Putin appointed Minister for Economic Development Maxim Oreshkin to be his special representative in charge of trade and economic cooperation with Japan (in March), and also inspected

INNOPROM, a Russian industrial trade fair, which Japan took part in as a partner country in 2017 (in July: Ekaterinburg, Russia).

#### ■ Main political dialogues in 2017

##### Japan-Russia summit meetings

April	Moscow, Russia
July	Hamburg, Germany
September	Vladivostok, Russia
November	Da Nang, Vietnam

##### Visits to Japan by Russian dignitaries

March	Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu
July	First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov
September	Secretary of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev
October	Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich

### Showed a positive outlook for the signing of a peace treaty, but again indicated it as a long-term issue

As Japan-Russia dialogues were actively conducted, President Putin called the situation of a non-existent peace treaty between the two countries as “anachronism,” and showed recognition that bilateral cooperation for the overall development of both countries would foster negotiations of a peace treaty (in December 2016: during President Putin's Japan visit).

In 2017, intergovernmental talks between Japanese and Russian deputy foreign ministers were held (in March and August); field studies by Japan's government and private teams were conducted in the Northern Territories (during June 27 – July 1 and in October), and special visits of former

Japanese residents to ancestral graves by airplane were realized (in September) based on the aforementioned agreements of the joint economic activities.

On the other hand, regarding the issue of a peace treaty, Putin said, “It would be naïve to think we can solve this problem in an hour” (in December 2016, during his visit to Japan), suggesting once again that the signing of a treaty would take time, as well as Foreign Minister Lavrov saying, “Our firm position is that (Japan) should come to terms with the results of World War Two” (in March); emphasizing that there is no change in its principle stance that the Northern Territories are part of Russian territory.

### Further attempts of intensifying local development and armaments in the Northern Territories

In these circumstances, Russia advanced its development of the Northern Territories

taking measures such as developing its kindergartens, residential housing and other

forms of infrastructure, as well as, the fisheries and tourist industries. Also, Prime Minister Medvedev signed a government decree, designating a part of the Northern Territories as a “prioritized development area” which is a special economic zone (in August). In this special zone, resident companies are given concessions on tax and administrative procedures, and local fishery companies in the Northern Territories filed applications for their undertakings to be designated in the special zone by the end of November.

On the other hand, Russia showed moves with intentions to strengthen its armament in the Northern Territories and the Kuril Islands with Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu saying the deployment of a division to the Northern Territories and Kuril Islands would be completed by the end of 2017, while other officials of Russia’s Ministry of Defense visited the Island of Matua of the Kuril Islands and conducted field studies on

feasibility to construct footholds for Russia’s Pacific Fleet (in June – September).

Russia is showing a positive stance on the joint economic activities with Japan in the Northern Territories; however, it is moving ahead with mid-to-long term plans of local development by 2025, with Putin emphasizing the necessity of increased armament in the area as “simply a forced response to the situation in the region” (in June), hinting these issues would continue in the future. Particularly, there were remarks by Russian officials saying that proposals on joint economic activities from Japan are less likely to be realized in the initial stages. Russia would actively pursue investments from domestic and third-country entities (in September: Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and Presidential Envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District Yury Trutnev) making it difficult to forecast the relevant developments of Russia regarding the Northern Territories.

## Russia gave names to unnamed islands in the Northern Territories

Since around 2016, Russia has been taking part in activities to name unnamed islands in the Northern Territories and Kuril Islands, and in February Prime Minister Medvedev signed a government decree authorizing the names of 5 previously unnamed islands. (Refer to the map on right. Derevyanko Island and Gnechko Island were named after generals in the Soviet Army, Farkhutdinov Island was named after the former Governor of Sakhalin Oblast, Gromyko Island was named after the former Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, and Shchetinina Island was named after a Soviet female captain of a blue water cruise vessel.)

The recent namings were first proposed by the Sakhalin Provincial Assembly, and since 2012, the relevant activities on naming the islands have been observed with, for example, the Sakhalin provincial government and the Sakhalin branch of the Russian Geographical Society having dispatched successive research teams to the Northern Territories and Kuril Islands. Russia's naming of unnamed islands in the Northern Territories was unusual, and it is assessed that behind this lay the intent of promoting the Northern Territories as "territories of its homeland." In addition, amid bilateral relations progressing in good manner with Putin's visit to Japan (December 2016),

there were a considerable number of groups (in Russia) which felt concern over the return of the Northern Territories to Japan, and it is assessed that the necessity to alleviate domestic concern was another factor behind these namings.

Russia is currently continuing relevant activities of naming unnamed islands in the Northern territories, and included among the newly proposed names is "Sorge Island" (after Richard Sorge, who was engaged in gathering information in countries including Japan during the period mainly in WWII and later decorated by the Soviet Union).

### ■ 5 previously unnamed islands whose names were authorized in February's government decree



## 4-1 Overview

In 2017, the declining trend of the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) became obvious with, for example, territories under the control of ISIL drastically being diminished; however, threat posed by ISIL still remained serious as ISIL-related terrorist attacks continued to take place frequently in Western countries and Asia.

ISIL drastically lost areas under its control, organizational strength, and funds with the loss of Mosul in the northern region of Iraq, which had been one of its largest strongholds, as well as its self-proclaimed “capital,” Raqqa in the northern region of Syria. However, terrorist attacks linked to ISIL fighters and ISIL-related organizations successively occurred in the Middle East and North Africa regions near Syria and Iraq.

In addition, with the first ISIL-linked terrorist attacks taking place in Western countries such as the UK and Spain, the threat posed by ISIL seemed to be spread

geographically, indicating the serious nature of its threat.

Furthermore in Asia, several groups that supported ISIL united in the southern region of the Philippines and sieged Malawi City for a long duration, revealing increased combat capabilities of these groups supporting ISIL.

On the other hand, in regards to terrorist groups other than ISIL, “Al Qaeda,” whose activities had been pointed out to be on the decline in recent years, released the most statements in 2017 over the past 5 years, intensifying its publicity activities to restore its centripetal forces, while “Al Qaeda”-affiliated groups also continued committing terrorist attacks in countries such as Syria and Somalia. Also, terrorist attacks by groups such as the “Taliban,” which intended to expand areas under its control, frequently took place in Afghanistan and nearby countries.

## 4-2 “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) showed signs of decline in Syria and Iraq

### Progress made in mopping up ISIL

In Syria, a state of rivalry among powerful entities continued in the country as the Assad administration, ISIL – with bases in the northern and eastern regions of Syria – and rebel forces in the northwestern regions each controlled their own territories; however, the Assad administration receiving Russian support pushed forward its efforts in recapturing territories controlled by ISIL and rebel forces, and “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF), with support from countries such as the US, strengthened its offensive in recapturing ISIL’s self-proclaimed “capital” of Raqqa in the northern region of Iraq.

Meanwhile, Iraqi security forces, with support from countries such as the US as well as Shia-led militias, advanced operations to sweep and flush out ISIL forces throughout regions in Iraq including Mosul in the northern region of Iraq, where the largest stronghold of ISIL was located.

ISIL had already been facing diminishing control of territories, forces and funds with mop-up operations by its adversary forces, and in 2017 when such ISIL-sweeping operations were further pushed, the diminishing trend further accelerated.

In successive losses, ISIL lost control of

Palmyra in the central region of Syria (in March) and Tabq in the northern region of Syria, which was said to have been a strategic stronghold in the suburb of Raqqa (in May). In addition, ISIL continued to wage fierce battles with SDF over Raqqa, which it had controlled as its “capital city” for 3 years, but ultimately it also lost control of the city (in October).

Even after this, ISIL lost control of many oil and gas fields, as well as Mayadin and Abu Kamal, cities in the eastern region of Syria which were traffic hubs and said to have been its military strongholds (from October - November), losing all of its strongholds located in urban areas.

Moreover, as Iraqi security forces, Shia militias, and “Peshmerga,” the security forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government,

advanced operations to recover Mosul in the northern region of Syria, ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi demolished the Great Mosque of al-Nuri (in June), which was said to hold symbolic importance to ISIL as a place where al-Baghdadi himself declared the “establishment” of “caliphate” in July 2014. With this and other developments, the defeat of ISIL became conclusive in Mosul, which led to the declaration of the full liberation of the city by the Iraqi government (in July). Further, ISIL lost Tal Afar (in August) and Hawija (in October), both of which were its strongholds in the suburb of Mosul in the northern region of Syria, and with the fall of the western cities of Al-Qa’im and Rawa, its last remaining strongholds in Iraq, ISIL lost urban strongholds in Iraq.

### Amid diminishing number of fighters and funds, ISIL tightened its organizational control for its survival

Regarding the number of ISIL fighters, Brett McGurk, U.S. special envoy for the coalition against ISIL, clarified that its estimated number in Syria and Iraq was between 12,000 to 15,000 as of December 2016. Several thousand ISIL fighters in total were said to have been killed in the battles to recapture its strongholds such as Mosul, Raqqa and Hawija, and a spokesman of the coalition forces in mid-October revealed an estimate, saying the number of remnant ISIL fighters in both countries was approximately 6,500 in total.

In regards to ISIL funding, it is estimated that ISIL generated a monthly revenue averaging US \$16 million between April and June which was an 80% decline during the same period in 2015, according to IHS Markit, a company that provides information and analysis. ISIL’s source of finance was mainly said to be related to its controlled territories, including the smuggling of oil and “taxation” of inhabitants. Therefore, it is assessed that

as its controlled territories diminished, so too did its finances (IHS Markit, <https://ihsmarkit.com>).

Even as its forces and finances waned, ISIL successively conducted large-scale terrorist attacks with various modus operandi including suicide belts and car bombings in cities and regions such as a suburb of Al-Bab in the northern region of Syria, a border area with Iraq in the eastern region of Syria, a southern area of Iraq’s capital Baghdad, a suburb of Tikrit in the northern region of Iraq, and Nasiriyah in the southern region of Iraq. With these attacks, ISIL intended to display its presence by attempting to divert and destabilize efforts of opposing forces to flush it out and showcase its high capabilities of committing terrorist attacks. In addition, ISIL is said to tighten its organizational control and strive for its survival by means such as reinforcing discipline toward its field commanders in various battle fronts.

### Possible terrorist attacks taking advantage of turmoil in Syria and Iraq are of concern

ISIL lost all of its significant strongholds in Syria and Iraq; however, considering the political situations in both countries, UN-

brokered peace talks, as well as, peace talks led by Russia, Turkey and Iran were periodically held, but in either talk, demands



from both the Assad administration and rebel forces were not met, and turmoil continued in Syria.

In Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held a local referendum of its independence (in September), which increased tension not only between KRG and the Iraqi government but also between KRG and surrounding nations. In addition, concerns were expressed over the deteriorating relations between KRG and the

Iraqi government, which were built through cooperative efforts against ISIL (in September: spokesperson of the US State Department).




With the current mop-up operations against ISIL continuing, it is assessed that ISIL would take refuge in desert areas to reorganize its strength and continue terrorist attacks by taking advantage of turmoil in Syria and Iraq.

## Continued calls of terrorist acts in various regions

Through its online magazine, “Rumiyah,” ISIL advocated the validity of its organization as well as maintained and proliferated the threat of terrorism by, among others, encouraging terrorist activities in different regions. According to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation of King’s College London in the UK, there has been a 36% reduction in ISIL propaganda since mid-2015 to the beginning of 2017 in accordance with the declining trend of ISIL. Also, the loss in quality was pointed out as images and videos were frequently recycled. Further, regarding its content, the promotion of a

“utopia” showing the abundance and richness of its occupied territories was almost nonexistent as of November, and with most of the material related to fighting scenes, it was an indication of ISIL’s declining trend even on the propaganda front. Even in these circumstances, ISIL presented concrete methods of conducting terrorist attacks using items that are easily accessible such as knives and vehicles, as well as methods for attacking targets in daily life, and gave detailed “instructions” of how to commit these acts (refer to following chart) by, for example, presenting the abduction and holding of hostages as a new method in

### “Instructions” on how to conduct terrorists attacks according to “Rumiyah” magazine

Weapon / Method	Target	Issue where “instructions” appeared in “Rumiyah”	Weapon / Method	Weapon / Method	Issue where “instructions” appeared in “Rumiyah”
Knife	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Drunkards walking quiet streets at night</li> <li>People near entertainment centers such as night clubs</li> <li>Night shift workers</li> </ul>	 <p>Issue 2 (Oct. 2016)</p>	Arson	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Residential buildings</li> <li>Factories</li> <li>Gas stations</li> <li>Schools</li> <li>Hospitals</li> <li>Churches</li> <li>Banks</li> <li>Showrooms</li> <li>Night clubs</li> </ul>	 <p>Issue 5 (Jan. 2017)</p>
Vehicles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Large-scale outdoor events</li> <li>Parades</li> <li>Outdoor markets</li> </ul>	 <p>Issue 3 (Nov. 2016)</p>	Abducting and holding hostages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Night clubs</li> <li>Movie theaters</li> <li>Concert halls</li> <li>Shopping malls</li> <li>Restaurants</li> <li>Mass merchandise outlets</li> <li>Pools</li> <li>Skating rinks</li> </ul>	 <p>Issue 9 (May 2017)</p>

May. These “instructions” were spread through various means being mentioned periodically within propaganda clips made and delivered by ISIL.

In addition, ISIL released a statement by its leader, Abū Bakr al-Baghdadi (in September), whose whereabouts were unknown and rumored dead, appealing to the masses that the self-proclaimed “caliph”

was alive and well, while galvanizing its fighters, not only in Syria and Iraq but in other countries and regions, by strongly advocating the “jihad” to continue.

It is assessed that ISIL would further use various means to call for terrorist attacks in various regions in order to let its presence felt.

**4-3**

## **ISIL-related threats of terrorism in regions continued to be serious**



### **ISIL-related terrorist incidents continued in countries surrounding Syria and Iraq**

Terrorist attacks by ISIL-affiliated groups continued to take place in countries surrounding Syria and Iraq.

ISIL claimed responsibility for the nightclub shooting in Istanbul in the western region of Turkey (in January) as it viewed Turkey as a hostile force that “joined the fight against the ‘Islamic State’.” The perpetrator was said to be an ISIL fighter believed to have received orders from ISIL senior officials based in Raqqa in the northern region of Syria. Further in Istanbul, a police officer was stabbed to death, and this case was also allegedly linked to ISIL by a suspected ISIL member (in August). In these circumstances, Turkish security agencies, believing these cases were related to ISIL, continued its mop-up operations in each region of Turkey.

Iran is also regarded as an enemy by ISIL, which it calls, “Rafidah” (a pejorative term for Shi’ite), and ISIL released statements claiming responsibility for the shootings and suicide bombings by several armed groups targeting the Iranian Parliament building and the Mausoleum of Ayatollah Khomeini in the capital city of Tehran (in June). The case was allegedly carried out by five ISIL fighters and was reportedly the first ISIL-related terrorist attacks in Iran. Following the attacks, Iranian security forces further strengthened counter-terrorism measures nationwide and continued operations against ISIL-related terrorist plots and to detain relevant figures.

ISIL has named Saudi Arabia as a target of its terrorist attack, claiming that the King of Saudi Arabia has not right to name himself as “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.” Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabian security forces thwarted consecutive terrorist attacks with alleged ISIL involvement, such as the plots targeting the “Great Mosque” of Mecca (in June) and the suicide bombing targeting the Defense Ministry in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia’s capital (in September).

In Egypt, even as Egyptian security forces strengthened mop-up operations, “Sinai Province” of ISIL repeatedly conducted terrorist bombings and attacks targeting security agencies and local tribesmen in the Sinai Peninsula in the northeastern region of Egypt, and was pointed out as being involved in the attack against a mosque, killing over 300 people (in November). In addition, statements in the name of “ISIL Egypt” were issued, claiming responsibility of terrorist attacks beyond the Sinai Peninsula, such as the twin bombings of Coptic Orthodox churches in the cities of Tanta in Gharbia Governorate and Alexandria in Alexandria Governorate in the northern region of Egypt (in April).

In Yemen, fighting continued among Yemen forces backed by the Saudi-led coalition, Shi’ite “Houthi” rebels, and former Yemen President Saleh’s forces, with UN-sponsored peace talks, having been suspended since August 2016, nowhere in

sight. In addition, struggle for power was revealed between the “Houthi” rebels and Saleh forces. In these circumstances, ISIL-affiliated groups conducted a terrorist attack targeting security forces in Aden Province in the southern region of Yemen, killing dozens of people (in November).

In Libya, a divided state remains as political groups continue to oppose each other. In July, representatives of the two main groups agreed to a ceasefire in France; however, concrete details of its implementation have not been hashed out, and as the groups which did not join the agreement scattered nationwide, a lot of issues still remain for the realization of unity. As political unrest continued, fighters of ISIL-affiliated groups, which lost its stronghold in the coastal city of Sirte (in December 2016), dispersed in desert areas in central and southern regions of Libya and continued their activities. They showed moves to actively renew their activities such as attacking on a checkpoint in Jufrah Province

in the central region of Libya in August and bombing judicial agencies in Misurata Province in the western region of the country in October.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, “Khorasan Province” of ISIL continued its vigorous activities, setting parts of Nangarhar and Kunar Provinces in the eastern region of Afghanistan as its main bases. With its senior leaders, including its supreme leader, along with many of its fighters killed in US airstrikes, “Khorasan Province” is said to be losing ground; however, it still showed its high capability of committing terrorist attacks by conducting bombings targeting Shi-ites and security forces in both countries.

With ISIL’s declining trend in Syria and Iraq, there is a possibility that ISIL fighters would move and disperse to countries surrounding Syria and Iraq. In these countries, there is concern that ISIL-affiliated groups and their fighters would continue terrorist activities.



## ISIL-linked terror threats remained serious in Western countries

In Western countries, ISIL has been intensifying its call to conduct terrorist attacks by making use of statements and magazines that concretely give instructions on picking tools for committing terrorist acts and methods to select targets to reach followers residing in Western countries, and “lone wolf” terrorist attacks repeatedly took place by those who were influenced by ISIL in response to these calls.

In the UK, a man drove a car into pedestrians on the Westminster Bridge before running into the vicinity of the British Parliament and stabbing a police officer (in March), three men ploughed into pedestrians on the London Bridge before stabbing people in nearby restaurants (in June), and a bomb was detonated in an underground train (in September), all in the capital city of London, while a suicide attacker detonated a bomb near a concert arena in Manchester in the central region of the UK (in May). Terrorist acts were also committed in France such as the shooting of police officers (in April) and the car ramming of a police vehicle (in June),

both occurring on the Champs-Élysées avenue in the capital city of Paris. Further, ISIL-related terrorist attacks followed in Spain, with the case of a van-ramming into pedestrians in Barcelona, and in the US, with the case of a truck ramming into a bicycle lane in Lower Manhattan in New York. For England and Spain, it was the first ISIL-linked attacks, showing geographical expansion of ISIL-related terrorist attacks. This indicated the threat posed by ISIL in Western countries is becoming serious.

As attacks, with the use of easily accessible tools and instruments such as knives and vehicles, have been increasing, especially attacks involving vehicles, it is assessed that ISIL followers have recognized vehicles as a useful tool in carrying out terrorist attacks.

Even though ISIL has been on a declining trend as seen in Syria and Iraq where its organizational strength is diminishing, terrorist attacks by followers answering ISIL’s calls remain a strong concern as the threat of terror committed by people influenced by ISIL in Western countries has not lessened.

In addition, terrorist attacks with direct involvement of ISIL fighters, such as the

series of terrorist attacks in Paris (in November 2015), also remains a concern.

## Escalated activities of groups supporting ISIL in Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia, existing leaders of radical Islamist groups have long since expressed support and allegiance to ISIL, and in 2017, activities of groups supporting ISIL escalated in the Philippines and nearby countries, indicating ISIL has paid growing attention to Asia.

In the Philippines, the Duterte administration strengthened its mop-up operations against radical Islamist groups such as “Abu Sayyaf Group” (ASG) based in the southern Philippines, and in January, declared it would annihilate the groups within 6 months. In these circumstances, Isnilon Hapilon, a leader of ASG and appointed by the ISIL core as its regional leader, moved quietly from its base in Basilan Island to Mindanao Island, pushing forward cooperation with other groups such as the “Maute group,” another group supporting ISIL. With this move, an armed group of several hundred men including a part of ASG and the Maute group, ISIL supporters as well as foreign fighters conducted near simultaneous attacks on government criminal facilities (prisons), police stations, municipality offices, universities, churches, and hospitals in Marawi seizing control of the central part of the city (in May).

After the attacks, the Philippine government immediately declared martial law in the Mindano region and pushed forward with mop-up operations against the armed groups which were entrenched in Marawi City, and on October 23, Defense Secretary Delphin Lorenzana announced the operation was over. With this, ISIL and its support groups displayed combat capabilities for a long duration as the resistance dragged on for 5 months, with the armed groups holding normal citizens as hostages killing over 200 security forces personnel and

citizens with roughly 400,000 people being forcefully evacuated from Marawi and its surrounding regions.

In “Rumiyah” magazine (10th issue, June), ISIL applauded the siege of Marawi comparing it to its own capture of Mosul (Iraq) while calling on ISIL supporters from different regions to join the Armed groups. Moves that responded to these calls were observed in neighboring countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore where ISIL supporters from these countries attempting travel to the southern Philippines were arrested.

In addition, terrorist attacks and the uncovering of terrorist plots by ISIL supporters continued in these countries. In Indonesia, terrorist incidents took place such as the attack of a government building in Bandung City (in February), suicide bombings in East Jakarta (in May), and attacks on police headquarters in Medan (in June) and in Malaysia, alleged ISIL supporters were arrested in the cases of a car bomb plot in the capital city of Kuala Lumpur (in February) and a terrorist plot to attack a casino in Pahang Province (in June).

A sizable number of ISIL militants were killed in the siege of Marawi; however, the possibility has been pointed out that remaining fighters have returned to or taken refuge in surrounding countries. ISIL named the Philippines and Indonesia as a corner of “East Asia,” hinting at its activities being extended to the entire region beyond Southeast Asia, and a number of ISIL supporters have called for terrorist attacks in “East Asia,” listing target countries which include Japan. Taking these into account, the spread of further threats posed by ISIL in Asia is a matter of concern.



## Vigilance is required on possible dangers to Japanese people of getting caught in terrorist incidents

Claiming that taxes collected by coalition nations were used for airstrikes against it, ISIL has attached importance on terrorist attacks targeting soft targets where people congregate in large numbers with the aim of justifying these casualties and causing as many civilian casualties as possible in these countries.

In Western countries, a rash of terrorist attacks involving large numbers of tourists have occurred as soft targets continue to be targeted. Especially, many foreign tourists were killed in the vehicle-ramming attacks such as the Westminster Bridge attack in London in the UK and La Rambla Street

attack in Barcelona in the northeastern region of Spain.

Also, a series of bombings and attacks targeting night markets, casinos, and parades took place in Southeast Asian countries near Japan.

With numbers of Japanese tourists and residents in Western countries and Southeast Asia increasing as a significant number of Japanese companies have extended their overseas offices, vigilance is required about the possible harm and damages that may be caused by future attacks in which Japanese people may accidentally be involved in.

### ■ Main incidents of soft targets in Western countries and Southeast Asia

Date	Country	Overview
Sep. 2, 2016	Philippines	Bombing of night market in Davao City, 15 killed, over 60 injured. "Maute Group" among others were pointed out as perpetrators
Mar. 22, 2017	UK	Car ramming of Westminster Bridge, a tourist attraction in central London, 5 killed, roughly 50 injured.
Apr. 7, 2017	Sweden	Truck ramming along Drottning Street in central Stockholm, 5 killed, 15 injured.
Apr.11–May.15, 2017	Philippines	Clash between ASG and security forces in international tourist spot in Bohol Province, 4 security forces killed
Apr. 20, 2017	France	A gunman shot police officers, injuring nearby tourists in Champs-Élysées in central Paris
May. 24, 2017	Indonesia	2 suicide bombers in successive bombings in East Jakarta killed 3 police officers patrolling a parade and injured 10 civilians
Jun. 2, 2017	Philippines	A man attacked a casino in Pasay, Metro Manila killing 37 including 5 foreigners, and injuring 67 (Actual link to ISIL unknown but ISIL claimed responsibility)
Jun. 3, 2017	UK	Van-ramming on London Bridge, a tourist attraction in central London, and three armed men from the van stabbed bystanders in nearby restaurants, 8 killed, roughly 50 injured.
Aug.17–18, 2017	Spain	Van ramming in La Rambla Street in central Barcelona and car ramming in the coastal town and tourist spot of Cambrils, 16 killed, over 130 injured.
Oct. 31, 2017	US	Truck ramming of bicycle path in Lower Manhattan, New York, 8 killed, 11 injured.

\*Incidents not confirmed by local authorities conducted by terrorist groups also included



## Rash of terrorist attacks in Europe by Maghreb emigrants

By targeting the concert of a popular American artist, the Manchester suicide bombing in May in the central region of the UK raised a lot of concern revealing the perpetrator as a second-generation Libyan refugee. In addition, the successive vehicle rammings of pedestrians in Barcelona and Cambrils in the northeastern region of Spain left roughly 150 killed and injured in August, and over 10 perpetrators were Moroccan immigrants. Many perpetrators of ISIL-related “lone wolf” attacks committed in Europe in 2017 have either immigrated or are children of immigrants, and for the most part have predominately come from Maghreb nations such as Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya.

In Europe, many immigrants are not financially well off, and it is said that many look to crime as they experience a sense of alienation while not being able to adapt to European societies. In particular, due to

historical and geographical factors, there has been a large flow of immigrants to Europe from Maghreb nations, and as second and third-generation citizens increase, it is said that many have been faced with an identity-crisis leading them to be easily influenced by Radical Islamist ideology and that this lay behind their radicalization.

Also, a large number of fighters in territories occupied by ISIL are from Maghreb nations with 3,000 fighters being said to have come from Tunisia, a major pool of ISIL fighters. As ISIL is in a declining trend and losing control of its strongholds in Syria and Iraq, an increased number of fighters is expected to return to Maghreb nations; however, the possibility has been pointed out that some would enter Europe disguised as refugees. Therefore, future terrorist attacks involving these refugees are of concern.

### 4-4


## “Al-Qaeda” continued its attempt to recover its centripetal forces



### “Al-Qaeda” actively continued publicity activities

Recently, “Al-Qaeda” has continued releasing statements under the name of its leaders such as current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Hamza bin Laden, son of previous leader Osama bin Laden and considered to be the organization’s future supreme leader, releasing the largest number of statements in 2017 than in any year over the previous 5 years. The issuance of these statements was assessed as a means to show off its presence in competition with its rival, the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) over the leadership of “global jihad.” In these statements, Zawahiri called for the “jihad” wherever and whenever possible, setting the US and its allies as the most-prioritized targets (in January), while Hamza gave a list of priority targets in his statement,

**Number of statements from “Al-Qaeda” leaders released by its official media wing, “Al-Sahab”**



advising “martyrdom-seekers” in Western countries to target “first, all those who attack the Islamic faith; second, Jewish interests; if targets listed above cannot be sought out, then the US forces; if US forces cannot be sought out, then interests of the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and Russia” (in May).

Also, in regards to the conflict between “Tahrir al-Sham” (HTS) and “Ahrar al-Sham Islamic Movement” (AS) in Syria, “Al-Qaeda” tried to display mediation in calling for the fighting between “Brothers of Islam” to stop, regain power, and attack the enemy (in

July). Further, “Al-Qaeda” promoted its stance that it valued the lives of its fighters as it emphasized the importance of utilizing trenches and wearing protective gear for safety to protect the lives of the mujahideen (holy fighters of Islam) in various regions (in July).

Taking the opportunity of ISIL’s declining trend in Syria and Iraq, “Al-Qaeda” is assessed to be likely continue its publicity activities to increase sympathizers and assume the leadership role of the “global jihad,” while calling for attacks on Western countries including the US.



### **Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups continued terrorist attacks in various regions**

Based in Yemen, “Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” (AQAP) tried to increase its forces in the ongoing Yemeni Civil War, but the regions of its strongholds continued to shrink with mop-up operations by the Saudi-led coalition, as well as Yemeni and US forces driving AQAP to withdraw from the port city of Mukalla in Hadhramaut Governorate in the eastern region of Yemen in 2016 and from several cities in Shabwah and Abyan Governorates in the southern region of the country (in August and September). However, AQAP continued terrorist attacks targeting military bases and security forces in various regions including Hadhramaut and Abyan Governorates, and targeted Western countries by calling for “lone wolf” attacks, such as “Train Derail Operations” outlined in its online-magazine, “Inspire” (Issue 17, in August).

Activities of “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM), mainly based in Algeria, remained low-key, but in the Sahel-Sahara region, the group was active with the bombing of a military camp in the Gao Region in northern Mali (in January). In March, several groups which had been under AQIM, as well as other groups based in the region, formed a new organization called, “Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), which attacked a luxury resort in Mali’s capital, Bamako (in June), and conducted many terrorists attacks targeting security forces in northern and central Mali.

Despite mop-up operations by the Somali

armed forces, “African Union Mission in Somalia” (AMISOM), and US forces, the Somalia-based group, “Al-Shabab” conducted bombings targeting government buildings in the capital city of Mogadishu (in June), attacks on the AMISOM convoy in Lower Shabelle in the southern region of Somalia (in July), and according to the Somalia government, the group was pointed out to be behind the truck bombing in downtown Mogadishu that left over 500 dead (in October). Further, the group expanded its activities attacking a police station in Lamu County in the eastern region of Kenya (in July).

In Syria, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, leader of “Al-Nusra Front” who had expressed his “split” from “Al-Qaeda” in July 2016, announced the group was dissolving and merging with several opposition factions to newly form “Tahrir al-Sham” (HTS: in January). Since then, HTS’s presence has been growing as it defeated rival groups winning control over major cities in Idlib Governorate in the northeastern region Syria (in July), where it is based.

Based in countries and regions facing internal instability, Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups are likely to continue various terrorist activities by taking advantage of unstable situations facing these countries and regions.

## Continued Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Regarding the Palestinian issue, peace talks between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, brokered by the US government were held in September 2010 and from July 2013 to April 2016; however, an agreement was not met as both parties opposed issues such as the construction of new Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the establishment of a unified cabinet between the Palestinian Authority and “Hamas,” an anti-Israel hardliner group, with no progress in the negotiations since.

In addition, conflict rages on between both parties over the issue of worship in the “holy land” of Jerusalem. In October 2014, confrontation arose between the Israel Police and Palestinian residents after the Israeli police gun downed a Palestinian who had shot Jewish people, which led to the closure of the holy site to both Muslims and Jews as a precautionary measure for security. As such conflicts continued, there have been frequent Palestinian attacks against Jewish people since September 2015, though their links to

any terrorist groups have not been established, and according to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the attacks have left over 50 Israelis dead and over 800 injured as of August 2017.

Furthermore, after three Arab citizens of Israel fatally shot two Israeli police officers in July 2017, Israel installed metal detectors at the entrance of a “holy land” compound in Jerusalem’s Old City. Uproar from Palestinians led to confrontations with Israeli security forces, with the Palestinian National Authority and “Hamas” protesting Israel’s decision. In its aftermath, tension has been ignited in other regions as an Israeli was attacked in the compound of the Israeli Embassy in Jordan and anti-Israeli protests were held in Turkey and Malaysia which were only a part of a battery of incidents that have left over 1,000 casualties.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is deeply rooted, with action to alleviate tensions nowhere in sight.

4-5

## “Taliban” continued its offensive in Afghanistan



### “Taliban” continued its offensive in Afghanistan, but the sphere of its controlled areas moved back and forth

In Afghanistan, bombings and attacks on security forces by opposition groups such as the “Taliban” reportedly killed over 6,000 police and soldiers (during January-April). In May, the bombing near the German Embassy in the capital, Kabul, claimed over 150 lives and injured over 300, including two Japanese nationals, one of whom was a staff of the Japanese Embassy, and Afghan’s security service accused the “Taliban” of being behind the attack.

The Afghan government and the “Taliban” held official peace talks for the first time in 2015, but no moves were seen to reopen negotiations in 2017. With the Afghan government believed to have about 60

percent of the country under its control or under its influence, the “Taliban” strengthened its offensive in different regions against the government, seizing parts of Faryab Province in the northern region, Paktia Province in the southeastern region, and Ghor Province in the western region of the country, but the Afghan army regained these areas (in July and August) continuing a see-saw battle.

To overcome this situation, the US announced it would send over 3,000 extra troops to Afghanistan (in September). In response, the “Taliban” released statements criticizing the US and showing its stance of conducting fierce resistance, which has led to

concerns of further attacks by the “Taliban” fueled by this decision.



## **Continued terrorist attacks in Pakistan by “Taliban” supporters**

In Pakistan, the Pakistan’s Armed Forces cooperated with security forces in military operations nationwide to mop up terrorist groups such as “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan” (TTP), a “Taliban” support group, and “Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan Jamaat-ul-Ahrar” (TTP-JA), an offshoot of TTP, and even though many of their members, including its main leaders, have either been detained or killed, terrorist groups continued attacks in different areas of the country.

TTP conducted suicide bombings in markets in Parachinar in the Kurram District of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in the northwestern region of Pakistan (in

January) and in the eastern city of Lahore, the capital of Punjab Province in the eastern region of the country (in July). Also, TTP-JA conducted suicide bombings targeting police officers in Lahore as retaliatory attacks against the military’s mop-up operations (in February) and a Shia mosque in Parachinar (in March).

As it has been pointed out that TTP and TTP-JA established cooperative relations with “Khorasan Province” of the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,” terrorist attacks are assessed to be likely continue in retaliation to military operations by the government.

## 5

## Cyberattacks became diversified and serious including global scale cyberattack cases

### Large scale cyberattacks with ransomware took place worldwide

As information and communication technologies further penetrate daily living and social and economic activities become more dependent on such technologies, cyberattacks have become prevalent and are serious threats. Under such circumstances, roughly 150 nations worldwide including Japan were hit with large scale cyberattacks with ransomware (malware that renders computers inaccessible unless a ransom is paid) infecting computers of government agencies, health services, financial institutions and large corporations (in May). In June, several Western countries including Ukraine were hit with cyberattacks involving other ransomware, affecting system operations of government agencies and large corporations.

Successive occurrences of these mass-scale cyberattacks caused turmoil in social and economic activities worldwide.

The group behind these attacks is not clear; however, it was revealed that in both cases a hacking tool exploiting the vulnerability of operating systems (OS) was used, with the tool being released by a group claiming itself as “The Shadow Brokers” (in April). This group announced it would sell information and encrypted data obtained from infected systems in exchange for digital currency (in May). Vigilance is required as there is a concern that hackers with ill intent gain access to cyberattack tools, like the aforementioned, and conduct similar hacks.

### Various types of cyberattacks confirmed in Japan

In Japan, apart from the attacks with ransomware, cases of targeted attacks with the intention of information theft and cases of attacks exploiting the vulnerability of certain software were confirmed.

Regarding these attacks, targets included university researchers. The Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, an independent administrative institution, issued an alert (in January) that suspicious emails impersonating the society to apply for scientific research funding were sent to these researchers.

In addition, successive cyberattacks exploiting software vulnerabilities also took place. It was announced that vulnerabilities in the software, “WordPress,” were exploited to hack into several domestic websites (in

February), and vulnerabilities in the software, “Apache Struts2” were also exploited to leak credit card and identity information from providers of online and electronic payment services (in March), electric power companies (in March), ticket sales and distribution companies (in April), and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (in June).

An international hacker entity named, “Anonymous” has announced it would conduct cyberattacks against Japan in the name of protesting against whaling and dolphin hunting, and from around April to June, posted warnings of DDoS attacks targeting websites of our government agencies with several cases of disruptions having been confirmed.





## Threat posed by cyberattacks with suspected state involvement

Regarding the issue of Russia's alleged intervention in the US presidential election (in 2016) through cyberattacks, the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence stated that the operation of cyberattacks targeting the election was conducted by Russian intelligence agencies influence its election process, as well as those of other nations (in January, [https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA\\_2017\\_01.pdf](https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf), 1-2, p5).

In addition, US-CERT, an organization under the US Department of Homeland

Security (DHS), prompted warnings of North Korea's malicious behavior of cyber-related activities targeting the world's media, banks and important infrastructures including the US, and, referring to the results of analytic efforts by DHS and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), also pointed out that North Korea would continue cyberattacks to pursue its military and strategic aims. (in June, <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA17-164A>).

### ≡ COLUMN ≡

#### Threat posed by North Korea in cyberspace

It has been pointed out that North Korea conducted cyberattacks against foreign government agencies and companies with the aim of internal information theft, social disruption, subversive activities, and acquisition of foreign currency.

South Korea's Ministry of National Defense stated North Korea groomed over 6,800 cyber operations officers and was ramping up for various types of cyber warfare (in January, 2016 Defense White Paper: pp.22-24), as well as, US-CERT announced that North Korea's cyberattacks would continue (in June). Also, South Korea's Financial Security Agency released a report on cyberattack groups that allegedly have ties with North Korea. The

report said the groups had intended to conduct activities such as the theft of internal and classified information and other subversive activities, but recently, the groups are assessed to actively pursue the acquisition of foreign currency (in July: "Campaign Rifle: Andariel, the Maiden of Anguish" p.52).

North Korea has repeated provocative actions with its missile launches and nuclear tests, and its threat has become much more serious. Under these current conditions, it is assessed that North Korea is highly likely to conduct cyberattacks as a means for achieving its goals; therefore, vigilance is required against future cyberattacks by North Korea as a real threat in Japan.

## [ 6 ] Trends in the acquisition of materials and technologies related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

6

### Activities aimed to acquire materials and technologies convertible to military use



**By showing off its continued development and achievement of ICBMs, the threat from North Korea's procurement and proliferation activities increased**

North Korea conducted successive test launches of various missiles such as the “intercontinental ballistic missile” named “Hwasong-14” (in July), and also forced its 6th nuclear test, claiming that it had successfully conducted a “test of hydrogen bomb mounted on an ICBM” (in September). In this period, North Korea released an image, claiming it had conducted a “ground jet test of a newly developed Korean-style high-thrust engine” (in March), as well as mentioning it had used newly developed “carbon composites” on the warhead of “Hwasong-14” (in July). In addition, North Korea repeatedly insisted that it achieved success in “homemade carbon/carbon composites” (which seems to be carbon-fiber reinforced carbon) when releasing an image of Chairman Kim Jong Un's on-site inspection at the Chemical Material Institute of the Academy of National Defense Sciences (in August).

In this manner, North Korea showed off its continued development and achievement of

ICBMs with its, so-called, own technological capabilities, but in the meantime, Chinese firms were pointed out to have illegally exported 6-axis machine tools to North Korea around 2015, in which foreign-made control units were installed, despite such units being subjected to export restrictions (in April: Institute for Science and International Society [ISIS], a US think-tank). In addition, the possibility was pointed out that these engines, which were used in the aforementioned “ground test” and “Hwasong-14,” may have been former Soviet-made engines obtained illegally and refined (in August: International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], a UK think-tank).

As North Korea is likely to continue its development of ICBMs, the possibility cannot be denied that North Korea would use such materials and technologies illegally obtained from overseas, converting them for the development of ICBMs; therefore, procurement activities conducted by North Korea is a serious concern.



**With China establishing a central guiding commission for “civil-military fusion,” vigilance is required in its approaches to Japan through private companies**

China has pushed the “civil-military fusion” forward urging its civilian sectors to join the production of armaments and the research and development of defense science and technology. In January, the “Central Commission for the Development of Civil-Military Fusion” was newly established as a central guiding apparatus with two plenary sessions held since (in June and September). In these plenary meetings, President Xi

Jinping, who heads the commission, gave an “important speech” in which he stressed that “we shall promote the development of highly efficient civil-military fusion extending to various fields, and establish a state strategic system with the military and civilians being unified.”

On the other hand, China still seems to be dependent on foreign procurement of advanced technologies and equipment, with

the US Department of Defense pointing out that China intends to acquire advanced technologies from foreign countries, such as engines for its aircraft carrier and other vessels, guidance and control systems and machine tools, and sensitive materials as well as their installation, with which its domestic industry is facing challenges in manufacturing (in May: “Annual Report to Congress,” pp.70-71). Even in Japan, furnace parts needed in the production of carbon fiber, an advanced material, were procured domestically and exported to China without authorization leading to affiliates of Japanese corporations being indicted (in April), as well

as having the relevant Japanese companies receive administrative punishment (in July) due to the unauthorized export of induction furnaces to China, which can be used in the development of nuclear weapons.

With growing efforts of “civil-military fusion” as a state strategy in China, as Chinese private enterprises that engage in this fusion are expected to increase, the possibility cannot be denied that these companies would procure advanced technologies and materials from Japan, concealing their link with the munitions industry; therefore, vigilance is required.



### **Iran showed intention of continuing its missile development with its procurement activities remaining a matter of concern**

Iran launched a satellite-carrying homemade rocket with possible application of ballistic missiles in July, and in September announced it had “successfully” conducted a test launch of a new intermediate-range ballistic missile, which it released an image of. President Rouhani declared, “We would continue to conduct missile tests whenever necessary for technical reasons. We would ask the permission of no one.” (In May) Iran’s parliament then approved measures to increase the budget for its missile development program (in August), showing its stance to further push its development.

On the other hand, regarding Iran’s nuclear issue, the international community continues to monitor Iran’s nuclear activity based on the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) implemented in

January 2016.

Iran has a history of illegally procuring equipment and technology used in developing and manufacturing weapons of mass destruction from overseas which it cannot secure domestically. As Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution pointed out that the amount of evidence indicating Iran’s attempts to acquire missile-related material from overseas remained the same and that the amount of evidence indicating its attempts to acquire nuclear-related material decreased, but such attempts continued (in July: English version of the summary of the Office’s “Annual Report,” p.33), caution is still required on Iran’s procurement activities of materials and technology that may be used for military purposes.

## A Malaysian company pointed out as front organization of North Korea

According to the final report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea (February 27), an air shipment from China to Eritrea was confiscated by a certain UN member state in July 2016. In the confiscated cargo, items were found, such as military-grade communications equipment and related accessories, and the items were products of a Malaysia-based company, Glocom.

According to its website ([glocom-corp.com](http://glocom-corp.com)), Glocom deals with the research and development and manufacturing of radio communications equipment for military and paramilitary organizations. On the other hand, according to the aforementioned final report, the company listed a physical address in Malaysia as its contact point, but there was no actual presence at the address, and that Glocom used another company as its front company in Malaysia. In addition, the report pointed out Glocom as a front company of Pan Systems Pyongyang, which is allegedly operated under the control of the Reconnaissance Bureau of North Korea, with these companies apparently being used by

North Korea to sell military communications equipment.

It is known that in Malaysia, which established diplomatic relations with North Korea in 1973, there were precision-instrument manufacturing companies that were linked with the “Khan Network,” a nuclear black market created by Pakistani nuclear physicist, Abdul Qadeer Khan. Media reports indicated that the Khan Network had provided North Korea with nuclear-related technology.

As North Korea currently puts its focus on developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), it cannot be denied that North Korea would establish underground networks overseas, including Asia, and proliferate equipment and technology related to WMDs by making use of these networks. While sanctions against North Korea are strengthened by the international community, there is a possibility that North Korea would establish entities masquerading as local companies overseas, such as Glocom, and use them for its illegal activities such as procurement and money laundering; therefore, vigilance is required.





# Internal Affairs in 2017



## 1-1

## Aum Shinrikyo strove to expand its organization while maintaining its dangerous traits

▶▶▶ Total number of followers remained steady, its assets reportedly over 1 billion yen


With approximately 1,650 domestic followers and another 460 in Russia, Aum Shinrikyo (a cult group) remained active centered around groups, namely; the group called, “Aleph” (mainstream group); the group led by Yamada,\* which keeps a degree of separation from “Aleph”; and the group called, “Hikari no Wa” (Joyu group); while maintaining dangerous traits by still being influenced by Shoko Asahara, whose real name is Chizuo Matsumoto and the mastermind behind the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack, and placing him as the object of absolute faith.

In addition, the cult group continued to acquire funds through donations by its lay followers and participation fees of various events such as “intensive seminars” for lay followers, and on the other hand, set aside approximately 54 million yen (total from Jan. – Nov.) as compensation for damages to victims and surviving families of both sarin gas attacks in Matsumoto City and Tokyo subway system with no large expenditures such as purchases of facilities. As a result, the group’s total assets (cash, deposits and savings, and loans) exceeded 1 billion yen as of the end of October.

\*As the group does not use its own official name, it is called after one of its senior members.


### Mainstream group’s owned assets and accumulated payment of compensation

(JPY 100 million)



### Joyu group’s owned assets and accumulated payment of compensation

(JPY 10 million)



▶▶▶ Proper and strict surveillance enforced

Based on Article 7 Paragraph 2 of the Act on the Control of Organizations, PSIA mobilized roughly 570 of its officers and conducted on-site inspections of Aum Shinrikyo facilities covering 30 sites in 14

prefectures (as of the end of November).

As a result, it was confirmed that alters with the portrait of Asahara as well as teaching material with his recorded sermons were kept in the facilities of the mainstream

group, and that the group led by Yamada used a building in Tokyo (Musashino facility) as its base of operations for guiding and indoctrinating its lay followers in the metropolitan area, and that Buddhist paintings related to Asahara were even hoisted in facilities of the Joyu group.

Under these circumstances, one of the two followers, who had been indicted by the PSIA on charges of violating Article 39 of the Act on the Control of Organizations (evasion of inspection) during the on-site

inspection of the Yokohama facility (in Kanagawa Prefecture), was sentenced to pay a fine (of 500,000 yen) by the Yokohama District Court (in March).

Also in 2017, PSIA collected reports from the cult group of its organizational structure and activities quarterly, releasing information obtained from these reports and results from a total of 40 on-site inspections covering 17 municipalities in the Tokyo Metropolitan area and three prefectures.



### **PSIA submitted a renewal request (for the 6th time) to the Public Security Examination Commission**

Cognizant of the actual state of the cult group, on November 20, the Director-General of PSIA submitted a request to the Public Security Examination Commission to extend the surveillance period of cult groups for another three years (for the 6th time), including “Aleph,” “Hikari no Wa” and the group led by Yamada, for the necessity to continually shed light on the state of the cult group’s activities, being aware that the group’s dangerous nature remained, such as Asahara, the mastermind behind the sarin gas attacks in Matsumoto City and the


Tokyo subway system, still wielding influence and that the cult group maintained its platform in which even murder would be authorized, while maintaining closed and fraudulent traits.

Moreover, in Aleph and Hikari no Wa’s legal battle with Japan to rescind the decision to extend the surveillance period (the 5th time), claims by Hikari no Wa were accepted in the judgement of the first instance (in September), with Japan appealing the ruling as of October 6.

## ■ Facilities where on-site inspections were conducted (January – end of November 2017)

### Legend

Name of facility	Date of inspection
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## Mainstream group enforced its “Absolute faith in Asahara” and intended to expand its organization



### Continued its teaching aimed at the implementation of absolute faith in Asahara

The mainstream group maintained its guidance aimed at establishing absolute faith in Asahara through various events such as “intensive seminars” for lay followers and “birth festival,” commemorating the birth of Asahara, as they have done in previous years.

In the “intensive seminar” held three times a year (in January, May and September), the group had the lay followers view videos in which Asahara preached. It also involved the lay followers repeatedly carrying out an ascetic training exercise in which they partook in the discipline of repeatedly throwing their bodies on bedding and getting up while reciting their faith in Asahara ( “ritsuiraihai” or worship of the upright position). Also, during Asahara’s “birth festival” (in March), senior followers delivered sermons emphasizing the greatness of Asahara to the gatherings of more than 800 followers in the cult group’s facilities nationwide.

In addition, the “30th Anniversary Ceremony of the Establishment of the Order of Truth” was held at the Sapporo Shiroishi facility (in October) – marking the 30th year since the renaming of “Aum Shinsen no Kai” to “Aum Shinrikyo” – where a video was shown of the group’s “history,” and its senior followers delivered sermons emphasizing the

importance of conveying and expanding Asahara’s teachings encouraging its followers to “work hard to contribute in purifying the hearts of Japanese people which is the will of our guru,” with these scenes simultaneously being broadcasted to other facilities nationwide.

Further, the mainstream group conducted systematic recruitment nationwide as in the past, placing importance on these activities to realize the “salvation of sentient beings” (Shujokyusai). Specifically, the group recruited new followers by reducing their resistance and negative perceptions toward the group in a manner that hid the religious nature of the group – such as holding various events on matters including yoga and fortune-telling – identifying those participants who showed interest in yoga and/or spiritual world, and introducing them to yoga classes and study groups, all the while, concealing the name of the group; and developed relationships with them while postulating conspiracy theories that repute the group’s involvement in felonious acts such as the Tokyo sarin gas attack in tandem with discussions on general yogic thought, as well as, stressing the importance of Asahara’s teachings without mentioning his name. As a result of these efforts, the group acquired over 100 new followers in 2017.



### Internal friction stemming from the return of Asahara’s son appeared to calm down

In the mainstream group, internal friction developed among the senior members from October 2013 onwards, between Asahara’s wife and those who had plotted to have his second son return to the cult’s activities on the one hand, and Asahara’s third daughter and those who opposed the return of the second son on the other. The Joint Meeting, which is the decision-making body of “Aleph,” successively “expelled” or

“temporarily suspended membership” of senior members who sided with the third daughter as well as senior members who argued against the punishments between 2014 and 2015. It has been confirmed that some of the followers among those who received the aforementioned punishments firmly maintained their absolute faith in Asahara and conducted activities, while keeping certain distance with “Aleph,” like

the group led by Yamada.

Currently, the internal conflict of the group appears to be in a state of calm with stability of organizational operations being measured by the Joint Meeting; however, with followers still holding grudges towards the successive punishments, the possibility cannot be denied that friction may rekindle.

In addition, the mainstream group continuously strived to build momentum towards the return of Asahara's second son such as with the convening of the "birth festival" commemorating the birthday of the second son in which over 250 followers gathered in various facilities (in March).

## 1-3 Joyu group continued evading surveillance



### Continued efforts to evade surveillance

As the Joyu group has consistently maintained efforts in "hiding Asahara" and has given the outward appearance that Asahara's influence was dispelled since the establishment of "Hikari no Wa," the group started a blog entitled, "Hikari no Wa hiroba" (meaning "Square of Hikari no Wa:" in January) where "voices of those who joined their events" were posted promoting the safety of Hikari no Wa as well as articles that applaud Fumihiro Joyu's "lectures," while Joyu appeared on various talk shows

stressing that the group has "distanced" themselves from Asahara.

In addition, the Joyu group posted comments on its website apologizing for the sarin gas attacks in Matsumoto City and on the Tokyo subway system on the dates of the two incidents, respectively (in March and June), yet explained that followers of the Joyu group were not directly involved in the cases, showing a stance of evading direct responsibility.



### No changes in present situation under Asahara's remaining influence

The Joyu group held "intensive seminars" three times for its lay followers as they have done in previous years (in January, May and August), and Joyu gave weekend sermons in facilities of different areas.

In addition, the Joyu group has made various attempts to evade surveillance action, yet it still hung Buddhist images considered as incarnations of Asahara in its facilities, as

well as, conducted dangerous ascetic-training exercises similar to ones that had been practiced by Aum Shinrikyo, such as having followers soaked in hot waters close to 50° C for the cleansing of nadi (which is the passageway of energy said to be in the human body) during the "pilgrimage to and around holy places" in areas that were connected to Asahara.



## Countless heinous crimes committed by Aum Shinrikyo

After changing its name from “Aum Shinsen no Kai” in July 1987, Aum Shinrikyo expanded its organization taking advantage of the “occult boom” of the times, and from around 1988, Asahara placed himself as the head of the organization with the aim of realizing “utopia” in accordance with the teachings of Aum Shinrikyo.

In these circumstances, Asahara began speaking with a self-righteous logic, such as stating that “the ends justify the means,” from around 1989, and that “in order to practice truth, the killings of people who block that path are good deeds.” Asahara, on the basis of the aforementioned rationale, directed the silencing and killing of followers, who knew about the group’s secret of incinerating the bodies of other followers having died during training, for fear that this would impede efforts to acquire the license as an official religious entity, and (upon acquiring the license,) it directed the murder of a lawyer who had approached the Tokyo Metropolitan Government to revoke the license of Aum Shinrikyo as a religious entity in Tokyo.

In addition, Asahara recognized the necessity of political influence in order to realize “utopia,” and 25 of its senior members including Asahara ran in the Lower House of the national Diet election in February 1990, and all of them lost. In response to this as well as the emergence of anti-Aum Shinrikyo protests opposing its advancement in areas nationwide, the group pushed forward with the efforts to take up arms, such as the development of chemical weapons including sarin, insisting that there would be no

option other than demolishing the existing national regime by force.

Also, after 1994, Asahara directed the murder of one of its members under suspicion of being a spy; the attack – using various means including VX gas – of lawyers, journalists and relatives of its followers who criticized the group; and the indiscriminate mass murder of civilians using chemical weapons, such as the Matsumoto sarin gas attack in June 1994, and the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack in March 1995; thereby causing extensive damage and harm while posing danger to the public security of Japan in a grave and serious manner.

### Chronology of Aum Shinrikyo-related incidents

Feb.14, 1984	Establishment of “Aum Shinsen no Kai”
mid-Jul. 1987	Renamed to “Aum Shinrikyo”
Feb. 1989	Murder case of Aum Shinrikyo follower
Aug.25, 1989	Approved as a religious entity in Tokyo
Nov. 4, 1989	Murder case of a lawyer’s family
Feb. 1990	25 members run in a House of Representatives election (All lost)
Jan.30, 1994	Murder case of Aum Shinrikyo follower
May. 9, 1994	Attempted murder of a lawyer
mid-Jun. 1994	Introduced a ministries and agencies system mimicking administrative agencies of Japan
Jun.27, 1994	Matsumoto sarin gas attack On orders given by Asahara, who determined court judges of the Matsumoto Branch Court of the Nagano District Court were a hindrance to the existence of its Matsumoto office and dojo (at the time), senior members sprayed sarin gas – a deadly poison used as a chemical weapon – targeting the relevant residential compound of the judges, killing 8 and injuring many others.
around Jul.10, 1994	Murder of Aum Shinrikyo follower and disposing of body
Dec. 2, 1994 – Jan. 4, 1995	VX gas assault and attempted murder
Feb.28, 1995	Abduction, confinement, and death of notary administrative manager
Mar.20, 1995	Tokyo subway sarin gas attack With the purpose of avoiding compulsory investigations, the cult group sprayed sarin gas – a deadly poison used as a chemical weapon – in a total of 5 cars of 3 subway lines converging in Kasumigaseki Station in Tokyo during the morning rush hour, throwing the center of the capital into disorder and killing 13 and harming thousands of others.
May. 5, 1995	Cyanide gas attempt at Shinjuku Station
May.16, 1995	Letter bomb sent to Tokyo Metropolitan Government office
May.16, 1995	Asahara was arrested

## Current state of protest activities by local residents living near Aum Shinrikyo facilities

Local residents living around the cult's facilities continue to harbor fears and anxiety about the group, and on January 27, the "Association of the Relevant Municipalities for Measures against Aum Shinrikyo" – an organization created by 25 local public authorities including municipalities that house Aum Shinrikyo facilities nationwide – submitted written proposals to the Minister of Justice and the Director-General of PSIA requesting the development of the relevant legal systems for drastic solutions on issues relating to Aum Shinrikyo.

In addition, rallies and demonstrations demanding the eviction from its facilities and the dissolution of the group were hosted and held by the relevant councils that were set up by local residents in areas nationwide. Over 1,000 local residents in total participated in these protest rallies and demonstrations in

2017.

Further, in collaboration with the request to extend the surveillance period (for the 6th time), local residents living around the cult's facilities held a petition campaign demanding the extension of surveillance as well as the continued existence and enhancement of the Act on the Control of Organizations, and on October 27 submitted the petition to the Director-General of PSIA with approximately 270,000 signatures.

Moreover, a total of 42 meetings were held in 19 regions from January to the end of November aimed at sharing information and opinions between local residents and the PSIA, where the PSIA strived to alleviate the fears and anxiety of the residents by, for example, explaining the current situation of the cult and results of the surveillance actions.

### Overview of protest rallies and demonstrations in 2017 (as of end of November)

Target facility	Organizer	Date	No. of mobilized protestors (approximate)
Ikuno facility	Residents' society for measures against Aum Shinrikyo (currently Aleph) in Ikuno Ward	Feb. 13	70
		Apr. 10	50
		May. 8	60
		Jun. 12	70
		Jul. 10	60
		Sep. 11	70
		Oct. 19	300
		Nov. 13	75
Adachi Iriya facility	Residents' council for measures against Aum Shinrikyo (Aleph) in Adachi, Iriya	Mar. 25	150
		Jun. 20	180
		Nov. 26	150
Minami-Karasuyama facility	Civil council for measures against Aum Shinrikyo (Aleph) in Karasuyama	May. 13	140
		Nov. 11	140
Minakuchi facility	Society for the promotion of autonomy in Kashiwagi, Koka City	Aug. 27	200

## [2] Trends in Domestic Groups Concerning Events that Drew Attention from Society

**2-1**

### Conducted inter-party and factional campaigns opposing the proposed revision for the Organized Crime Punishment Act



#### Criticized the Abe administration through repeated rallies and demonstrations

Regarding the revisions to the Organized Crime Punishment Act that was enacted in June, protest activities opposing the bill continued to be carried out around the national Diet during the Cabinet decision of the bill (in March) and the Legal Affairs Committee vote in the House of Representatives (in May), as well as in different areas, with not only rallies and demonstrations but also with the collecting of signatures against the bill.

In these circumstances, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) claimed the bill as “nothing but an evil law which should be described as a modern version of the ‘Security Preservation Act’ (a pre-WWII legislation of Japan),” and JCP Diet members including its Chairman Kazuo Shii and other party members repeatedly participated in the aforementioned protests and rallies claiming that “it is a question of, ‘Is it okay if we let

mass surveillance take over society allowing electronic surveillance of phone conversations and emails as well as informants and spies?” He also called for support stating, “Let’s develop the united front between opposition parties and citizens to defeat the Abe administration,” as well as for support of the signature campaign organized by anti-bill forces.

Activists of radical leftist groups also participated in the aforementioned protest activities calling for the “defeat of the Abe administration that ‘conspired to host the Tokyo Olympics’” (Chukaku-ha: Middle Core Faction of the Revolutionary Communist League) and also for “the bill that is conspired as a ‘Peace Prevention Law’ to be blocked” (Kakumaru-ha: Revolutionary Marxist faction of the Revolutionary Communist League).

**2-2**

### Continued protest activities including obstructive actions to prevent the relocation of the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Henoko



#### Repeated obstructive actions in Henoko against relocation work

Regarding the construction of alternative facilities around Henoko in Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture for the relocation of the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, the Okinawa Defense Bureau allowed the commencement of construction work to fill up the Henoko coast (in April). In response, the JCP and radical leftist groups, together with opposition forces against the relocation, repeatedly carried out protest activities in

Henoko, such as on-site sit-down strikes with anti-relocation factions, with the JCP criticizing the government of “ignoring and trampling on the voice of many of the local residents and (the construction) is a reckless attempt without lawful permission by the governor,” as well as anti-mainstream faction of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association claiming the government “deemed petitions to the governor as ‘unnecessary’ without consent and

allowed the construction to begin without permission,” and “it is a completely unlawful construction.” Especially, the radical leftist groups together with portions of anti-relocation forces, repeatedly conducted obstructive

actions against the construction work as they entered restricted waters near the planned relocation site with small boats and formed human blockades preventing passage of vehicles related to the relocation work.



### **Support expressed for the lawsuit to suspend offshore construction brought up by the governor of Okinawa**

With Takeshi Onaga, the governor of Okinawa Prefecture, publicly claiming it “will not allow the construction of a new military base in Henoko” and bringing up the lawsuit to suspend construction work to fill up the coast (in July), the JCP expressed “the governor’s decision to file the suit to stop the unlawful construction was a matter of course.” Also, JCP party members and radical leftist activists participated in the “Rally of Prefecture Residents to Support Governor Onaga and Disallow Construction of the New Military Base in Henoko” held in Naha (in August).

Other than this, the JCP announced its

support towards Susumu Inamine, mayor of Nago and an advocate of the anti-relocation movement, upon his expression to run for the next city mayoral race (to be voted in February 2018). JCP also supported candidates that opposed the relocation during the election of the House of Representatives in the four voting districts of Okinawa (in October) in which 3 were elected, and published an article called, “Indication of the firm will of Okinawan residents against Abe’s reckless policy to force the construction of the new army base in Henoko” in its organ paper “Shimbun Akahata” (Oct. 24 issue).

## **2-3**

### **Continued activities that demanded the “real resolution” on the issue of comfort women**



### **Appeal for the annulment of “Japan-Korea agreement” and necessity to offer apologies to former comfort women**

Regarding the issue of comfort women, groups supporting former comfort women issued a statement demanding the Japanese government admit to the “failed mutual agreement between Japan and Korea” (in January) as a response to the Japanese government’s action of sending the Japan’s Ambassador to South Korea on temporary leave to return home after a statue of a comfort women was erected in front of the Consulate General of Japan in Pusan, South Korea (in the end of 2016). Also, the groups demanded the Japanese government apologize and pay former comfort women, conducting activities in front of the statue in Pusan (in March) to appeal to the public and sending a written request to the Prime Minister of Japan (in August).

In these circumstances, the JCP showed its recognition of the issue, stating that “the

agreement is only the starting point in resolving issues, and the real resolution will come about when the human dignity of victims of all ‘comfort women’ are restored” in the Congress Resolution adopted in its 27th Party Congress, while Akira Koike, Head of the Secretariat of the JCP, mentioned that a sincere apology was required from the Japanese government to former comfort women in the new year assembly of Mindan (Korean Residents Union in Japan), in which he attended (in January).

In addition, radical leftist groups took action towards the annulment of the “Japan-Korea agreement” voicing their demands in their organ papers insisting on “sharing the fury of the South Korean people towards the Abe administration and to fight for the annulment of the Japan-Korea agreement” (organ paper of Chukaku-ha, “Zenshin,” dated

Jan. 16), as well as to “join the battle of women forced to be ‘comfort women’ for the Imperial Army and abolish the agreement

between Japan and Korea” (organ paper of anti-mainstream faction of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association, “Kaiho,” dated Jul. 15).

**2-4**

## Continued protest activities amid the reopening of nuclear power plants



### Protest activities, rallies and demonstrations in different areas

About the issue of nuclear power plants, protest activities, rallies and demonstrations were held around the national Diet and in local areas that house nuclear power stations as Units 3 and 4 of the Takahama nuclear power plant in Fukui restarted (in May: Unit 4, and in Jun: Unit 3) upon the decision of the Osaka High Court to overturn injunctions (in March).

Diet members and other members of the JCP participated in the aforementioned protest actions, claiming that “the majority of public opinion of the Japanese people is against nuclear power plants restarting” and called for nongovernment parties and citizens to join the fight against the restarting of these plants, as local assembly members of

the JCP conducted activities in areas around nuclear power stations geared towards municipalities and electric companies demanding the suspension of nuclear power plants from restarting.

Radical leftist groups were critical, claiming that “the desperation to restart nuclear power plants is to secure technology and facilities to develop nuclear weapons” (anti-mainstream faction of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association), and its activists participated in rallies and demonstrations, which were carried out by anti-nuclear power plant groups, while distributing its organ papers and fliers which called for the suspension of restarting nuclear power plants.



## COLUMN



### Opposition against the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games 2020

Regarding the Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games, opposition campaigns have been conducted such as street propagandas rallies with the aim of discouraging the International Olympic Committee since the bidding stage, and in January, a network organization was set up for the purpose of uniting anti-Olympic groups.

Members of radical leftist groups also participated in the network organization, and together with members of various groups that

protest against issues such as nuclear plants and the relocation of the military base, the network organization has incorporated these issues into anti-Olympic sentiments and has strove to generate anti-Olympic public opinion.

In addition, the network organization has worked on expanding its global solidarity by, for example, reaching out to members of anti-Olympic groups in countries such as Brazil and Korea that have either hosted or will host the Olympic games.



## [3] Radical Leftist Groups

3

**Radical leftist groups developed activities accusing and promoting the “overthrow of both the Abe and Trump administrations”**

### **Kakumaru-ha exerted approaches to the public workers and core industrial unions**

From the beginning of the year, Kakumaru-ha (Revolutionary Marxist faction of the Revolutionary Communist League) repeatedly accused US President Donald Trump of “showing intent to dramatically reinforce its nuclear weapons capability even before the inauguration of the Trump administration,” and made calls to “overthrow the Abe administration” while opposing the relocation of the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Henoko and the proposal to revise the Organized Crimes Punishment Act.

Specifically, Kakumaru-ha held the “General Rally of Labor Workers with Anger” (in February) with the slogan, “Oppose the worsening changes to labor legislations,” while accusing the “Trump and Abe administrations of heightening the crisis of war by rushing to strengthen the military alliance between Japan and the US,” and to “crush them with the union of the labor class.” In addition, Kakumaru-ha promoted propaganda activities in the union-sponsored Spring Offensive Pep Rally (in March) and May Day rallies (in April and May), urging participants from government and public workers’ unions such as Jichiro (All Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers’ Union) and the Japan Teachers’ Union, as well as core industrial labor unions such as JR Soren (Japan Confederation of Railway Workers’ Union) and Japan Postal Group Union to

“stop attacks by the war-monger Trump administration against North Korean” and to not “permit the Abe administration to lead Japan into war;” calling for support and solidarity of its faction.

At the front of the grassroots movement regarding the issue of the relocation of the US military base from Futenma to Henoko, activists of Kakumaru-ha participated in protest activities organized by anti-relocation factions, such as in front of Camp Schwab Gate (from January to July), as well as, on waters near planned relocation sites (in February, March and July). Also, in regards to the revision of the Organized Crimes Punishment Act, Kakumaru-ha conducted propaganda activities on the occasions of bi-partisan opposition actions in front of the national Diet (from May to September) and called for the “defeat of the Abe administration which pushes for war and the amendment of the constitution.”

At the front of the student movement, Zengakuren (All-Japan Federation of Students’ Self-Governing Associations), an affiliate of Kakumaru-ha, raised issues such as “stopping the relocation of the Futenma Base to Henoko” as its agenda of struggle during the meeting of its “139th Central Committee” (in March) and its student activists participated in local gatherings opposing the relocation.

### **Chukaku-ha conducted various activities with intention to raise awareness in society**

Chukaku-ha (Middle Core Faction of the Revolutionary Communist League) conducted various activities, calling to “bring down Abe and Koike (Governor of Tokyo), who are both full of corruption and vested

interests, and (they) are rushing to amend the constitution and to war,” and to “overthrow Trump with the rise of anger of labor workers all over the world.”

Specifically, Chukaku-ha let its activists

run for the elections of both the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly (in July) and the House of Representatives (in October), calling to “block the amendment of the constitution,” “forfeit the Olympics,” and “imprison Abe,” while new efforts were seen to promote both candidates by printing feature articles (Oct. 5 issue) to appeal to high schoolers in the “special high school issue” (which it started issuing from the Jun. 15 issue) of its organ paper, “Zenshin,” and to post videos introducing these papers with its candidates on video-sharing sites; however, neither candidate was elected.

At the front of the labor movement, Chukaku-ha held activities centered on its affiliate, the “National Railway Motive Power Union” (NRMU), in different regions, protesting the “split of JR (Japan Railways).” Also, in the labor rally and demonstration (in November) – which Chukaku-ha places as the culmination of its activities for the year – Chukaku-ha called to “shatter talks of war between Trump and Abe” during the Japan-US Summit (in November).

At the front of the grassroots movement, Chukaku-ha deemed the revisions to the Organized Crime Punishment Act as the “current version of the Security Preservation Act” and held protest activities around the national Diet, which coincided with the timing the bill was considered at both chambers of the Diet, calling for the halt of the revision (in May to June), while holding

gatherings in Tokyo (in March and May). In addition, at the front of its anti-nuclear plant struggle, Chhukaku-ha convened rallies in various areas including Fukushima Prefecture where it called to “never allow forced radiation, and defeat the Abe administration.”

At the front of its student movement, Chukaku-ha conducted activities soliciting to freshmen in major universities nationwide, as well as, lashed out against the expulsion of its student activist attending Kyoto University and conducted protest activities within the university and Kyoto City to “withdraw the expulsion.”

At the front of its activities relating to international solidarity, Chukaku-ha invited union officials from overseas to the regular convention held by its affiliates, “NRMU Mito” (in January) and the “Tokyo-Seoul International Joint-Action” (in November). In addition, activists of Chhukaku-ha joined rallies which were convened in Seoul by labor unions of South Korea (in November).

Furthermore, Masaaki Osaka – an underground Chukaku-ha activist who had been on the run since 1972 after being placed on the wanted list – was arrested in Hiroshima Prefecture (in May) and charged with 5 separate crimes including murder (in June). In response, Chukaku-ha showed its stance of tackling relevant activities to rescue him, claiming that “Comrade Osaka is innocent” in its organ paper Zenshin (dated Jun. 1).



### **Kakurokyo Kaiho-ha centered activities on anti-war and anti-military base issues**

From the beginning of 2017, Kakurokyo Kaiho-ha Shuryu-ha (Mainstream faction of the Liberation Faction of the Revolutionary Workers' Association) took part in anti-war and anti-military base issues as well as the struggle against Narita Airport, calling to “defeat the American imperialist, Trump, and the Japanese imperialist, Abe, who both push for war and fascism with war policies, segregation, and antforeignism” and claimed it would “fiercely stand up against issues to halt the push for war, stop the dispatch of troops, and dissolve the army of imperialism and its military bases.” At the front of the anti-war and anti-military base issues, its

activists repeatedly participated in gatherings and seaborne protest actions against the relocation of the US military base from Futenma to Henoko organized by anti-relocation factions. In the struggle over Narita Airport, its activists participated in rallies and demonstrations hosted by the Kitahara Faction of the Sanrizuka-Shibayama United Opposition League against Construction of the Narita Airport (in March, July and October), while holding monthly demonstrations in Narita. Also, through the distribution of cooked rice, the group was able to gather and mobilize day laborers towards the Narita struggle.

From the beginning of the year, Kakurokyo Kaiho-ha Hansyuryu-ha (Anti-mainstream faction of the Liberation Faction of the Revolutionary Workers' Association) centered its efforts around the issues of anti-war and anti-military base, calling for the "defeat of the Abe administration that violently forces the restarting of nuclear power plants towards nuclear armament and to fully implement 'laws related to security legislations.'" On issues of anti-war and anti-relocation, its activists participated in rallies over the relocation of the Futenma Base to Henoko organized by anti-relocation groups, as well as holding protest activities in Oita

Prefecture (in March), Miyagi Prefecture (in May), and Shizoka Prefecture (in September), which coincided with military drills of the US Marines in Okinawa. In addition, it held protest activities in Kanagawa Prefecture (in March) and Nagasaki Prefecture (in August) coinciding with the dispatch of escort vessel of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) to Somalia. On the issue of anti-nuclear plants, it held demonstrations opposing the construction of the Oma Nuclear Power Plant (in Aomori Prefecture: in August). By distributing cooked rice, it was able to mobilize day laborers in these protests for anti-war and anti-relocation struggles.

## ≡ COLUMN ≡

### **Radical leftist groups continued recruitment activities in universities, targeting freshmen**

Radical leftist groups attach importance to universities as places to recruit young activists and conducted recruitment activities on various campuses nationwide. In the past, typical modus operandi of such recruitment by radical leftist groups was that "radical-leftist-style" activists wore helmets, sunglasses, and masks, distributed solicitation fliers which specified the name of the sect they belonged to, and gave public speeches identifying their sect. However, recently, there is an increasing trend that they've adopted different methods,

in which university freshmen cannot discern activists from regular students based on appearance alone nor recognize radical leftists being behind certain activities, such as distributing fliers of university clubs or student body associations that keep its partisanship secret, and holding lectures given by journalists in which ordinary students may easily participate. Vigilance is required as fear exists over freshmen being drawn into radical leftist groups unknowingly.

## 4

JCP mobilized its efforts to unite groups opposing the government and ruling party, raising the “defeat of the Abe administration” flag



JCP stressed the importance of a unified front of opposition parties to “defeat the Abe administration” in its 27th Party Congress

JCP held its 27th Party Congress in January for the first time in the past three years since 2014. During the Party Congress, JCP expressed its recognition of the political landscape in Japan, stating that “a new political framework of confrontation has emerged between ‘complementing forces of the Liberal Democratic Party and Komeito and ‘the unified front of opposing parties and citizens.’” Based on this recognition, JCP decided not only to form an alliance with opposition parties in preparation for the election of the House of Representatives, but also to reach an agreement on forming a

unified administration. In addition, JCP invited for the first-time representatives of different political parties and factions (Democratic Party of Japan, Liberal Party, Social Democratic Party and Wind of Okinawa Party) to the Party Congress and provided an opportunity for them to express greetings.

Kazuo Shii, Chairman of JCP; Akira Koike, Head of the Secretariat of JCP; and six Vice-chairpersons all remained in the three main posts. Also, there was a minor reshuffle in the Central Committee of JCP (25 members) with only 2 members being newly appointed.



Persistently criticized and questioned the Abe administration over its internal and foreign policy

Since February, JCP has repeatedly criticized Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for “taking the government into his own hands” in the national Diet, and demanded that his wife testify on the scandals of “Moritomo Gakuen” (a Japanese private school operator) to sell government-owned real estate and “Kake Gakuen” (a university/school operator based in Okayama Prefecture) to establish a new department for veterinary medicine, with indications showing Shinzo and Akie Abe had intent in both cases. In addition, regarding the case involving “daily activity logs” of the Ground Self-Defense Forces of Japan deployed in South Sudan, JCP criticized the government for “continuing to cover up the facts surrounding the dangers in South Sudan,” and demanded Tomomi Inada resign as Defense Minister (at the time in February); and furthermore, JCP demanded ethics be excluded from textbooks (in April) as it criticized the government of

“forcing a specific set of values designated by the state” through “ethics textbooks.”

After the national Diet entered into deliberations concerning the amendments to the Organized Crime Punishment Act (in April), JCP Diet members participated in protest rallies almost on a daily occurrence in surrounding areas of the Diet, claiming to “work hard to scrap the bill,” and submitted a motion of censure to the Upper House of the Diet (in June) against Katsutoshi Kaneda, the Minister of Justice (at the time), together with the Democratic Party (in Japan). Other than this, in response to Prime Minister Abe’s statement (in May) – as the President of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) – that it would “aim to specify the Self-Defense Forces in Article 9 of the Constitution and hope these amendments take effect in 2020,” JCP demanded the statement be recanted, claiming the statement was “intervening in the Legislative Branch by the head of the

Executive Branch who is not authorized to take initiative to amend the Constitution” in the Commission on the Constitution of the House of Representatives.

Regarding the Abe administration’s foreign policies, Shii attended the negotiation conference on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons held at UN headquarters (in March and July) as a member of the UN NGO, “Parliamentarians for Disarmament and Nuclear Non-proliferation,” and released a statement on the Japanese government’s response to the treaty, criticizing the government of “turning its back against the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear

Weapons” (in July), while strongly urging Japan to sign the treaty during the lecture commemorating the 95th anniversary of the founding of the Party (in July). Also, Shii released comments in which he accused North Korea of its ballistic missile launches and nuclear tests; however, he also repeatedly criticized the Japanese government’s response to these launchings and tests referring to the remarks by cabinet members that “now is not the time for dialogue,” saying, “The Japanese government’s odd stance stands out,” and, “What are they going to do if the Japanese government is the only one rejecting dialogue?”

### **JCP appealed its position as a “receptacle for non-Liberal Democratic Party voters” in various elections**

In the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election (in July), JCP promoted the uniqueness of its party during the election campaign, calling for the “suspension of Tsukiji fish market relocating to Toyosu” as other parties such as LDP approved and consented to the relocation. The casting and counting of votes resulted in JCP increasing its seats in the Assembly by two from 17 to 19, with Shii holding a sudden speech on the streets in Tokyo the day after the results, claiming a “quick dissolution of the House of Representatives and general election.”

With the dissolution of the lower house (in September), JCP put up rival candidates in the great majority of electoral districts where former members of the Democratic Party became candidates with the endorsement of the Party of Hope during the 48th election

for the House of Representatives (in October), while regulating corresponding candidates from the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan and Social Democratic Party, which resulted in 206 JCP-endorsed candidates in single-seat electoral districts (292 candidates previously).

In the election campaign, JCP and its candidates called to “put an end to Abe’s out-of-control government” and claimed the “Party of Hope as LDP’s complementary force,” which resulted in one seat in the single-seat electoral districts and 11 seats in proportional representation (approximately 4.4 million votes; 7.9% share of votes) – a decrease of nine seats from its 21 seats pre-election (1 seat in the single-seat electoral districts, 20 seats in PR).



## JCP mobilized its efforts to incorporate student and youth groups

In the resolution of the 27th Party Congress (in January), JCP revealed its policy to attach importance to incorporate the youth and students, showing concern of the party's current state of stagnant generational turnover, saying, "The earnestness and urgency to pass down our party's undertakings to the young generation has been commonly felt by the whole Party." Following the resolution, JCP published the "JCP magazine 2017" (in June) – a brochure (small-sized paperback book, 32 pages) for the youth and students, introducing the party's policies and outlook on themes such as "disparity and poverty," "black companies (businesses that exploit its employees)," and "the Trump administration" – and distributed it in stations and university campuses in different regions. As a result of this endeavor,

JCP presented examples of university students and male-laborers in the 30's joining the party in its organ paper "Shimbun Akahata" (dated Jun. 20 and Aug. 30).

In addition, the Democratic Youth League in Japan (DYL) – a youth organization that has received support from JCP and produced senior JCP members in great numbers – also created the "Democratic Youth Newspaper 2017, extra spring edition," compiling the contents of its activities, and distributed the paper for recruitment efforts of university freshmen in campuses of different regions. The results of this activity were reported in "Shimbun Akahata" (dated May 27), claiming the "increase in number of new DYL recruits this year doubled compared with last year and (it) is forming new campus groups."

## 5

## Right-wing groups and other organizations held activities that raised issues with neighboring countries

▶▶▶ Right-wing groups conducted activities focused on various issues including territorial disputes and the recognition of history

Since the acquisition of direct ownership of the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese government (September 2012), it has become a normal occurrence for Chinese government vessels to enter surrounding waters daily and intrude territorial waters about 3 times a month, and in response, right-wing groups have conducted propaganda activities in the streets in areas around Chinese diplomatic missions in various places in Japan calling for “Communist China to stop acts of invading Senkaku Islands immediately.” In addition, right-wing groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets as well as rallies and demonstrations criticizing China in various areas on the annual “September 29 Anti-Communist China Day” (held on the date of the signing of the Japan-China Joint Statement).

Regarding North Korea, right-wing groups vehemently opposed North Korea’s successive missile launchings since February and nuclear test (in September), and conducted propaganda activities in the streets in areas around different Chongryon-related facilities calling for the “international community to do away with North Korea,” and for “Chongryon and Korean residents to leave Japan.” Also, about the abduction of Japanese people by North Korea, right-wing groups demanded the Japanese government and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party “rescue the abducted victims right away.”

Regarding South Korea, right-wing groups responded to the inauguration of the Moon Jae In administration (in May) claiming “President Moon declared to annul the Japan-

Korea agreement and is looking to worsen bi-lateral relations,” while conducting propaganda activities in the streets in areas around South Korean diplomatic missions calling the “South Korean government to honor the Japan-Korea agreement and take down the statue of a young girl symbolizing comfort woman.” Also, right-wing groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets in various areas to “reclaim Takeshima,” during the annual “February 22 Takeshima Day” (which Shimane Prefecture enacted as “Takeshima Day” by its local ordinance) and “October 28 Reclaim Takeshima Day” (the day South Korea rejected the submission of the Takeshima dispute to the International Court of Justice).

Regarding Russia, right-wing groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets around Russian diplomatic missions in Japan during the visits of Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and of Sergey Shoygu, the Minister of Defense to Japan (in March: Japan-Russia Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers’ talks, Tokyo), as well as the annually held “February 7 Northern Territory Day” (the day the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and Russia was signed) and “August 9 Anti-Russia Day” (the day when the Soviet Union abrogated the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and invaded places such as Manchuria) demanding “economic cooperation with Russia is not necessary” and for the “immediate return of the Northern Territories.”



## Right-wing affiliated groups conducted activities centered on “anti-South Korea & anti-North Korea” issues

Right-wing affiliated groups conducted activities promoting “anti-South Korea and anti-North Korea” sentiments. Regarding South Korea, propaganda activities and demonstrations were conducted in the streets against the unlawful occupation of Takeshima demanding Japan “cease diplomatic relations with a country of aggression.” Also, in regards to North Korea, rallies and demonstrations were held in areas around Chongryon-affiliated facilities reproaching North Korea and Chongryon over the abduction of Japanese citizens and the successive missile launches and nuclear testing, with groups demanding the “expenditures for nuclear testing be used towards the investigation and immediate return of the abductees.” Among their remarks and deeds observed during these activities, some were criticized as “hate speech.”

In addition, a lawsuit was filed in response to the Osaka City legislature’s enactment of the “Osaka City Ordinance on Dealing with Hate Speech” (which took effect in July 2016), with right-wing affiliated groups

demanding the ordinance be void claiming it as “unconstitutional with its inclusion of ‘criminal punishment’ despite there being no punitive clauses in the ‘Act on the Promotion of Efforts to Eliminate Unfair Discriminatory Speech and Behavior against Persons Originating from Outside Japan.’”

Besides this, representatives of right-wing affiliated groups established a political party (in February: Convention for the party’s establishment) sending a candidate to the Tokyo Assembly elections (in July) who pledged to “discontinue public assistance to foreigners” in its election campaign, making public speeches bashing preferential treatment policies of foreign residents in Japan (the candidate was not elected with the least number of votes).

Meanwhile, people criticizing right-wing affiliated groups as “racist” conducted protest activities such as obstructing roads by staging a sit-in or hurling profanities along roadsides and intersections where demonstrations and propaganda activities in the streets by these right-wing affiliated groups were held.

## ≡ COLUMN ≡

### Right-wing affiliated groups opposed protest activities conducted by Chinese residents in Japan

During the “2017 Sapporo Asian Winter Games,” it was reported that the hotel where the Chinese teams were lodging had placed books in its guest rooms written by the hotel owner denying the “Nanjing Massacre,” which the Chinese government and state-run media condemned, stating “some forces in Japan are trying to distort history.” In response, right-wing affiliated groups heaped praise on the hotel owner, saying, “Whatever China says, it is wonderful that (the owner) continues to place the books there” (in February).

Under these circumstances, approximately

80 Chinese residents living in Japan held a demonstration in Shinjuku Ward, Tokyo calling the hotel owner to “keep corporate ethics,” and in response, approximately 220 members of right-wing affiliated groups approached and chased the Chinese demonstrators, as well as conducted protest activities condemning them that “Chinese people must not carry out political activities in Japan,” while 30 members of right-wing groups utilized sound trucks hurling profanities along roadsides towards the demonstrators to “hurry and go back to China” (in February).

# Appendix

(Major Security Developments in Japan and Overseas from Jan. to Nov. 2017)

International Incidents

Domestic Incidents

Jan. 1st (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Party Chairman Kim Jong Un announced preparations for the launching of its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) "entered the final stages" in his "New year's speech." Also, referred to the expansion of production through "self-reliance" towards implementing the "5-year strategy for national economic development."</li> <li>A gunman shot and killed 39 people and wounded 69 others in a night club in Istanbul of Western Turkey. Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) claimed responsibility.</li> </ul>
2nd (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Right-wing groups conducted activities for the "New Year's Imperial Palace Public Celebrations" (Tokyo).</li> </ul>
6th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regarding Russian hacking and interference of the US Presidential election (2016), the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) of the US indicated the cyberattacks were conducted by the Russian intelligence agency under orders given by President Putin as a ploy targeting the election, and that the Russian government would try to influence election processes of other countries.</li> </ul>
12th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aichi Prefectural Police arrested 5 Aum live-in followers for trying to evade the official on-site inspection by PSIA conducted on Feb. 4, 2016 (Feb. 2; All charges were dropped.).</li> <li>JCP Head of the Secretariat Akira Koike and others attended Mindan (Korean Residents Union in Japan) Central Headquarters' new year's assembly as a guest (Tokyo).</li> </ul>
15th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JCP held its 27th Party Congress. Representatives of other parties (Democratic Party, Liberal Party, Social Democratic Party, Wind of Okinawa Party) attended as guests (Until the 18th; Shizuoka).</li> <li>Right-wing groups held protest activities against the "27th Party Congress of the JCP" (Shizuoka).</li> </ul>
17th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>China's President Xi Jinping attended the annual World Economic Forum (Davos, Switzerland) as China's first President, and gave remarks such as saying "we should clearly oppose protectionism."</li> </ul>
18th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A terrorist attack using a car bomb took place at a military base in Gao region of Northern Mali, killing at least 77 and injuring over 100. "Al-Mourabitoun," an affiliate group of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), claimed responsibility.</li> </ul>
21st (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A bomb exploded in a market in Kurram Agency of The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in northwestern Pakistan killing 25 and injuring over 50 others (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and "Lashkar-e-Jhanvi al-Alami" issued statements claiming responsibility.).</li> </ul>
25th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>South Korea's National Police Agency announced the malware-attached E-mails impersonating academic research organizations sent on Nov. 3, 2016 and Jan. 3, 2017 to 40 staff members of its government agencies in charge of foreign affairs, security, national defense, and North-South unification affairs originated from IP addresses in North Korea.</li> <li>The Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department referred to prosecutors that an outside auditor of the Joyu group, charged with violating traffic laws (driving without a valid license; Feb. 15; Summary order was issued with fine of 300,000 yen), be placed under house arrest.</li> </ul>

Feb. 3rd (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Right-wing groups conducted protest activities against the "66th National Conference on Educational Research" of the Japan Teachers' Union (until Feb. 5th; Niigata).</li> </ul>
7th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Right-wing groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets to "reclaim Northern Territories" on Northern Territories Day (Nationwide).</li> </ul>
8th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Russia's Prime Minister Medvedev signed a government order giving names to a total of 5 unnamed islands including 3 islands in the Northern Territories.</li> </ul>
11th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Right-wing groups held activities of worship at shrines and celebrated "Empire Day" on National Foundation Day (Nationwide).</li> </ul>
12th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea launched one of its "Pukguksong-2" ballistic missiles, flying to a range of about 500 kilometers and impacted in the Sea of Japan.</li> <li>Kakumaru-ha held the "General Rally of The Anger of Labor Workers" (Tokyo).</li> </ul>
13th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Kim Jong Nam, half-brother to North Korea's Party Chairman Kim Jong Un, was assassinated at Kuala Lumpur International Airport. Malaysian police arrested four suspects including one male North Korean national and placed four other North Korean males on the international wanted list who fled Malaysia on the day of the incident.</li> </ul>
16th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A terrorist attack using a car bomb took place in Bayaa neighborhood of Baghdad, Iraq's capital, killing 59 and injuring 66. ISIL issued a statement claiming responsibility.</li> </ul>
18th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Right-wing groups held protests against the "32nd Regular Congress" of the All Japan Teachers and Staffs Union (Until the 19th, Tokyo).</li> </ul>
22nd (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Right-wing and right-wing affiliated groups, conducted protest activities to "reclaim Takeshima" on Takeshima Day (designated by the ordinance of Shimane Prefecture; nationwide).</li> </ul>
26th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Right-wing groups held memorials calling this day, "February 26 Incident Day" (Tokyo, Miyagi, etc.).</li> </ul>
Mar 1st (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chinese government announced its foreign policy guidelines on internet space, titled "International Cooperation Strategy for Cyberspace," in which China specified it would "exercise a significant role to the army to protect the sovereignty, security, and development of cyberspace."</li> </ul>
5th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The fifth session of the 12th National People's Congress (NPC; until Mar 15) was held in China (Beijing). Prime Minister Li Keqiang announced the yearly objective of 6.5% for its GDP growth rate while giving the report on its government activities.</li> <li>Right-wing groups held propaganda activities in the streets to "establish an independent constitution" in response to the "84th Party Congress of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP)" (Tokyo).</li> </ul>
6th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea simultaneously launched what could be seen as four "Scud-ER" ballistic missiles. All flew approximately 1,000 kilometers with three impacting in waters of Japan's exclusive economic zone.</li> </ul>
8th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>China's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, gave statements during press conferences of the 5th session of 12th NPC (Mar 5 - 15) mentioning such things as, "China naturally seeks to improve relations with Japan, but Japan must first restore its 'mental disorder.'"</li> </ul>



11th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Two suicide bombings took place near a Shiite mausoleum in Damascus, the capital of Syria, killing 74 and injuring 120. "Hayat Tahrir al-Sham" (HTS) issued a statement claiming responsibility.</li> </ul>
14th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Russia's President Putin signed the presidential order appointing Minister of Economic Development Oreshkin as the Special Representative of the President in charge of Trade and Economic Cooperation with Japan.</li> </ul>
15th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Aum Shinrikyo's Kosei facility was completely burned down by an accidental fire (Shiga).</li> </ul>
19th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea's Korean Central News Agency reported the country conducted ground jet tests of its newly developed high-thrust engine.</li> <li>Right-wing groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets to "reclaim the Northern Territories" in response to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers' talks between Japan and Russia (Until the 20th, Tokyo).</li> </ul>
21st (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JCP members participated in protest activities against the amendment of the Organized Crimes Punishment Act (Tokyo).</li> </ul>
22nd (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JCP Chairman Kazuo Shii attended the "Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading towards their Total Elimination" held at UN headquarters (Until April the 1st, New York).</li> </ul>
26th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Russian political activist, Navalny held "anti-corruption" demonstrations throughout Russia including Moscow.</li> </ul>
27th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Yokohama District Court ordered an Aum live-in follower of its mainstream faction to pay a fine of 500,000 yen for avoiding the on-site inspection conducted by PSIA on Mar. 2, 2016.</li> </ul>
Apr 3rd (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>An explosion that appeared to be caused by a suicide bombing took place on the subway of St. Petersburg in western Russia, killing 14 and injuring 50.</li> </ul>
6th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>China's President Xi Jinping visited the US (until the 7th) and held talks with US President Trump (6th). Both parties reconfirmed measures to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and fully implement the UN Security Council's resolutions and agreed to formulate the "100-day plan" to resolve bi-lateral economic and trade issues as well as to newly establish four frameworks for talks.</li> </ul>
9th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Bombs exploded in Coptic churches in Tanta and Alexandria of northern Egypt, killing at least 47 and injuring over 130 in total. "ISIL Egypt" issued a statement claiming responsibility.</li> </ul>
11th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea held the fifth session of the 13th Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) (Mansudae Assembly Hall, Pyongyang). Kim Jong Un attended and gave the report on the work of the Cabinet, adopted settlements for 2016 and budget for 2017, and elected the foreign affairs committee of SPA.</li> </ul>
15th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea held a military parade celebrating the 105th anniversary of the birth of its founding father, Kim Il Sung. (Kim Il Sung Square, Pyongyang). Kim Jong Un attended and displayed what looked to be a new ICBM.</li> </ul>
21st (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Armed groups attacked a military base in Balkh Province in northern Afghanistan, killing about 150 soldiers and injuring over 150. "Taliban" issued a statement claiming responsibility.</li> </ul>
26th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>China launched its first home-built aircraft carrier in Dalian, Liaoning Province.</li> </ul>

27th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Russia's President Putin met with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for about 3 hours in Moscow, Russia. Special visits of former Japanese residents to ancestral graves by airplane and the dispatch of governmental and non-governmental research teams to the Northern Territories were agreed, as well as international situations including Syria and North Korea were discussed.</li> </ul>
28th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo held Golden-week intensive seminars (until May 7, Saitama and other prefectures).</li> </ul>
29th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Right-wing groups offered prayers and conducted activities celebrating Emperor Showa on Showa Day (nationwide).</li> </ul>
May 2nd (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Joyu group held Golden-week intensive seminars (until May 7; 13th – 14th; 21st, Tokyo and other prefectures).</li> </ul>
3rd (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Right-wing groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets to "establish an independent constitution" on Constitution Day (nationwide).</li> </ul>
12th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Large-scale cyberattacks took place with ransomware (WannaCry) broke out worldwide. US government released a statement on the 15th announcing the hack "infected over 300,000 computers with (damages) spreading to approximately 150 countries.</li> </ul>
14th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea launched one "Hwasong-12" IRBM. It reached altitudes of approximately 2,000 kilometers and flew about 800 kilometers and impacted in the Sea of Japan.</li> <li>The "Belt and Road" Forum for International Cooperation was held in Beijing, China (until the 15th), in which approximately 1,500 people from about 130 countries, including current and former heads of state and senior government officials from 29 countries, attended. A joint communique was adopted (the 15th).</li> <li>Russia's President Putin met with China's President Xi Jinping in Beijing, China.</li> </ul>
17th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JCP members and radical leftist activists participated in protest activities against the restarting Unit 4 of Takahama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui).</li> </ul>
18th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chinese public vessels entered Japanese waters near Senkaku Islands. A drone-like craft was spotted hovering over the front bridge of the vessel which were in waters about 14 kilometers west-northwest of Uotsuri Island.</li> </ul>
19th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JCP members participated in protest activities against the amendment of the Organized Crimes Punishment Act (Tokyo).</li> </ul>
21st (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea launched one "Pukguksong-2" ballistic missile which flew approximately 500 kilometers and impacted in the Sea of Japan.</li> </ul>
22nd (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A male suicide bomber killed 22 and injured 120 at the entrance of a concert arena in Manchester in central England. A statement claiming responsibility in the name of "ISIL England" was issued.</li> </ul>
23rd (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Armed groups giving their support to ISIL seized the urban area of Marawi City, Lanao Del Sur in southern Philippines. By the time the Philippines army concluded military operations (Oct. 23rd), approximately 920 fighters of the armed groups, 165 soldiers of the security forces, and 47 citizens were killed.</li> </ul>
24th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Consecutive suicide bombings by two males took place near a bus-terminal in East Jakarta of Indonesia's capital city, Jakarta, killing 3 police officers.</li> </ul>
29th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea launched a flying object that appeared to be a "modified Scud-class missile," flying 400 kilometers and impacting in Japanese waters of the Sea of Japan.</li> </ul>



International Incidents  
Domestic Incidents

31st (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Car bomb exploded near the German embassy in central Kabul, Afghanistan's capital, killing at least 150 and injuring over 400.</li> </ul>
Jun. 2nd (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UN Security Council adopted Sanction Resolution 2356 against North Korea.</li> </ul>
3rd (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>After ramming a van into pedestrians on the London bridge in the center of the UK's capital, three perpetrators including Pakistani-British citizens proceeded to stab people in nearby restaurants and pubs, killing 8 and injuring 50.</li> </ul>
6th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JCP members and radical leftist activists participated in protest activities against the restarting of Unit 3 of Takahama Nuclear Power Plant (Fukui).</li> </ul>
7th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Armed groups simultaneously attacked the Parliament building and Mausoleum of Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran's capital city, Tehran, killing 18 and injuring 52. A statement claiming responsibility in the name of "ISIL Persia" was issued.</li> </ul>
8th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Russia's President Putin met with China's President Xi Jinping in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan.</li> </ul>
13th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea released previously detained US university student, Otto Fredrick Warmbier to Joseph Yun, the United States Special Representative for North Korea Policy (Warmbier died on the 19th.).</li> <li>China established diplomatic ties with Panama in Central America.</li> <li>US-CERT – an organization within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – issued an alert on North Korean cyberattacks, pointing out that North Korea will continue such attacks to propel its military and strategic aims.</li> <li>JCP Chairman Shii participated in the "June 13th Public Gathering to Scrap the Bill of the Organized Crimes Punishment Act! No to Abe's Amendment of the Constitution!" (Tokyo)</li> </ul>
16th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) began road construction in Doklam Pass in the China, India, and Bhutan border. Standoff between the armies of China and Indian followed (Until Aug. 28).</li> </ul>
20th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>China's National Development and Reform Commission and the State Oceanic Administration announced the "Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the 'Belt and Road' Initiative," intending to show the direction of maritime cooperation with countries along the initiative's corridors and that the Arctic Ocean would be newly subjected to the initiative.</li> </ul>
23rd (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A car bomb exploded near the police office in Quetta, the provincial capital city of Balochistan in southwestern Pakistan, killing 12 and injuring 20 others. "ISIL-Khorasan" and "Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar" (TTP-JA) issued statements, both claiming responsibility.</li> </ul>
28th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) announced damages from cyberattacks with ransomware (Petya) took place worldwide since June 27.</li> </ul>
29th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>US government informed the US Congress of its decision to sell \$1.42 billion in arms to Taiwan.</li> </ul>
July 1st (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Celebratory event commemorating the 20th Anniversary of Hong Kong's Return to Motherland held in Hong Kong, with attendance of China's President Xi Jinping.</li> </ul>
2nd (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JCP claimed 19 seats in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election (gained 2 extra seats from pre-election).</li> </ul>

4th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea launched one "Hwasong-14" type ICBM which easily cleared an altitude of 2,500 kilometers and flew approximately 900 kilometers and impacted in waters of Japan's exclusive economic zone.</li> <li>Russia's President Putin met with China's President Xi Jinping in Moscow, Russia.</li> <li>China's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi and Russia's Foreign Minister Lavrov signed the "joint statement on the issue of Korean-Peninsula between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation."</li> </ul>
5th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JCP Chairman Shii attended the "Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, Leading towards their Total Elimination" held at UN headquarters (Until the 7th; New York, USA).</li> </ul>
7th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Russia's President Putin met with US President Trump during the G20 Summit (until the 8th; Hamburg, Germany). Putin also met with Japan's Prime Minister Abe and agreed to hold vice-ministerial level talks involving joint economic activities in the Northern Territories, as well as, the two discussing about international situations including North Korea. Xi Jinping met with Abe on the 8th and agreed to improve bilateral relations.</li> </ul>
10th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Iraq's Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced the liberation of Mosul in northern Iraq which had been occupied by ISIL since June 2014.</li> </ul>
13th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nobel Peace Prize laureate and Chinese literary critic, Liu Xiaobo died in hospital in Shenyang of Liaoning Province in China.</li> </ul>
15th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chinese public vessels navigated Japanese waters south of Taima. Afterwards, (two) Chinese public vessels navigated Japanese waters north of Okino Island. On the 17th, the same two vessels navigated Japanese waters near the Tsugaru Strait.</li> <li>Right-wing groups conducted protest activities against "the 106th Regular Congress of the Japan Teachers' Union" (until the 16th, Tokyo).</li> </ul>
19th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JCP held a commemorative lecture meeting to celebrate its 95th anniversary (Tokyo).</li> </ul>
21st (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Russia and China conducted "Joint Sea 2017" – joint military exercises – in the Baltic Sea (Until the 28th).</li> </ul>
25th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Armed groups attacked an oil exploration team in Magumeri area in Borno State of northeastern Nigeria, killing 69 and abducting 3 staff. On the 29th, "Boko Haram" released a video of the 3 detainees pleading for their rescue.</li> </ul>
27th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Iran announced the successful launching of its satellite-carrying rocket, "Simorgh."</li> </ul>
28th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea launched one "Hwasong-14" type ICBM. It easily cleared an altitude of 3,500 kilometers and flew approximately 1,000 kilometers and impacted in waters of Japan's exclusive economic zone.</li> <li>Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs demanded the US to cut 455 staff in US diplomatic missions in Russia by September 1 in response to the US cutting the same number of Russian diplomatic staff in the US.</li> </ul>
30th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Military parade commemorating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the PLA was held at the Zhurihe training base in the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region with the attendance of the Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xi Jinping.</li> </ul>
Aug. 1st (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Operations began at the "support base" in Djibouti of East Africa as the first overseas outpost of China's PLA.</li> </ul>

2nd (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>US President Trump signed a bill for tougher economic sanctions against Russia.</li> </ul>
5th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UN Security Council adopted Sanction Resolution 2371 to toughen sanctions against North Korea.</li> </ul>
6th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Right-wing groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets, blaming the US of using atomic bombs on Atomic Bomb Day (Until the 9th; Tokyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki and other prefectures).</li> </ul>
8th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Strategic Force of the Korean People's Army announced its consideration of making an enveloping fire around Guam Island of the US.</li> </ul>
9th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Right-wing groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets calling for the "return the Northern Territories" during what it calls, "Anti-Russia Day."</li> </ul>
11th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo held summer intensive seminars (until 16th; 19th – 20th; Tokyo and other prefectures).</li> </ul>
12th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JCP members and radical leftist activists participated in the "Prefectural Residents' Assembly to disallow the construction of new Henoko military base and support governor Takeshi Onaga" (Okinawa).</li> </ul>
15th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Right-wing groups offered prayers at the Yasukuni Shrine and other Gokoku shrines and joined the Memorial Service for War Dead on day World War II ended (nationwide).</li> </ul>
17th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Fourteen people died and over 130 were injured when a van ploughed into a crowded area of La Rambla Street in central Barcelona of northeastern Spain. The next day in Cambrils also of northeastern Spain, a vehicle ran down pedestrians, killing 1 and injuring 6. The day after on the 19th, ISIL issued a statement claiming responsibility.</li> </ul>
18th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Right-wing groups held protest activities against the "All Japan Teachers and Staff Union's 2017 National Assembly for Educational Research" (Until the 20th; Okayama).</li> </ul>
23rd (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Russia's Prime Minister Medvedev signed a government order designating a part of Shikotan Island in the Northern Territories as a "priority development area" for a special economic zone.</li> </ul>
24th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JCP Vice Chairman Yasuo Ogata visited Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) central headquarters, delivering Chairman Shii's statement on North Korea's ballistic missile launchings while exchanging thoughts with So Chung On, Director General of International and Unification Affairs of Chongryon (Tokyo).</li> </ul>
25th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked police facilities and military bases in Maungdaw Township of Rakhine State in northwestern Myanmar, killing 12, including police officers.</li> </ul>
29th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea launched a "Hwasong-12" type IRBM which flew over Hokkaido and impacted about 1,180 kilometers east of Cape Erimo in the Pacific Ocean.</li> </ul>
Sep. 3rd (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea's Workers' Party of Korea convened the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee where it was decided to conduct testing of a hydrogen bomb that can be mounted on an ICBM.</li> <li>North Korea conducted its 6th nuclear test and announced the "successful testing of the hydrogen bomb mounted on ICBM."</li> <li>Russia President Putin met with China's President Xi Jinping in Xiamen, China.</li> </ul>
7th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Russia's President Putin met with Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for about 3 hours in Vladivostok, Russia. Specified projects to quickly implement joint economic activities in the Northern Territories (5 items) and special visits of ancestral graves in the Northern Territories by airplane, eyed at the end-of-September, were agreed upon.</li> </ul>

8th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries hosted a "reception to commemorate the 45th anniversary of normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan" in Beijing. Wang Chen, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and members affiliated to the China-Japan Friendship Association were among the 300 that attended.</li> </ul>
10th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nationwide local elections were held in Russia. Governor elections in 16 federal subjects resulted in candidates of the ruling party, "United Russia," winning out.</li> </ul>
11th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UN Security Council adopted Sanction Resolution 2375 against North Korea.</li> </ul>
14th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>EU decided to extend sanctions against Russia until March 15, 2018.</li> <li>Russia and Belarus held "Zapad (West) – 2017" joint strategic military exercises (Until the 20th).</li> <li>Successive suicide bombing and shootings took place at restaurants and checkpoints in Nasiriyah, the provincial capital of Dhi Qar Governorate in Southern Iraq, killing at least 84 and injuring 93. ISIL issued a statement claiming responsibility.</li> </ul>
15th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>North Korea launched a "Hwasong-12" type IRBM which flew over Hokkaido and impacted 2,200 kilometers east of Cape Erimo in the Pacific Ocean.</li> <li>A bomb placed in a subway exploded at the Parsons Green Station in southwest London, the capital of the UK, injuring 30. ISIL issued a statement claiming responsibility.</li> <li>Mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo held autumn intensive seminars (until the 18th; 22nd – 25th; Saitama and other prefectures).</li> </ul>
18th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Russia and China conducted "Joint Sea 2017" naval exercises in the Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, and other areas (Until the 25th).</li> </ul>
21st (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Chairman Kim Jong-un of North Korea released a statement in the name of Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, announcing it "will consider with seriousness exercising of a corresponding, highest level of hard-line countermeasure in history." Ri Yong-ho, Foreign Minister of North Korea, provoked the possibility of "testing its hydrogen bomb over the Pacific Ocean."</li> </ul>
22nd (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Iran announced the "successful" launching and testing of its new domestic-made ballistic missile, "Khorramshahr."</li> </ul>
25th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Regarding the litigation case that the mainstream and the Joyu groups of Aum Shinrikyo took action against the state (Public Security Examination Commission), seeking to repeal the ruling to extend the surveillance period based on the Act on the Control of Organizations (5th time; 2015), the Tokyo District Court lifted surveillance on the Joyu group (The state appealed the ruling, dated October 6.).</li> </ul>
27th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The South Korea's National Police Agency announced the dissemination of malware attached to E-mails impersonating State and financial institutions sent to affiliates involved in the exchange of virtual currency (July - August) were the acts of North Korea.</li> </ul>
29th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>China's Premier Li Keqiang exchanged congratulatory messages with Japan's Prime Minister Abe marking the 45th anniversary of the normalization of China-Japan diplomatic ties.</li> <li>Right-wing groups held propaganda activities in the streets calling to "defend the Senkaku Islands until the death" on what its calls, "Anti-Communist China Day."</li> </ul>
Oct. 3rd (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>JCP hosted the 2nd Plenary Session of the Central Committee, and adopted policies dealing with the 48th general election of members of the House of Representatives (Tokyo).</li> </ul>

International Incidents  
Domestic Incidents

4th (Wed)	• An armed group composed of three perpetrators attacked a courthouse in Misrata city of the Misrata District in western Libya where they carried out suicide bombings, killing 4 and injuring over 40 others. ISIL's "State of Tripoli" issued a statement claiming responsibility.
7th (Sat)	• North Korea's Workers' Party of Korea held the second plenary session of the 7th Central Committee of the Party.
8th (Sun)	• Mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo held the "Ceremony commemorating the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Order of Truth" (Hokkaido and other prefectures.).
14th (Sat)	• A bomb loaded on a truck exploded near a hotel in central Mogadishu, the capital city of Somalia, killing over 500 and injuring about 300 others.
16th (Mon)	• Russia's Speaker of the Federation Council (Upper House) Matviyenko, met with An Don Chun, Deputy Chairman of North Korea's Supreme People's Assembly and Chung Sye Kyun, South Korea's Speaker of the National Assembly separately during the 137th IPU Assembly (Until the 18th; St. Petersburg, Russia).
18th (Wed)	• The 19th National Congress of the CPC (National Congress) was held (until the 24th). The "report" (political report) of the 18th Central Committee titled, "Win the decisive battle for the comprehensive completion of a moderately prosperous society and obtain a great victory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era" was given, and a "Bill of amendment of the Constitution of the CPC" was considered and adopted.
20th (Fri)	• "Syrian Democratic Forces" (SDF) announced the liberation of Raqqa in northern Syria which had been occupied by ISIL since the beginning of 2014.
22nd (Sun)	• JCP claimed 12 seats in the 48th election for the House of Representatives (Loss of 9 seats pre-election).
25th (Wed)	• The first plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee was held. Twenty-five members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party and seven members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee were appointed, with Xi Jinping being elected as General Secretary of the Standing Committee. Also, members of the Central Military Commission were appointed.
26th (Thu)	• Japan's Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA) reported damages from cyberattacks with ransomware (Bad Rabbit) took place from October 24, with infections centered around regions such as Russia and Ukraine.


28th (Sat)	• Right-wing groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets calling for the "recovery of Takshima" on what it calls, "Reclaim Takeshima Day."
31st (Tue)	• A man rammed a pickup truck onto a bicycle lane in Lower Manhattan of New York, USA, killing 8 and injuring 11. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack.
Nov. 5th (Sun)	• Chukaku-ha, a radical leftist group, held the "National Laborers General Rally" (Tokyo).
5th (Sun)	• Armed groups attacked and took hostages from the security force headquarters building in the State of Aden in southern Yemen killing at least 35. "Adan-Abyan State" of ISIL issued a statement claiming responsibility.
10th (Fri)	• Russia's President Putin met with Japan's Prime Minister Abe during the APEC summit conference (until the 11th; Da Nang, Vietnam). Putin also met with Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping met with Abe on the 11th.
17th (Fri)	• Song Tao, head of the International Liaison Department of the Communist Party of China, visited North Korea as General Secretary Xi Jinping's special envoy (until the 20th), and held talks with Choe Ryong Hae, Vice Chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea, explaining details of the CPC's 19th National Congress.
20th (Mon)	• US State Department re-designated North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism. • The Director-General of PSIA submitted a request to the Public Security Examination Commission to extend the period of surveillance disposition (the 6th time) of Aum Shinrikyo based on Article 12 Paragraph 1 of the Act on the Control of Organizations.
22nd (Wed)	• Russia's President Putin met and discussed the peace process in Syria with Iran's President Rouhani and Turkey's President Erdogan in Sochi, Russia.
24th (Fri)	• An armed group composed of about 30 men attacked a mosque in the town of Bir al-Abed in Arish of the North Sinai Governorate in northeastern Egypt, killing over 300.
29th (Wed)	• North Korea launched a "Hwasong-15" type ICBM. It easily cleared an altitude of 4,000 kilometers and flew approximately 1,000 kilometers and impacted in waters of Japan's exclusive economic zone.

## PSIA Website



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