


January 2016

Annual Report 2015

Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations



Public Security Intelligence Agency

On the Publication of the Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations (2016 Edition)

Director-General, Public Security Intelligence Agency **Takashi Nonoue**

In January each year, the Public Security Intelligence Agency (公安調査庁, *Koanchosacho*; hereinafter referred to as PSIA) publishes the Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations, providing a summary of the public security situation within Japan and overseas during the previous year. This is the 2016 edition.

The task of the PSIA is to ensure public security on the basis of laws including the Subversive Activities Prevention Act and the Act on the Control of Organizations Which Committed Indiscriminate Mass Murder. Accordingly, we are conducting surveillance of Aum Shinrikyo. In order to fulfill the duties, the PSIA gathers and analyzes intelligence about situations at home and abroad that could affect public security, including intelligence concerning developments in neighboring countries, international terrorism and various domestic groups. Through these endeavors, the PSIA is controlling the organizations and striving to contribute to policymaking via the provision of intelligence, as a core member of the intelligence community in Japan.

Looking at the internal and external situations in 2015, while North Korea continues nuclear/missile development, major terrorist attacks occurred one after another, including murders of Japanese citizens in Syria and serial terror attacks in Paris. International threats to Japan are also growing as ISIL named Japan as a target, accusing the country of being part of the Crusade. Within the country, while Aum Shinrikyo still maintains dangerous traits and power, radical leftist groups continue their activities and are trying to attract the general public. Furthermore, cyber-attacks aimed at the theft of important information from Japanese organizations occurred in succession. The internal and external situations are growing increasingly severe.

Amid this situation, the Group of Seven (Ise-Shima Summit) will be held in May 2016. To ensure the safety of the summit, the PSIA set up the special intelligence task force for the 2016 Group of Seven and is putting all efforts into information gathering and analysis. Today, threats are not limited to state institutions but reach private organizations and citizens, causing increased need for public-private cooperation to ensure public security. For this purpose, we will step up our efforts to provide information directly to the public.

After the Ise-Shima Summit, Japan will hold the 2020 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games and other high-profile events, which will draw global attention to security in Japan. I sincerely hope that you will find this publication useful, and that it will provide you with a greater understanding of the PSIA's work.

November 2015

Contents

- 01 On the Publication of the Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations (2016 Edition)
-

Feature Article

06 Toward the Ise-Shima Summit

- 1 Concerns about international terrorism, cyber-attacks, and illegal acts by anti-globalization groups
- 2 PSIA strengthening efforts to ensure a safe summit

Focal Issues of the External Situation in 2015



1 North Korea and Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan)

09 1-1 North Korea attempting to raise national prestige while retaining its “dual policy”

10 **Column** *North Korean remarks on “dual policy” and becoming a “nuclear power”*

11 1-2 North Korea’s confrontation with the U.S. remained to be solved, while its relations with China indicated signs of improvement

12 **Column** *North Korea and China moved closer together*

13 1-3 North Korea achieved resumption of talks in addition to heightening military tensions

14 1-4 North Korea attempted to postpone a report on “investigation into Japanese abductees” even after one year passed from the investigation start

16 1-5 Chongryon attempted to thoroughly ensure “union” to enhance control under Chairman Ho Jong Man

18 **Column** *Developments regarding the 60th Chongryon anniversary*

2 China

- 19 2-1 The Xi Jinping leadership faced a torrent of difficult economic and social problems and attempted to make a breakthrough with hardline measures
- 21 **Column** *China accelerating development of the “national security” system*
- 22 **Column** *Ceremony to mark the “70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japan”*
- 23 2-2 **China began to create an international order in its favor while attempting to establish its position as a regional power**
- 26 **Column** *Continuing tensions in the South China Sea*
- 26 2-3 China maintained its principle stance on “recognition of history” and “territorial problems” while indicating the attitude of favoring the improvement of relations with Japan
- 29 **Column** *China-South Korea cooperation involving the “recognition of history issue”*
- 30 **Column** *China’ s propaganda campaigns exploiting “facilities and historical documents related to the war against Japan”*
- 31 2-4 China grew cautious in anticipation of Taiwan’ s government change

3 Russia

- 32 3-1 **Responding to confrontation with Western countries over the Ukraine problem, Russia attempted to enhance cooperation with China and former Soviet Union countries, and to increase its influence in the Middle East**
- 34 **Column** *“Cooperation” and “competition” are mixed in Russia-China relations*
- 35 3-2 While seeking to improve relations with Japan, Russia criticized Japan’ s territorial claim to the Northern Territories issue as the revision of history and sent senior officials to the territories one after another
- 38 **Column** *The Russian federal government formulated a new Northern Territories development program*

4 Middle East/North Africa

- 39 4 The Middle East/North Africa situation becomes more confusing

5 International Terrorism

- 42 5-1 **ISIL expanding threats to other regions**

- 44 **Column** *Japanese involved in terror attacks in foreign countries. ISIL named Japan as a terror attack target*

- 45 5-2 Security situation still unstable in Afghanistan and Pakistan

- 46 **Column** *The Death of the “Taliban” supreme leader*

- 46 5-3 ISIL’s influence expanding in Southeast Asia

- 47 **Column** *Terror and World Heritage*

6 Adverse Activities against Japan

- 48 6 **Activities aimed at acquiring materials/technology that could be diverted for military use or important information**

- 50 **Column** *Reports about North Korea-Iran cooperation in nuclear and missile development*

- 50 **Column** *Threats of terror attacks using remotely controlled IoT devices*

- 50 **Column** *Public Security Intelligence Agency efforts to protect key information*

Focal Issues of the Domestic Public Security Situation in 2015



1 Aum Shinrikyo

- 52 1-1 **Aum Shinrikyo still firmly maintains dangerous traits**

- 54 **Column** *Four-part meeting*

- 54 1-2 The mainstream group worked toward the return of Asahara’s sons while maintaining commitment to “absolute faith in Asahara”

- 55 **Column** *Twenty years after the subway sarin gas attacks*
— Victims and bereaved families are still suffering and are concerned that the incident will be forgotten —

- 56 1-3 The Joyu group continued to strive to evade surveillance

2 Moves by domestic groups concerning events that drew attention from society

- 58 2-1 **Criticism from various groups about the administration over the bills related to the Legislation for Peace and Security**
- 58 2-2 Continued obstructive activities and protests to prevent the relocation of U.S. Futenma base in Henoko
- 59 2-3 Protests with the goal of “blocking the restarts” of nuclear power plants
- 60 2-4 Criticizing the government’ s stance on historical recognition at “the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II”

3 Radical Leftist Groups

- 61 3-1 **The anti-mainstream faction of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association caused a guerrilla incident for three consecutive years**
- 62 3-2 Radical leftist groups focused on winning over laborers and citizens
- 63 3-3 Developments relating to the Japanese Red Army and the “Yodo-go” group
- 64 **Column** *International solidarity by radical leftist groups*

4 The Japanese Communist Party (JCP)

- 65 4 **The JCP showed its presence by stressing the confrontational stance toward the Abe administration**
- 66 **Column** *“National Coalition Government” is similar to the party’ s concept 55 years ago*

5 Right-wing Groups, etc.

- 67 5 Right-wing groups and others raised issues with neighboring countries
- 68 **Column** *International activities of right-wing groups*

69 Appendix (January–November: Major security developments in Japan and overseas)

72 PSIA Website

*This 2016 edition of the Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations reviews developments in domestic and international public security in 2015 (as of the end of November), as well as examining future prospects in these areas. In this report, unless otherwise noted, the months refer to those of 2015. The titles of individuals mentioned hereinafter are those current at the time of writing.

1 Concerns about international terrorism, cyber-attacks, and illegal acts by anti-globalization groups

The Group of 7 (Ise-Shima Summit) will be held in Shima City, Mie Prefecture, on May 26 and 27, 2016. The Summit ministerial meetings will be held in 10 cities across the country from April.

Summits held in other countries were hit by terrorist and cyber-attacks. Some participants of protest activities were arrested.

Summits that gather leaders of major countries can be easy targets for terrorist and other attacks. There have been various attacks in the past. During the Gleneagles summit (UK, in July 2005) for example, simultaneous bombing occurred in the subway system and a bus in London that was far away from the summit, leaving 52 people dead and about 700 injured. At the time of the G20 Cannes Summit Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (February 2011), a French government agency was attacked by cyber terrorists supposedly aiming to steal information on the G20. It was also reported that European diplomatic organizations had been attacked by cyber terrorists supposedly aiming to steal information on the G20 Saint Petersburg Summit (Russia, September 2013) before it was held.

Protest activities were held by anti-globalization and other groups radicalized during the G8 Summit in Heiligendamm, Germany (June 2007), and the G20 Summit in Toronto, Canada (June 2010), leading to the arrest of several hundreds of protestors in each case. At the time of the G7 Summit in Schloss Elmau, Germany (June), radical activists called the Black Bloc (a group of people dressed in black engaging in radical protests including violence) joined the protest and some protestors clashed with the police.

Summits held in Japan also experienced terrorist and guerilla attacks by radical leftist groups

Radical leftist groups in Japan announced, “We would make sure to blow up summits that are pushed as a part of building a system for war by Japanese Imperialism” and have caused 50 terrorist/guerrilla incidents in total. They include the incident where “Chukaku-ha” shot explosives targeting the guest house where the Tokyo Summit was held in May 1986, the incident where the anti-mainstream faction of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association shot metal projectiles at U.S. Yokota base, and other incidents that could affect the safe and smooth operation of the summits.

Radical leftist groups and anti-globalization forces led by them and others considered summits to be “conferences to promote new liberalism policies” and together with overseas groups staged activities protesting the Toyako Summit in July 2008 in Hokkaido and other places around the country. Four protestors were arrested during a demonstration march that gathered anti-glo-

balization groups at home and abroad including the “Black Bloc.” On the other hand, right-wing groups viewed the summit, a get-together of leaders of major countries, as an opportunity to publicize their causes. Some groups carried out propaganda activities “against the United States” in Sapporo city.

Watching out for moves by international terrorist organizations, radical leftist groups and anti-globalization groups, as well as cyber-attacks

There is a threat of cyber-attacks and other illegal activities by international terrorist organizations, radical leftist groups and anti-globalization groups targeting the Ise-Shima Summit. Among international terrorist groups, “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) and al-Qaeda named Japan as a target of terrorist attacks. Actually there have been attacks on Japanese citizens abroad, including the murders of Japanese citizens by terrorists in Syria (January to February). The threat will grow as the leaders of the major countries that are named as targets will visit Japan. Attacks may occur not only at the venue but also in other urban areas in the light of past examples.

Because some radical leftist groups in Japan have contact with international terrorist groups and related organizations, we can’t deny the possibility of terrorist attacks by people involved in international terrorist groups with support by the radical leftist groups in Japan. The anti-mainstream faction of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association, which caused guerrilla incidents for three consecutive years, might cause similar incidents to disrupt the summit.

In addition, radical leftist groups and anti-globalization forces led by them and others are expected to stage radical protests in cooperation with other groups at home and abroad.

There is also concern about accidental illegal incidents because some right-wing groups might carry out propaganda activities criticizing the United States when US dignitaries visit Japan, or activities against radical leftist groups protesting against the summit.

Another concern is the threat of attacks against our government agencies and key infrastructure as well as espionage trying to steal important information in cyber space also during this summit.


2 PSIA strengthening efforts to ensure a safe summit

Setting up a special intelligence task force to strengthen information collection and analysis

Responding to the decision on the summit venue, PSIA set up the special intelligence task force for the 2016 Group of Seven (June 8.)

Under the leadership of the headquarters, we will strengthen our information collection and analysis to prevent terrorist attacks on the summit and other illegal incidents through strengthening partnerships with relevant organizations at home and abroad, while at the same time providing the information we obtain to relevant organizations in a timely and appropriate manner.

Focal Issues of the External Situation in 2015



External Situation 1

1 North Korea and Chongryon

(General Association of Korean Residents in Japan)



1-1 North Korea attempting to raise national prestige while retaining its “dual policy”

North Korea carried out massive events to mark the 70th anniversary of the WPK foundation, emphasizing giving priority to people

Marking the 70th anniversary of the foundation of the Workers' Party of Korea in October 2015, North Korea carried out various massive commemorative events at the Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, including a large-scale military parade, Pyongyang citizens' demonstration march, students' torch march, and a 10,000-person major performance.

In his address to the military parade, First Secretary Kim Jong Un vowed to “thoroughly materialize the policy of putting people first” and “sacrifice myself for people,” repeatedly emphasizing the attitude of giving priority to people. He also asserted that his country could “wage any type of war favored by the U.S.

imperialists.” In the military parade, what was viewed as the improved version of the KN-08 long-range ballistic missile was made public, demonstrating nuclear and missile development efforts.

After a series of events to mark the 70th anniversary of the WPK foundation, the WPK announced a plan to hold the Seventh Congress early in May 2016, the first WPK congress in about 36 years since October 1980, emphasizing that “the party would make it a marching congress to propose a strategic grand design for constructing a strong, prosperous state” (October).


Developing economic infrastructure to build “a strong economy and a civilized nation”

The Kim Jong Un regime focuses on the modernization of factories, enterprises, and farms, and the redevelopment of Pyongyang while retaining its “dual policy” of economic construction and nuclear development, and pursuing the construction of “a strong socialist economy and a civilized nation.” In 2015, the regime emphasized its achievements on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the WPK foundation and tackled the large-scale renovation of Pyongyang International Airport and the construction of high-rise condominium buildings and hydro power stations. Giving priority to economic cooperation with China and Russia regarding external economic relations, the regime created two new special economic zones around the border between North Korea and China (April and October), held a briefing in China on investment in the Wonsan-Mt. Kumgang International Tourist Zone (March), launched full operation of the Port of Rajin for shipping Russian coal, and implemented talks with Russian authorities on electricity supply,

and railway and road development.

In a limited range of North Korean regions, including Pyongyang, signs of economic vitalization, including growth in vehicle and domestic products distribution, have recently been seen, along with the emergence of what seem to be wealthy people. However, chronic food shortages are expected to remain (September,

Trends in China-North Korea Trade Value



* The red dotted line indicates the value estimated on the assumption that the rate of decline in the January-October period would continue for one year.

the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). Attracting investment in special economic zones has made little progress, while China-North Korea trade, which accounts

for about 90% of North Korea’s external trade, has indicated a downward trend. There has been no clear indication that the whole of the North Korean economy would get on a growth path.

Taking advantage of a “reign of terror” to enhance control on executives

In the meantime, the Kim Jong Un regime has repeated the execution of executives and their frequent reshuffle to solidify the foundation of the dictatorship led by First Secretary Kim since its inauguration in 2012. From late 2014 to May 2015, Pyon In Son, chief of the Korean People’s Army General Staff Operations Bureau, Ma Won Chun, director of the design department of the National Defense Commission, and Defense Minister Hyon Yong Chol, who had frequently accompanied First Secretary Kim,

were reportedly purged for such reasons as irreverent remarks against First Secretary Kim and failure to implement orders. Of them, Ma’s power was restored (October). However, Hyon was reportedly executed. Choe Ryong Hae, a member of the Politburo Presidium and a WPK secretary, who had been viewed as a heavyweight of the Kim regime, disappeared from the public stage (November), leading to reports that Choe had been purged. The future status of high-level officials is still uncertain.

Tougher Control likely to be taken toward the WPK Congress

Behind the North Korean plan to hold a WPK Congress for the first time in about 36 years may be an attempt to domestically and externally demonstrate the firm establishment of the Kim Jong Un regime. Involving the election of new leadership members at the Congress, more existing executives may be purged or executed.

In the economic scene, as First Secretary Kim Jong Un emphasized the policy of “placing people first,” the Kim regime is expected to attempt to

enhance its stability by making efforts to improve food, clothing and housing conditions to impress the public with the improvement of national livelihood. Since North Korea is expected to retain its “dual policy” of economic construction and nuclear development and continue nuclear arms development, however, it may be difficult for North Korea to rapidly improve its economy through the introduction of foreign investment.

Column

North Korean remarks on “dual policy” and becoming a “nuclear power”

In his address to a military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the WPK foundation (October 10), First Secretary Kim Jong Un referred to neither the “dual policy” of economic construction and nuclear development nor becoming a “nuclear power.” Nevertheless, the following remarks have been reiterated within North Korea.

- Peace restored on the brink of a war (with South Korea) has been achieved due to our strong military power centering on the defensive nuclear deterrence (First Secretary Kim’s remark at an enlarged meeting of the WPK Central Military Commission on August 27).
- Making our country shine as a political, military power, a grand nuclear power, a producer and launcher of artificial satellites is a great achievement to solidify the everlasting base for our race’s perpetual prosperity (a report by Kim Yong Nam, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, at a central reporting meeting to mark the 70th anniversary of the WPK foundation on October 9).
- As there are the dual policy of economic construction and

nuclear weapon development proposed by our party and the power of the sophisticated Strong Revolutionary Forces of Mt. Paektu bearing the red flag of the Workers’ Party of Korea as the first military flag and the grand solidarity of military forces and people, the socialist country as the perpetual nest of our people is an impregnable fortress (an editorial on the Rodong Sinmun, the official organ of the WPK, on October 10).

These remarks indicate North Korea’s strong confidence that the possession of nuclear weapons allows the regime to be stable. Unless the existing international relations surrounding North Korea change dramatically, North Korea is expected to retain the “dual policy.”

The “dual policy” is designed to “focus on economic construction and national livelihood improvement by enhancing the effects of war deterrence and defense forces decisively even without increasing defense expenditure additionally” (a report by First Secretary Kim at a plenary meeting of the WPK Central Committee in March 2013). However, no move leading to military spending cuts has been seen.

1-2 North Korea's confrontation with the U.S. remained to be solved, while its relations with china indicated signs of improvement

North Korea fell short of resuming talks with the U.S. despite proposals about the mutual moratorium on U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises and nuclear tests, and about the conclusion of a peace agreement

While continuing to confront the U.S. over the nuclear development issue, North Korea offered to temporarily halt nuclear tests in exchange for the suspension of U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises (January). As the U.S. side rejected the offer, with U.S. President Barack Obama discussing the possible collapse of North Korea, the North said, "We are no longer willing to sit face to face with mad dogs [Americans]" (February). North Korea thus enhanced its confrontational approach against the U.S. again. In the meantime, North Korea released video footage depicting what it claimed to be a test to launch a submarine-launched ballistic missile from under water (May), demonstrating its efforts to improve nuclear and missile capabilities. On a long-range ballistic missile launching test that North Korea claimed to be a satellite launch, First Secretary Kim Jong Un inspected the General Satellite Control and Command Center (in Pyongyang) and said Korean satellites would be launched into outer space at the time and locations set by the Central Party (May). The head of the State Space

Development Bureau said North Korea was struggling to make the 70th anniversary of the WPK foundation shine with further advanced science and technology, but that the world would clearly witness Korean satellites flying high in blue sky in the future (September), indicating a satellite launching test could be timed to coincide with the day of the 70th WPK anniversary (in October). The director of North Korea's Atomic Energy Institute stated that the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, which North Korea vowed to restart in April 2013, were operating normally and that North Korea was ready to

respond with "nuclear thunder" if the U.S. and others maintain hostile policies, indicating an attempt to implement a nuclear test depending on U.S. and other responses to a satellite launch (September).

In fact, however, North Korea claimed it offered to sign a peace agreement with the U.S. through an official channel, emphasizing its attitude of giving priority to talks. It then shelved a plan to launch a satellite around the 70th WPK anniversary day (October).

North Korea resumed an exchange of senior officials' visits with China, expressing the ambition to mend bilateral ties

North Korea's relations with China had cooled down by China's decision to tighten the implementation of sanctions on North Korea based on United Nations Security Council resolutions in response to North Korea's implementation of its third nuclear test in February 2013 in defiance of China's opposition. However, North Korea sent Choe Ryong Hae, a member of the WPK Politburo Presidium and Secretariat, to China's ceremony to mark the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (September) and accepted the visit to North Korea by Liu Yunshan, a member of the Communist Party of China Politburo Standing

Committee, ranked fifth in the party, on the occasion of the 70th WPK anniversary (October), resuming an exchange of senior officials' visits with China that had been suspended since the spring of 2014. First Secretary Kim held a meeting with Politburo Standing Committee member Liu and stated that the WPK and people intended to further enhance and develop North Korea-China friendship over generations, indicating his ambition to mend relations with China (see Column on p. 12).

As for relations with Russia, to which North Korea had been attempting an approach while North Korea's relations with China had been cooling down, North Korea intensified an

External Situation 1
External Situation 2
External Situation 3
External Situation 4
External Situation 5
External Situation 6
Domestic Situation 1
Domestic Situation 2
Domestic Situation 3
Domestic Situation 4
Domestic Situation 5

exchange of senior officials' visits and cultural interchange, positioning 2015 as the North Korea-Russia friendship year for the 70th anniversary of North Korea's liberation and the Soviet Union's victory in war against Germany. Although First Secretary Kim did not accept an invitation by Russia to a ceremony for the 70th

anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory in war against Germany held in Moscow, North Korea sent Kim Yong Nam, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, to the Russian ceremony (May), demonstrating its attitude of giving priority to relations with Russia.

North Korea may be seeking to resume talks with the U.S. and mend ties with China while retaining the position of a “nuclear power”

North Korea is expected to continuously seek to resume talks with the U.S. and mend relations with China. In that process, First Secretary Kim could visit China. Given that North Korea is very unlikely to repeal nuclear weapons, however, the North is little expected to implement talks with the U.S. Its efforts to improve relations with China are expected to repeat twists and turns. The possibility of North Korea launching satellites and carrying out nuclear tests cannot be denied. In that sense, we must remain alert.

Column

North Korea and China moved closer together

The cooling down of relations between North Korea and China, triggered by the North's nuclear test and other developments, continued into 2015. North Korea refrained from issuing editorials or holding banquets to mark the anniversary of the Sino-North Korean Mutual Aid and Cooperation Friendship Treaty (July) and that of the establishment of China-North Korea diplomatic relations (October), demonstrating a chilly attitude against China. China for its part viewed North Korea's attitude on the nuclear issue as problematic and took various opportunities, such as China-South Korea and U.S.-China summit talks (September), to raise the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, repeating checks against North Korea.

At the same time, however, China indicated moves to prevent China-North Korea relations from deteriorating decisively. When North-South tensions heightened in response to North Korea's gunfire against South Korea (August), China called on both parties to exercise self-restraint while refraining from criticizing either of the two parties. While indicating its cautious attitude about improving relations at the initiative of their central governments, China attempted to step up its tourism and

trade exchanges with North Korea through local governments around the border with the North by promoting a plan for the Tumen River Delta international tourism cooperation zone (Jilin Province) and establishing a China-North Korea free market trade zone (Liaoning Province). China also implemented assistance through the Red Cross Society of China to North Korea over floods that hit the northeastern part of the North (September).

In the meantime, China accepted the visit to Beijing by Choe

Ryong Hae, a member of the WPK Politburo Presidium and Secretariat, in a manner to receive a top-level dignitary on the occasion of a ceremony to mark the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (September) and sent Liu Yunshan, a member of the Communist Party of China Politburo Standing Committee, ranked fifth in the party, to an event to commemorate the 70th WPK anniversary (October, Liu became the first central leadership official to visit North Korea since July 2013), reaffirming the importance of China-North Korea relations. On the North Korean side, First Secretary Kim Jong Un expressed an attitude of giving priority to China-North Korea relations at a meeting with Politburo Standing Committee member Liu and showed a performance in which Kim took and raised Liu's hand on stage at the commemorating event, demonstrating friendly relations with China. However, Politburo Standing Committee member Liu stood against the nuclear problem anew at a meeting with First Secretary Kim where Liu carried with him a personal letter from Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Behind the Chinese move to improve relations with North Korea, while leaving any specific achievement on the back-burner might have been an attempt to demonstrate China's influences on North Korea domestically and externally and induce changes in North Korea through engagement. North Korea for its part took advantage of the visit to Pyongyang by Politburo Standing Committee member Liu to emphasize an improvement in China-North Korea relations domestically and externally in an attempt to intensify their future economic interchange and vitalize their exchange of senior officials' visits.

1-3 North Korea achieved resumption of talks in addition to heightening military tensions

North Korea ignored South Korea's proposal for dialogue while calling for improving North-South ties

In North Korea, First Secretary Kim Jong Un in his New Year address (January) raised a slogan for exploring a grand path toward the voluntary unification in the year marking the 70th anniversary of Korea's liberation and indicated his willingness to resume contacts between senior North and South officials. He also stated that there is no reason to deny a top-level meeting (a summit) if the relevant atmosphere and environment are ready, calling for improving North-South ties.

Nevertheless, North Korea refrained from accepting South Korea's proposal for talks between North and South government officials in late 2014 and demanded the suspension of U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises and a South Korean private organization's dropping of propaganda leaflets in North Korea as a condition for implementing bilateral talks. The North also effectively rejected the South's proposal for events for a reunion of family

members separated between the two Koreas that was made at the beginning of the year by conditioning the acceptance of the proposal on the South's termination of sanctions on the North (5.24 measures) (January). When the Foal Eagle U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise (March-April) started, North Korea unilaterally declared that the opportunity for dialogue and the improvement of relations had gone and intensified direct criticism of South Korean President Park Geun Hye through media, increasing its confrontational attitude.

Among private-level exchanges, North Korea cancelled a North-South joint event that had been agreed upon for the 15th anniversary of the North-South Joint Declaration (June 2000), using as an excuse the South Korean authorities' "intervention" in the event (June) and forwent its participation in the 28th Universiade (July) in South Korea's Gwangju (June).

North Korea ordered a "quasi state of war" to threaten South Korea

As for a South Korean private organization's dropping of propaganda leaflets near the Military Demarcation Line, North Korea warned that the Korean People's Army would launch indiscriminate operations to blow up propaganda balloons without prior warning (March). It also warned that it would begin direct aimed strikes without any prior notice claiming South Korea's territorial water violation near the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea, and carried out firing drills near the NLL (May), ratcheting up North-South military tensions.

In the meantime, a mine exploded in the South Korean demilitarized zone at the Military Demarcation Line, heavily injuring two South Korean troops (August). South Korean authorities alleged the incident as

representing North Korea's "clear military provocation" and resumed loudspeaker propaganda broadcasts to North Korea near the Military Demarcation Line for the first time in 11 years in response to the incident.

In response, North Korea denied its involvement in the incident and opened fire against South Korea near the Military Demarcation Line, threatening to launch military actions unless South Korea suspended the loudspeaker broadcasts and removed the loudspeakers within 48 hours. First Secretary Kim then convened an emergency enlarged meeting of the WPK Central Military Commission and gave the order that the frontline area enter a "quasi state of war" (August).

North Korea turned to the attitude of seeking talks with the South upon the suspension of loudspeaker broadcasts and implemented events for family members separated between the two Koreas

At the same time, North Korea indicated to South Korea a willingness to take control of the situation and proposed contact between senior North and South officials. As South Korea accepted the proposal and implemented the contact between senior North and South officials, North Korea won South Korea's suspension of the loudspeaker broadcasts in exchange for expressing regret over the injury of South Korean troops in the mine explosion and made an about-face to agree to hold an early meeting between North and South government officials and promote events for a reunion of family members separated between the two Koreas (August).

Later, North Korean First Secretary Kim expressed appreciation for the agreement as a key turning point to shift North-South relations to reconciliation and confidence (August) and

vowed to continue efforts to improve North-South relations and protect the stability of the Korean Peninsula situation at a meeting with Liu Yunshan, a member of the Communist Party of China Politburo Standing Committee, who visited North Korea (October), indicating his attitude of tackling the improvement of North-South relations. When the U.S. and South Korea issued a joint statement about the North Korean nuclear and missile problem at their summit just after the Kim-Liu meeting, North Korea, while criticizing the statement as a very dangerous provocation that could devastate North-South relations, implemented events for a reunion of family members separated between the two Koreas as planned (October) and agreed to hold a vice-ministerial meeting from the two Koreas (November).

North Korea is expected to continue a carrot-and-stick approach to change South Korea's attitude on the North

have been an attempt to win actual economic benefits, such as South Korea's termination of the "5.24 measures," and mitigate its national security costs arising from

the continuation of confrontational relations with the South. Given North Korea's traditional

use of an easy shift from a conciliatory approach to a hardline one as a standard tactic, North Korea can be expected to turn to a hardline approach again in response to such developments as U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises.

1-4 North Korea attempted to postpone a report on "investigation into Japanese abductees" even after one year passed from the investigation start

North Korea opposed law enforcement authorities' search of Chongryon executives' houses and criticized Japan

North Korea agreed to investigate all Japanese including abductees in the so-called "Stockholm Agreement" in May 2014 but failed to report investigation results to Japan in 2015.

In the meantime, North Korea strongly opposed Japanese law enforcement authorities' search of the houses of Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan)

Chairman Ho Jong Man, Vice Chairman Nam Sung U and others over their alleged illegal import of matsutake mushrooms from North Korea (March) and the United Nations Human Rights Council's adoption of a resolution on the North Korean human rights situation (submitted by Japan and the European Union) at its 28th session (March), notifying the Japanese

government in writing that the North could not have government-to-government talks with Japan under such circumstances (April).

Furthermore, North Korea again enhanced anti-Japan criticism that it had apparently

restricted since the Stockholm Agreement. Particularly, the North strongly criticized Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe over his statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II (August).

North Korea notified Japan of a plan to postpone a report on the results of its “investigation into Japanese abductees” before one year passed from the start of the investigation

North Korea had told Japan that it would try to complete its “investigation into Japanese abductees” in a total of about one year. Before one year passed, in July 2015, since North Korea’s launch of its “special investigation committee” and the investigation, however, the North notified Japan that “we have faithfully carried out a comprehensive investigation on all Japanese and will take more time,” expressing its intent to postpone the completion (July). At a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida in Malaysia (August), North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong failed to indicate any prospect for the investigation results report while saying, “The special investigation committee is faithfully implementing the investigation.”

Ambassador Song Il Ho, North Korea’s top negotiator in talks with Japan, accepted an interview with Kyodo News (September) and said: “We have almost completed a report on investigation results, but have not shared the

investigation results with the Japanese side. Therefore, we need a Japanese partner serving as a counterpart of the ‘special investigation committee.’ ‘Taking more time’ does not mean that the report has not been ready, but that the two sides have yet to share information or agree on the timing for announcing the report.” He thus indicated that although the investigation had been almost completed, some Japanese actions would be required for the submission of the report.

In human exchanges with Japan, North Korea accepted delegations of Japan-North Korea friendship organizations and the Japanese press sector. Regarding the remains of Japanese nationals left in North Korea after World War II, the North accepted the visit to the Ryongsan gravesite with a purpose of paying tribute to the dead (in a suburb of Pyongyang) by the six members of the Pyongyang Ryongsan association, including relatives of such Japanese nationals (August).

North Korea may be attempting to postpone a report on the results to lead Japan to become exhausted and divided

North Korea might have been looking for opportunities to win actual benefits, including the additional termination of Japanese measures against the North and more Japanese assistance, by maintaining a negotiation channel with Japan while

postponing the report on the results of

the “investigation into Japanese abductees.” Eventually, North Korea is expected to explore a favorable settlement by leading Japan, which has given priority to solving the abduction issue and demanded the return of all abductees, to be exhausted and divided over the issue.

Major developments since the Stockholm Agreement

Date	Development
< 2014 >	
May 28	The Japanese and North Korean governments agree on an investigation on all Japanese (Stockholm Agreement).
July 4	North Korea launches the “special investigation committee.” Japan lifts some of the measures against North Korea.
October 28	A Japanese delegation meets with members of the “special investigation committee,” in Pyongyang.
< 2015 >	
March 26	Japanese law enforcement authorities search the houses of Chongryon Chairman Ho Jong Man and others over their alleged illegal import of matsutake mushrooms.
March 27	The U.N. Human Rights Council at its 28th session adopts by majority a resolution submitted by Japan and the European Union on the North Korean human rights situation.
April 2	North Korea sends a written notice to Japan, saying government-to-government talks could not be held.
July 2	North Korea tells Japan that the investigation into Japanese abductees will take more time.
August 6	The Japanese and North Korean foreign ministers meet (Malaysia)
August 15	“The Pyongyang Ryongsan association” visits a gravesite in North Korea (until August 18).
August 19	North Korea releases a statement by the National Defense Commission Policy Bureau spokesman criticizing the Japanese prime minister’s statement.
September 9	Ambassador Song Il Ho holds an interview with Kyodo News.

1-5 Chongryon attempted to thoroughly ensure “union” to enhance control under Chairman Ho Jong Man

Marking its 60th anniversary, Chongryon thoroughly promoted education to enhance loyalty to First Secretary Kim Jong Un while trying to solidify its organization

In the run-up to its 60th anniversary day in May, Chongryon implemented an “innovation campaign” from January to May to intensify efforts to thoroughly promote ideological education and strengthen branches and sub-branches, attempting to raise the level of activities and vitalize its organization. The campaign gave top priority to ideological education in which Chongryon emphasized the “greatness” of First Secretary Kim Jong Un to enhance activists’ loyalty to him.

On the 60th anniversary day, Chongryon cited the anniversary as “the first great auspicious occasion for Koreans in Japan in the Kim

Jong Un age” and held commemorative events at various locations (see Column on p. 18). Particularly, it mobilized members across the organization for a “grand festival for Koreans in Japan,” attempting to unite North Korean residents in Japan under its control. Positioning a letter (encouraging Chongryon to enhance initiatives for various activities) sent by First Secretary Kim to Chongryon on the occasion of the 60th anniversary as a “platform guideline toward the new heyday,” Chongryon formulated a policy to “thoroughly implement” the challenges given in the letter (June).

Responding to police search of houses of the chairman and other executives, Chongryon thoroughly promoted the enhancement of organizational “union”

Japanese law enforcement authorities, including the Kyoto Prefecture Police

Department, searched the houses of Chongryon Chairman Ho Jong Man and Vice Chairman Nam Sung U and other places over

their alleged import of North Korean matsutake mushrooms disguised as Chinese products into Japan in violation of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (March) and arrested the second son of Chairman Ho Jong Man and

others for the alleged crime (May). In response, Chongryon convened an emergency meeting of activists (April), criticizing the search and relevant actions as a “crackdown on Chongryon.” It also sent activists to the National Police Agency (April) and the Kyoto Prefecture Police Department (May), filing protests with them. The Chongryon central headquarters instructed

local organizations to be united under the “central leadership” (June). The instruction by the Chongryon central headquarters was apparently a response to the aforementioned search and arrest and First Secretary Kim’s letter encouraging Chongryon to strengthen the unified leadership of the Chongryon central headquarters.

Chongryon continued to use the Korea Central Hall even after its resale

Marunaka Holdings (Takamatsu, Kagawa Prefecture) made a winning bid (November 2014) to buy the Korea Central Hall (Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo) that is home to Chongryon’s central headquarters and was auctioned by the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) to help collect loans. When Marunaka resold the property to Green Forest (Sakata, Yamagata Prefecture) (January 2015), a revolving mortgage of up to 5 billion yen was preliminarily registered

on the Hall’s land and building, with a Chongryon affiliate acting as creditor and Green Forest as debtor (January). Even after the resale, Chongryon continued to use the Hall. Later, Green Forest used a company split to establish Chiyoda Kanri (Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo) with a former executive of a Chongryon-controlled organization serving as representative director (June), letting Chiyoda Kanri take over the Hall lease business.

Chongryon implemented efforts to benefit from the “tuition-free senior high school education program” and win local government “subsidies”

Chongryon, which has made efforts to subject Korean schools to the “tuition-free senior high school education program,” continued protests, requests, and street campaigns at various locations in Japan in 2015, “disconfirming” the Japanese government’s decision to exempt Korean schools from the program. Chongryon mobilized activists and Korean school stakeholders to submit written requests to the prime minister and the education minister for the immediate application of the program to Korean schools and implemented relevant protests around the education ministry (February, July, and September). Chongryon also

made the requests to Japanese Diet lawmakers as well. Regarding lawsuits pending on the application of the “tuition-free senior high school education system” to Korean schools in various prefectures (Tokyo, Aichi, Osaka, Hiroshima, and Fukuoka), Chongryon mobilized activities to sit in on relevant trials and held reporting and study meetings in cooperation with Japanese supporters, trying to nurture further opportunities for the application. Chongryon also continued protests and requests to local governments suspending “subsidies” to Korean schools, calling for the resumption of such subsidies.

Chongryon trying to enhance control under the Chairman Ho Jong Man regime and vitalize its organization

The Chongryon central headquarters is expected to enhance control on local organizations in an attempt to strengthen its leadership including Chairman Ho Jong Man and tighten the overall organization. The central headquarters is also predicted to enhance activities of branches and sub-branches as terminal organizations to vitalize the overall organization. Particularly, the center is expected

to tackle the development of infrastructure for activities of sub-branches in the run-up to a “meeting of sub-branch representatives” in 2016. Regarding the Korea Central Hall problem, Chongryon is likely to transfer the ownership of the Hall from Green Forest to Chiyoda Kanri to help allow the central headquarters to continue using the Hall.

Column

Developments regarding the 60th Chongryon anniversary

Since its founding on May 25, 1955, Chongryon has held commemorative events and sent delegations to North Korea in milestone anniversary years.

The Chongryon central and local headquarters held various commemorative events for the 60th anniversary (May). At the Korea Central Hall, the central headquarters sponsored a “congratulatory party” for external guests (May 21), a “commemorative party” for activists and members (May 23), a “central meeting of Koreans in Japan for conveying a platform letter” (May 25), and a “central meeting of Koreans in Japan” (May 25). At the Tokyo Korean Junior and Senior High School, Chongryon held a “grand festival for Koreans in Japan” (May 31), which included an art performance and a sumo tournament. At the “central meeting of Koreans in Japan,” a “letter to Marshal Kim Jong Un” expressing loyalty to First Secretary Kim (carried by the Rodong Sinmun, the official organ of the WPK, on May 26) was introduced. In his opening address to the “grand festival

for Koreans in Japan,” Chongryon Chairman Ho Jong Man called for exploring the heyday for the movement of Koreans in Japan in the prestigious Kim Jong Un age.

Chongryon sent a “thanksgiving delegation” led by Vice Chairman Pae Ik Ju to North Korea (May 21-30). During its stay in North Korea, the “thanksgiving delegation” met with Kim Yong Nam, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, and participated in a “central reporting meeting,” a “commemorative party” and other events held to mark the 60th Chongryon anniversary. At the “central reporting meeting,” Yang Hyong Sop, Vice President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, said in a speech, “Chongryon must explore the new heyday of the movement of Koreans in Japan by definitely carrying through the last words given to Chongryon and Koreans in Japan by comrade Kim Il Sung (president) and comrade Kim Jong Il (general secretary) and implementing all activities as desired by the chieftain.”

2 China



2-1 The Xi Jinping leadership faced a torrent of difficult economic and social problems and attempted to make a breakthrough with hardline measures

Economic deceleration emerged while economic reform responding to the “New Normal” failed to make progress

The Xi Jinping leadership positioned 2015 as an important year for responding to the “New Normal” after a transition from high growth to stable growth (March, a government activity report) and tackled economic reform including a development approach switch.

However, stock prices continued to decline from June to July, making the future course of the economy more uncertain. In response, the Xi Jinping leadership intervened in the stock market by taking stock price manipulation, trading restrictions and other stock price-supporting measures and mobilized the Ministry of Public Security (police) to crack down on “malicious short selling.” Such aggressive market intervention by the government was expected to distort market discipline and run counter to economic reform, leading the international

community to have an increased sense of distrust in the Chinese economy.

The Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee (October) produced a basic guideline for an economic and social development strategy over five years from 2016. The guideline, while predicting no change in the economy’s long-term upward trend, noted that the imbalance of development and unsustainable problems were standing out, indicating that economic reform pursued by the Xi Jinping leadership made no smooth progress. In explaining the basic guideline, General Secretary Xi Jinping described annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth as “6.5% or more” over the next five years, indicating that the basic GDP growth target was set at 6.5-7.0%.

Amid a spate of grave social incidents, the leadership tightened control on speech to contain anti-government criticism

While China saw a spate of grave social incidents that could develop into problems for which the party and government could be held responsible, the Xi Jinping leadership tightened control on the press and speech to prevent anti-government criticism from being sharpened and to maintain social stability.

In Hubei Province, a large sightseeing ship capsized in the Yangtze River (June), causing more than 400 deaths reportedly. In Tianjin, a large-scale explosion of a chemical warehouse occurred (August), killing more than 160 people. Public discontent flared in response to protracted efforts to follow up the incidents and find their causes. The government banned exclusive media reports on these incidents, imposing strict information control. It also tightened control on the Internet that could spread massive anti-government criticism over a short term,

investigating or punishing some 200 Internet users alleged to have been involved in diffusing false rumors adding fuel to social unrest (August, Xinhua News Agency).

The government also detained a massive number of human rights lawyers and social activists for the reason that they organized people discontent with the party and government to disrupt social order (July).

The Xi Jinping leadership established the “National Security Law” as the base for tightening social control and developing laws involving national security (July). The law justifies the government’s social control as “rule by law” to enable forceful actions. Its apparent purpose may be to secure the single-party dictatorship and social stability (see Column on p. 21).

Xi Jinping advocated “Four Comprehensives” and demonstrated his control of the military in “events to mark the 70th anniversary of victory in World War II”

General Secretary Xi Jinping advocated “Four Comprehensives” ((i) comprehensively building a moderately prosperous society, (ii) comprehensively deepening reform, (iii) comprehensively governing the nation according to law, and (iv) comprehensively being strict in governing and controlling the party) as the Communist Party’s guiding principles for state management (February 2015, “People’s Daily”). General Secretary Xi Jinping is expected to take advantage of the guiding principles to promote the enforcement of strict discipline and anti-corruption campaign within the party and give himself authority. In the anti-corruption campaign, the Xi leadership punished Guo Boxiong, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (July), following the disciplining of his predecessor Xu Caihou in 2014. The

punishment of the two military executives who had militarily supported the previous leadership demonstrated General Secretary Xi Jinping’s strong determination to get rid of corruption in the military and promote military reform.

At a ceremony to mark the “70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression,” General Secretary Xi Jinping announced an “important statement” declaring a “300,000-troop cut” (see Column on p. 22). As some people feel a sense of crisis about their possible loss of vested interests due to the Xi leadership’s military reform and resist the reform, General Secretary Xi Jinping might have attempted to exploit the 300,000-troop cut declaration to demonstrate his control of the military at home and abroad.

China took “conciliation” and “crackdown” measures in dealing with ethnic minority problems while failing to show any direction toward stabilization

China held commemorative events to mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region (September) and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (October). Yu Zhengsheng, Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, attended these events in the respective autonomous regions and emphasized smooth economic development in ethnic minority regions, trying to create an atmosphere for conciliation between ethnic groups.

The Xi Jinping leadership, while stepping up “conciliation” with ethnic minorities through local economic promotion and preferential

treatments for these minorities, has promoted the “national assimilation” policy through Han Chinese immigration into ethnic minority regions. However, this forcible approach has deepened the divide between the Han people and ethnic minorities.

Tibetan monks’ self-immolation in apparent protests to authorities was sporadically reported in the Tibet Autonomous Region, while Uygur people’s radical violent attacks occurred in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region for the apparent purpose of expressing discontent with the ethnic minority policy. Authorities toughened surveillance and crackdowns particularly on the Uygur people.

The Xi leadership's future challenge is whether top-down state management could control society and economy

Since its inauguration in 2012, the Xi Jinping leadership created central leadership, supraministry coordination bodies headed by General Secretary Xi Jinping as horizontal organizations for the Communist Party and government agencies, building a solid centralized administrative framework for state management. Regarding social and economic problems that China faces, the Xi Jinping leadership stated that structural contradiction such as shortages of new economic growth drivers and weakening traditional growth drivers was outstanding (July, Central Politburo Conference), admitting that

economic restructuring to secure sustainable economic growth has failed to make smooth progress.


The Xi Jinping leadership has reached a stage where the progress and achievements of “reform” are called into question after the first half of the term for the leadership. As the Chinese economy has entered the “New Normal” with the employment situation feared to deteriorate, economic policy failure and stagnant “reform” are likely to lead to anti-leadership criticism and induce social destabilization.

Column

China accelerating development of the “national security” system

The Chinese government established the “National Security Law” to secure national safety and protect the interests of the public (July). The law is positioned as the “basic law” to address national security threats as described in the “comprehensive national security concept”^{*} that General Secretary Xi Jinping advocated.

China is developing the national security system related to the law. Already, it established the “Counter-Espionage Law” in November 2014 to enhance the national counter intelligence system. At present, the 12th meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress is deliberating on the “Counter-Terrorism Law” to toughen control on religions and ethnic minorities, the “Foreign NGO Management Law” to enhance control on foreign NGOs operating in China, the “Network Security Law” to enhance network security and legalize Internet information control, and other laws. China is expected to establish more laws related to the “comprehensive national security concept,” further toughening social control in China.



^{*}General Secretary Xi Jinping advocated the “comprehensive national security concept” in his important speech at the first meeting of the CPC Central National Security Commission in April 2014. In the speech, he vowed to build the national security system integrating security in politics, land, military, economy, culture, society, science and technology, information, ecology, resources and nuclear affairs.

Column

Ceremony to mark the “70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japan”

<Notable points regarding domestic politics>

China has implemented a military parade at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing on its National Day (October 1) to mark an anniversary of its founding every 10 years since the Jiang Zemin administration (see the table below). The latest military parade at a ceremony to mark the “70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japan” reversed traditional precedents, representing the first ever one to mark a “war victory” since the founding of the People's Republic of China. Such unusual military parade indicates how stable President Xi Jinping's power base is. While his antagonism with former top leaders called CPC elders was reported in

regard to the arrest of Zhou Yongkang, a former member of the CPC Politburo Standing Committee, former President Jiang Zemin and many other CPC elders attended the ceremony, demonstrating reconciliation within the CPC domestically and externally. In his address to the ceremony, President Xi Jinping cited his “Four Comprehensives” along with his predecessors’ guiding theories such as the Maoism and Deng Xiaoping Theory and authorized himself as equal to historic leaders, taking advantage of the ceremony to advertise the stability of the Xi Jinping leadership domestically and externally.

<Notable points regarding foreign policy>

A total of 31 countries sent top-level leaders to the ceremony. Most of them other than Russia and South Korea were developing and emerging countries. On Western leaders’ absence from the ceremony, Kaihoganpo, the organ of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), commented (September 3) that Western hostile forces would not like to see China assume the global power position. In his meetings with leaders from developing and emerging countries, President Xi Jinping discussed the China-promoted “One Belt, One Road” strategic initiative (“Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st Century Maritime

Silk Road”) in an attempt to spread the initiative. He also met with Sudan President Omar Hassan al-Bashir, who was put on an international wanted list by the International Criminal

Court (ICC) for his alleged human rights crimes, emphasizing the principle attitude of “nonintervention in domestic affairs.”

In his address to the ceremony, President Xi Jinping discussed China's recent diplomatic slogans including a “global community of shared future” and a “new type of international relations,” indicating China's ambition to become the core for forming a future international order and system.

<Notable points regarding Japan>

In his address to the ceremony, President Xi Jinping said China “suffered over 35 million casualties” in the war. He discussed the same number in his speeches in 2014, including those in Germany (March), on the “anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japan” (September 3), and on the “National Memorial Day for Nanjing Massacre Victims” (December 13). The same number was cited by successive leaders including then President Jiang Zemin in his address to the “50th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japan” in 1995 and then President Hu Jintao in his address to the “60th anniversary” in 2005. However, they explained that the number was “based on

incomplete statistics.”

Since 2004, China has implemented a large-scale nationwide project entitled “Research on casualties and property losses during the war of resistance against Japan.” It announced research results in September 2014 and July 2015. China plans the third announcement, intending to publish more than 300 relevant books at home and abroad. President Xi Jinping's latest remark on the casualties might have been based on the research results. China may step up efforts to spread the number as a “scientifically grounded one” throughout the international community.

[China's military parades since the 1980s]

Year for implementation	Celebration	General Secretary	President	Central Military Commission Chairman
1984	35th founding anniversary	Hu Yaobang	Li Xiannian	Deng Xiaoping
1999	50th founding anniversary	Jiang Zemin		
2009	60th founding anniversary	Hu Jintao		
2015	70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japan	Xi Jinping		

2-2 China began to create an international order in its favor while attempting to establish its position as a regional power

Building regional cooperation frameworks globally

China implemented proactive diplomacy with Latin American and Caribbean countries free from regional cooperation frameworks and with African countries willing to enhance relations with China. China invited foreign ministers and other representatives from the 33 member countries of the “Community of Latin American and Caribbean States” (CELAC) to Beijing and sponsored the “first ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum” (January), where a five-year plan for mutual development was adopted.

In his address at the United Nations (September), President Xi Jinping pledged to provide \$100 million in grant military aid to the African Union (AU) over the next five years. He also hosted the “High-level Roundtable on South-South Cooperation” at the U.N. headquarters and called for “enhancing the representativeness and say” of developing countries. China thus

emphasized its position as a representative of the third world.

Over recent years, China has globally built its regional cooperation frameworks with Europe, the Middle East, and Africa as well as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), trying to secure its leadership in these frameworks.

Southeast Asia	China-ASEAN Leaders' Meeting
Central Asia	Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
Middle and Near East	China-Arab Cooperation Forum
Europe	China-EU Leaders' Meeting
Africa	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
Latin America	China-CELAC Forum

Major regional cooperation frameworks led by China

China fully launched its Silk Road economic initiative in a bid to expand its influences on Silk Road countries

China positioned the promotion of the “One Belt, One Road” initiatives comprising the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” advocated by President Xi Jinping in 2013 as its key diplomatic strategy for 2015 and tried to enhance cooperation with relevant countries.

China aimed to found the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) within the year and attempted to launch specific operations of the “Silk Road Fund” to promote the initiative. Although Japan and the U.S. refrained from joining the AIIB due to their doubts about the lending standards of the international financial organization, Asian and West European countries participated in the AIIB, helping boost the number of AIIB founding member countries to 57 (April). As for the “Silk Road Fund” in which China alone invested about \$40 billion, President Xi Jinping signed a memorandum for the China-Pakistan joint construction of a hydroelectric power plant in Pakistan as the first project under the fund when he visited Pakistan (April).

Behind China’s “emphasis” put on the “One Belt, One Road” initiative may be an external objective of building a giant economic bloc from Asia to Europe led by China and a domestic challenge to look for markets and investment destinations to solve chronic overproduction in steel, cement, and many other Chinese industries. Particularly, China positioned ASEAN as a “priority region for the construction of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road” (August, Foreign Minister Wang Yi) and proactively



The “One Belt, One Road” initiative (Kyodo News)

proposed economic and trade cooperation with ASEAN and the construction of transportation infrastructure passing through China’s Midwest and the Indochina Peninsula.

At an Asian and African leaders’ meeting (April) and a CEO summit under the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (November), President Xi Jinping described “One Belt, One Road” countries as a “community of shared future” and vowed to promote wide-ranging regional cooperation, emphasizing his call for integrating Asia, Africa, and Europe.

AIIB Overview	
Establishment date	Planned for January 2016
Headquarters	Beijing
Capital	About \$100 billion
President	Jin Liqun (designated)
Participant countries	57 countries
10 largest investors	China 297.8
	India 83.7
	Russia 65.4
	Germany 44.8
	South Korea 37.4
	Australia 36.9
	France 33.8
	Indonesia 33.6
	Brazil 31.8
	U.K. 30.5
(Unit: \$100 million)	

China implemented diplomacy as a “victor country,” but achievements were limited

As 2015 marked the 70th anniversary of China’s “victory in World War II,” China held a ceremony to commemorate the “70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japan” (September), emphasized its position as “victor country” in World War II and its present contributions to international peace, and implemented a military parade for the anniversary of victory in the war against Japan for the first time ever (see Column on p. 22). President Xi Jinping attended a Russian ceremony for the “70th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany” (May) and signed a joint statement with Russian President Vladimir Putin, saying that China and Russia would absolutely protect the achievement of their victory in World War II as major victors in World War II, founding members of the United Nations, and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. They thus indicated their attitude of enhancing China-Russia cooperation in addressing “historical problems.”

However, top leaders of the U.S., U.K., France, and other major countries refrained from attending the ceremony for the anniversary of victory in the war “against Japan.” China thus

failed in a diplomatic attempt to cooperate with Western countries as “victor countries.”

As for China-U.S. relations, President Xi Jinping paid an official visit to the U.S. (September), calling for promoting economic and trade cooperation at a meeting with representative U.S. business administrators in Seattle and proposing joint efforts to address various regional and global problems at talks with U.S. President Barack Obama. However, Xi failed to clear up U.S. doubts regarding China’s alleged cyberattacks on the U.S., and South China Sea and other security problems and to get any positive response to his proposal for building the “new type of major power relationship” (in which the two countries would (i) keep away from colliding with or counter each other, (ii) respect each other and (iii) cooperate and win joint victory).

In the meantime, President Xi Jinping visited the U.K. (October) and became the first Chinese leader to deliver a speech at the British parliament, in which Xi described China and the U.K. as interdependent and a community of interest, emphasizing China as the biggest partner of the U.K.

China deepened relations with South Korea and tried to mend ties with North Korea

With South Korea, China enhanced relations in various areas by promoting economic cooperation including the signing of a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) (June) and by inviting South Korean President Park Geun Hye to the ceremony for the 70th anniversary of victory in the war against Japan (September) to demonstrate to the international community the two countries’ cooperation in dealing with perceptions of history.

China also tried to mend soured political relations with North Korea by sending Liu Yunshan, a member of the CPC Politburo Standing Committee, ranked fifth in the CPC, to events to mark the 70th WPK anniversary (October). Liu was the highest ranked CPC official to visit North Korea since the inauguration of the Xi administration in November 2012 (see Column on p. 22).

China forced military base construction in the South China Sea in defiance of fears of the international community


China asserted that it had every right to deploy on relevant islands and reefs necessary facilities for military defense and the right to establish an air defense identification zone in the South China Sea (May, Director-General, Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Without gaining consent from the Philippines and Vietnam, which have made territorial claims in the South China Sea, China unilaterally and rapidly implemented land reclamation on seven reefs of the Spratly Islands. The Chinese land reclamation size expanded nearly six-fold in seven months from some 2 square kilometers in December 2014 to about 11.7 square kilometers in June 2015 (as announced by the U.S. Department of State). On three of

the reclaimed islands, China has been building 3,000-meter-class runways, continuing efforts to turn these islands into military bases (see Column on p. 26).

An ASEAN leaders' meeting (April), a summit of Group of Seven industrialized countries (June), and others expressed "serious concern" on or "opposition" to China's unilateral actions

including land reclamation to alter the status quo. Nevertheless, China reiterated that it had undisputed sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and their vicinity (Foreign Ministry spokespersons and others), maintaining its hardline attitude. China also advocated a dispute settlement measure called the "dual track approach" in a bid to divide ASEAN and block U.S. intervention.

Premier Li Keqiang in his address to an East Asia summit (November) claimed that the dual track approach had gained support from many ASEAN countries. Nevertheless, ASEAN countries have made no move to proactively support the proposal.



South China Sea map (Kyodo News)

◇ Dual track approach (proposed in August 2014)

- (1) Specific disputes should be solved through negotiations and talks between direct parties to the disputes ⇒ blocking the ASEAN unity
- (2) South China Sea peace and stability should be protected jointly by China and ASEAN countries ⇒ blocking U.S. intervention

China may seek to establish its regional power position and build a new international order as a great power

China is expected to seek to increase its presence while implementing "host diplomacy" by hosting meetings as the chair of the Group of 20 major nations in 2016. China is also expected to work on the U.S. to build a "new type of major power relationship" with the next U.S. administration in mind.

China's "One Belt, One Road" initiative covers not only investment in and economic assistance to relevant countries but also cultural and welfare facility construction and training of professional engineers, featuring a composite objective of winning "popularity among people"

through multi-faceted expansion into these countries. China is expected to promote the initiative in a bid to establish itself as a regional power influential in politics and national security.

China's development of regional cooperation frameworks around the world and its call for a "community with a shared future" may be designed to pave the way for changing the traditional international orders and rules. Therefore, China is expected to further enhance its relations with developing and emerging countries.

Column

Continuing tensions in the South China Sea**<China promoting facility construction without clarifying its definition of “militarization”>**

“China does not intend to pursue militarization,” President Xi Jinping said, referring to the land reclamation on the Spratly Islands at a joint press conference with U.S. President Barack Obama after their talks (September). However, the Chinese government has not clarified its definition of “militarization.” Therefore, China may continue to construct effective military facilities without interpreting the deployment of and patrolling by military aircraft as “militarization,” even though the international community generally considers such actions to be “militarization.”

On reclaimed land at Fiery Cross Reef, China has been identified as constructing not only a more-than-3,000-meter runway but also a heliport and seawalls.

These facilities feature “international public facilities” for marine scientific research, meteorological observation, fishery production and other private sector functions, which China is expected to exploit for avoiding criticism from the international community.

<The U.S. expanded military and defense cooperation with ASEAN countries and implemented a “freedom of navigation operation”>

In the meantime, the U.S. released a “joint vision statement” with Vietnam for enhancing bilateral military relations (June) as part of its efforts to expand military and defense cooperation with ASEAN countries that have made territorial claims in the South China Sea and are concerned about China’s militarization there.

The U.S. also carried out a “freedom of navigation operation” in which Aegis destroyer “Lassen” sailed within 12 nautical miles (about 22 kilometers) of China-reclaimed land on Subi Reef (October). U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter told a Congressional hearing (October) that the operation could be

continuously conducted.

The U.S. and China have agreed to avoid any accidental collision and continue talks through a visit to China by U.S. Pacific Command Commander Adm. Harry Harris (November) and other events.

However, the U.S. and China have not narrowed their differences over the South China Sea. Given China’s strong willingness to promote land reclamation and the U.S. call for “freedom of navigation,” the South China Sea situation is expected to remain tense.

2-3 China maintained its principle stance on “recognition of history” and “territorial problems” while indicating the attitude of favoring the improvement of relations with Japan**China emphasized the importance of improvements in relations with Japan and resumed bilateral dialogue and exchange frameworks**

China indicated its attitude of rebuilding dialogue channels with Japan for improving bilateral relations through the resumption and expansion of leaders’ meetings and exchange at government and private levels.

President Xi Jinping discussed the importance of a mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests at a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Indonesia (April). When “Japan–China Tourism Cultural Exchange Delegation” visited China with some 3,000 participants (May), Xi Jinping said that he was giving very high priority to developing China-Japan relations and that this basic policy would not change even in the face of

storms. This message was apparently aimed at improving bilateral relations.

In the meantime, the Japanese and Chinese governments held the “13th Japan-China security dialogue” (March), the first such meeting in about four years, and the “fifth Japan-China finance dialogue” (June), the first such meeting in about three years. China sent a delegation of the National People’s Congress to the “eighth meeting of the Japan-China parliamentary committee” (April), representing China’s first participation in such meeting in about three years. The two countries thus resumed dialogue and exchange frameworks that had been suspended. After attending a Japan-China-

South Korea summit in South Korea, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang met Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (November) and agreed that the two countries were moving in the

direction of improvement in their relations and should further enhance the momentum for the improvement.

China took advantage of the “70th anniversary of the victory in the War of Resistance against Japan” to widely implement its propaganda campaign “against Japan”

In the meantime, China exploited events regarding the “victory in the war of resistance against Japan” for its active international propaganda campaign to criticize Japan’s “recognition of history” (see Column on p.29-30) after Foreign Minister Wang Yi vowed to implement a series of activities for the 70th anniversary along with the international community and firmly oppose remarks and actions supporting the past aggression (CPC organ “Qiushi Journal” dated January 1).

China proactively implemented commemorative activities marking its victory in World War II at the United Nations headquarters, taking advantage of a China-sponsored open debate meeting at the United Nations Security Council (February), a special meeting hosted by the United Nations General Assembly (May), and other events to urge the international community to be alert to “denial or beautification of history.” The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) decided to add historical documents on the “Nanjing Massacre” to its Memory of the World

Register as applied by China (October). As for “comfort women” documents that failed to be added to the register, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that China would consider the UNESCO International Advisory Committee’s recommendation that urged China to file a joint application with relevant countries over the comfort women documents.

On the “Victory Day of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression” (September 3), China held what it positioned as the most important “70th anniversary” ceremony, where President Xi Jinping delivered a “key address” emphasizing the global significance of the “victory in the war against Japan.” President Xi refrained from criticizing Japan directly in the ceremony but stated at a reception later in the ceremony day that people should have the right historical concepts even though they were born after the war of aggression. He thus indicated the attitude of continuing to maintain and demand what China asserts as the “correct recognition of history.”

China paid close attention to “Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s statement” and repeated warnings in consideration of domestic public opinions

China indicated strong interests in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s planned statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, tenaciously asking the Abe statement to take over the 1995 “Murayama Statement.” One factor behind the tenacious request may be that the denial of succession of the “Murayama Statement” could undermine the foundation of Japan-China relations, based on the four basic documents, including the 1998 “Japan-China joint declaration” in which the two countries agreed to comply with the “Murayama

Statement.” Another factor may be that the Xi Jinping leadership feared domestic opinions could develop into an uncontrollable “anti-Japan” campaign depending on the specifics of the Abe statement and lead to anti-government criticism even under the Xi leadership’s posture of improving relations with Japan.

In response to the Abe statement (August), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated discontent by saying that Japan should not play dumb against key principle problems. However, China refrained from taking any hardline actions such

as a suspension of government- and private-level exchange. Chinese media also generally made restrained responses to the Abe statement, including the People's Daily dated August 15, which confined itself to saying that the Abe

statement indicated no good faith while using key "Murayama Statement" words such as "aggression," "colonial rule," "deep remorse," and "apology."

China sent government ships to waters near the Senkaku Islands and continued unilateral resources development in the East China Sea

Since the Japanese government acquired ownership of the Senkaku Islands in 2012, China continues demonstrations in which ships belonging to maritime law enforcement authorities have been sent to waters near the islands and entered Japan's territorial waters around them.

While conducting such demonstrations, China accepted the "Third-Round Meeting of the Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs" (January) and meetings of a joint working group between Japanese and Chinese defense authorities for building an "air and maritime contact mechanism" (January

and June), indicating a positive attitude toward cooperation in preventing maritime crimes and creating a system to avoid accidental collisions in the East China Sea.

As for resources development in the East China Sea, Japan released a report on China's construction of platforms and other structures (July). In response, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated an attitude of seeking dialogue with Japan but held fast to its principle position of continuing resources development by saying that Chinese activities were just and legal.

China calling for "placing importance on developing relations" with Japan in pursuit of actual benefits while maintaining its attitude of demanding the "correct recognition of history" from Japan

Behind China's positive attitude of improving relations with Japan may be an apparent domestic factor, in that China must stabilize relations with Japan, enhance economic relations with Japan and cooperate with Japan in environmental, technological, and other areas to secure its future economic development at a time when its economic growth is slowing.

In the meantime, China has deepened a sense of caution against or distrust in Japan, criticizing Japan's foreign policy, including "diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map" and "proactive contributor to peace," and moves of Japan's Legislation for Peace and Safety as an attempt to "contain China" or "expand military forces."

China seems to have a sensitive reaction to and persistently check Japanese actions related to national security while indicating a positive attitude of improving relations with Japan in pursuit of actual benefits. China apparently intends to effectively take advantage of its "history card" to maintain the legitimacy of the rule by the CPC and secure an advantageous position in the international community. In a group study of the CPC Central Politburo, President Xi Jinping himself called for enhancing research on the war of resistance against Japan to use facts for rebutting incorrect remarks (July). China is expected to proactively communicate the results of such research to the world in a bid to establish what China claims as the "correct historical recognition."

Column

China-South Korea cooperation involving the “recognition of history issue”

China strongly criticized moves to revise traditional recognition of history in Japan as attempting to deny the results of World War II and distort history. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told the United Nations (February) that “although the historical facts have long been made clear on the war against fascism, there are still some who are reluctant to recognize the truth and even attempt to overturn the verdict and whitewash past crimes of aggression,” seeking the international community’s support for the Chinese stance. On the other hand, China has attempted to turn Chinese claims into historical facts through the registration of “Nanjing Massacre” historical documents on the UNESCO Memory of the World Register (October) and other moves. Such Chinese moves indicate an attempt to “form public opinions through international organizations.”

As for “comfort women” historical documents that failed to be added to the UNESCO Memory of the World Register, China is expected to exploit the “recommendation by the UNESCO International Advisory Committee” to enhance an approach to South Korea, Taiwan, North Korea, the Netherlands, the Philippines, and other relevant countries or regions over a “joint application” for the registration of the “comfort women” historical documents.

Some private Chinese organizations have been cooperating with private groups in South Korea in addressing comfort women and other problems. In this respect, the following moves were seen in 2015:

- April: When Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the U.S., South Korean and Chinese groups in the U.S. cooperated in staging protest demonstrations in Washington and San Francisco.
- August: South Korean and Chinese groups in Australia engaged in a movement to urge the Strathfield municipal council to pass a resolution for erecting a comfort women statue. (The council rejected the resolution.)
- September: South Korean and Chinese organizations in the U.S. cooperated in supporting a resolution for erecting a comfort woman statue at the San Francisco municipal council. (The council passed the resolution.)
- October: Private South Korean and Chinese organizations installed in Seoul a comfort woman statue, which became the first one made jointly by China and South Korea.

The Chinese government has not been directly involved in or given instructions on such cooperation between private organizations. Given that the Chinese government has provided domestic researchers and private organizations with indirect assistance such as academic research and exchange funds and approval on overseas travelling, it is feared that the expansion of private Chinese and South Korean organizational and people-level overseas cooperation will further increase.

External Situation 1

External Situation 2

External Situation 3

External Situation 4

External Situation 5

External Situation 6

Domestic Situation 1

Domestic Situation 2

Domestic Situation 3

Domestic Situation 4

Domestic Situation 5

Column

China’s propaganda campaigns exploiting “facilities and historical documents related to the war against Japan”

On the occasion of the “70th anniversary of the victory in the War of Resistance against Japan,” China exploited facilities and historical documents related to the “war against Japan” for domestic and overseas propaganda campaigns (see the table below for major activities).

As for the exploitation of relevant facilities, the State Council announced a total of 180 “State-level Anti-Japanese War Memorial Facilities and Relics” (September 2014 and August 2015) and encouraged the public to clearly recognize crimes of Japanese fascist aggressors through these facilities. China also improved and expanded relevant facilities, constructed new buildings, and created foreign language explanations for exhibits to increase the functions of relevant facilities for external propaganda campaigns.

As for the exploitation of relevant historical documents, China published foreign language versions of books that are related to the “war against Japan” and indicate costs paid and contributions

made by China for the victory in the war of resistance against Japan, attempting to “draw international community’s attention” to Chinese claims.


China also applied for the registration of historical documents on the “Nanjing Massacre” and “comfort women” on the UNESCO Memory of the World Register in March 2014 and won approval for the registration of the “Nanjing Massacre” documents (October). As for “comfort women” historical documents that failed to be approved for the registration, China may apply again for the registration in 2017 in cooperation with South Korea and other countries. Given that China has indicated it would apply for the registration of the site of invading Japanese Army Unit 731 in China on the UNESCO World Cultural Heritage Site, China is likely to continue its activities to exploit “facilities and historical documents related to the war against Japan” for establishing the “correct recognition of history.”

Date	Major activities exploiting relevant facilities and historical documents
May	Renmin Chubanshe publishes a historical book on the Chinese War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (English edition was published in August)
May	Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press, etc. publish a “corpus of evidence document for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East” (Japanese version).
July	“The Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance against Japanese Aggression” (Beijing) opens the “Great Victory, Historical Contribution” exhibition to mark the 78th anniversary of the war’s outbreak.
August	The State Archives Administration releases “eight historical documents indicating Japanese forces’ coercive recruitment of ‘comfort women.’”
August	“The Museum of War Crime Evidence by Japanese Army Unit 731” opens a new building (Heilongjiang Province).

Date	Major activities exploiting relevant facilities and historical documents
August	Renmin Chubanshe publishes a historical book on the Chinese War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (English edition was published in August)
August	Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press, etc. publish a “corpus of evidence document for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East” (Japanese version).
September	“The Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance against Japanese Aggression” (Beijing) opens the “Great Victory, Historical Contribution” exhibition to mark the 78th anniversary of the war’s outbreak.
August	The State Archives Administration releases “eight historical documents indicating Japanese forces’ coercive recruitment of ‘comfort women.’”
October	“The Museum of War Crime Evidence by Japanese Army Unit 731” opens a new building (Heilongjiang Province).

Number of State-level Anti-Japanese War Memorial Facilities and Relics by province (180 locations)

20	17	14	9~5	4~1
----	----	----	-----	-----



2-4 China grew cautious in anticipation of Taiwan's government change

The opposition Democratic Progressive Party retains dominant support toward the presidential election

As a presidential election is scheduled for January 2016 in Taiwan, Tsai Ingwen, chairperson of the Democratic Progressive Party, who is running in the presidential election and keeps some distance from China, retains dominant support. The Chinese Nationalist Party, known as Kuomintang, which has remained in power since 2008, had originally

selected Hung Hsiuchu, Vice President of the Legislative Yuan, as its presidential candidate. In consideration of Hung's lack of popularity, however, the party replaced her with Kuomintang Chairman Eric Chu as presidential candidate through its extraordinary meeting (October), indicating its domestic confusion.

China backed Kuomintang with an appeasement policy and a meeting between Chinese and Taiwanese leaders, though failing to influence the presidential election

China positively evaluated China-Taiwan relations under the Kuomintang government and implemented the relaxation of procedures for Taiwanese' visits to China (July), the conclusion of a taxation agreement for the avoidance of double taxation (August), and other measures to back up the Kuomintang government's continuation and appease Taiwanese people. To the Democratic Progressive Party, China reiterated its principle that political mutual confidence and the institutionalized dialogue mechanism may collapse without the common political base of the 1992 consensus that the two sides belong to one China (September, a spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council). To Taiwanese voters, China

warned that cross-strait relations could set back if the Democratic Progressive Party restores power. President Xi Jinping held a direct meeting with Taiwanese

President Ma Yingjeou, representing the first leaders meeting between China and Taiwan since the 1949 division (November). Xi and Ma reaffirmed the maintenance of the 1992 consensus while Xi appreciated that cross-strait relations followed a peaceful development path since 2008 and that as the Taiwan Strait situation stabilized, the achievements of cross-strait relations' development were enormous. Xi thus indicated his support for Kuomintang but fell short of reversing Kuomintang's back foot.

China grew alert to Taiwan's approach to the U.S. and Japan, enhancing relevant checks

Democratic Progressive Party leader Tsai Ingwen visited the U.S. (May to June) and Japan (October) to prepare for the management of the next administration while retaining her dominant popularity toward the presidential election. In response to such actions by Tsai Ingwen, China indicated a sense of caution by stating that it would like the U.S. to refrain from supporting any action aiming to affect China's unification and stability (September, a U.S.-

China leaders' meeting) and that no one should be allowed to advertise "Taiwan's independence" (September, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson). Even if a government change comes in Taiwan, China may not immediately adopt a hardline policy. However, China may respond sensitively to and increase checks on a Democratic Progress Party administration's attitude against China and its moves to expand external relations.

External Situation 3

3 Russia



3-1 Responding to confrontation with Western countries over the Ukraine problem, Russia attempted to enhance cooperation with China and former Soviet Union countries, and to increase its influence in the Middle East

Armed clashes sporadically occurred in eastern Ukraine even after a cease-fire agreement was reached, and Europe extended sanctions on Russia

The Ukraine government and pro-Russian armed groups reached a cease-fire agreement on a conflict in eastern Ukraine in September 2014. In January 2015, however, their armed clashes were feared to intensify again. As German and French leaders were concerned about the deterioration of the situation and launched mediation, a new cease-fire agreement was concluded (February). Nevertheless, localized clashes were repeated, with the withdrawal of heavy artillery from the front line and other agreed measures toward peace failing to be implemented.

The destabilization of the Ukraine situation led to international criticism alleging that

Russia had engaged in operations of pro-Russian groups, prompting the U.S. to implement additional sanctions on Russia (March and July) and maintain a severe attitude against Russia. Within the European Union (EU), some member countries including Greece, Cyprus and Italy, to which Russia attempted an approach through economic cooperation, expressed conflicting opinions, indicating a cautious attitude against extending EU economic sanctions against Russia. Finally, however, the EU decided to extend the sanctions, contending that the cease-fire agreement in eastern Ukraine failed to be observed (June).

While recession became more serious in Russia, authorities toughened control on private organizations

Western economic sanctions, an international oil price plunge, and massive capital outflow dealt an additional severe blow to the declining Russian economy, forcing the Russian government to decide on an austere fiscal policy cutting expenditures in the 2015 budget, excluding defense and some other fields, by 10% (January). At the same time, the Russian government announced an economic and financial crisis countermeasures program worth about 2.3 trillion rubles (about 4.4 trillion yen) (January) and implemented other economic stimulus measures. Nevertheless, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted that the Russian gross domestic product growth rate would shrink to minus 3.8% in 2015 (April).

President Vladimir Putin has maintained high popularity ratings at the 80% level by adopting

a hardline external attitude as Russian people's patriotism has gained momentum through Russia's confrontation with Western countries over the Ukraine problem. Depending on future economic trends, however, the president could lose public support.

In the meantime, the Putin administration, concerned about domestic political destabilization through U.S. "intervention," enacted a new law to ban activities of international nongovernment organizations (NGO) in Russia (May) and subjected a leading domestic foundation in charge of scientific research support to legal regulations under an allegation that the foundation was receiving foreign financial assistance (May). The administration thus enhanced control on private organizations for the reason of "foreign threats."

Russia attempted to beef up patriotism and demonstrate cooperation with foreign countries through ceremonies to mark the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany

On the 70th anniversary day for the victory over Nazi Germany (May 9), the Putin administration sponsored relevant ceremonies at various locations throughout Russia to beef up domestic patriotism. At a military parade in Moscow, the administration demonstrated sophisticated equipment to raise national prestige.

While leaders of major Western countries and Japan were absent from a ceremony for the anniversary in Moscow, leaders of former Soviet Union countries, China, India, and some other

countries accepted the Russian invitation to the ceremony. In his address to the ceremony, President Putin thanked the countries that participated in the ceremony for their roles in World War II, emphasized the Soviet Union as a major member of the “victorious allied countries” that defeated fascism, and stressed the need to protect the postwar international order. Chinese, Indian, and some other military delegations joined the military parade, demonstrating their cooperation with Russia.

Russia tried to take advantage of relations with China and international frameworks to maintain its international influence

Russia has tried to enhance relations with countries other than the Western nations it confronted over the Ukraine problem. In this respect, Russia officially inaugurated the “Eurasian Economic Union,” as an economic integration framework with Kazakhstan and Belarus in January and expanded it to the five-countries framework including Armenia and Kyrgyzstan (August). Russia also held a leaders meeting and conducted the Maritime Cooperation 2015 joint naval exercise with China (see Column on p. 35),

and concurrently sponsored leaders meetings of the five BRICS emerging countries and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Ufa, central Russia, as the chair of both groups (July). As a result, Russia and the other BRICS members adopted the Ufa Declaration calling for enhancing their political and economic cooperation. The SCO summit agreed to launch procedures for SCO associate members

India and Pakistan to become official SCO members.

Russia started military intervention in Syria, demonstrating its own initiative in the Middle East

At a time when the Syrian situation attracted global attention due to Syrian refugees’ flow into Europe and threats of the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL), Russian President Putin in his address to the United Nations General Assembly (September) called for creating an international anti-terror alliance. He also insisted on cooperation with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad administration, differentiating Russia from Western countries that were urging the Assad administration to step down. Later, Russia launched airstrikes in Syria at the request of the Assad administration (September). In response,

Western countries denounced Russian airstrikes for targeting Syrian anti-government groups as well as terrorists.

After a series of terrorist attacks on the French capital of Paris (November), Russia reached an agreement with countries including Western and Middle Eastern countries on the need for peace in Syria (November) and enhanced attacks in Syria (November) in retaliation for an alleged terrorist attack on a Russian aircraft that crashed on the Sinai Peninsula in eastern Egypt (October). In parallel to the military intervention in Syria, Russia enhanced cooperation with

External Situation 1
External Situation 2
External Situation 3
External Situation 4
External Situation 5
External Situation 6
Domestic Situation 1
Domestic Situation 2
Domestic Situation 3
Domestic Situation 4
Domestic Situation 5

Iran and Iraq for counterterrorism purposes, increasing its presence in the Middle East.

In the meantime, Russia signed a memorandum with the U.S. military counterpart to avoid accidents among military aircraft engaged in airstrikes in Syria (October). After the Turkish forces shot down a Russian military aircraft (November), however, Russia invoked economic sanctions on Turkey and announced its deployment of surface-to-air missiles in Syria

(November), demonstrating a sense of caution toward the U.S.-led anti-ISIL coalition including Turkey.

Russia, though plagued with economic difficulties and confrontation with Western countries, is expected to maintain its unique foreign policy, proactively engaging in key international problems in a bid to “secure its national interests” and “demonstrate its presence as a superpower.”

Column

“Cooperation” and “competition” are mixed in Russia-China relations

<Russia and China demonstrated the enhancement of their cooperation in tackling “historical problems,” the Eurasian economic integration initiative, and military exchange>

Russia tried to demonstrate the enhancement of its strategic partnership with China on various occasions while its tensions with Western countries continued over the Ukraine crisis and the Syrian situation.

Russia and China held major war memorial ceremonies on May 9 and September 3, respectively, to mark the 70th anniversary of the victories in World War II. At these ceremonies in Moscow and Beijing, from which leaders of Western countries and Japan were absent, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping treated each other as guests of honor, with their military forces participating together in military parades for the first time. The Russian and Chinese leaders at their talks vowed to protect the results of World War II as victors in the war and firmly oppose the distortion of history.

On May 8, the Russian and Chinese leaders signed a joint statement calling for “linking” the Russia-led “Eurasian Economic Union” of former Soviet Union countries with the China-led “Silk Road Economic Belt” initiative, sending the international community a signal that the Russia-China strategic partnership is solid in the absence of their competition for influence over former Soviet Union countries.

As for military exchange, Russia and China implemented their “Maritime Cooperation” joint naval exercise twice in 2015 for the first time since they launched the annual exercise in 2012. The first exercise for 2015 came in mid-May, taking place in the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean Sea for the first time. Russia has given strategic priority to the waters facing Ukraine and Syria. The waters are also important for China, as it has been promoting its use of port and harbor facilities in Greece in regard to its “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” initiative. The year’s second Russia-China joint naval exercise took place in the Sea of Japan in late August, attracting attention with the participation of fixed-wing aircraft from the Chinese air force and a landing drill that were firsts for the joint naval exercise.

The joint naval exercises, implemented around the aforementioned Russian and Chinese ceremonies for the 70th war victory anniversary and bilateral summit talks might have been designed to politically demonstrate the two countries’ cooperation rather than practical military cooperation. The Russian “Maritime Doctrine,” approved by President Putin in July, cited the development of friendly relations with China as a priority measure for the Pacific.

<While Russia-China relations were enhanced, economic and energy cooperation stagnated with competition arising in the security field>

While Russia called for enhancing relations with China to counter Western economic sanctions following the Ukraine crisis, Russia-China economic and energy cooperation stagnated due to economic slowdown in both of the countries and an oil price plunge, with no specific progress seen in major deals including natural gas pipeline (eastern and western route) projects and Russia’s sale of major oil concessions in eastern Siberia to China.

Furthermore, specific measures to link the two aforementioned economic integration initiatives for Eurasia are unknown. Rather, Russia is concerned that China would expand its influence in the former Soviet Union bloc that Russia sees as “under its control.”

While economic and energy cooperation as a “stabilizer” of Russia-China relations is weakening, the future course of

underlying security-related competition and Russia’s sense of caution against China is attracting attention. For example, Chinese naval ships’ first-ever expansion into the Bering Sea (September) anticipated their future expansion into the Arctic Sea at a time when Russia itself was giving priority to its advance into the Arctic Sea. Given that the Chinese naval ships sailed across the Okhotsk Sea, which is strategically important for Russian SSBN nuclear-powered submarines carrying ballistic nuclear missiles, Russia may have grown more cautious against China. In addition, China’s military parade featured many intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles, which Russia cannot possess under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with the U.S., providing a new factor that could increase the sense of caution in Russia.

3-2 While seeking to improve relations with Japan, Russia criticized Japan's territorial claim to the Northern Territories issue as the revision of history and sent senior officials to the territories one after another

As the Russian economy stagnated, Russia was interested in enhancing economic relations with Japan

As the Russian economy was slumping due to Western sanctions and international oil price plunges, Russia indicated its attitude of seeking to improve relations with Japan.

At the Japan-Russia leaders' meeting on the occasion of an annual summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Beijing in November 2014, the two countries reaffirmed progress in bilateral working-level cooperation and agreed to launch preparations for Russian President Putin to visit Japan at an "appropriate time in the following year." In response, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the only condition for President Putin's visit to Japan would be Japan's invitation (January), indicating his attitude of waiting for a specific proposal from the Japanese side. Russian State Duma Speaker Sergei Naryshkin during his visit to Japan for the "third Japan-Russia Forum" (May) said the ball was in the Japanese court, suggesting that President Putin's visit to Japan would depend on Japan's attitude.

At a Japan-Russia leaders' meeting on the occasion of a Group of 20 summit in Turkey

(November), the leaders agreed to proceed with preparations for President Putin's Japan visit at the most appropriate time and continue top-level talks.

When Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida visited Russia (September), he and Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov held the 11th meeting of the Japan-Russia Intergovernmental Committee on Trade and Economic Issues, in which the Russian side indicated its proactive attitude of enhancing bilateral economic relations. At the United Nations General Assembly (September) and the Japan-Russia leaders' meeting on the occasion of the G-20 summit (November), President Putin stated that bilateral trade value was declining, although bilateral relations had made progress, with opportunities for bilateral contacts increasing in various fields. He also stated that, although economic contacts were continuing, the recent sharp fall in trade was regrettable, indicating that Russia was interested in enhancing economic cooperation with Japan.

On the Northern Territories issue, Russia emphatically justified its occupation of the territories as the "result of World War II"

In consideration of the 70th anniversary in 2015 of the end of World War II, Russia, while indicating its attitude of seeking to improve relations with Japan, claimed that the Northern Territories legitimately became Russian territories as a result of World War II. Russia thus indicated the attitude of separating the territorial issue from talks to improve bilateral relations.

After Foreign Minister Kishida in his speech in Brussels, Belgium (January), stated that both Russia's occupation of the Northern Territories

and its "annexation" of Crimea represented the change of the status quo by force, the Russian Foreign Ministry strongly denounced the Kishida remark for attempting to revise the cause and results of World War II.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov stated that Russia was not holding any negotiations with the Japanese government on the "Kuril problem," indicating that the Northern Territories were transferred to Russia based on legal grounds as a result of World War II (September). Russia thus effectively claimed

that there were no negotiations on the Northern Territories. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, at a joint press conference with his Japanese counterpart Kishida after their talks in Moscow (September), stated that he and Kishida had not discussed the Northern Territories and that progress regarding this problem could come

only when Russia clearly understood that Japan would fully admit postwar historical facts, including the United Nations Charter. At a later meeting of Japanese and Russian vice foreign ministers (October, Moscow), the Russian side indicated no change in its stubborn attitude toward the Northern Territories issue.

Russia sent minister-level officials to the Northern Territories, demonstrating it as a “part of Russian territory”

Russia repeatedly sent minister-level officials to inspect infrastructure development in the Northern Territories.

Russian Healthcare Minister Veronika Skvortsova visited Shikotan Island in the Northern Territories and inspected a new hospital built in Anama on the island (July). In response to a report by the health minister to a government meeting on a new Northern Territories development program (July) just after the visit, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev expressed his hope to visit the Northern Territories again and encouraged other ministers to travel to the Northern Territories.

Despite the Japanese government’s request for Prime Minister Medvedev to suspend visits to the Northern Territories, he visited Etorofu Island in what he claimed was a “trip to a part of Russian land” along with multiple ministers to attend the “Iturup” (Etorofu) National Youth Educational Forum, conducting an exchange with students participating in the forum, inspecting infrastructure development, and calling on a military unit stationed there (August). Russia also sent three more ministers to the Northern Territories in a manner to demonstrate the Northern Territories as “Russian territories.”

Senior Russian officials visiting the Northern Territories (Since 2012)	
2012 July 3	Dmitry Medvedev, prime minister; Olga Golodets, deputy prime minister; Oleg Govorun, minister of regional development; Viktor Ishayev, minister for the development of Russian Far East and presidential envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District (Kunashiri)
September 27	Nikolay Fyodorov, minister of agriculture (Etorofu)
2014 September 24	Sergei Ivanov, chief of the Presidential Administration; Yury Trutnev, deputy prime minister and presidential plenipotentiary envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District (Etorofu)
2015 July 18	Veronika Skvortsova, minister of healthcare (Shikotan)
August 13-14	Yury Trutnev, deputy prime minister and presidential plenipotentiary envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District (Etorofu)
August 22	Dmitry Medvedev, prime minister; Yury Trutnev, deputy prime minister and presidential plenipotentiary envoy to the Far Eastern Federal District; Alexander Galushka, minister for the development of the Russian Far East; Dmitry Livanov, minister of education and science (Etorofu)
September 1	Alexander Tkachev, minister of agriculture (Etorofu)
September 7	Maxim Sokolov, minister of transport (Kunashiri and Etorofu)

Russia formulated a new Northern Territories development program, making steady progress in developing social infrastructure and modernizing military units

With the existing development program for the Northern Territories nearing its end, Russia formulated a new program for development over the next decade (August). The new program will invest 68.9 billion rubles (about 130 billion yen), up some 2.5-fold from the previous one, to develop social infrastructure and promote tourism, fishing, fish-processing and other industries (see Column on p. 39).

As for social infrastructure, Russia almost completed the construction of large facilities like air and sea ports by 2014 and proceeded with projects for building a culture and sports center (Etorofu), refurbishing a geothermal power plant (Kunashiri) and developing water and sewage equipment (Shikotan) in 2015.

As for the modernization of military units

stationed in the Northern Territories, Russia deployed the Tor-M2U surface-to-air missile system (September) and plans to deploy drones within 2015, making progress in updating equipment. In garrison development, Colonel-general, Sergei Surovikin, Commander of the Eastern Military District, stated that Etorofu and the Kunashiri Islands would be given priority (April). Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu ordered the acceleration of construction (June). Prime Minister Medvedev inspected a military unit on Etorofu Island and stated that Russia needed a force with modern combat capabilities on the Kuril Islands, indicating military priority given to the Northern Territories and a strong ambition to develop garrisons there (August).

Russia will enhance a hard and soft approach on Japan, continuing Northern Territories development over a medium to long term

Russia is likely to take a double-faced approach under which it will indicate interest in enhancing economic and other relations with Japan while maintaining a hardline attitude on the Northern Territories problem.

Russia is seeking to attract foreign investment while the domestic economy stagnates. In this respect, it expects to see foreign participation

in Northern Territories development. Russia is likely to improve the investment climate of the Northern Territories through social infrastructure development and expansion, and the establishment of a Russian “Territory of Advanced Development” (TOR) (see Column on p. 39).

Column

The Russian federal government formulated a new Northern Territories development program

new Northern Territories development program

Russia has promoted mainly transportation and energy development in the Northern Territories under a large-scale nine-year development program (a 2007-2015 special federal program for social and economic development in the Kuril Islands, hereinafter referred to as the current program) led by the federal government. As a result, progress has been made in developing social infrastructure, including airports (Etorofu and Kunashiri), a heliport (Shikotan), seaports (Etorofu, Kunashiri and Shikotan), vehicle roads (Etorofu and Kunashiri), geothermal power plants (Etorofu and Kunashiri), and a wind power/diesel power plant (Kunashiri). An increase in cargo and passenger traffic has been achieved. As for industrial promotion, the traditional fishing and fish-processing industries have achieved production growth. However, no remarkable achievement has been seen for tourism expected to grow as a new industry.

In the meantime, the federal government formulated a 10-year development program (a 2016-2025 special federal program for social and economic development in the Kuril Islands, hereinafter referred to as the new program) replacing the current program (August). The new program includes 29 projects in three fields: (i) transportation infrastructure (seaport and vehicle road development, etc.), (ii) investment climate development and resources utilization (tourism infrastructure development, rare metal refining technology development, etc.) and (iii) national livelihood improvement (housing and educational facility development, etc.). Of the new program budget worth about 68.9 billion rubles (about 130 billion yen), about 52% (about 36 billion rubles) is designed for national livelihood improvement, indicating the federal government's attempt to give priority to improving the living environment to increase local residential population.

In comparison with the current program, the new program features a budget expansion of about 2.5 times and major changes in the percentage of budget expenditures (see the graph). Under the current program,


the federal government has shouldered about 76% of the budget. Under the new program, however, the Sakhalin state government has sharply boosted its contributions to surpass the federal government share. In addition, the share for non-budget financial resources (private sector investment) has doubled from 7% to 14%, pushing down the federal government share. Behind the change may be financial conditions of the federal government, plagued with a domestic recession. In his policy speech

in December 2014, President Putin vowed to cut the budget for the next three years by 5%, tackling spending cuts to cope with the economic slump. Therefore, the federal government's share of the new program's budget resources for the first two years is limited to about 8.6% (about 840 million rubles out of the total of about 9.77 billion).


As a result, the Sakhalin state government's spending and private sector investment have increased sharply in a manner to offset a plunge in federal government expenditure. Attracting attention is the increase in private sector investment, including foreign firms' participation in Northern Territories development. Russia has attempted to lead foreign governments and companies to participate in Northern Territories development and made approaches to foreign countries. In the past, a South Korean company participated in a seaport development project (in Uchioka, Etorofu, between 2012 and 2013).

Russia is considering establishing a Russian "Territory of Advanced Development" (TOR), a kind of special economic development zone, to attract private sector investment in the Northern Territories. Prime Minister Medvedev has indicated a positive attitude toward establishing the TOR to simplify administrative procedures for investors and provide tax incentives in the Northern Territories. If third countries are involved in Northern Territories development through the TOR establishment, the Northern Territories issue may be complicated. In this sense, attention must be paid to the TOR establishment and other moves to attract investment in the Northern Territories.

Current program



New program



4 Middle East/North Africa



4 The Middle East/North Africa situation becomes more confusing

In Syria, the Assad administration's control area shrinks, with various groups controlling their respective areas

In Syria, which is plagued with confusion, the Assad administration has maintained control mainly in the capital city, Damascus, the central region, and the western coastal region since 2013, while the northern and eastern regions were controlled by the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) and other anti-government rebel groups. Since January 2015, Kurdish forces supported by the U.S. and other countries have advanced into ISIL-controlled areas in northern Syria, placing many Kurdish residential areas under their control. Since January, ISIL has advanced into government-controlled areas to expand its control in southern and central Syria. Since March, other rebel forces advanced into government-controlled areas in central and western Syria to increase their control.

After losing its controlled areas due to the offensive of ISIL and other anti-government rebel forces, President Bashar al-Assad delivered a speech on state-run television and indicated a policy of prioritizing defense for western Syria including Damascus and its major stronghold in the western coastal region, while admitting that government-controlled areas have shrunk.

In this way, Syria remained divided among

the Assad administration, ISIL, and other anti-government rebel forces, and Kurdish forces.

The United Nations Security Council adopted the chair's statement supporting a mediation proposal for a political solution by the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative Staffan de Mistura (August), calling for cooperation among various forces in Syria. However, their fighting continued in various areas of Syria, with no progress made in the political negotiation process based on the proposal.

According to an NGO, “Syrian Observatory for Human Rights” based in the U.K., the Syrian death toll since the outbreak of anti-government movements in Syria in March 2011 exceeded 240,000, including those killed in battles (August).

Due to armed conflicts and other factors, massive refugees from the Middle East and North Africa region, including Syria, have flowed into Europe. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), since the outbreak of anti-government movements in March 2011, the number of Syrian refugees exceeded 4 million (July).

Volatile security situation in Iraq

In Iraq, the Haider al-Abadi administration inaugurated in September 2014 tried to reconstruct military forces in a bid to mop up ISIL militants controlling a wide area in northern and western Iraq. Under support by U.S. and other forces, Iraqi security forces and a pro-government Shiite militia organization continued operations to mop up ISIL militants, though with little progress seen.

At various locations in Iraq, people frequently took to the streets from April onwards, criticizing government corruption and calling for the improvement of the electricity supply. In response, Prime Minister Abadi proposed a reform plan to eliminate corruption and reorganize the government (August), and announced such specific measures as the

abolition of some ministerial posts including that of deputy prime minister, demonstrating his attitude of renovating the government.

An investigation committee of the Iraqi National Assembly released an investigation report (August) on ISIL's occupation of Mosul in northern Iraq in June 2014, concluding that 35 then senior government and military officials, including then Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, were responsible for allowing Mosul to be occupied by recruiting corrupt officers as military executives.

In July, the United Nations said that some 15,000 civilians died in Iraq due to ISIL and other attacks during the period between the beginning of 2014 and April 2015.

Russia and Turkey enhanced anti-terrorism engagement

After suicide bombing attacks attributed to ISIL members and terrorist attacks by the "Worker's Party of Kurdistan" (PKK), occurred in Turkey, which neighbors Syria and Iraq (July), Turkey implemented airstrikes on ISIL-controlled areas in Syria and PKK strongholds in northern Iraq (July). Since then, Turkey continued airstrikes on PKK strongholds in northern Iraq, enhancing its confrontational attitude against the PKK. It also participated in the anti-ISIL coalition's airstrikes on ISIL-controlled areas in Syria (August).

Australia and France also took part in anti-ISIL airstrikes (September). The U.K. independently implemented drone attacks on ISIL-controlled areas in Syria as its self-

defense measure. Russia, which has supported Syria's Assad administration, enhanced military assistance to the administration and implemented airstrikes on areas occupied by Syrian anti-government rebels since late September. Western countries denounced the Russian airstrikes as causing the situation to deteriorate.

In the midst of these situations, an ISIL affiliate claimed responsibility for shooting down a Russian aircraft on the Sinai Peninsula in northeastern Egypt (October) and ISIL admitted to conducting serial terrorist attacks in Paris, France (November). In response, France and Russia indicated their cooperation in attacking ISIL militants in Syria and Iraq.

Unstable situation in Libya, Egypt, and other Middle East countries

As confrontation between secular and Islamic forces in the parliament deepened after a parliamentary election in June 2014 in Libya, the parliament was divided into two. Existing extreme Islamist groups and ISIL-affiliated militants took advantage of the confusion to expand their forces, implementing frequent terror attacks in eastern region and the capital of Libya. A militia organization and an extreme Islamist group supporting their respective parliaments were fighting at various locations in Libya.

Egypt saw frequent terror attacks, despite an enhanced crackdown by authorities. In particular, ISIL affiliates based on the Sinai Peninsula in northeastern Egypt are active, allegedly conducting terror attacks on security organizations, shelling sailing ships (July), and killing Croatian workers (August). Terror attacks in the capital of Egypt included an attack on the prosecutor general (June) and a bombing on diplomatic facilities (July).

Tunisia implemented a democratization road map after the collapse of Ben Ali administration in 2011 and completed the democratization with the inauguration of a new cabinet in February 2015. However, terror threats remained in Tunisia. Affiliates of “Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM) and the ISIL were alleged to have conducted terror attacks.

In Saudi Arabia, Crown Prince Salman became the seventh Saudi king, as King Abdullah passed away (January), making a generational

change in the leadership. Authorities continued and enhanced a crackdown on terrorists, announcing a mass arrest of suspected terrorists. Nevertheless, terror attacks attributed to an ISIL affiliate occurred. In particular, suicide bombing attacks hit Shiite mosques two weeks in a row (May). Such attacks that allegedly targeted security organizations also occurred (July and August). In the capital, Riyadh, and other locations, sporadic terror attacks hit security officials.

In Yemen, the “Houthis,” a Shiite militant group based in the North, seized the presidential palace and other facilities in the capital, Sanaa (January), and approached Aden, a southern city, where President Hadi was based after leaving Sanaa (March), prompting a Saudi Arabia-led alliance to implement airstrikes (March). However, the “Houthis” resisted the airstrikes and intensified fighting with President Hadi supporters. An ISIL affiliate conducted terror attacks on the “Houthis” in the capital, Sanaa. Extreme Islamists took advantage of the destabilization to activate attacks.

In Palestine, extreme Islamists based in the Gaza Strip sporadically fired rockets at Israel in the absence of progress in peace negotiations between Palestine and Israel. In the West Bank as well, multiple attacks by Palestinians amid increased resentment against Israeli authorities occurred, indicating an unstable security situation.

5 International Terrorism



5-1 ISIL expanding threats to other regions

ISIL expands its influence to other regions as well as maintaining strength in Syria and Iraq

The “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) has expanded its control in Syria and Iraq since January 2014, placing wide areas in northern and eastern Syria and northern and western Iraq under its control.

In the face of attacks from Kurdish and other forces supported by the U.S. and other countries, however, ISIL withdrew from Ayn al-Arab, a northern Syria town, which it had dominantly controlled (January). Meanwhile, ISIL has intensified its activities in southern and central Syria including the capital, Damascus, since January, seizing Palmyra, a key town of Homs Province in central Syria , which was under the control of the government (May).

In Iraq, ISIL pulled out from Tikrit, a central Iraq city, in the face of Iraqi security and Shiite militant forces’ operations to regain control of the city (March). In Al Anbar Province, western Iraq, however, ISIL maintained its military advantage, seizing a major part of Ramadi, the capital of the province (May).

Subsequently, ISIL repeated battles throughout the country with the Assad administration forces, non-ISIL anti-government rebels and Kurdish forces in Syria and with Iraqi security forces and Shiite militants in Iraq. Due to airstrikes by the anti-ISIL coalition, however, ISIL fell short of sharply expanding areas under its control.

While ISIL has reportedly lost more than 10,000 fighters, including multiple executives, due mainly to anti-ISIL airstrikes in Syria and Iraq, it has been reported that ISIL has accepted foreign fighters and maintained almost the same strength of 20,000 to 30,000 as in August 2014, when airstrikes on Iraq started.

In the other parts of the Middle East and in North Africa other than Syria and Iraq, existing extreme Islamist groups declared support for

or loyalty to ISIL and established multiple “Provinces” as territories of the Islamic State since ISIL announced the “establishment” of the “Islamic State” as a “Caliphate state” in June 2014. In 2015, former regional leaders of the “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan” (TTP) established “Khorasan Province” as a new ISIL territory in West Asia (January). In West Africa, the terror group “Boko Haram” declared loyalty to ISIL supreme leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (March) and later changed its name to “West Africa Province.” ISIL thus expanded its influence further in other areas than Syria and Iraq.

ISIL affiliates have intensified their activities in various locations. Particularly, they claimed responsibility for a museum terror attack in the Tunisian capital, Tunis, targeting tourists from “Crusader” countries (March, killing 21 foreigners, including three Japanese), a resort hotel attack in Sousse Governorate, northern Tunisia (June, killing 38 foreigners), and a Russian aircraft crash on the Sinai Peninsula, northeastern Egypt (October, killing 224 foreigners).

Behind ISIL maintaining strength in Syria and Iraq, and expanding influence in other regions are its well organized propaganda operations using the Internet. ISIL has multiple media sections that issue claims of responsibility for terror attacks, introduce ISIL operations, call for terror attacks and immigration into ISIL-controlled areas with documents, voices, pictures and video. They thus send and disseminate massive messages via media including social media accounts of ISIL fighters and supporters. They also use multiple languages including English and French as well as Arabic in an apparent bid to expose messages to more people and increase propaganda effects.

While “al-Qaida” central leadership wanes in influence, some affiliated groups continue terror attacks

“Al-Qaida” saw the deaths of its No. 2 leader Nasir al-Wahishi, who headed “al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula” (AQAP), and other senior members in 2015 after Osama bin Laden and many other senior members were killed or detained. An affiliate of “al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb” (AQIM) pledged loyalty to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (September), indicating that “al-Qaida” central leadership is waning in influence.

In the situation in which the response to increasing ISIL’s influence drew attention, “al-Qaida” supreme leader Ayman al-Zawahiri issued statements (September) saying that ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was not qualified for the Caliph, clearly denying the legitimacy of al-Baghdadi as Caliph. Al-Zawahiri called on “all fighters” in Syria and Iraq to “cooperate and coordinate with each other,” indicating

his stance that priority should be given to fighting against the U.S. and others, rather than disputes over ISIL’s declaration of a “Caliphate state.”

Yemen-based AQAP claimed responsibility for an attack on the French weekly “Charlie Hebdo” (January) and indicated interest in implementing terror attacks in Europe and the U.S. In Yemen, AQAP seized Mukalla, the capital

of Hadhramaut Province located in the eastern region (April), while security deteriorated due to the rise of the “Houthis,” a Shiite militant group. In June, AQAP announced that its leader al-Wahishi died and was succeeded by a senior member, Qasim Yahya al-Raymi.

Somalia-based “Al-Shabaab,” while facing military operations by Somali forces and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), carried out terror attacks inside and outside Somalia. It continually conducted terror attacks on Somali forces and AMISOM, an assault on Garissa University College in eastern Kenya, neighboring Somalia (April), an attack on a vehicle of United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (April), and a suicide bombing attack on a luxury hotel accommodating Chinese and other embassies (July).

The “al-Nusra Front,” based in Syria, cooperated with other anti-government rebel groups in attacking Syrian government forces, seizing major cities in northwestern Syria (March). The U.S. Department of Defense confirmed that Muhsin al-Fadhli, leader of the “Khorasan Group” that reportedly belongs to the al-Nusra Front and close to “al-Qaida,” died in airstrikes (July).

“Home-grown terrorist” threats enter a new stage in Western countries

As ISIL and AQAP have repeatedly called on Muslims living in Western countries through statements and organs to implement “jihad” in their respective countries of residence, a serious fear is that those influenced by ISIL and other propaganda would conduct terror attacks in response to such calls.

Since anti-government movements emerged in Syria (March 2011), the number of foreign fighters who have entered Syria and Iraq has reportedly reached 25,000, from more than 100 countries. As a considerable number of fighters from Western countries have reportedly participated in attacks in Syria and Iraq, their authorities have cracked down on networks soliciting fighters participating in ISIL and other terror groups to prevent their citizens from going to Syria or Iraq, and have growing more concerned that their citizens who returned home after participating in battles in Syria and Iraq could (i) engage in terror attacks, (ii) introduce and disseminate radical beliefs or (iii) urge others to go to conflict-torn regions.

In the meantime, the French capital, Paris, saw a shooting attack on the French weekly Charlie Hebdo (January) for which AQAP claimed responsibility, as well as a suspected ISIL supporter’s siege at a food store (January). In the Danish capital, Copenhagen, a person suspected to have been radicalized during detention conducted a shooting attack (February). In a Dallas suburb in Texas, a southern U.S. state, a man alleged to have been influenced by ISIL conducted a shooting attack (May). In the French capital of Paris, people who had visited Syria and entered Europe as Syrian refugees staged serial terror attacks using guns and bombs to kill 130 people (November). ISIL claimed responsibility for the attacks.

In Western countries, threats of “lone-wolf” terror attacks by “home-grown terrorists” radicalized in countries of residence and of fighters returning from the Middle East engaging in organized terror attacks became realistic in these ways.

Column

Japanese involved in terror attacks in foreign countries. ISIL named Japan as a terror attack target

While terror threats heightened in various locations around the world, Japanese people were involved in terror attacks in foreign countries one after another. In Syria, terrorists killed two Japanese citizens (January and February). Then, the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) in its series of statements and the seventh issue of its online English magazine “Dabiq” (February) claimed Japan as a future target of ISIL attacks, saying that Japan participated in the “crusade” attacking the Islamic State.

In Tunisia, an armed group assaulted a museum in the capital, Tunis, killing 22 people, including foreign tourists—three of which were Japanese—and injuring 44 people, including three Japanese. ISIL claimed responsibility for the attack through its statement and the eighth issue of “Dabiq” (March), while the Tunisian government pointed to another organization’s involvement in the attack.

Furthermore, ISIL, in its 11th issue of the “Dabiq” (September), named Japan and dozens of other countries and organizations

as members of the “crusader coalition,” citing Japanese diplomatic missions in Bosnia, Malaysia, and Indonesia as examples of attack targets.

In the meantime, a terror attack hit a Japanese citizen in Bangladesh (October). An organization, which called itself “ISIL Bangladesh,” claimed responsibility for the attack, saying that it “attacked a pagan Japanese as a citizen belonging to the ‘crusade coalition’ after precise surveillance.” The incident came as ISIL touched on attacks on Japanese interests. Therefore, terror threats to Japan and Japanese interests are feared to further increase.

In the Philippines, an armed group assaulted a resort facility on Samar Island off Davao City on Mindanao island in the southern Philippines (September), kidnapping four tourists, including three foreigners, and injuring a Japanese citizen. The “Abu Sayyaf Group” issued a statement claiming responsibility for the attack and demanding ransom money (November).

Date	Medium	ISIL statements on Japan (Note: . . . indicates an omission)
January	Video statement anticipating the killing of Japanese in Syria	To the prime minister of Japan: Although you are more than 8,500 km away from the Islamic State, you willingly have volunteered to take part in this crusade. . . . And to the Japanese public: Just as how your government has made the foolish decision to pay \$200 million to fight the Islamic State . . .
February	Video statement on the killing of a Japanese in Syria	To the Japanese government: . . . an entire army thirsty for your blood . . . because of your reckless decision to take part in an unwinnable war . . . will also carry on and cause carnage wherever your people are found. So let the nightmare for Japan begin.
February	“Dabiq” Issue 7	. . . all Japanese citizens and interests—wherever they may be found—are now a target for the soldiers and patrons of the Khilāfah everywhere.
March	“Dabiq” Issue 8	. . . two soldiers of the Islamic State carried out an assault on kāfir tourists in the Bardo National Museum. . . . The operation succeeded in bringing anguish to a number of the nations involved in the crusader coalition (Italy, France, Britain, Japan, Poland, Australia, Spain, and Belgium), after some of their own citizens became prey for the soldiers of the Islamic State.
September	“Dabiq” Issue 11	The new crusader coalition for Iraq and Syria—“Operation Inherent Resolve”—officially includes the following countries and entities: . . . Japan . . . As for the Muslim who is unable to perform hijrah from dārul-kufr to the Khilāfah, then there is much opportunity for him to strike out against the kāfir enemies of the Islamic State. There are more than seventy crusader nations, tāghūt regimes . . . Their interests are located all over the world. . . . In addition to killing crusader citizens anywhere on the earth, what, for example, prevents him from targeting . . . Japanese diplomatic missions in Bosnia, Malaysia, and Indonesia?
October	Statement on the killing of a Japanese in Bangladesh	In a blessed operation, the soldiers of the Caliphate in Bangladesh, a security platoon, targeted a citizen of the crusade coalition against Islamic State, the Japanese’ s crusader . . . after he was under precise surveillance, where he was liquidated with the aid of firearms in the city of Rangpur . . . The series of security operations will go on against the citizens of the crusader coalition, who shall have no peace in the countries of the Muslims . . .
November	“Dabiq” Issue 12	. . . another security cell belonging to the soldiers of the Khilāfah in Bengal (Bangladesh) targeted a Japanese citizen . . . all Japanese citizens and interests - wherever they may be found - are now a target for the soldiers and patrons of the Khilāfah everywhere.

5-2 Security situation still unstable in Afghanistan and Pakistan

In Afghanistan, the “Taliban” staged frequent terror attacks amid stymied peace talks

In Afghanistan, Afghan security forces became fully responsible for domestic security beginning in January as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) completed its mission. Given the situation, the Taliban repeatedly held unofficial talks with Afghan government officials in Urumqi, the capital of China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (May), Oslo, the capital of Norway (June), and other locations, and held the first official peace talks with the Afghan government in a suburb of the Pakistani capital, Islamabad under the auspices of the Pakistani government (July). In late July, just before the planned second round of official peace talks, however, the death of “Taliban” supreme leader Mullah Omar in 2013 was unveiled, prompting the “Taliban” to give priority to establishing its leadership, with the second round postponed. On the other hand, the Taliban continued attacks on Afghan government facilities and security forces and repeatedly seized villages and towns. In particular, Kunduz, the capital of Kunduz Province in northeastern Afghanistan became

the first Afghan provincial capital to be seized by the “Taliban” (September) since the collapse of the “Taliban” regime in 2001.

As the Taliban has reportedly had internal disputes over the selection of its new leader and other matters, new leader Akhtar Mohammad Mansour has given priority to the unity of the organization and repeated bombing terror attacks in the Afghan capital, Kabul, demonstrating his hardline attitude. There are no prospects for the resumption of the peace talks in the immediate future.

In eastern Afghanistan, bordering Pakistan, ISIL declared the establishment of “Khorasan Province” (January) and grew more active. ISIL has since been expanding its influence mainly in the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar. Although U.S. drone attacks killed major ISIL senior members in “Khorasan Province” (July), ISIL has increased clashes with the Taliban and Afghan security forces as well as attacks on local residents, becoming a destabilizer in the region.

In Pakistan, “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan” and other terrorist groups continue attacks despite military forces’ mop-up operations

Pakistani forces launched the “Zarb-e-Azb” mop-up operation against militant groups in North Waziristan of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in northwestern Pakistan in June 2014 and continued the operation. The forces announced that they killed more than 2,700 militants and destroyed more than 800 hideouts in the operation by July.

Even after the mop-up operation started, the “Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan,” or “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan” (TTP), active mainly in northwestern Pakistan, continued terror attacks, killing more than 20 people in an attack on a Shiite religious facility (February) and 29 people in an assault on an air force base (September) in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Province. The TTP denied the achievements announced by Pakistani forces as an ungrounded lie.

Among other militant groups, the “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Jamaat-ul-Ahrar” (TTP-JA) claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing attack on a Christian church (March) in the eastern Pakistani province of Punjab, which killed more than 15 people. The “Lashkar-e-Islam” (LI) reportedly kidnapped and killed 11 tribe people in the FATA (September). Multiple militant groups, including the TTP-JA, claimed responsibility for a terror attack on Shiite residents in the southern Pakistani province of Sindh (May) and a suicide bombing attack on Punjab’s interior minister in Punjab Province (August) (killing more than 14 people, including the interior minister). Many militant groups other than the TTP are repeating terror attacks.

Column

The Death of the “Taliban” supreme leader

In a manner to confirm an announcement by the Afghan government, the “Taliban” issued an official statement on July 30, saying that Taliban founder and supreme leader Mullah Omar died of a disease in April 2013.

Omar had been believed to have fled to Pakistan since the collapse of the “Taliban” regime in 2001 and made no public appearances. Some of the “Taliban” mid-level senior members had tried in vain to identify the whereabouts of Omar, leaving Omar to be a figure of mystery.

According to the “Taliban,” Omar was born in 1960 in the southern Afghan province, Kandahar. After his father died when Omar was five, he entered a madrasa school run by one of his uncles at the age of eight. Omar suffered a right eye injury during his participation in fighting against the then Soviet Union. Under the “Taliban” regime, Omar ruled Afghanistan with strict interpretation of Islam, tribal customs, and the “terror” of religious police, banning music, films and other forms of entertainment. His approach was reportedly influenced by his growing in an isolated environment. His strict belief in Islam attracted Islamic fundamentalists inside and outside Afghanistan, establishing himself as “Amir ul-Mumineen” (leader of the believers).

The “Taliban” had kept Omar’s death secret for more than

two years for the reason cited by the Taliban as an operational advantage against foreign forces stationed in Afghanistan. Some “Taliban” senior members have asserted that Omar was killed by then No. 2 leader Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, who succeeded Omar as top leader. The facts remain unknown.

The “Taliban” selected Mansour as new leader and “Amir ul-Mumineen” when it announced Omar’s death. Over the selection, Mansour’s dispute with some senior members including Omar’s relatives reportedly intensified. While continuing coordination to prevent the organization from being divided, the “Taliban” launched the Mansour leadership. Before Omar’s death was announced, the “Taliban” had issued a statement in the name of Omar admitting the legitimacy of peace negotiations with the Afghan government, leading to expectations that the peace negotiations would make progress. As the statement turned out to have been made by Mansour, however, many local commanders reportedly felt that they were betrayed. Therefore, the new “Taliban” leadership is likely to try to internally enhance its influence while intensifying its dispute over legitimacy with “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL), which claims to be a “Caliphate state.”

5-3 ISIL’s influence expanding in Southeast Asia

A number of ISIL-related suspects arrested in Malaysia and other places

In Indonesia, former “Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyyah” (JI) leader Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (in prison) has repeatedly declared his loyalty to “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL), leading JI-influenced groups to support ISIL. The “Mujahideen Indonesian Timur” (MIT), which also pledged loyalty to ISIL, reduced its strength as some of its senior members died in mop-up operations by security forces. Nevertheless, MIT leader Santoso was still at large, continuing terror attacks. In the midst of these situations, a small explosion occurred at a shopping mall in a suburb of the Indonesian capital, Jakarta (February), representing a chlorine bomb similar to a chemical weapon used by ISIL in Syria. Although no one was killed or injured in the explosion, this kind of bomb was reportedly used for the first time in Indonesia. Local police authorities indicated that some fighters returning from Syria might have been involved in the explosion.

In Malaysia, suspected terrorists who attempted to conduct terror attacks in the country were arrested one after another. 17

suspects, including two returning from Syria and two active soldiers, were arrested for their alleged plan to attack police stations and military camps, obtain arms from them, and stage terror attacks in the Malaysian capital, Kuala Lumpur (April). 12 people were arrested for their suspected plan to conduct bombing attacks on government and other facilities in Kuala Lumpur (April). 10 people, including security officials and public servants, were seized for allegedly planning terror attacks in Malaysia while recruiting Malaysians, helping them go to Syria, and providing financial aid to fighters returning from Syria (August). In Australia, two people suspected to have some relations with ISIL were arrested for preparing for terror attacks in Sydney (February). Boys and some other people who were influenced by ISIL were arrested for preparing to attack police officers at a memorial ceremony in Australia (April). While such arrests were reported, a 15-year-old Iraqi-Kurdish boy from Iran shot a police officer to death in front of the New South Wales Police Headquarters in a Sydney suburb (October).

Militant groups continually pose threats in the Philippines and southern Thailand

In the Philippines, the “New People’s Army” (NPA), the military division of the “Philippine Communist Party,” continue terror attacks on private enterprises and security forces. The “Moro Islamic Liberation Front” (MILF) operating in the southern Philippines signed a comprehensive peace agreement with the Philippine government in 2014. When security forces searched for Malaysian JI senior member Zulkifli bin Hir in a MILF-controlled area of Maguindanao Province, however, a battle occurred, killing 44 police officers, 18 MILF members, and Zulkifli (January). The “Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters” (BIFF), which spun off from the MILF and pledged loyalty to ISIL, continually conducts

attacks on security forces, though losing its leader Ameril Umbra Kato due to a disease (April). The “Abu Sayyaf Group” (ASG), whose part of senior members have pledged loyalty to ISIL, have frequently kidnapped foreigners and local residents for ransom money, mainly in the southern Philippines.

In southern Thailand, terror attacks continue while the interim government and a separatist militant group tried to resume their peace negotiations. In Yala Province, four soldiers died in a shooting attack (June). In Pattani Province, a suicide vehicle bomb attack injured eight soldiers.

Column

Terror and World Heritage

The “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) has extremely interpreted and enforced Islamic law in Syrian and Iraqi areas under its control, destroying ancient relics and remains that it interprets as “idols” banned under the law.

In Mosul, a northern Iraqi province, ISIL destroyed the World Heritage ruins of ancient Hatra founded by the Parthian empire that prospered about 2,000 years ago (March). In Homs, a central Syrian province, it also destroyed the World Heritage Temples of Baalshamin and Bel at the ruins of Palmyra built under control by the Roman Empire (August). Later, it demolished other parts of the ruins.

ISIL reportedly have also demolished relics at other ruins and museums in Syria and Iraq, leading to growing fears that precious historical heritage could be lost in ISIL-controlled areas.

In a past incident in which a terrorist organization demolished a World Heritage site, the “Ansar Dine,” based in northern Mali, destroyed a shrine of a Muslim leader in Tombouctou, central Mali, in 2012. In 2001, the Taliban destroyed stone Buddhist images in Bamyan, central Afghanistan, attracting attention from the international community. Later, the Buddhist images and their vicinity were added to the World Heritage List (2003).

External Situation 1
External Situation 2
External Situation 3
External Situation 4
External Situation 5
External Situation 6
Domestic Situation 1
Domestic Situation 2
Domestic Situation 3
Domestic Situation 4
Domestic Situation 5

External Situation 6

6 Adverse Activities against Japan



6 Activities aimed at acquiring materials/technology that could be diverted for military use or important information

Caution required against China’s intelligence operations targeting Japanese advanced technology

China compiled what seems to be a record-high defense budget and is developing advanced weapons to beef up its military equipment without specifying any breakdown or purposes of the budget. It has also promoted “military-civilian integration,” encouraging the private sector to take part in research and development of defense technology, upgrading the integration to a national strategy. At a plenary meeting of People’s Liberation Army delegates during the Third Session of the 12th National People’s Congress (March), Central Military Commission Chairman Xi Jinping described “military-civilian integration” as an important policy involving every aspect of national security and development strategies, emphasizing the significance of the integration. China’s defense white paper released in May also called for “combining military forces with the people” to form a framework where military-civilian integration would deeply develop.

As China reportedly depends on foreign products for aircraft engines, guidance systems, precision machine tool technology, and other goods and technology that are difficult to be procured domestically, it has been pointed out that Chinese intelligence agencies and overseas Chinese might have been involved in procuring sensitive items (May, an annual report to Congress by the U.S. Department of Defense). Of concern is that organizations and people related to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army may procure advanced products and technology from Japan while concealing their backgrounds well and divert them for military use. Given that a Chinese company was found to have imported Japanese carbon fiber available for military use via Busan Port in South Korea (May), Japan still remains a target for Chinese procurement operations. Caution is required against dubious approaches involving China.

Frequent cyber-attacks aimed at stealing key information

In Japan, a cyber-attack on the Japan Pension Service led to a leak of personal data of some 1.25 million people (May). Other cyber-attacks that are suspected of stealing important information continually occurred, including those hitting research institutes and large companies in Japan.

Outside Japan, personal information of more than 20 million people, including government employees, were found to have leaked from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) (July). Continuous caution is required as cyber-attacks with an aim of stealing key information are posing a serious threat.

Concern about North Korean procurement and proliferation activities

While signs of missile-related facility improvements and nuclear facility operations in North Korea were emerging, North Korea released video footage depicting what it claimed to be a test to launch a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from under water, in which advanced technologies are needed (May) and asserted the “miniaturization and diversification” of “nuclear weapons” (May). Therefore, it is a serious concern that North Korea continues to procure sensitive materials

and technology required for developing and producing nuclear weapons. In its final report (February), the Panel of Experts assisting the UN Security Council’s North Korea Sanctions Committee noted that North Korean shipping firm “Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited” (OMM), which is subject to UNSC sanctions, had a wide operation network that covered Asia, Europe, South America and other regions and included a Hong Kong company where a Japanese person served as a director.

Continual caution against Iran’s procurement of materials related to weapons of mass destruction required

After agreeing with six countries including the U.S. and European countries, on the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” including limitations on uranium enrichment (July), Iran won approval on the plan by its Parliament and its supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (October), impressing the world with its steady efforts to implement the plan. Just after the agreement, however, Iran reportedly conducted construction work at the Parchin military facility, which is suspected to have engaged in nuclear weapons development. Then, Iran was believed to be eliminating traces of past tests (August, U.S. think tank Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)).

Despite UN Security Council Resolution 1929 in 2010, which prohibits Iran from conducting any operations involving ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons, Iran asserted that there was no room for negotiations with other countries on the defensive missile plan because the missile program is for defense (February, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi). Iran also released video footage of what it claimed to

be the inside of a plant of the Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO) (March), explaining that the plant was manufacturing carbon fiber that could be diverted for military use. Furthermore, Iran made public its sophisticated “Fateh-313” ballistic missile, demonstrating progress in its adoption of domestic technology. Iran also stressed that it would continue arms transactions without paying attention to any resolution (August, President Hassan Rouhani). In addition, Iran test-launched its new Emad long-range ballistic missile available for terminal guidance, indicating the possibility that Iran could start the missile’s mass production (October).

Iran has used front companies and forged documents to artfully procure from abroad goods and technology that are not domestically available for developing weapons of mass destruction. Given that Japanese products have reportedly remained targets for such procurement, Japan must bear in mind reports regarding Iran’s dubious procurement operations.

Column

Reports about North Korea-Iran cooperation in nuclear and missile development

North Korea and Iran have allegedly transferred missile related materials, machines and technology to each other since North Korea provided missile technology to Iran during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. It is also reported that the two countries have cooperated in the nuclear development, in terms of mutual transfer of nuclear test data and dispatched nuclear engineers.

At present, North Korea-Iran cooperation reportedly shifted its

focus to software cooperation including technology and test data exchange, and joint development, rather than hardware such as providing main parts of missiles. It is reported that missile technology transfers of North Korea and Iran are becoming sophisticated, including transfers via third countries. Some recent media reports indicate that the two countries continue such cooperation.

- Major media reports in 2015 on North Korea-Iran cooperation -
- Hundreds of North Korean nuclear and missile experts stay in Iran (Christian Science Monitor dated February 20)
- It is confirmed that since September 2014, North Korea has transported missile parts, including engines that can be used for building long-range missile systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads, to Iran by sea at least twice. (Washington Free Beacon dated April 15)
- In April 2015, a North Korean delegation comprising nuclear, nuclear warhead and ballistic missile experts visited Iran. These North Korean experts stayed at military facilities in Tehran and contacted Iranian research institutes. (National Council of Resistance of Iran website)
- A plan seems to be in progress to supply more than 10 disassembled ballistic missile engines from North Korea to Iran (Kyodo News dated June 26)

Column

Threats of terror attacks using remotely controlled IoT devices

In recent years, the "Internet of Things (IoT)," which connects aircraft, vehicles, home electric appliances and various other things to the Internet, is spreading. In the meantime, threats of terror attacks using remotely controlled IoT devices have become a matter of concern, as indicated by researchers who reported the vulnerability of the IoT at the "Black Hat," international conference on cyber security (August, Las Vegas, U.S.). The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has pointed out that aircraft connected to the Internet are potentially vulnerable to unauthorized access to their avionics systems. Test

results in the U.S. indicate that vehicles could go out of control if they were hacked while driving.

These threats extend to home electric appliances. Appliances that have become more convenient through Internet connection could be remotely controlled by cyber-attacks. In such event, a heater could cause a fire. A U.S. survey firm has estimated that 30 billion things will be connected to the Internet in the world by time of the 2020 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games. Threats of terror attacks using remotely controlled IoT devices are growing more realistic.

Column

Public Security Intelligence Agency efforts to protect key information

The Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA), as a member of Japan's government intelligence community, has tried to contribute to decision-making and implementation of policies by providing intelligence. PSIA strives to collect and analyze relevant information based on the recognition that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and relevant materials, and dubious countries' theft of key information pose serious threats that could gravely damage not only Japanese government agencies but also Japanese companies and research organizations.

As for the protection of key information in particular, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry launched the "Public-Private Strategic Council for Countermeasures against the

Outflow of Trade Secrets" (January) to promote the protection of technical information by uniting the efforts of the public and private sectors, considering frequent incidents in which key technology of Japanese companies was leaked inside and outside Japan. In order to encourage companies and research organizations to take a more cautious stance and implement thorough information protection measures through the provision of information to the ministry on technical information theft trends, the agency joined the strategic council and introduced real incidents of information leaks at the "Public-Private Forum on Trade Secrets," a working-level meeting under the council (July). The agency will take various opportunities to provide information to enhance public-private cooperation.

Focal Issues of the Domestic Public Security Situation in 2015



Domestic Situation 1

1 Aum Shinrikyo



1-1 Aum Shinrikyo still firmly maintains dangerous traits

Recognizing the danger of the cult, the Public Security Examination Commission decided to extend the surveillance period over the cult

Activities of Aum Shinrikyo (the cult) are now led by a group that uses the name “Aleph” (mainstream group) and a group using the name “Hikarinowa” (Joyu Group). The PSIA has been implementing surveillance of the cult based on the Act on the Control of Organization Which Committed Indiscriminate Mass Murder since February 2000 and requested the Public Security Examination Commission to extend the surveillance period (fifth time) in December 2014.

Upon the request, the commission found on January 23 that it was necessary to continue to clarify the activities of the cult because there were facts showing that the cult was still in danger of committing indiscriminate mass murder, and decided to extend the surveillance period by three years (until January 31, 2018).

In its decision, the commission stated that Asahara still has an absolute influence on the cult’s activities and pointed out the following facts as showing the danger:


- i. Members have absolute faith in Asahara,
- ii. They maintain a closed society cut off from the public,
- iii. Senior members gave statements to justify the sarin attacks in Matsumoto and the Tokyo subway system,
- iv. Fumihiko Joyu, who played an important role in spraying bacillus anthrax in the process of the cult’s arming, is active as an officer, and
- v. The cult guides young people, including elementary and junior-high school students, to establish absolute faith in Asahara and his doctrine.

The mainstream group and Joyu group filed their respective suits to seek nullification of the decision.

Dec, 1999	The Organization Control Act was enacted
Jan, 2000	The Public Security Examination Commission (PSEC) decided on surveillance
Feb, 2000	The cult changed its name to “Religious Organization – Aleph”
Jan, 2003	PSEC decided to extend the surveillance period over the cult (first time)
Feb, 2003	The cult changed its name to “Religious Organization Aleph”
Jan, 2006	PSEC decided to extend the surveillance period over the cult (second time)
May, 2007	Joyu Group established “Hikarinowa.”
May, 2007	“Religious Organization Aleph” changed its name to Aleph.
Jan, 2009	The PSEC decided to extend the surveillance period over the cult (third time)
Jan, 2012	The PSEC decided to extend the surveillance period over the cult (fourth time)
Jan, 2015	The PSEC decided to extend the surveillance period over the cult (fifth time)

Process of surveillance over the cult

The number of followers remains almost the same, while the assets have increased




Changes in the number of followers

The cult has 32 facilities in 15 prefectures in Japan and several facilities in Russia. The cult has also engaged in continual fund-raising activities by holding various events including “intensive seminars” for lay members. As a result, the total amount of its assets (cash, deposits, savings and loans) increased from about 800 million yen at the end of January, when the surveillance period was extended, to about 890 million yen at the end of October.

On the other hand, the cumulative amount paid for compensation to the victims and the bereaved families of the sarin attacks in Matsumoto and the Tokyo subway system between January and the end of November remained as low as about 80 million yen.

Currently the cult has about 1,650 followers in Japan (about 300 live-in members and about 1,350 lay members) and about 160 Russian members in Russia.

In Japan, the cult engaged in systematic recruitment activities, and acquired about 100 new followers during 2015. However, a large number of lay followers, including the new members, left the cult after being unable to settle in. As a result, the number of members has been almost the same since 2013.



Changes in the amount of the cult's assets and compensation paid

Conducting on-site inspection at a total of 35 facilities in 13 prefectures

The PSIA mobilized a total of about 570 public security intelligence officers to carry out on-site inspections at a total of 35 of the cult's facilities in 13 prefectures in 2015 (until the end of November) in accordance with the Organization Control Act (see p.62).

At the facilities of the mainstream group, portraits of Asahara and an alter bearing a painting of Shiva (cult members believe Asahara to be an avatar of the deity) were found, while at the facilities of the Joyu

group, paintings of Shakyamuni, Kannon, and Maitreya, which were preached to be avatars of Asahara by Asahara and Joyu in the past, were found.

The mainstream group, in particular, maintained an uncooperative attitude by taking too long to open the gates to the facilities for the inspection, for example. Both the groups were uncooperative, stating “it's not compulsory to answer” to questions asked by the PSIA officers.

Promoting initiatives to help to alleviate fear and anxiety among local residents

People living around the cult’s facilities have fear and anxiety even today, 20 years after the sarin attack in the subway system, and held opposition rallies and protest demonstrations in various locations. The PSIA receives reports (once every three months) from the cult, concerning the current status of the organization and its activities based on the Organization Control Act. The PSIA provided 4 prefectures and 14 municipalities that made requests with

information regarding the contents of these reports together with the outcomes of the on-site inspections on a total of 52 occasions. Furthermore, in order to help alleviate fear and anxiety among local residents, the PSIA held 39 sessions for opinion exchange with residents in 21 areas. During the sessions, the PSIA explained the current status of the cult and surveillance results (until the end November).

Column

Four-part meeting

In addition to opinion-exchange sessions with residents across Japan, the PSIA has been holding a regular “four-part meeting” with the local government and the police in addition to the PSIA and residents in Kanazawa, Ishikawa Prefecture, to share information about the cult. In a session held in May, local government officials stated “amid concerns that the incidents might be forgotten, it is important to continue various efforts to control the increase in the number of followers.” In August, local

residents provided comments that a “certain deterrent effect may be expected by spreading four-part meetings all over the country.” Other areas are calling for four-part meetings. The PSIA will continue to help to alleviate fear and anxiety among local residents through active participation in the meeting and similar activities.

1-2 The mainstream group worked toward the return of Asahara’s sons while maintaining commitment to “absolute faith in Asahara”

Continuing strict guidance aimed at absolute faith in Asahara

As has happened in the past, the mainstream group implemented strict guidance aimed at establishing absolute faith in Asahara, through events such as the “Birth Festival” to celebrate Asahara’s birthday and intensive seminars for lay members. In Asahara’s “Birth Festival” held at the cult’s facilities in various locations gathering more than 600 people for four years in a row, senior members gave sermons to establish absolute faith in Asahara, including statements such as “You have to deepen your connection with the Holy Master (Asahara) in this life” (March). In the intensive seminars held three times each year (January, May and September), the group implemented strict guidance to establish absolute faith in Asahara by making its followers pursue round-the clock training for a few days without breaks or sleeping hours; including repeated throwing down of their bodies on the ground while chanting absolute faith in Asahara (standing worship) and viewing videos where

Asahara preaches “you have to practice tantra vajrayana (dangerous doctrine that implicitly encourages murder) in order to transmigrate together with the Holy Master” while chanting the same. In addition, the mainstream group established faith in Asahara among minors by making them engage in training like adults, or participating in “intensive seminars.” In particular, for preschool children and elementary school students, the group aimed at natural indoctrination through plays using teaching materials such as “Truth Karuta” and “Truth Sugoroku.” Positioning recruitment as an important activity to realize the “salvation of sentient beings” preached by Asahara, the mainstream group continued systematic recruitment activities at the cult facilities (branch training facilities). Specifically, the group mainly approached young adults and students on downtown streets or in bookstores, or held events concealing

a religious atmosphere, such as tarot card fortune telling and cherry-blossom viewing, the group led people who showed interest in yoga or the spiritual world to participate in yoga classes without mentioning the cult's name. In these yoga classes, members who played the role of instructors, while building a personal relationship, preached to the recruitment targets the teachings of Asahara without mentioning

his name, and persuaded them to believe "the subway sarin gas attacks were a conspiracy by outsiders." When recruitment targets became less cautious toward the cult, the group made them join the cult by disclosing the cult's name. As a result of this skillful method, the group acquired a lot of new followers during 2014, and expected to continue active recruitment activities.

Expelling senior members who were negative regarding the return of Asahara's sons

After the arrest of Asahara, the cult had announced a new structure making his eldest son and second son the "leaders" (June 1996) based on the instruction of Asahara, but in response to the request for surveillance in December 1999, the group decided not to have official leaders or have the sons involved in the cult's activities, but actually continued to worship them. In this context, since October 2013 Asahara's wife had plotted to make the second son return to the cult's activities with the agreement of senior members of the mainstream group. However, Asahara's third daughter was against the return of the second son and some senior members of the mainstream group concurred with her. The

moves gradually developed into friction among senior members and spread to the operation of the whole cult.

Since May 2014, the "joint meeting," the decision-making body of the mainstream group, has expelled or sent to long-term training one after another senior members who were negative regarding the return of the second son, continued the purge in 2015 and continued to remove them by filing suits for evacuation of the cult's facility and repayment of loans provided to them. The expelled senior members continued their activities following Asahara and his doctrine, even after they were expelled.

Fostering momentum toward return of the second son by holding "Birth Festival" for him

Since 2014, the mainstream group has been holding events to celebrate the birthday of the second son on the 11th day of every month to make followers play for "his return to the cult as early as possible." From mid-May to end-June, a senior member Koichi Ninomiya visited branch training facilities across Japan and emphasized

the legitimacy of the second son as Asahara's successor, stating "it is important to maintain the principle from blood." In routine study sessions at branch training facilities, senior members stated "It is sure that he (the second son) will return to the cult" in an effort to build momentum toward his return.

Column

Twenty years after the subway sarin gas attacks — Victims and bereaved families are still suffering and are concerned that the incident will be forgotten —

The cult released sarin gas on three subway lines in Tokyo on March 20, 1995, wreaking tremendous damage that killed 12 people and injured more than 3,000 people. In 2015, commemorating the 20th anniversary of the attack, the victims' support group and others held a gathering to mark the passage of 20 years since the sarin attack in the subway system in Tokyo. Answers to a questionnaire survey made at this occasion showed that many victims are still suffering from eye problems, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other symptoms, while some victims and bereaved families are concerned that the incident will be forgotten and are also angry that the cult still exists.

Commemorating the 20th anniversary, the cult groups posted their comments on the respective website: we express our deep sympathy to victims of the incident (Aleph); "Our sincere apologies for people who were damaged by the incident (Hikarinowa)." Within the cult, however, senior members put responsibility on society and explained to recruitment targets that the incident was a conspiracy by parties outside the cult.

All the first trials of the subway sarin attacks and a series of incidents have drawn to a close with the sentencing of former senior member Katsuya Takahashi to life imprisonment on April 30 (Takahashi appealed the ruling in May).

External Situation 1
External Situation 2
External Situation 3
External Situation 4
External Situation 5
External Situation 6
Domestic Situation 1
Domestic Situation 2
Domestic Situation 3
Domestic Situation 4
Domestic Situation 5

1-3 The Joyu group continued to strive to evade surveillance

The Public Security Examination Commission acknowledged the cult’s attempt to “hide the influence of Asahara.” The group maintained its trait after the decision of extension.

In the decision to extend the period of surveillance for the third time, the PSEC stated that the Joyu Group was “organized by people who had faith in Asahara and followed his doctrine in order to escape surveillance and realize his will.” Against this statement, the group argued that “the decision is based on erroneous findings” on its website (January). Joyu, actively using opportunities for interviews by TV and other media on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the subway sarin gas attack, emphasized that “Now I feel I can support my mind and body without Asahara” (March). The group also added “Believing in the doctrine of Asahara and Aum Shinrikyo is a complete mistake” to the basic principles of Hikarinowa (June) to impress anew that the group had broken away from Asahara.

However, Joyu said to lay members that “I find it impossible to think that Asahara alone

is responsible for the crimes. Society as a whole generates crime” (June) and all facilities of the group continued to hold Buddhist paintings that were deemed to be avatars of Asahara, which revealed the situation that the group is still under the influence of Asahara.

While externally claiming that “Hikarinowa is not a religious organization” and “We will make our group activities transparent,” the group held Buddhist paintings in its facilities and maintained the live-in system established by Asahara, where followers leave their families, dedicate themselves to the organization and live together in one household. In addition, during on-site inspections, members consistently refused to answer questions by PSIA officers regarding the whereabouts of accounting data. In this way, there was no change in the group’s delusive and closed organizational traits.

Strengthening defense of the organization in order to evade surveillance

In the request to extend the surveillance period, the PSIA pointed out that “Hikarinowa Basic Principles’ are not deemed to be its code because they were not well known among followers.” In response, the Joyu group tried to pretend that the principles were well known to followers by issuing “Notice concerning the Basic Principles and contact with PSIA officers” (July) and making them submit “receipt.” The “Notice” specified that a member who had a relationship with a PSIA officer might be disqualified or excommunicated. By strictly keeping contact

with PSIA officers in check, the group reinforced the defense of the organization.

In addition, the group filed a suit to seek nullification of the decision of the fifth extension of the surveillance period (June), claimed that the content of the PSIA’s request for the fifth extension of the surveillance period was defamation and added this to the statement of the claim of the state compensation suit that the group had filed in November 2014. The group is likely to continue its efforts to evade surveillance.


Struggling to obtain funding through seminars and “pilgrimages to holy places”

As in 2014, the Joyu Group held triannual “Intensive Seminar” (in January, May and August), repeatedly organized “pilgrimages to holy places” to visit temples and shrines designated as holy places by Joyu and collected

participation fees from lay followers and general participants. Senior members tenaciously urged them to participate in these events as an effort to obtain funding.

Facilities where on-site inspections were conducted

(January-end of November 2015)



Domestic Situation 2

2 Moves by domestic groups concerning events that drew attention from society



2-1 Criticism from various groups about the administration over the bills related to the Legislation for Peace and Security

Branding the bills as “war bills,” domestic groups staged large-scale opposition rallies and demonstrations aimed at overthrowing the regime

Protests against the Legislation for Peace and Security were initiated by women’s groups near the Diet in January. Since May, youth groups including the Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy (SEALDs) have been formed across the country. Movement against the legislation intensified before the passing and enactment of the bills in September. Outside the main gate of the Diet building, daily protests were held.

In this context, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) branded the bills as “war bills.” JCP Chairman Kazuo Shii, JCP Diet members, and party members continually participated in “No ABE! Occupy the PM’s Office!” in July, “100,000 people at the Diet, one million people across Japan taking action” in August and the “Action in front of the main gate of the Diet Building.” They sought to boost the protests saying, “Push the war bills to be scrapped and join forces to bring down the Abe administration.” After the

enactment of the bills, the JCP announced the concept of “National Coalition Government to Repeal the War Law (The Legislation for Peace and Security),” calling on other opposition parties against the legislation to form a broad cooperation toward “overthrowing the government.” The JCP continues to send its Diet members to protests staged near the Diet to say “We wish to continue talks among opposition parties in order to establish a new government.”

Radical leftist groups mobilized activists to rallies and demonstrations held by citizens opposing security legislation, arguing, “Prevent the war bills at any cost” (Chukaku-ha), or “Block voting at House of Councilors” (mainstream faction of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association) in their respective organ papers. Some activists were arrested for obstructing official duties of police officers on guard.

2-2 Continued obstructive activities and protests to prevent the relocation of U.S. Futenma base in Henoko

Repeating obstructive activities against relocation works at Henoko

When the Okinawa Defense Bureau started works for the alternative facilities to relocate of the U.S. Futenma base to Henoko in Nago City, sit-ins and other protests were implemented continually at Henoko by residents and supporters in and out of Okinawa.

In this context, the JCP and radical leftist groups engaged in protests criticizing the relocation as “reckless acts that suppresses

the public opinion of Okinawa.” In particular, Kakumaru-ha and other radical leftist groups sent activists to Henoko throughout the year. They tried to prevent the work by obstructing vehicles involved in the relocation work in front of the gate of U.S. Camp Schwab and repeatedly intruding into the restricted water areas surrounding the site for the relocation.

Trying to boost the protest movements by sending party members and activists from across the country to protest rallies

Rallies against the relocation work at Henoko were held one after another in Okinawa, the Tokyo metropolitan area, and many other locations. The JCP and radical leftist groups sent party members and activists from across the

nation to the rally, “70 years after the war. Stop construction of a new base in Henoko. Protest by Okinawa residents” rally held in Naha in May and the protests near the Diet building to boost the movement.

Supporting the Okinawa Governor who is against relocation to Henoko, the JCP called for a review of the relocation plan in the US

Since November, when Takeshi Onaga, whom the party supported in the election, assumed the office of Okinawa Governor, the JCP has been the ruling group of the prefectural assembly. Assembly members of the party and other assembly groups accompanied the governor to the United States (May 27 to June 5) and called on US Congress members to review the relocation

plan. In response to the governor’s revocation of the approval of land reclamation work in October, the party expressed its support for the governor’s decision by publishing a comment by Chairman Shii in “Shimbun Akahata” to the effect that “the Abe administration’s reckless attempt to move ahead with the construction of the new base is absolutely unacceptable.”

2-3 Protests with the goal of “blocking the restarts” of nuclear power plants

Criticizing the restart of nuclear power plants as “disregarding public opinion” and demanding immediate suspension

In response to the restart of the No. 1 reactor at the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant in Kagoshima in August, anti-nuclear groups and others continually conducted protests in front of the Prime Minister’s Office, near the Diet, the location of the nuclear plant, and other places across the country.

JCP Diet members participated in the protests in front of the Office of the Prime Minister and near the Diet (from the end of March 2012), and criticized the government’s energy policy. Upon the restart of the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant (August and October) the party issued a statement by Chairman Shii to the effect that “the restart trampled on public opinion head on”

(August) and had its Diet members participate in the protests at Sendai to demand an immediate suspension of the restart.

Its affiliated organization “No Nukes Zenkoku Network” together with anti-nuclear power groups held protests in front of the Prime Minister’s Office, gathering groups in other fields including groups of youths waging an opposition campaign against the legislation for peace and security and groups protesting hate speech. In the protests, Chairman Shii repeated criticism of the government to the effect that “What the Abe administration is doing in any field is tyranny trampling on the opinions of the majority of people.”

Radical leftist groups mobilized activists to rallies held by anti-nuclear power groups and asserted their causes.

Radical leftist groups mobilized activists to rallies and demonstrations organized by anti-nuclear power groups and called for the decommissioning of all reactors by distributing their own groups’ organs and pamphlets, as well

as arguing that “nuclear power generation will directly lead to nuclear-armed Japan” in their organs.

In addition, an anti-nuclear power group supported by radical leftist groups continued

to illegally occupy a corner of the grounds of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry building and occupy it (from September 2011). Even after the Tokyo District Court (February)

and the Tokyo High Court (October) handed down a ruling to vacate the land (the case is still under dispute), they continued to occupy the area.

2-4 Criticizing the government's stance on historical recognition at "the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II"

Trying to unsettle the government concerning the statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II

As Japan commemorated the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, the JCP, radical leftist groups, and other groups calling for settlement of war compensation issues demanded "regret" and "apologies" concerning "colonial rule and aggression" from the government and criticized the government's response. Particularly against Prime Minister Abe's statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of the war ("Statement on the 70th Anniversary of the End of the War" on August 14), they held rallies and symposiums in many places and criticized the stance of the government.

In this context, JCP Chairman Shii questioned Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, saying "Do you understand that the past wars of Japan were wrong?" while mentioning the Potsdam Declaration in a party leaders' debate in parliament (May 20). When "Statement on the 70th Anniversary of the End of the War" was published, the chairman gave a news conference and argued that "the statement is full of deception and virtually abandoned the position

expressed by the "Murayama Statement."

Radical leftist groups stated "We cannot forgive the 'Statement on the 70th anniversary of the End of the War' that takes a so-what attitude to the aggression and colonial rule. We should bring down the Abe government," "We cannot deter any war without completely opposing all wars and bringing down the governments that enforce wars" at antiwar rallies and other occasions, and urged to "overthrow the government" and "block the war law" by connecting the statement with the legislation for peace and security.

In the year of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, school textbooks were selected, as is done once every four years. The JCP in its "Shimbun Akahata" criticized history/civics textbooks with the involvement of the Japan Society for History Textbook Reform as "glorifying wars of aggression." Diet and local assembly members of the party carried on movements against selection of these textbooks in various locations.

Sticking to the stance of pressing for a solution to the comfort women issue

On the occasions of an international conference (Seoul, May), Prime Minister Abe's visit to the United States (April), and demonstrations in major cities (August), rallies were held calling for a solution to the comfort women issue.

In this context, the JCP firmly maintained its stance of calling on the Japanese side to solve the issue. For example, the party argued at the Diet that the government had been slack in its efforts to collect related material after the "Kono Statement." In addition, Chairman Shii who visited South Korea in October suggested that

we should accelerate the solution to the comfort women issue and stated "It is necessary for the Japanese government to take a step forward" at a meeting with senior members of the South Korea-Japan Parliamentarians' Association.

Radical leftist groups criticized the Japanese government's responses by stating in their organs "Never allow denial of 'comfort women'" and "Abe government does not accept responsibility for the Japanese Army's 'comfort women' system as a sex slave system and refused to apologize/compensate the victims."

3 Radical Leftist Groups



3-1 The anti-mainstream faction of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association caused a guerrilla incident for three consecutive years

The faction launched metal projectiles at U.S. Camp Zama in Japan

The anti-mainstream faction of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association caused a guerrilla incident shooting a metal projectile at U.S. Army Camp Zama located in Zama City, Kanagawa Prefecture, early on April 28, and claimed responsibility for the incident in its newspaper Kaiho (May).

The faction claimed that it had caused the guerrilla incident as an iron response to the expansion and strengthening of Japan-U.S. counterrevolution-class alliance, and stressed

that “We will not only block full-fledged construction work of the new Nago Base at any price but also blow up all bases of U.S. Forces in Japan and Japan Self Defense Forces.”

The faction caused guerrilla incidents for the third year in a row since November 2013, when it shot metal projectiles at U.S. Yokota base, followed by the shooting of metal projectiles at a construction company undertaking the relocation of the U.S. Futenma Base to Henoko (October 2014).

Threatening guerrilla attacks on facilities related to the Self-Defense Forces, U.S. Forces, companies involved in the base relocation, and nuclear power-related facilities

The faction asserted in its New Year’s article, “We will push ahead with relentless revolutionary guerrilla warfare against the military industry and companies involved in the construction of the new base, let alone the political and military center of Japan and U.S.,” and, “We will smash the new construction and expansion of nuclear plants including those in

Aomori and Ohma.” After the guerrilla incidents mentioned above, the faction continued to stress the need for “continual guerilla wars” in its “Revolutionary Army Appeal” (August), threatening guerrilla attacks on facilities related to the Self-Defense Forces/U.S. Forces, companies involved in the base relocation, and nuclear power-related facilities and companies.

Month	Document	Content
Jan	New Year’s article	We push a relentless revolutionary guerrilla war against the military industry and companies involved in the construction of the new base as well as the political and military center of Japan and the United States ... prevent by force the restart of nuclear power plants in Sendai, Kagoshima and Takahama, Fukui, and smash the new construction and expansion of nuclear plants including those in Aomori and Oma.
Feb	Revolutionary Army Appeal	We will expand the horizon of our pursuit shooting battle and block by all means the construction of the new base in Nago to serve as a base of the counterrevolution war. We will block construction/restarts of nuclear plants, crash the “nuclear fuel cycle,” and prevent nuclear armament of Japanese imperialism.
May	Army Report (criminal declaration)	We will not only block full-fledged construction work of the new Nago Base at any price but will also blow up all bases of U.S. Forces in Japan and Japan Self Defense Forces
Jun	Revolutionary Army Appeal	Never allow the “drastic historical change 70 Years After the End of the War,” which boasts the radical change of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as an “unshaken alliance” and “alliance of hope.”
Aug	Revolutionary Army Appeal	The revolutionary army will make a leap toward a full-fledged struggle for power through the explosion of continuous guerrilla wars ... block construction of the new Nago base in Okinawa by force and through armed conflict ... fight the battle against the forcible implementation of the nuclear policy for nuclear armament and a short-term gain of power companies and nuclear plant manufacturers through operation of nuclear power plants and facilities, starting from the restart of the Sendai nuclear plant on August 11.

Statement of the anti-mainstream faction
of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association

3-2 Radical leftist groups focused on winning over laborers and citizens

Kakumaru-ha focused on winning over citizens who were opposing the related bills for peace and security

Based on its policy to prioritize efforts to build up the organization, “Kakumaru-ha” focused energy on acquiring members from the Japan Public Sector Union, such as the All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union and the Japan Teachers’ Union, as well as the Japan Confederation of Railway Workers’ Union, the Japan Postal Group Union, and the NTT Workers’ Union. At “The Great Rally of Workers’ Anger” (February) held in February to build unity toward the spring labor offensive, the group argued that the “Abe administration embarked on the destruction of the All-Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union and the Japan Teachers’ Union, which are advancing initiatives against war and for peace” and confirmed its commitment to attracting members of these unions. For this purpose, it mobilized activists around the venue of the Central May Day event (April) and venues at which labor unions were holding their regular conferences, such as the Japan Postal Group Union (June) and the All-

Japan Prefectural and Municipal Workers Union conferences (August) and called on people to join the group. In its newspaper Kaiho (January), referring to the fact that the relationship between “Kakumaru-ha” and the Japan Confederation of Railway Workers’ Union had been discussed in the Diet, the group asserted that its “revolutionary workers are developing battles together with a broad range of aggressive and conscientious union members.”

In an effort to attract civic segments protesting against the government’s measures, the group sent activists to non-partisan prefecture rallies against the relocation of U.S. Futenma base to Henoko (May) and non-partisan rallies against the enactment of the bills related to the legislation for peace and security. The activists called on participants to “overthrow the Abe government” and to participate in rallies affiliated with the group. The group is expected to continue its efforts to attract civic segments protesting against the government’s measures.

Chukaku-ha focused on attracting nuclear plant laborers and young people opposing the legislation for peace and security

“Chukaku-ha,” based on the policy for expansion of the organization through labor movements, called for a “rally to a labor union of nuclear plant laborers” in its organ Zenshin (February) and concentrated its efforts on attracting nuclear plant laborers by using a pamphlet titled “Appeal to Nuclear-plant Laborers” (issued in June) that was compiled by the National Railway Mito Motive Power Union, affiliated with the group, based on dialogues with laborers. The group stressed the achievement stating, “Our battle finally gained nuclear-plant laborers and started to open up the horizon for settlement of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident and decommissioning of all nuclear reactors” in its newspaper (July). Later, the organ reported that “nuclear-plant and decontamination workers stood up in determination to form their

own union” to suggest the progress of the effort (August).

Citing the slogan of “Block enactment of the security related bills by all means” from the beginning of the year, the group carried out protests, including a sit-in and demonstration near the Diet with their All-Japan Federation of Students’ Self-Governing Associations at the front. In this context, criticizing a student group “SEALDs,” (the Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy) carrying out propaganda activities near the Diet, the group stated in its organ newspaper, “The leadership of the SEALDs controls actions in front of the Diet in full cooperation with the police and is calling for the removal of radical leftist groups” (August) and “Never allow attacks by SEALDs guards” (September). It called on students and

other young participants in SEALDs and similar movements to join the group by “promoting a broad propaganda and instigation strategy targeting young participants in the Diet Battle.” Stating that the “workers in bases and SDF

personnel (workers in uniform) hold the keys to the battle” in its newspaper, the faction called on them to stand up against the bills related to the legislation for peace and security (August).

The mainstream and anti-mainstream factions of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association approached citizens opposing the relocation of the Futenma Base

The mainstream and anti-mainstream factions of the “Kaiho-ha” group of the Revolutionary Workers’ Association strove to win over workers through outdoor hot meal services and other support activities by their respective day labor unions for day laborers. The mainstream faction sent such workers to the “Narita struggle” to stage protest demonstrations and rallies in Narita.

The anti-mainstream faction carried out a demonstration by day laborers with the goal of “blocking the restart” of the Sendai Nuclear plant (Kagoshima Prefecture) in Satumasendai,

Kagoshima Prefecture. In Ohma Town (Aomori Prefecture) the faction carried out a demonstration by day laborers for the first time displaying the name of “Kaiho-ha” on banners to call for the “blocking of construction” of Ohma nuclear power plant (July). Since February, the faction started to send activists to the monthly protests against major construction companies (Tokyo) that were started by a civil group opposing the relocation of U.S. Futenma base to Henoko in December 2014, targeting major construction companies (Tokyo) with the aim of approaching the participating citizens.

3-3 Developments relating to the Japanese Red Army and the “Yodo-go” group

Despite the announcement of the dissolution of the succeeding group, the Japanese Red Army maintained its dangerous traits

After the announcement of the dissolution of the succeeding group (May 2014), the leader of the Japanese Red Army, Fusako Shigenobu (currently serving a prison sentence), on the occasion of a rally to commemorate the Lod Airport massacre (May 30, 1972) (May), issued a statement praising the members who committed the crime as the “Lydda fighters.” Tsutomu Shirosaki (currently in custody), a member of the Japanese Red Army who was involved in the Jakarta incident (May 14, 1986), was

deported from the United States and arrested in Japan in February. When “Society to rescue Tsutomu Shirosaki” started activities led by his supporters toward his trial, Shigenobu expressed her gratitude and sympathy for the support in the newspaper of the group supporting her (February). The dangerous traits of the Japanese Red Army still remain because its seven internationally wanted members are still at large as well as continuing to praise and support the perpetrators of past terrorist attacks.

Stalled activities of domestic supporters of the “Yodo-go” group, which remains in North Korea

Three members of the “Yodo-go” group remaining in North Korea and being charged with abducting Japanese nationals, with cooperation of their supporters in Japan, had brought a state compensation suit toward the retraction of the warrants for their arrest on the charge of abducting Japanese nationals, but the Supreme Court rejected their demand for revision (February). In addition, supporters have

not visited North Korea since September 2014, partially because questioning of the members charged with abducting Japanese nationals was included in the special investigation committee’s “investigation into Japanese nationals.” As a result, the gathering of their support group was held far later than usual and other activities also slowed down.

Column

International solidarity by radical leftist groups

Based on the Trotsky’s theory of Marxism, radical leftist groups in Japan argue that communism revolution is not possible in a single country but must be achieved in multiple countries. Based on this argument, radical leftist groups pursue exchange and cooperation with overseas groups. Among these groups are the organizations designated as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the U.S. Department of State and their related organizations, as well as anti-globalization groups and

unions known for their radical activities.

As the Ise-Shima Summit is scheduled to be held in Japan in May 2016, we cannot deny the possibility of terrorist attacks by people involved in these international terrorist groups targeting the summit with support of the radical leftist groups in Japan, which requires attention.

Organization	Overseas organization
Japanese Red Army	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) * Designated as an FTO
Japan Communist League United Committee	May First Movement (KMU) * A union under the influence of the Communist Party of the Philippines/ New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) *Designated as an FTO International League of Peoples’ Struggle (ILPS) * An “anti-imperialism” international organization whose representatives are leaders of CPP/NPA
JRCL	The Rebolusyonaryong Partido ng Manggagawa-Mindanao (RPM-M) * A sect of CPP/NPA above ATTAC * International anti-globalization group based in France
Chukaku-ha	Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) * A Korean trade union national center known for its radical labor movement

4 The Japanese Communist Party (JCP)



4 The JCP showed its presence by stressing the confrontational stance toward the Abe administration

The party praised its achievement of gaining support among people who are “increasingly anxious and angry about the administration” in the unified local election

Stressing “the advent of the full-scale confrontation age between the Liberal Democratic Party and Japanese Communist Party” at the 3rd Central Committee General Meeting (January) based on the increase in their representation in the general election (from 8 to 21 seats) (December 2014), the JCP set the goal for the next national election at “8.5 million votes and over 15% of votes” for proportional representation. The meeting positioned the unified local elections in April as “the first step to achieve the new goal (for national election),” set goals including seats in the seven prefectural assemblies (Tochigi, Kanagawa, Shizuoka, Aichi, Mie, Shiga and Fukuoka) where the party did not have representation at the time. During the

election campaign, the party called on voters to support the party by stating “hand down a sharp verdict on ‘the path to a country that will engage in warfare abroad’ of the Abe administration.” As a result, the party increased its representation by 130 seats from the previous election, including those in the seven prefectural assemblies.

The JCP praised the result, “The party secured representation in all 47 prefectures including uncontested seats for the first time in the party history,” and, “We have expanded sympathy and support among people who are increasingly anxious and angry about the Abe administration recklessness” (at a press conference by Chairman Kazuo Shii in April).

Seats gained by the JCP in the 18th unified local elections

Assembly	Current seats	Previous seats	Increase / Decrease
Prefectural assemblies	111	80	31
Government ordinance city assemblies	136	99	37
Special ward assemblies	128	121	7
Other city assemblies	672	627	45
Town council	292	282	10
Total	1,339	1,209	130

At the Diet, the JCP showed its presence by making an independent inquiry based on an “internal government document” it discovered and proposing a coalition among opposition parties

Branding the bills related to the legislation for peace and security as “war bills” and citing “Fight the battle with all-out effort of the party” (general assembly of the JCP Diet members in January), in the Diet deliberations (the Upper House Special Committee on legislation for peace and security held in August and September), the JCP presented an alleged internal document of the Ministry of Defense, and argued, “Troop

formation is already planned assuming the passing of the bills. This is absolutely unacceptable. The bills should be withdrawn.”

On the day of the passing and enactment of the bills (September) the party held the 4th Central Committee General Meeting and made a proposal calling for the establishment of the “National Coalition Government to Repeal the War Law (security legislation)

External Situation 1
External Situation 2
External Situation 3
External Situation 4
External Situation 5
External Situation 6
Domestic Situation 1
Domestic Situation 2
Domestic Situation 3
Domestic Situation 4
Domestic Situation 5

with a focus on the coalition of non-partisan groups and individuals and electoral cooperation among opposition parties in the next national election.”

Later, the JCP held party-head meetings with the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the Social

Democratic Party (SDP) and other opposition parties one after another (September) aiming at forming a coalition with them and promoted cooperation toward realization of the proposal, thereby demonstrating the party’s stance to play a leading role among opposition parties.

With a view to the Upper House election, the JCP demonstrated a cooperative stance while trying to expand support for the party among non-partisans and young adults

The JCP proposed “mass movements to block the war bills and expand the party strength” (for the period from June to the end of September) at its Executive Committee in June and promoted activities to expand its support and party strength while trying to boost the protests against the bills related to the legislation for peace and security. As regards the protests against the bills, the party focused attention on movements of non-partisans and young adults. Announcing that “the party will link arms with them and provide support in various forms” (at a press conference by Chairman Shii in July), the Chairman and other Diet members participated in rallies mainly organized by a student group, “SEALDs,” the Students Emergency Action for Liberal Democracy and demonstrated a stance to cooperate with non-partisans and young adults by calling on participants to “join forces to overthrow the Abe administration.” In addition, the party held “gatherings” to show a digest

version DVDs of its discussion at the Diet. Its local party members encouraged these young adults and students to join the party or take “Shimbun Akahata.”

In this context, the Executive Committee held in October encouraged dialogues and propaganda targeting a broad range of groups and individuals beyond the existing party supporters toward realization of the “National Coalition Government” and leaping forward in the Upper House Election. Party members carried out propaganda using leaflets calling for realization of “the National Coalition Government” in various locations.

The JCP is expected to continue to promote its activities to expand support and party strength among non-partisans and young adults by calling for realization of “the National Coalition Government” toward the Upper House Election in 2016.

Column

“National Coalition Government” is similar to the party’s concept 55 years ago

Chairman Shii explained the position of “the National Coalition Government” in its party platform as “a government of a united front ‘within the range that we can agree with for the time being” at a press conference (September). About the treatment of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty when “the National Coalition Government” is realized, the chairman said, “The government will not work to denounce the treaty,” while stating, “The party will consistently pursue the major principle to denounce the treaty” (at a press conference in October). The latter statement shows that the party has not changed the line of the party platform.

In July 1960, just after the campaign against the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960, the JCP proposed a concept of a government against the Japan-US Security Treaty, albeit a different name. The party praised its own proposal as “an

epoch-making proposal that clarified the direction of a united-front government based on the immediate central goal under the situation at the time where different democratic forces could agree with the goal against the security alliance” (“80 Years of the Japanese Communist Party” and other sources). We can say that the recent proposal is a rehash of the concept from 55 years ago.

What the party looks at beyond the recent concept is, after establishing “a power aiming for socialism” through “a democratic revolution” by “a democratic union government,” an eventual realization of “a socialist and communist society.” The party remains “a revolutionary party” that sticks to the course of its platform (resolution of the Executive Committee in June).

5 Right-wing Groups, etc.



5 Right-wing groups and others raised issues with neighboring countries

Right-wing groups carried out various activities raising territorial, diplomatic and historical recognition issues

To protest against repeated incursions into territorial waters by Chinese surveillance ships around the Senkaku Islands since the Japanese government acquired ownership of the Senkaku Islands (September 2012) and also against the ceremonies held by China to commemorate the 70th Anniversary of Victory of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (Beijing, September), right-wing groups carried out propaganda activities near Chinese diplomatic offices across Japan, during which they called out, "China should get out of the Senkaku Islands," and submitted petitions demanding that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other organizations adopt a resolutely diplomatic posture. On their annual "September 29th Anti-Chinese Communist Day" (marking the date on which the Joint Communiqué was signed by Japan and China), they engaged in propaganda activities, rallies and demonstration marches criticizing China across Japan.

Against South Korea, right-wing groups raised the issues of historical recognition and Takeshima, and carried out propaganda activities around South Korean diplomatic offices in Japan calling out, "Stop fabrication of the 'military comfort women' issue," "South Korea should return Takeshima, which it stole from Japan," for example. At the time of South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs' visit to Japan and events commemorating the 50th anniversary

of restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea (both in June), right-wing groups again carried out propaganda activities calling for a "break-off of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea."

Against North Korea, raising the issue that Chongryon was still using the Korea Central Hall (Chongryon's central headquarters) after its resale by the successful bidder (January), right-wing groups continued propaganda activities condemning the bidder and its affiliates. They also carried out propaganda activities protesting the events commemorating the 60th anniversary of Chongryon formation (May) in various locations.

Right-wing groups marked "2.7 Northern Territories Day" (the day entering into the Treaty of Amity between Japan and Russia) and "8.9 Anti-Russia Day" (the day when the Soviet Union denounced the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and invaded Manchuria and other places) by engaging in propaganda activities calling out, "Recapture the Northern Territories," and, "We condemn the weak-kneed diplomacy," for example.

Right-wing groups have weakened their protest against the government of Japan since the inauguration of the 2nd Abe Cabinet, while they are expected to continue to aim their criticism at China, South Korea, North Korea, Russia and other neighboring countries.

External Situation 1
External Situation 2
External Situation 3
External Situation 4
External Situation 5
External Situation 6
Domestic Situation 1
Domestic Situation 2
Domestic Situation 3
Domestic Situation 4
Domestic Situation 5

Right-wing-affiliated groups engaged in movements focused on “anti-South Korean” activities

Raising territorial and history recognition issues, right-wing-affiliated groups emphasized activities to criticize South Korea.

Especially when President of South Korea Park Geun-hye and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon attended the events commemorating the 50th anniversary of restoration of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea (June) and the ceremonies to commemorate the 70th Anniversary of Victory of Chinese People’s

Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (Beijing, September), they carried out demonstration marches and propaganda activities calling for a “break-off of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea.”

When right-wing-affiliated groups were engaging in the demonstration marches and propaganda activities, forces denouncing them as “racist” protested against them along the routes and at intersections.

Column

International activities of right-wing groups

While many right-wing groups engaged in activities in Japan, raising territorial, diplomatic and history recognition issues, some groups conducted operations abroad.

After the murder of Japanese citizens by terrorists in Syria (January and February), a group with personal connections in the Middle East visited Jordan and asked a local Jordanian attorney for negotiation with the

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) toward return of the victims’ articles and ashes (January and March). The group also visited Crimea of Ukraine together with a former prime minister of Japan and expressed its support for the annexation of Crimea by Russia (March), participated as observers in local elections held in Crimea and insisted on the legitimacy of the election to local media (September).

Appendix

(January–November: Major security developments in Japan and overseas)

■ Issues that occurred overseas ■ Issues that occurred in Japan

Jan. 1st (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> North Korean First Secretary Kim Jong Un releases his New Year's speech, expressing willingness to strengthen the initiatives for the 70th anniversary of liberation from Japan (August 15) and of the foundation of the Korean Workers' Party (October 10) as well as to promote dialogue with South Korea, while stressing the commitment to its "dual policy of economic construction and nuclear weapons development." The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its year-end and new year intensive seminars (December 27, 2014–January 4, 2015; Saitama and other locations). The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its year-end and new year intensive seminars (December 27–28, December 30, 2013–January 3 and 18, 2015; Tokyo and other locations).
2nd (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Right-wing groups carry out a "visit of the general public to the Palace for the new year greeting" activity (Tokyo).
7th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two armed French men storm the offices of the weekly "Charlie Hebdo" in Paris, the capital of France (until 9th), killing 12 people.
8th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The first ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum takes place (lasting until 9th in Beijing), co-chaired by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his Costa Rican counterpart Manuel Gonzalez, adopting the "Plan of Cooperation between China and the Latin American and Caribbean Countries (2015–2019)." An armed French man shoots at a police officer and others in a suburb of the French capital of Paris, killing the officer. He barricades himself in a food store, killing four people at the store (9th).
9th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In a proposal to the U.S., North Korea offers to temporarily halt nuclear tests in exchange for the suspension of U.S.–South Korea joint military exercises.
20th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Video footage of two Japanese men held allegedly by the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) is released on the Internet. Footage indicating the killing of one of the two is released on the Internet on January 24 and that of the other on February 1. The Japanese Communist Party holds the 3rd Central Committee General Meeting and adopts an action policy for the 18th unified local elections (Tokyo).
23th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Public Security Examination Commission decides to extend the period of the surveillance of Aum Shinrikyo based on the Organization Control Act (fifth time).
26th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ISIL announces the establishment of "Khorasan Province" in an area including Afghanistan and northeastern Iran, claiming the expansion of areas under ISIL control.
28th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Marunaka Holdings, Co. (Takamatsu, Kagawa), the owner of the Korea Central Hall (Chongryon's central headquarters), resells the hall to a warehousing firm named Green Forest (for ¥4.4 billion).
Feb. 1st (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Kakumaru-ha holds "The Great Rally of Workers' Anger" (Tokyo).
5th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Right-wing groups carry out protest activities against "Japan Teachers' Union's 64th National Conference on Educational Research" (until the 8th, Yamanashi).
7th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Right-wing groups mark Northern Territories Day by engaging in propaganda activities calling for the "recapture of the Northern Territories" (various locations nationwide).
10th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> North Korea holds a meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, deciding the initiatives to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the party's foundation (October 10) and the 70th anniversary of North Korea's liberation (August 15) (Pyongyang).
11th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Right-wing groups mark National Foundation Day by engaging in celebration activities (various locations nationwide).
12th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France meet at Minsk of Belarus and sign a document realizing peace between the Russian and Ukraine governments, pro-Russia militants and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
13th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An armed group attacks a Shiite Muslim mosque in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Province, northwestern Pakistan, killing more than 20 Shiite Muslims. The "Tehrike-Taliban Pakistan" (TTP) claims responsibility for the attack.
22th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Right-wing groups and right-wing-affiliated groups mark Takeshima Day (prefectural ordinance of Shimane Prefecture) by engaging in propaganda activities calling for "recapture of Takeshima" (Tokyo, Shimane, and other locations).
26th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Tokyo District Court hands down a ruling to order an anti-nuclear power group supported by radical leftist groups illegally occupying the corner of the grounds of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry building to evacuate the land.

Mar. 3rd (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The UN Security Council publishes a final report by the Panel of Experts assisting the Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee, pointing out that North Korean shipping firm "Ocean Maritime Management Company, Limited" (OMM) had transactions with a Hong Kong company represented by a Japanese man.
4th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Tokyo High Court rejects the appeal of a former senior follower of Aum Shinrikyo, Makoto Hirata, who was given a nine-year prison sentence for his involvement in the case of unlawful capture and confinement causing the death of a chief manager of a notary public office (appeals to the Supreme Court on the 17th).
5th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Third Session of the 12th National People's Congress of China is held (in Beijing until the 15th). Premier Li Keqiang delivers the Report on the Work of the Government, saying that the gross domestic product growth target is lowered from "around 7.5%" in 2014 to "around 7%" in 2015.
7th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The terrorist group "Boko Haram" declares loyalty to ISIL. ISIL announces acceptance of the loyalty (12th).
8th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The JCP and radical leftist groups mobilize party members and activists for anti-nuclear power rallies and demonstrations to mark the 4th anniversary of the nuclear power plant accident (until the 14th; various locations nationwide).
11th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Iranian Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics publishes video footage depicting what it claims to be a carbon fiber production plant.
18th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An armed group attacks a museum in Tunis, the capital of Tunisia, killing 22 people, including three Japanese nationals, and injuring 44 people, including three Japanese.
20th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Suicide bombing attacks hit two mosques in Sanaa, the capital of Yemen, killing more than 140 people. ISIL's "Sanaa Province" claims responsibility for the attacks.
22nd (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Anti-nuclear power groups affiliated with the JCP conduct rallies and demonstrations criticizing the Abe administration (Tokyo).
31st (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The government of Japan makes a cabinet decision for a two-year extension of the measures against North Korea, including the embargo of North Korean vessels and of export/import of all items.
Apr. 2nd (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An armed group attacks Garissa University College in eastern Kenya, killing 148 people, including students. "Al-Shabaab" claims responsibility for the attack.
22nd (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chinese President Xi Jinping holds talks with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe when visiting Indonesia to attend a summit commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Asian-African Conference.
25th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its Golden Week seminars (until the 29th, and May 2–6; Saitama and other locations). The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its Golden Week seminars (until the 26th, and May 1–6; Tokyo and other locations).
28th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The anti-mainstream faction of the "Kaiho-ha" group of the Revolutionary Workers' Association causes a guerrilla incident shooting a projectile at U.S. Army Camp Zama (Kanagawa).
29th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Right-wing groups mark Showa Day by visiting the Musashino Imperial Mausoleum and shrines for the war dead (various locations nationwide).
30th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Tokyo District Court sentences former Aum Shinrikyo senior member Katsuya Takahashi to life imprisonment for his involvement in five crimes including the sarin attack on the subway system (Takahashi appeals on May 1).
May 3rd (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Two armed American men attack an exhibit featuring cartoon images of Islamic prophet Muhammad in Texas, a southern U.S. State, injuring one person. ISIL claims responsibility for the attack (5th). Right-wing groups mark Constitution Day by engaging in propaganda activities calling for autonomous establishment of a constitution (various locations nationwide).
8th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Kim Yong Nam, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly in North Korea, visits Russia to attend a ceremony commemorating the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany (until the 11th). North Korea test launches a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from under water. Chinese President Xi Jinping visits Russia and talks with President Vladimir Putin. They agree to link the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union with the China-led Silk Road Economic Belt initiative. Xi attends a ceremony to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany (9th). The U.S. Department of Defense releases an annual report to Congress on China's military and security trends, pointing out that China is activating land reclamation in the South China Sea, and is using intelligence services and Chinese nationals in the U.S. to obtain sensitive items that can be repurposed for military use.

9th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A ceremony commemorating the 70th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany is held at Red Square, Moscow, Russia. President Putin in his speech stresses the role that the Soviet Union played in the victory and thanks former Soviet Union countries, China, India and other countries represented in the ceremony for their roles in World War II.
11th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Russia and China conducts their “Maritime Cooperation 2015” joint naval exercise (first stage) (until the 21st), which is the first held at the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s Novorossiysk base and in the eastern Mediterranean. Nine surface vessels participate in the exercise (the second stage is carried out on August 20-28 at the Russian base of Vladivostok and the Sea of Japan). The Supreme Court rejected the third special appeal related to the petition for the retrial of Chizuo Matsumoto, alias Shoko Asahara (currently requesting a retrial for the 4th time).
12th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Joint investigation headquarters including Kyoto prefectural police arrest Ho Jong Do, the second son of Chongryon Chairman Ho Jong Man, for violating the Foreign Exchange Act. Chongryon condemns the arrest at a press conference that it held at the Korea Central Hall (Tokyo, on the 13th) and makes protests through activists sent to the Kyoto prefectural police as well as criticizing the arrest (the 18th).
17th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The JCP and radical leftist groups send party members and activists to the “70 years after the war, Okinawa protests the new US military base” rally (Okinawa).
22nd (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A suicide bombing terror attack hits a Shiite mosque in Qatif, eastern Saudi Arabia, leaving more than 20 people dead and over 100 injured. ISIL’s “Najd Province” claims responsibility for the attack.
25th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chongryon holds “central conference of Koreans in Japan” (Tokyo) and other events commemorating the 60th anniversary of its formation and sends a delegation to North Korea (from the 21st to 30th). First Secretary Kim Jong Un sends “a letter” (dated the 25th) to Chongryon, commemorating the 60th anniversary.
26th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hyogo prefecture police arrest three employees of Polychemicals Ltd. (Ashiya, Hyogo) for illegal export of Japanese carbon fiber via South Korea to China.
Jun. 1st (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The large cruise ship “Dong Fang Zhi Xing” traveling on China’s Yangtze river from Nanjing in Jiangsu Province to Chongqing capsizes (with 456 passengers and crewmembers). According to the People’s Daily (dated June 13), an official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, 12 survive the accident and 442 are killed. It is found that targeted attack e-mails were sent to the Japan Pension Service, which led to the leak of personal information of 1.25 million people held by the service during the period from May 21 to 23. The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo files a suit to seek nullification of the decision of the fifth extension of the surveillance period based on the Organization Control Act.
4th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> It is found that the U.S. Office of Personnel Management was hit by a cyber-attack, with personal data of about 4.2 million government officials leaked. Later, it is found that personal data of about 21.5 million people leaked.
7th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An annual Group of Seven summit in Schloss Elmau, Germany, is held (until the 8th). Anti-globalization forces held a protest on the previous day, with some protestors clashing with police (in a suburb of Elmau).
21st (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In response to the South Korean Foreign Affairs minister’s visit to Japan, right-wing groups and right-wing-affiliated groups carry out propaganda activities calling for a “break-off of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea” (until the 22nd, Tokyo and other locations).
26th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A gunman attacks a resort hotel in Sousse, northern Tunisia, killing 38 foreign tourists. An armed French man attacks a U.S. firm’s gas factory in a suburb of Lyon, southeastern France, killing one person.
29th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) inaugural ceremony and a special finance ministers’ meeting are held (Beijing). The representatives of the 57 AIIB founding members attend the ceremony, with 50 countries signing the AIIB inauguration agreement. In the Egyptian capital of Cairo, a bomb targeting the convoy of the prosecutor general of the country explodes, killing the prosecutor general.
Jul. 1st (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The 15th session of the 12th Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China passes the “National Security Law” for immediate enforcement. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff published “the National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015”. The strategy clarifies a military operation guideline of enhancing cooperation with Japan, Australia and other countries in order to counter Russia, Iran, North Korea and China, which are challenging international norms and threatening U.S. security.

2nd (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Through the embassy in Beijing, North Korea informs Japan that it has sincerely carried out a comprehensive survey covering all Japanese nationals but will take more time.
14th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Iran and six other nations, including European countries and the U.S., endorse the “Comprehensive Joint Action Plan” including restrictions on uranium enrichment operations.
16th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In North Sinai Governorate, northeastern Egypt, an armed group launches a rocket and hits an Egyptian Navy vessel sailing in the Mediterranean. ISIL’s “Sinai Province” claims responsibility for the attack.
20th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A suicide bombing attack hits an event held at a culture center in Sanliurfa Province in southeastern Turkey, killing 34 people and injuring over 100. The government of Turkey concludes that ISIL is responsible for the attack.
22nd (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo filed a suit with the Tokyo District Court to seek nullification of the decision allowing the fifth extension of the surveillance period based on the Organization Control Act.
23rd (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In a governmental meeting on a new Northern Territories development plan, Russian Prime Minister Medvedev says that anyone who has never been there (Northern Territories) should go and that, at any rate, he plans to go there and inspect the situation.
24th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The JCP and radical leftist groups oppose the bills related to the legislation for peace and security and send party members and activists to rallies and demonstrations that are held to criticize the Abe Administration near the Prime Minister’s Office and the Diet building (Tokyo).
27th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The U.S. Department of State publishes the 2015 Trafficking in Persons Report. The report places North Korea at the lowest of the four tiers, alleging that North Korea has put an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 people into domestic labor camps under a form of political oppression and has subjected 5,000 people to forced labor abroad.
29th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Afghan government announces that “Taliban” leader Mullah Omar died in Pakistan in April 2013. The “Taliban” admits his death and announces that its No. 2 leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammed Mansour has been selected as successor to Omar (30th).
30th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Politburo of the Communist Party of China holds a meeting and decides to expel Guo Boxiong, a former vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission, from the party and send him to a military prosecution agency for suspected grave bribery.
Aug. 4th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Landmines explode in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) on the South Korean side and injure two South Korean soldiers. South Korea concludes the explosion as military provocation by North Korea and restarts its propaganda broadcasts using loud speakers against the North (10th).
7th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Three bombing attacks, including two suicide bombing attacks targeting foreign forces in Afghanistan and a police facility, occur in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, killing at least 50 people, including a U.S. soldier, and wounding over 300 people. The “Taliban” claims responsibility for the two suicide bombing attacks. The JCP and radical leftist groups send party members and activists to rallies and demonstrations against the restart of the No. 1 reactor of the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant (until the 11th, Kagoshima).
8th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its summer seminars (until August 9, 11-16 and 22-23; Tokyo and other locations).
9th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Right-wing groups dub the day “Anti-Russia Day” and conduct propaganda activities calling for “recapture of the Northern Territories” (various locations nationwide).
11th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> JCP Chairman Shii issues a statement criticizing the restart of the No. 1 reactor of the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant (the 11th).
12th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In China’s Tianjin, a large-scale night explosion occurs at a chemical warehouse. According to China’s state-run news agency Xinhua (11th), the explosion kills 165 people, leaving eight others missing.
14th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson says “Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui has conveyed China’s strict stance to Japanese Ambassador to China Masato Kitera” on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. JCP Chairman Shii holds press conference on Prime Minister Abe’s statement at the party headquarters (Tokyo).
15th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Right-wing groups visit Yasukuni Shrine and their local Gokoku Shrines, and attend memorial services for the war dead commemorating the anniversary of the end of the war (various locations nationwide).

16th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A suicide bombing attack hits Attock, Punjab, eastern Pakistan, targeting Punjab's interior minister, killing more than 14 people including the interior minister. The "Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan Jamaat-ul-Ahrar" (TTP-JA) claims responsibility for the attack. Right-wing groups conduct protest activities against "Zenkyo National Conference on Educational Research 2015" (until the 17th, Miyagi).
20th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The North Korean People's Army opens fire against South Korea near the Military Demarcation Line. South Korean forces open return fire against the North. North Korea demands that South Korea remove loud speakers used for anti-North propaganda broadcasts within 48 hours. North Korea convenes an emergency enlarged meeting of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Military Commission and gives an order that the frontline area enter a "quasi state of war" at 5 p.m. (5:30 p.m. Japanese standard time) on the 21st.
22nd (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> North Korea and South Korea implement a high-level meeting (until the 24th in Panmunjom), agreeing on six measures - (1) opening government-level talks at an early date, (2) the North's apology for the injury of South Korean soldiers in the land mine explosion, (3) the South's suspension of loud speaker broadcasts, (4) the North's lifting of the quasi state of war order, (5) implementing contacts between North and South Korean Red Cross officials in early September to promote a reunion of family members separated between the two Koreas from the mid-autumn harvest festival day (September 27) and (6) vitalizing a private-level exchange. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev visits Etorofu Island as part of the Northern Territories along with multiple cabinet ministers, inspecting airport, seaport, and other infrastructure development and drills of military forces stationed there and interacting with participants in the Iturup (Etorofu) National Youth Education Forum.
28th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Turkish forces launch airstrikes on ISIL-controlled regions in Syria as a member of the U.S.-led alliance against the ISIL.
30th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The JCP and radical leftist groups send party members and activists to protests against the bills related to the legislation for peace and security near the Diet building (Tokyo).
Sep. 2nd (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Choe RyongHae, a member of the Workers' Party of Korea Politburo Presidium and Secretariat, visits China to attend a ceremony to mark the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (until the 3rd). Russian President Vladimir Putin visits China (until the 3rd), attending a ceremony for the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression. At a later meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Putin emphasizes that Russia and China should keep the history of World War II in their memory (3rd).
3rd (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> China holds a ceremony for the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression (Tiananmen Square, Beijing). Government representatives from about 50 countries attend the ceremony along with international organization leaders, including United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. President Xi Jinping delivers a key address, declaring a 300,000-troop cut.
14th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The JCP and radical leftist groups send party members and activists to protests against the bills related to the legislation for peace and security (adopted and enacted on the 19th) near the Diet building (until the 19th, Tokyo).
19th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo holds its autumn seminars (until the 23rd, and 25th-28th; Saitama and other locations). The Japanese Communist Party holds the 4th Central Committee General Meeting and adopts the proposal to call for the formation of a "National Coalition Government to Repeal the War Law (security legislation) (Tokyo).
20th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida visits Russia (until the 22nd), meeting with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov (21st) and holding a meeting of the Japan-Russia Intergovernmental Committee on Trade and Economic Issues (22nd), where the Russian side was represented by First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov.
22nd (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chinese President Xi Jinping visits the U.S. (until the 28th). In Seattle on the first leg of his U.S. tour, the Chinese leader signs a contract for buying 300 Boeing aircraft. In Washington D.C., he holds a bilateral summit with U.S. President Barack Obama, exchanging views on cyber-attacks, climate change, China's activities in the South China Sea and other topics. An armed group assaulted a resort facility on Samar Island off Davao City on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao, kidnapping four tourists, including three foreigners, and injuring a Japanese citizen.

28th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chinese President Xi Jinping delivers his first ever address to the United National General Assembly, proposing to establish "a new type of international relations" and build "a community of shared mankind destiny." He announces (1) the establishment of the "China-United Nations Peace and Development Fund" with a total of 1 billion dollars over the period of 10 years, (2) the establishment of a peacekeeping police squad and an 8,000-strong peacekeeping standby force, (3) \$100 million in grant military aid to the African Union (AU), etc. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on a U.S. trip to attend the United Nations General Assembly meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin. They discuss future Japan-Russia relations including negotiations on a peace treaty and agree to try to make progress in talks on the territorial issue. Russian President Vladimir Putin in his first address to the United Nations General Assembly in 10 years proposes to create a wide international alliance against terrorist organizations and emphasizes the need for cooperation with the Syrian Assad administration fighting against ISIL and other terrorist organizations.
29th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Right-wing groups dub the day "September 29th Anti-Chinese Communist Day" and engage in propaganda activities calling out "defend the Senkaku Islands to the death" (various locations nationwide).
30th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Russian forces launch airstrikes on areas controlled by anti-government rebels in Syria.
Oct. 2nd (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A 15-year-old boy shoots a police officer to death in a suburb of Sydney, the capital of New South Wales State, southeastern Australia. The boy is shot to death by police. JCP-related anti-nuclear power groups carry out rallies and demonstrations criticizing the Abe administration (Tokyo).
3rd (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An armed group shoots a Japanese national to death in Rangpur Province, northern Bangladesh. An organization calling itself "ISIL Bangladesh" claims responsibility for the attack.
9th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) decides to add historical documents on the Nanjing Massacre to its Memory of the World Register in response to an application by China.
10th (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> North Korea holds a military parade (Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang) to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Workers' Party of Korea. In his address to the military parade, First Secretary Kim Jong Un emphasized the attitude of giving priority to people and asserted that his country could "wage any type of war favored by the U.S. imperialists." The official websites of Narita and Chubu airports are subject to cyber attacks (in the early hours of the 10th) and are temporarily down. A twitter account supposed to be related to the international hacker group Anonymous suggested the attack.
11th (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The JCP and radical leftist groups send party members and activists to rallies and demonstrations against the restart (the 15th) of the No.2 reactor of the Sendai Nuclear Power Plant (until the 15th, Kagoshima).
23rd (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> JCP Chairman Shii talks with senior members of the South Korea-Japan Parliamentarians' Association (Seoul).
26th (Mon)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th Communist Party of China Central Committee opens (lasting until the 29th). On the last day, it approves a basic guideline for the 13th five-year plan. The Tokyo High Court hands down a ruling to order an anti-nuclear power group supported by radical leftist groups illegally occupying the corner of the grounds of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry building to evacuate the land.
27th (Tue)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> On the U.S. Aegis destroyer "Lassen" passage through waters within 12 nautical miles (about 22 kilometers) from a China-reclaimed island, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson criticizes the U.S. military ship action as posing threats to China's sovereignty and safety and damaging regional peace and stability.
28th (Wed)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Right-wing groups dub the day "Recapture Takeshima Day" and engage in propaganda activities calling for the recapture of Takeshima (various locations nationwide).
30th (Fri)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> North Korea announces the Workers' Party of Korea Politburo Presidium's decision to convene the seventh Congress of the party in early May 2016.
31st (Sat)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A Russian aircraft crashes on the Sinai Peninsula in northeastern Egypt, killing 224 passengers and crewmembers. ISIL's "Sinai Province" claims responsibility for causing the crash.
Nov. 1st (Sun)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Chukaku-ha holds the annual National Workers' Rally (Tokyo).
5th (Thu)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The official site of the Tokyo Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games is subject to cyber attacks starting from the night of the 4th to the 5th and is temporarily blocked.

7th (Sat)	• Chinese President Xi Jinping holds a direct meeting with Taiwanese President Ma Yingjeou in Singapore, representing the first leaders meeting between China and Taiwan since the 1949 division.
8th (Sun)	• North Korea announces a list of (171) members of a national funeral committee chaired by First Secretary Kim Jong Un for the death of Korean People's Army Marshal Ri Ul Sol. The list does not include Choe Ryong Hae, a member of the Workers' Party of Korea Secretariat and Politburo Presidium.
14th (Sat)	• In Paris, the capital of France, multiple armed people including French citizens attack a theater, restaurants and other facilities, killing 130 people and injuring about 350 others. An organization naming itself "ISIL France" claims responsibility for the attacks.
15th (Sat)	• Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe during his visit to Turkey for a Group of 20 summit meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin. They agree to proceed with preparations for President Putin's Japan visit at the most appropriate time and exchange views on a peace treaty.
24th (Tue)	• Turkish forces shoot down a Russian military aircraft around the Turk-Syrian border for the reason of air space violation. In response, Russian President Vladimir Putin denies the air space violation and denounces Turkey for "seriously affecting bilateral relations."
26th (Thu)	• North Korea and South Korea hold a bilateral working-level meeting (Panmunjom), agreeing to hold a vice minister-level meeting.
27th (Fri)	• The Tokyo High Court revokes the decision of the Tokyo District Court and acquits former Aum Shinrikyo live-in member Naoko Kikuchi of her involvement in a mail bomb attack on the Tokyo Metropolitan Government headquarters.

PSIA Website




Review and Prospects can also be read online on the PSIA website

●<http://www.moj.go.jp/psia/>

[Official Twitter account]

●@MOJ_PSIA
(http://twitter.com/MOJ_PSIA)



Annual Report2015
Review and Prospects of Internal and
External Situations
January 2016

