

Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations

January 2023

Upon the publication of the “Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations” (2023 Edition)

The domestic and international circumstances surrounding Japan are becoming increasingly severe.

Outside of Japan, North Korea has repeatedly launched ballistic missiles with unprecedented frequency, passing over Japan, and international terrorism has continued to occur in many parts of the world. In the neighboring countries, in addition to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has suspended the negotiations for a peace treaty with Japan, and China has frequently allowed vessels belonging to the China Coast Guard to enter the territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands, and has dropped ballistic missiles into Japan's EEZ during military exercises against Taiwan, and these developments have an impact on Japan's diplomacy and security.

On the other hand, in Japan, the so-called Aum Shinrikyo still maintains a dangerous nature, and radical leftist groups are engaged in activities to maintain and expand their organizations, requiring caution.

In recent years, it is particularly important to keep a close watch on trends, such as those aimed at acquiring technologies, data, and products owned by Japanese companies and universities, which are of concern from an economic security perspective, and those of cyber threats aimed at information theft and the destruction of critical infrastructure.

The Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) is contributing to various government policies by collecting and analyzing information on these situations that pose serious and grave threats to Japan's diplomacy, national security, and public security, and by providing this to relevant agencies. As a core member of Japan's intelligence community, we will continue to make every effort to ensure the national interest and the safety and security of our citizens.

This document is published in January each year to provide a panoramic and multidimensional view of domestic and international developments related to public security that took place largely during the previous year. This year's Special Feature covers the situation in Ukraine, which the international community is closely watching, as well as economic security and cyber trends, which have emerged as new threats in recent years.

The domestic and international situation surrounding Japan continues to change from moment to moment, becoming more complex and uncertain. We hope that you will use this document to help deepen your understanding of the domestic and international situation.

The understanding of the public is indispensable for the promotion of the work of the PSIA, and we will continue to make further efforts to provide information to the public. I, myself, am committed to further enhancing our "public relations capabilities" by giving lectures and other presentations, but I would like to take this opportunity to sincerely ask for your understanding and support for the work of the PSIA, using this document as a starting point.

Director-General
Public Security Intelligence Agency
WADA Masaki

Contents

Upon the publication of the "Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations" (2023 Edition)	1
---	---

Special Feature 1

The World Shaken by Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

1 The prolonged Ukraine crisis	6
2 The international community's response to relations with Russia	8
3 Moves in Japan in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine	10
COLUMN 1 Radical Islamist organizations' claims capturing Russia's invasion of Ukraine	10
COLUMN 2 Products targeted in Russia's invasion of Ukraine	11

Special Feature 2

Economic Security

1 The US and China continued efforts to secure key technologies, products, etc.	12
2 Trends in the acquisition of domestic and foreign technologies and products	14
3 Public Security Intelligence Agency's efforts in the field of economic security	15

Special Feature 3

Threat Proliferation with the Expansion of Cyberspace

1 Cyberspace gaining importance as a public space	16
COLUMN Disinformation that threatens the foundations of democracy	17
2 Cyberspace is becoming increasingly diverse in terms of activity entities	17
3 In addition to raising cybersecurity awareness, improving media information literacy is also an issue	19

[External Situation]

1 North Korea and the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon)

1 North Korea, amidst continuing economic hardship, used the "Corona Crisis" as a lever to boost the authority of Kim Jong Un	21
COLUMN 1 North Korea's publicly announced "fevered persons"	23
COLUMN 2 North Korea unveiled General Secretary Kim Jong Un's daughter for the first time	23
2 North Korea flaunted its "joint struggle against the US" relationship with Russia and China	24

3	North Korea refused to respond to Japan-US-South Korea calls for dialogue and focused on strengthening its military power	25
	COLUMN Ballistic missile development for tactical nuclear operations	27
4	General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) worked to put Kim Jong Un's "letter" into practice	28
	COLUMN The "gentle on the outside but firm on the inside" line and Kim Jong Un's "letter"	30

2 China

1	General Secretary Xi Jinping is now in his third term, and while he has established "one-man rule" and has a policy of aiming to become a "leading country," there are many challenges ahead	31
	COLUMN Loyalty could be more important than age in appointing the Party's central leadership cadre	35
2	China advocated its own doctrine to guide international security and accelerated efforts to expand its influence	36
	COLUMN The "Belt and Road Initiative" at the crossroads of its 10th anniversary	39
3	China conducted large-scale military exercises against Taiwan, and tensions rose in the Taiwan Strait	40
	COLUMN Measures against disinformation in Taiwan	42
4	China sought to improve relations with Japan amid rising tensions over the Taiwan Strait	42

3 Russia

1	As the conflict with the West deepened due to the invasion of Ukraine, Putin's administration struggled to avoid international isolation and maintain domestic stability	45
	COLUMN 1 Accelerating de-dollarization of Russia	47
	COLUMN 2 Putin's regime to strengthen "patriotism" education	47
2	With Japan-Russia relations at a total standstill due to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia increased its military activities in the Northern Territories and surrounding areas	48
	COLUMN Information dissemination by the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Japan	49

4 International Terrorism

1	Concerns about international terrorism originating in Afghanistan and continuing threat of international terrorism in Africa and other parts of the world	50
	COLUMN International terrorist organizations continued to operate in Afghanistan	50
2	The "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) flaunted the unity of its organization under new supreme leaders	51
	COLUMN A series of attacks on prisons and other facilities called for by the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL)	52
3	"Al-Qaeda" closely watched after US announcement of killing of its supreme leader	52
4	Terrorism continued to occur in many parts of the world, especially frequently in Africa	53
	COLUMN Radical Islamist organizations around the world protested over "blasphemous" statements in India about the Islamic Prophet Muhammad	57

5 Trends surrounding materials and other commodities for weapons of mass destruction

	Activities aimed at acquiring materials and technologies, etc. that can be diverted to military purposes	58
--	---	----

[Internal Situation]

1 Aum Shinrikyo

1	Aum Shinrikyo sought to defend its organization while maintaining its dangerous nature	61
	COLUMN Current status of "Aleph" after withdrawal of request for recurrence prevention disposition	62
2	The mainstream group still believed in "absolute faith in Asahara"	64
	COLUMN The reality of "Aleph's" recruiting activities	65
3	The Joyu group continued to "conceal Asahara," but remained under Asahara's influence	66

2 Radical Leftist Groups

Radical leftist groups conducted various activities in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the state funeral for the late former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe	67
COLUMN Fusako Shigenobu, the top leader of the Japanese Red Army, who was released from prison	69

3 The Japanese Communist Party (JCP)

JCP backpedaled in the Upper House Election, despite emphasizing its confrontational stance with the Kishida administration	70
COLUMN Minsei and JCP seeking to attract young people by taking advantage of the Corona disaster	71

4 Right-wing groups and other organizations

Right-wing groups and other organizations that were active in addressing the problems of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and other issues with neighboring countries	72
--	-----------

Appendix (Major domestic and international public security trends from Jan. to Nov.)	74
Information Dissemination	83

* This "Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations" (2023 Edition) reviews the internal and external public security trends of the year 2022 (as of November) and provides the prospects in the future. The months referenced in the text hereof indicate the months of 2022, unless otherwise specifically noted, and the titles of individuals used in the text hereof are those at the time referenced herein.

*  indicates the reference point.

The World Shaken by Russia's Invasion of Ukraine

1 The prolonged Ukraine crisis

The invasion of Ukraine by Russia, which began on February 24, has greatly shaken the international order not only in Europe but also in Asia. With fears of further escalation of the situation, it is necessary to keep a close eye on the development of the situation.

This Special Feature looks back on the course of the recent aggression against Ukraine and summarizes its impact on Japan and the international community at this point in time.

The events leading up to the invasion of Ukraine

Relations between Russia and Ukraine have deteriorated since Russia's "annexation of Crimea" in March 2014 and the subsequent escalation of armed separatist movements by pro-Russian forces in the eastern Donbass region, and became even tenser in March 2021 when Russia gathered troops near the border with Ukraine and on the Crimean Peninsula. Thereafter, the situation in Ukraine briefly appeared to be easing, as the US and Russia agreed to begin a Strategic Stability Dialogue to discuss disarmament at a US-Russia summit meeting (on June 16, 2021, Geneva, Switzerland). However, in September 2021, tensions began to escalate again as a result of Russia's joint military exercise "Zapad 2021" (on September 10-16, 2021) with Belarus involving 200,000 troops in western Russia, adjacent to Ukraine, and the troops who participated in this exercise were left in place near the Ukrainian border.

On December 17, 2021, the Russian Foreign Ministry published a draft treaty against the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that called for non-Eastward expansion of NATO and other measures, seeking legal guarantees for its own security. To this, NATO made clear in January that it would not respond to Russia's demands, saying that

"all countries have the right to decide on their own path" (NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, on January 7) and "NATO's door is open, remains open" (US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, on January 26).

In response, at a joint press conference following his meeting with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban (on February 1, Moscow), President Vladimir Putin strongly rebuked the NATO side, accusing it of "ignoring the fundamental Russian concerns" and suggesting that the situation in Ukraine could escalate into war. In addition, Russian troops who had gathered in Belarus to participate in the joint military exercise with those of Belarus "Allied Resolve 2022" (on February 10-20) remained in the country even after February 20 as the result of the extension of duration of the exercise, with tensions being on the rise further. In response to this large-scale deployment of Russian forces around the Ukrainian border, US President Joe Biden stated on February 18, "We have reason to believe the Russian forces are planning to and intend to attack Ukraine in the coming week — in the coming days," and shared his concerns with allies through active information disclosure.

Course of the invasion of Ukraine

On February 21, President Putin recognized the pro-Russian controlled regions of eastern Ukraine, "Donetsk People's Republic" and "Luhansk People's

Republic," as independent states, and on February 24, under the pretext of "demilitarization" and "denazification" of Ukraine, he launched a full-scale

military invasion called "special military operation."

Russian forces launched an invasion of Ukraine from four directions of the northern, northeastern, eastern, and southern regions of the country, and within a little more than a month, they approached the capital city of Kyiv while capturing major cities such as Izyum, the key city in the eastern Kharkiv Oblast, and Kherson, the capital of the southern Kherson Oblast.

During this period, Russia and Ukraine held a series of ceasefire talks in Gomel, Belarus (on February 28) and Brest, Belarus (on March 3 and 7), but the talks were unsuccessful because the Russian side, which demanded demilitarization and neutralization of Ukraine and recognition of Russian sovereignty over the Crimean Peninsula, and the Ukrainian side, which demanded immediate withdrawal of Russian troops, could not come to terms.

At the beginning of the invasion, the Russian forces were believed to have aimed at capturing the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv and overthrowing the Zelenskyy government, but they were met with resistance from Ukrainian forces supported by Western countries, and after March 25, they withdrew from the northern and northeastern areas of the country and concentrated their forces in the east and south.

Thereafter, the fourth round of ceasefire talks was held (on March 29, Istanbul, Turkey), and online

talks also continued, but in early April, media reports of a massacre of civilians in the town of Bucha, near Kyiv, hardened the attitude of both Russia and Ukraine, and negotiations ran into a deadlock.

After withdrawing its troops from the northern and northeastern areas of Ukraine, Russia initially strengthened its offensive in the eastern and southern regions, capturing major cities such as Mariupol in May and Severodonetsk in June, but after September, Russia faced a counteroffensive by Ukrainian forces, including the recapture of almost the entire Kharkiv Oblast.

Under such circumstances, on September 21, President Putin signed an Executive Order to partially mobilize the public for military service, which he had apparently avoided in order to maintain domestic stability. At the same time, on September 23-27, "referenda" were held in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya regions in eastern and southern Ukraine to "annex" them to Russia, and on October 4, President Putin unilaterally declared the "annexations" of these four regions.

In addition, in the current invasion, elements of "hybrid warfare" that makes use of "disinformation" spread by the Russian government and media organizations, as well as cyberattacks, which were also seen at the time of the "annexation of Crimea" in 2014, were also confirmed (📖 See p. 16, "Special Feature 3: Threat Proliferation with the Expansion of Cyberspace").

International situation became more chaotic following the invasion

The world security environment has also been shaken up by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In a televised speech on February 24, before the invasion began, President Putin stated that "Russia remains one of the most powerful nuclear states," and on February 27, he ordered his deterrence forces to be placed on high combat alert, threatening the international community, which condemned the invasion, by flashing the "nuclear threat" against the background of his country's nuclear capability.

Also, immediately after the start of the invasion, Russia occupied the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant in northern Ukraine and the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant in the south, exerting pressure on the Ukrainian people, both materially and

psychologically, and on the last day of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (on August 1-26, New York), Russia solely opposed the draft final document, which included the phrase that stresses "the paramount importance of ensuring control by Ukraine's competent authorities," referring to the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant occupied by the Russian military, as "not reflecting the position of each country" (on August 26, Russian Ambassador to the UN Vassily Nebenzia), and went against the international trend toward nuclear disarmament.

Furthermore, the Ukraine crisis has had a negative impact on global energy and food security beyond the realm of the two countries. On April 27, the

Russian state-owned gas company "Gazprom" suspended natural gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria, which had refused to accept Russia's unilateral request for a ruble settlement in natural gas transactions, and since June 14, it has continued to use resources as a weapon to shake up the market by reducing natural gas supplies to Europe, citing sanctions imposed by Western countries against Russia as a reason. Also, since the start of the invasion, concerns about a global food crisis have increased as Russian forces have cut off shipping routes on the Black Sea, a major export route for grain in Ukraine, one of the world's leading grain-producing countries. On July 22, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and the United Nations agreed to establish a "Joint Coordination Centre" in Istanbul, Turkey, to

monitor the safe navigation of ships in the Black Sea, and grain exports resumed on August 1. However, on October 29, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced an indefinite suspension of the agreement, citing the attack on the Russian Navy's Black Sea Fleet stationed on the Crimean Peninsula in southern Ukraine before dawn that day, continuing to agitate for the agreement.


In addition, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of displaced persons fleeing war and crossing the Ukrainian border exceeded 14 million at the end of October, many of them fleeing to Poland, Hungary, and other neighboring countries, adding to the burden on the host countries.

2 The international community's response to relations with Russia

In response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the UN General Assembly on March 2 adopted a resolution calling for Russia's immediate withdrawal from Ukraine with the support of 141 countries, including Japan. However, a total of five countries, including Belarus, Syria, North Korea, and Eritrea, as well as Russia, voted against the resolution, and 35 countries, including China, abstained from voting on the resolution (absent: 12 countries).

While some countries, including Japan, have imposed financial sanctions and embargoes on advanced technology products (See p. 11, "COLUMN 2: Products targeted in Russia's invasion of Ukraine"), the international community's response has not been unanimous, with many countries, including those in Asia and Africa, refraining from participating in the sanctions.

When President Putin launched his invasion, US President Biden declared on February 24 that "Russia alone is responsible for the death and destruction," and that "the US and its Allies and partners will respond in a united and decisive way," and the US thereafter led a series of sanctions against Russia. Furthermore, in the "National Security Strategy" released on October 12, which serves as a guideline for security policy, the US has indicated its confrontational stance, pointing to Russia as "an immediate and persistent threat to international peace



Each country's response to Russia
(Based on various media reports)

and stability."

At the same time, the US has provided strong assistance to Ukraine totaling more than \$16 billion as of the end of September, including the passage of the "Ukraine Democracy Defense Lend-Lease Act of 2022" (on May 9), which allows the rapid provision of military supplies to Ukraine, while not directly sending combat troops to the country.

In Europe, in March, the leaders of three Eastern European countries - Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia - visited the war-torn Ukrainian capital of Kyiv and met with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, followed in April by a series of visits to Kyiv by EU leaders, one after the other, including European Commission President Ursula von der

Result of the Adoption of Resolutions Related to the Condemnation of Russia at the Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly

	In favor	Against	Abstention	Absence
Resolution demanding immediate cessation of use of force (on March 2)	141 countries	5 countries	35 countries	12 countries
Resolution to suspend the rights of membership in the Human Rights Council (on April 7)	93 countries	24 countries	58 countries	18 countries
Resolution condemning "annexation" of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine (on October 12)	143 countries	5 countries	35 countries	10 countries

(Based on various media reports)

Leyen and European Council President Charles Michel, showing the unity of the EU against Russia. In addition, on November 23, the EU European Parliament adopted by a majority a resolution recognizing Russia as a "state sponsor of terrorism," thereby clarifying its confrontational stance toward Russia.

Regarding the situation in Ukraine, China has shown its position that it "respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each country, including Ukraine" (Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on March 10), and emphasized that it will not support aggression by Russia, and on the other hand criticized sanctions against Russia by Western countries as only "adding fuel to the fire and magnifying and complicating the existing problems" (Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng, on May 6), thereby effectively defending Russia while avoiding conflict with Ukraine and the Western countries as much as possible. Regarding the peace process, China has also indicated its

willingness to "work alongside the international community to carry out necessary mediation when necessary" (Foreign Minister Wang on March 7), but has distanced itself from any initiative or concrete action, insisting that the parties concerned must take action, saying that "those who tied the bell to the tiger must take it off (the problem must be solved by those who caused the problem)" (President Xi Jinping, on March 18).

North Korea has consistently defended Russia's aggression against Ukraine, claiming that "the US and the West defied Russia's reasonable and just demand" (North Korean Ambassador to the UN Kim Song, on March 1), and consistently defended Russia. On July 13, it recognized the "independence" of the two "People's Republics" in eastern Ukraine, and on October 4, it expressed support for the "annexation" of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine, including the "People's Republics," to Russia.

3 Moves in Japan in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine

In Japan, the Russian Embassy in Japan and others are making efforts to spread Russia's claims in relation to the invasion of Ukraine. On February 26, the first weekend after the invasion, Ukrainians in Japan gathered in front of JR Shibuya Station to protest the invasion, and on the same day, Russians in Japan also held a rally in front of JR Shinjuku Station to oppose the war, but in response to these anti-war rallies, the Russian Embassy in Japan posted a message on Twitter on February 26, asking people to "not fall for the false propaganda of the Kyiv regime" and other such messages.

On the other hand, due to Russian invasion, Russian residents in Japan and Russian restaurants, etc., have been subjected to unjustified slander and harassment on the Internet and in other media.

Radical leftist groups insisted, "Don't allow Putin's genocide of the people!" (organ paper "Kaiho" of Kakumaru-ha (Revolutionary Marxist Faction of the Revolutionary Communist League), April 18 issue), and held rallies and demonstrations criticizing Russia in various parts of the country. In addition, some radical leftist groups held protests against Russian diplomatic missions in Japan (in February, March, and May), calling for "impeachment of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine" and "denunciation of air strikes against the entire Ukrainian territory."

The Japanese Communist Party also called for "an immediate end to Russia's invasion of Ukraine" and

"the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops," and called for a "Ukraine Assistance Fund" on the grounds that "Japan's assistance should be devoted to non-military humanitarian aid," and delivered the collected donations to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other organizations.

Furthermore, right-wing groups carried out street propaganda activities criticizing Russia at Russian diplomatic missions in various locations in Japan and around the Prime Minister's Office, saying that "Russia must get out of Ukrainian territory" and "sever diplomatic relations with Russia," while some groups defended Russia, saying that "NATO's provocation of eastward expansion has driven Russia to war" and "Russia has its own arguments, not just the values of the West."

In addition, as many refugees entered Japan after March 2, when Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced the acceptance of Ukrainian refugees, radical leftist groups and the Japanese Communist Party seized on the government's response and criticized it, saying that "Japan's refugee status recognition criteria are not internationally accepted" (Chukaku-ha (Middle Core Faction of the Revolutionary Communist League)) and that "refugee status recognition should be fundamentally revised" (Japanese Communist Party).

COLUMN 1

Radical Islamist organizations' claims capturing Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Radical Islamist organizations such as the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) and "Al-Qaeda" sometimes use high-profile international events to promote their own agendas and call for terrorism, as they did with Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

In its Arabic-language weekly "Al-Nabaa," ISIL characterized the Russian invasion of Ukraine as "the beginning of a war between the Crusaders," and noted that "the Crusader coalition is likely to split internally," and expressed the hope that Russia's invasion of Ukraine would trigger an expansion of tension among other Western countries (in March). In the statement, the group also called on its supporters to carry out terrorist attacks in Europe (in April), claiming that "now that the Crusaders are strangling each other, there is

an opportunity [to carry out attacks] in Europe."

Meanwhile, "Al-Qaeda" criticized the US, which it views as an enemy, with its supreme leader, Ayman Zawahiri, saying in a statement (in May) that "the (weakened) US has made its ally, Ukraine, a prey to the Russians." The organization's affiliate, "Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent" (AQIS), also claimed in its organ magazine that "President Biden did not send troops to Ukraine because he fears defeat in Ukraine, as he did in Afghanistan" (in March).

Thus, although radical Islamist organizations used Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a propaganda campaign and a call to carry out terrorist attacks, there were no outbreaks of terrorism or other responses to them.

Products targeted in Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Western think tanks and other organizations have revealed that many of the missiles and other weapons used by the Russian military in its invasion of Ukraine contain products from Western countries and regions.

In May, the "Institute for Science and International Security" of the US pointed out that the "Orlan-10" unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which is used by the Russian military for reconnaissance and to transmit the coordinates of attack targets, is equipped with cameras, sensors, communication devices, engines and other components from the US, Europe, Japan and other countries.

In August, the UK's "Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies" (RUSI) released a report entitled "SILICON LIFELINE-WESTERN ELECTRONICS AT THE HEART OF RUSSIA'S WAR MACHINE," which analyzed 27 types of Russian military weapons, and pointed out as a result that semiconductors and electronic components from a number of Western countries and regions, including Japan, were installed in these weapons.

The report also noted that the Russian military consumed a large number of precision-guided missiles and other equipment during its recent invasion of Ukraine and lost much of its equipment on the battlefield, and expressed concern that Russia is developing new channels to secure access to Western microelectronic products through its "special services" and other means while it is subject to export controls by Western countries and regions.

President Putin visited the headquarters of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) in June and stated that one of the SVR's main missions is to "strengthen the defense capability and support the development of the motherland's industry and technology" (RIA Novosti, on June 30), which suggests that avoiding sanctions such as export controls by Western countries is a priority for Russian intelligence agencies, and it is therefore necessary to keep a close eye on Russia's moves to avoid sanctions, such as indirect procurement through third countries.

Russian military weapons noted to be equipped with products of Western countries and regions (examples)	Mounted parts and country/region of origin (examples)
Orlan-10 (UAV)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sensors (US) Cameras (Japan) Communication components (Switzerland) Engines (Japan) Electronic components (US, Germany) Semiconductors (US)
Iskander 9M727 (cruise missile)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Semiconductors (US) Electronic components (US, Switzerland) Cables (Germany)
Kh-101 (cruise missile)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Semiconductors (US, Switzerland, Taiwan) Electronic components (US, Netherlands)
TORN-MDM SIGINT SYSTEM (radio interception and detection system)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Electronic components (Japan, Germany)

1 The US and China continued efforts to secure key technologies, products, etc.

In 2022, the US and China continued to restrain each other through the implementation of sanctions and other measures. China announced its decision to impose sanctions on two US companies based on the "Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law," which allows China to take countermeasures against states and companies that "interfere in China's internal affairs," following the approval of the US arms sale to Taiwan (in February).

Meanwhile, the US announced (in October) that it had explained and consulted with its allies and other countries regarding the strengthening of regulations

on semiconductor exports to China, including strict restrictions on the export of certain advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment, etc. to China for the purpose of preventing military use, and a permit system for US companies to support the development of semiconductors for Chinese companies.

Under these circumstances, the US, China, and other major countries have been emphasizing efforts to strengthen their supply chains in cooperation with other countries in order to secure stable supplies of key technologies and products in their own countries.

US Focusing on Corporate Development and International Collaboration

From its inception, the Biden administration has planned to strengthen the supply chain for key technologies and products such as semiconductors, storage batteries, and rare earths to ensure its own economic development and national security, and has been making efforts to provide financial support for these industries. The US House of Representatives passed the "America COMPETES Act of 2022" (in February), which provides for measures to strengthen supply chains and support the relocation of manufacturing bases from countries of concern in anticipation of long-term competition with China. In addition, the US Department of Energy announced that it had launched a grant program to help build a stable supply system for storage batteries (in May).

Also, in recent years, the US has deepened cooperation with allies and like-minded countries in order to rebuild its supply chain, and it is evident that the US continues to focus on strengthening cooperation in 2022. US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo stated at the "Supply Chain Ministerial Forum" attended by 19 countries and regions (in July) that the US would work to

strengthen supply chain linkages through the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework" (IPEF), and the joint statement at the meeting made clear the need to build collective, long-term supply chains through cooperation among countries and regions in accordance with four principles: transparency, diversification, security, and sustainability. Also, at the IPEF Ministerial attended by 14 countries (in September), a ministerial statement was issued that included the strengthening of supply chain coordination in a contingency.


In particular, Western countries are working to strengthen their supply chains for semiconductors, which are essential materials for all industries. The European Commission submitted to the European Council and other bodies the "European Chips Act" aiming for self-sufficiency in semiconductors (in February), and the US passed the "CHIPS and Science Act" to financially support domestic semiconductor production (in August).

In the midst of these developments, the US released its first "National Security Strategy" under the Biden administration (in October), in which the US described China as "the only competitor with

both the intent and, increasingly, the capability to reshape the international order" and stated that the US would "effectively compete," and set forth policies of executing strategic investment in critical and emerging technology supply chains in the US,

emphasizing deepening partnerships on technology, trade, and security with allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, and continuing US leadership in these areas.

Countries/regions that participated in supply chain-related multilateral meetings hosted by the US



US-hosted multilateral conference on supply chain	
October 2021	Global Summit on Supply Chain Resilience
June 2022	Ministerial Meeting of the Minerals Security Partnership
July 2022	Supply Chain Ministerial Forum
September 2022	IPEF Ministerial, preliminary meeting of Chip 4

Wary of "decoupling" by the US, China worked to strengthen domestic production of key technologies and products and supply chain linkages with other countries

At the US-China summit, President Xi Jinping expressed concern about a series of US initiatives, such as "attempts at decoupling or severing supply chains (by the US) would make the world economy more vulnerable" (in July), and Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson strongly condemned the strengthening of US export restrictions on semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China,

saying "the US is aiming to maintain its sci-tech hegemony" (in October).

As China appears to be wary of various measures taken by the US from the perspective of national security, Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, in his "Political Report" to the National Congress (20th Party Congress) (📄 See p. 32, "Presenting a leading

country' policy based on China's unique development model"), referred to the strengthening of anti-foreign sanctions, anti-interference in internal affairs, etc. in the section on national security, and positioned the strengthening of supply chains as a national security issue, saying that "We will ensure the security of supply chains, and protect the lawful rights and interests of Chinese citizens and legal entities overseas." In the section on science and technology, he stated that China will "achieve breakthroughs in core technologies in key fields" in order to achieve domestic production of key technologies and products (in October).

China integrated rare earth-related companies to strengthen its international competitiveness (in December 2021) and announced a policy of restructuring and integrating core robotics-related companies (in January). Also, in response to a government directive (in May 2021) that set the ratio of domestically produced products in government

procurement for 315 products in the medical, marine, and other fields, several local governments have notified medical institutions within their jurisdiction that medical and laboratory equipment must be domestically produced. In addition, the Chinese government issued a guideline that office equipment such as multifunction printers that are subject to government procurement should be designed, developed, and manufactured entirely in China (press report, in July).

China also plans to strengthen cooperation with foreign governments and companies, and agreed with South Korea to strengthen cooperation in the supply chain (in August), and at the Meeting of the Council of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (in September), China announced that it would host a supply chain-related conference in 2023 under its leadership, indicating that SCO member countries are committed to strengthening cooperation.

2 Trends in the acquisition of domestic and foreign technologies and products

China sought to acquire technology through a variety of means

With regard to "chokepoint technology," which has become an obstacle to the development of China's manufacturing industry due to its domination by foreign countries, President Xi Jinping recognized (in June) that "overcoming the problem is a pressing issue," and expressed the need to "seize the strategic initiative" by "leveraging the marked advantages of socialism which has the ability to mobilize resources to accomplish major initiatives, and strengthening the leadership of the CPC and the government on major scientific and technological innovation," and reemphasized the need to strengthen the Party's leadership of science and technology policy (in September). For this reason, it is assessed that China will focus on the strengthening of acquisition of "chokepoint technology" from outside the country under the leadership of the Party and government, aiming at domestic production of such technologies.

On the other hand, Western countries are concerned about China's acquisition of technology and other assets from abroad, and the US Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has warned that "Chinese companies are using joint ventures to access to secrets of foreign companies" and that "Chinese economic espionage is causing company failures and job losses for US companies" (FBI Director Christopher Wray, in February). In addition, British Security Service (MI5) Director General Ken McCallum expressed concern that China is attempting to "extract UK advantage in multiple ways" (in July). Furthermore, the US and Japanese governments expressed concern about the Chinese government's policy of forcing foreign companies to design and manufacture multifunction printers and other products entirely in China, saying that this was "forcing foreign companies to transfer technology" (in July).

Amid these circumstances, in the US, former executives of a US military supplier company were indicted for violating international arms trade regulations by illegally exporting classified US technology to China and other countries (in March).

Also, a US professor who receives research grants from the US government was convicted for failing to report to US authorities the status of his contract with a Chinese university (in April), and a Chinese-American living in the US was convicted for illegally transporting turbine technology to a Chinese military-affiliated university (in March). In addition, Taiwanese authorities conducted investigations, including searches of the facilities of several semiconductor-related companies in Taiwan that are said to have ties to China and interviews with the people involved, for the alleged recruitment of Taiwanese engineers at high salaries (in March and May) (📖 See p. 40, "With the international community taking an interest in the situation in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan developed security arrangements in various fields").

Furthermore, there were moves to prevent China from acquiring companies due to security concerns in various countries, such as the Italian government's decision not to allow the purchase of a military UAV company by a Hong Kong company affiliated with a

Chinese state-owned enterprise (in March), and the British government's decision not to allow a Hong Kong company to acquire a British software company (in August) under the "National Security and Investment Act" enacted in January.

In Japan, there are still many companies and universities with advanced technologies in the fields of semiconductor manufacturing, materials, etc., and there have been cases of attempts to invest in Japanese companies and cases of Japanese engineers recruited by Chinese companies recruiting Japanese engineers from competing companies by using their own personal networks.

As China's methods of acquiring technology and human resources become more diverse and sophisticated, there is concern that China will continue to attempt to acquire important technologies and products owned by Japanese companies and universities by investing in and acquiring Japanese companies and inviting highly skilled human resources in order to improve its own manufacturing capacity and technology.

3 Public Security Intelligence Agency's efforts in the field of economic security

Japan is also making efforts to ensure economic security, and the "Act for the Promotion of Ensuring National Security through Integrated Implementation of Economic Measures" (Economic Security Promotion Act, partially enforced in August), which was enacted in May, established a basic policy on the promotion of security assurance through integrated economic measures, and also stipulated the following economic measures to ensure security: (1) Ensuring stable supply of specified key products, (2) Ensuring the stable provision of specified infrastructure services, (3) Supporting the development of specified critical technologies, and (4) Establishment of a system for the non-disclosure of patent applications. The Public Security Intelligence Agency, centering on its "Economic Security Intelligence Office," which was newly established in April, is strengthening information collection and analysis to help ensure economic security, including the prevention of leak of technologies, data, and products, and is contributing to relevant government

policies from an intelligence perspective.

In addition, since cooperation with potential target companies and universities is indispensable for preventing the leak of technologies, etc., the PSIA is working to share its knowledge and disseminate it to the public through individual lectures and exchanges of opinions. In May, the PSIA prepared and published an economic security leaflet describing the channels and examples of technology leaks and how to respond to suspicious approaches (📖 See p. 83, "Information Dissemination"), and in June, it held a symposium on economic security jointly with the Japan Business Federation, where a special agent from the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Japanese business representatives exchanged opinions on issues related to technology leaks and other topics. Based on requests from economic organizations, companies, universities, etc., the PSIA will further strengthen such outreach activities and contribute to the prevention of technology leaks from companies and universities, etc.

Threat Proliferation with the Expansion of Cyberspace

1 Cyberspace gaining importance as a public space

Expanding cyberspace in the space and maritime sectors

Cyberattacks aimed at stealing confidential information, acquiring money, and interfering with business operations have become commonplace in Japan and abroad, and their methods have also become more sophisticated. It is also reported that states are strengthening their cyber warfare capabilities, such as cyber espionage and destruction of critical infrastructure, in order to achieve political and military objectives, and from a security perspective, the threat of cyberattacks is becoming more serious.

In addition, with the recent acceleration of digitalization, cyberspace as "public space" is becoming increasingly important, and cyberspace continues to expand in the space and maritime fields as well, with the increase in the number of satellites in operation, the expansion of their utilization, and the progress of IT in the maritime industry, such as the introduction of navigation systems and engine control systems. Therefore, the impact of cyberattacks on society is expanding in every aspect.

In the space-related cyberattacks, which are reportedly on the rise, one hour before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the satellite communication network operated by the US information and communications company "Viasat" was cyberattacked,

disrupting communication services for several thousands of customers in Ukraine and tens of thousands across Europe, and in Germany, remote monitoring of several thousands of wind turbines was disabled (in February). While Ukrainian military and police were also reportedly using the company's satellites, the US and the UK announced that Russia was involved in the attack, pointing to disruption of Ukrainian military command and control as the objective (in May).

Maritime-related cyberattacks are also on the rise. According to reports from security firms, cyberattacks against operational technology systems in the maritime industry increased nearly tenfold from 2017 to 2020. In February 2019, the computer systems of vessels sailing to ports in New York and other cities in the United States were infected with malware, significantly degrading their functionality. The incident prompted the US Coast Guard to recommend that the maritime industry strengthen security measures (in July 2019). In 2022, port facilities in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands were reportedly hit by a series of cyberattacks that disrupted operations at oil terminals (in January), and a cyberattack that appeared to be ransomware shut down some terminal management systems at an Indian port (in February).

Disinformation continued to spread through cyberspace

As cyberspace continues to expand and permeate into the real world, including the expansion of cyberspace in the space and maritime domain, the activities of malicious actors pose a serious threat to the sustainable development of society and economy as well as the safety and security of people's lives. The activities of malicious actors in cyberspace include not only cyberattacks but also the spread of "disinformation." Disinformation has the potential to

exploit social unrest, influence people's perceptions, decision-making, and behavior, etc., causing further confusion, and its online dissemination at the time of elections has raised alarm in Europe and the US as a threat to the foundations of democracy (📖 See p. 17, "COLUMN: Disinformation that threatens the foundations of democracy"), and in 2022, attention was also focused on disinformation disseminated in connection with international events.

For example, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson claimed to have evidence of Ukraine developing biological and chemical weapons near its border with Russia, which was denied by the White House Press Secretary (in March). It was also reported that "the body of a foreign mercenary with a US passport was found during a raid on a Ukrainian militia stronghold" (Komsomolskaya Pravda, Russian newspaper, dated April 17), but the Washington Post interviewed the passport holder and reported that the Russian report was incorrect (in April).

Also, when US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan (on August 2-3), a reporter from the Chinese state-run media CCTV posted on blog that "Chinese military aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait," which was spread by the media and others, but Taiwan's Ministry

of National Defense denied the report (in August). In addition, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense warned Taiwanese citizens that social networking posts such as "Taiwan's Taoyuan International Airport was attacked by missiles from the Chinese People's Liberation Army" and "Chinese military aircraft shot down a Taiwanese military plane" were false information (in August) (📰 See p. 42, "COLUMN: Measures against disinformation in Taiwan").

Also in Japan, a post on Twitter (in August) stating that "the plane with Pelosi on board was shot down" was confirmed at the same time, but the post was made by an account posing as a news site of "Yahoo! Japan" news site and there was no such post on the official account, and the news site called for caution against information from fake accounts (in August).

COLUMN

Disinformation that threatens the foundations of democracy

In the United States, an investigation was conducted into allegations that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election by spreading disinformation to US voters. In March 2019, Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller released a report revealing that Russia had waged a campaign on social networking sites to meddle in the presidential election by spreading disinformation. Also, regarding the 2020 presidential election, the US authorities concluded that foreign powers, including Russia, had interfered by spreading disinformation, etc., although it did not affect the outcome of the election. Furthermore, a report released by the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections," indicated that the Russian president is believed to have authorized influence operations aimed at undermining public confidence of the American people in the election process by smearing then-candidate Biden and the Democratic Party while supporting former President Trump, and exacerbating social and political divisions within the US, and that Russian government agencies carried out that operation.

In Europe, there were also reports that false

information unfavorable to then candidate Emmanuel Macron was disseminated by a Russian state-run news agency during the French presidential election in 2017.

In response to this situation, the US government is cautious about regulating the content of information transmitted in consideration of freedom of expression, while platform operators are taking voluntary measures to prevent disinformation. Meta Platforms, Inc., the US operator of Facebook and Instagram, announced that it had removed more than 1,000 Russian-linked accounts that posted criticism of Ukraine and its supporters, as well as about 100 Chinese-linked accounts that posed as both conservative and liberal Americans (in September).

Likewise, in 2015, the European Union (EU) launched the website "EUvsDisinfo" in response to Russia's disinformation campaign, recognizing that election interference is "one of the most serious disinformation threats facing democratic societies," and published the disinformation it claimed was being disseminated in 13 languages.

Continued attention should be paid to the impact of disinformation on the democratic process.

2 Cyberspace is becoming increasingly diverse in terms of activity entities

State-involved or state-sponsored cyberattacks

The efforts of the US and European authorities to identify and disclose the perpetrators of state-involved or state-sponsored cyberattacks and the state

organizations they belong to (public attribution) continued in 2022, as follows.

■ China

In a joint press address on threats from the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party, MI5 Director General McCallum and FBI Director Wray noted that state-sponsored cyber threat actors have been observed attacking governments and the private sector, and that their activities are large scale and sophisticated (in July). At that time, the MI5 Director General also mentioned that they disrupted a sophisticated Chinese threat targeting aerospace companies (in May).

■ Russia

The UK announced that Russian military intelligence was involved in the tampering of websites and infection of malware targeting Ukrainian government agencies (in January), and the US and UK announced that Russian military intelligence was involved in DDoS attacks (in February) against Ukrainian financial institutions, which reportedly disrupted online payments and banking applications (in February and May, respectively). Also, the Ukrainian government announced that the cyber threat actor linked to Russian military intelligence that allegedly infected Ukrainian government agencies and critical infrastructure-related organizations with malware (in February) attempted to shut down the control system of a Ukrainian high-voltage substation using the malware (in April). Furthermore, cyber threat actors with ties to Russian intelligence agencies allegedly stole information from the diplomatic missions of NATO member countries prior to the Ukrainian invasion, and, commenting on these Russian cyberattacks, CEO of the UK's National Cyber Security Centre said, "the Russian State launched a series of major cyberattacks in support of their illegal invasion (of Ukraine) in February, probably the most sustained and intensive cyber campaign on record" (in September) (📄 See p. 6, "Special Feature 1: The World Shaken by Russia's Invasion of Ukraine").

■ North Korea

The Panel of Experts of the United Nations Security Council's North Korea Sanctions Committee released its final report for fiscal year 2021 and its midterm

report for fiscal year 2022 (in April and October), and reported that North Korea's cyber threat actors have conducted cyberattacks to obtain sensitive technology in violation of relevant UN resolutions, and that they continued to target financial institutions and crypto-asset exchanges, stealing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of crypto-assets every year from 2021 to 2022.

The FBI expressed its opinion that the theft of approximately \$600 million worth of cryptocurrency uncovered in March was likely carried out by a North Korean cyber threat actor (in April). The US Treasury Department also renewed sanctions against the said entity, adding virtual currency wallet addresses used in the case to the sanctions list (in April), and announced that it had sanctioned virtual currency mixers that allegedly helped North Korea launder stolen virtual currency (in May, August).

With regard to the North Korean cyberattacks targeting crypto-asset-related business operators, Japan's Financial Services Agency, National Police Agency, and National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity issued an alert to individuals and businesses involved in crypto-asset transactions (in October), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry announced that the "Lazarus Group," a North Korean cyber threat entity, would be added to the list of targets for asset freeze and other measures (in December).

■ Iran

Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama announced immediate severance of diplomatic relations with Iran (in September), saying that evidence had been obtained of the engagement of groups orchestrated and sponsored by Iran in a cyberattack against Albania including the government institutions (in July). At the same time, a US National Security Council spokesperson concluded that Iran was responsible for the cyberattack against Albania, and the US Treasury Department announced (in September) that it had placed sanctions on Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security and its Minister, who directed the execution of the cyberattack.

Diversifying activities of non-state actors

In addition to state-involved or state-sponsored cyber threat actors, attention was also focused on non-

state actors operating in connection with international events. Among the non-state actors, there are groups

and individuals with diverse ideological and social backgrounds, including international hacker groups such as "Anonymous," as well as IT technicians who participate in attacks at the behest of governments.

For example, since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, pro-Russian or pro-Ukrainian groups and individuals have appeared in cyberspace, each participating in cyberattacks against Russia or Ukraine and its supporters.

A group of hackers, supporting Russia and calling themselves "Killnet," reportedly carried out DDoS attacks on the websites of a US international airport (in March) and the Romanian Ministry of Defense (in April), citing support for Ukraine. The group continued to name Ukraine and NATO member countries as targets of cyberattacks (in May), and was said to have actually carried out DDoS attacks against Lithuanian administrative agencies (in June) and more than 200 organizations in Estonia (in August), among others.

On the other hand, Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced the creation of his country's IT Army on his Twitter account, calling

on IT professionals from around the world to join this army, and on the "IT ARMY of Ukraine" channel on Telegram, he called for cyberattacks against Russia and Belarus.

In addition, a Belarusian dissident hacker group with an anti-Russian agenda claimed to have attacked the Belarusian railroad to prevent Russian troops from advancing in Belarusian territory (in January), and some "Anonymous" groups stated that they were targeting the Russian government (in February) and claimed to have attacked printers in Russia (in March).

Also, since the day of US House Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, DDoS attacks have occurred on the websites of the Taiwanese Presidential Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Taoyuan International Airport, among others, and hacked train stations and television monitors in convenience stores displayed messages criticizing Pelosi's visit to Taiwan. Subsequently, a group of patriotic hackers in China claimed to have carried out cyberattacks against the Taiwan's Presidential Office, the police, and others (in August).

Threats posed by non-state actors spread to Japan

In Japan, there was a temporary problem with browsing at administrative agencies, the e-Gov portal site for administrative information, more than 20 websites of railroad companies and others, and the eLTAX local tax portal system (in September). Regarding some of these attacks, the aforementioned "Killnet" admitted to carrying out the cyberattacks, citing as reasons for the attacks Japan's "anti-Russia campaign" and "support for Ukraine and aggression

against the Kurile Islands (the Kurile Islands and the Northern Territories)." The group took up Japan's protest against the Russian government's announcement of a government decree regarding the suspension of the validity of the agreement on free visits and the four-island exchange program, and declared Japan a "stooge of the United States," and posted a video claiming "a declaration of war against the entire Japanese government" (in September).

3 In addition to raising cybersecurity awareness, improving media information literacy is also an issue

As the digitalization of society continues, cyberspace as a "public space" is expected to become more important. Along with this, the threat posed by cyberattacks is expected to increase in severity, and cyberattacks against Japan by various cyber threat actors, including those with state involvement and support, are expected to continue, so raising cybersecurity awareness is an issue in parallel with

the progress of digitalization.

In addition, in response to false information that may threaten the foundation of democracy, it is necessary to improve media information literacy, the ability to appropriately judge the truth or falsity of information by comparing it with other information and confirming the source of the information.

*EXTERNAL
SITUATION of
2022*

1

North Korea, amidst continuing economic hardship, used the "Corona Crisis" as a lever to boost the authority of Kim Jong Un


Kim Il Sung's birthday and other events were celebrated with great fanfare, while the economy remained sluggish

North Korea marked the 10th anniversary of the inauguration of Kim Jong Un to the highest party and state positions and the 110th anniversary of the birth of President Kim Il Sung (in April), and held a series of commemorative events, including a large crowd parade in Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, the capital, as well as artistic performances and military parades to boost national prestige both at home and abroad. Meanwhile, on the occasion of the anniversary, a new condominium district was opened in Pyongyang to showcase the tangible economic achievements, but these benefited only the residents of the capital and a limited number of meritorious workers.

In North Korea, a border blockade has been in place since 2020 to prevent the influx of new coronavirus infections, and trade between China and North Korea, which accounts for more than 90% of foreign trade, has been declining significantly for a long time. Although freight train service on the China-North Korean border resumed in January 2022, there was no marked increase in the volume of transactions because of the suspension of service for five months from the end of April to the end of

September due to the spread of the new coronavirus in China and the strengthening of quarantine measures following the outbreak of infected persons in North Korea, and the shortage of goods does not appear to have been sufficiently alleviated.

Against this backdrop, in his policy speech at the 7th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (in September), General Secretary Kim indicated his recognition of the current situation in the face of "unprecedented trials and ordeals," and his policy of focusing on the agricultural and light industry sectors, which are the key to self-sufficiency.



Trends in China-North Korea trade value (Based on China's maritime customs statistics)

After publicizing the corona infection for the first time, they claimed to have "exterminated" the virus in a short period of time and "created a miracle"

North Korea had previously claimed that there were no infected persons with the new coronavirus inside the country, but in May, it announced for the first time the occurrence of a new coronavirus case and implemented large-scale temperature checks, quarantine, and city lockdowns for all residents.

During this period, General Secretary Kim heightened the sense of crisis by claiming that there was "a great upheaval since the founding of the DPRK" (Rodong Sinmun, May 14), and at the same time directly presided over a countermeasures meeting and ordered the military to supply

Pyongyang citizens with medicines that were apparently ordered from China on an emergency basis and to send his own stockpile of medicines, thereby promoting the image of a leader who takes the initiative in addressing the issue and being close to the residents.

After the first public announcement of infected cases, North Korea announced daily the number of not infected but "fevered persons" (👉 See p. 23, "COLUMN 1: North Korea's publicly announced 'fevered persons'"), the definition of which is unclear,

and claimed that at one point there were 390,000 "fevered persons" per day, but after only one month, the number had plummeted, and in early August, North Korea declared the virus to have been exterminated and emphasized that it had achieved a "miracle" (Rodong Sinmun, August 11), citing the short time it had taken to end and the low fatality rate (0.0016%) of the "fevered" cases. However, the total number of infected persons during this period was not disclosed, and the actual status of the infection was not made public.

Convened a series of party meetings to improve the party's organizational strength and strengthen the tightening of its cadres

The Workers' Party of Korea (WPK), the party in regency in North Korea, has been working to strengthen party governance since its 8th Party Congress in 2021, and in 2022 it held a series of conferences and workshops for cadres of key organizations and activists of organizations and propaganda sections, including the 2nd Conference of Secretaries of Primary Committees of the WPK (in February), the 1st Workshop of Officials in the Information Field of the WPK (in March), and the 1st Special Workshop for Officials in Party Life Guidance Sections of Organizational Departments of Party Committees at All Levels of the WPK (in July), in order to help eliminate the sense of stagnation in society amid the prolonged sanctions

and border blockade, and to encourage cadres and activists who are responsible for leading party members and residents politically and for implementing party policies.

To tighten discipline among these cadres and activists, the WPK also appointed Kim Jae Ryong, former director of the Organizational Leadership Department, as chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, whose authority was expanded to supervise and investigate disciplinary violations at the 8th Party Congress, while General Secretary Kim instructed to expand and strengthen the authority and functions of the party discipline inspection departments, which assist the said Commission, in an effort to strengthen the Party's discipline section.

Economic hardship associated with sanctions and border blockades continued; focus on maintaining regime stability

North Korea is expected to remain in a holding pattern of "self-reliance" as it is forced to prolong sanctions and border blockades in the absence of improved relations with the United States and South Korea, and prospects for an end to the global outbreak of the new coronavirus and countermeasures against infection in its neighbor China.

Under these circumstances, North Korea is expected to demonstrate its commitment to improving

the lives of residents through housing construction and other tangible achievements, and to unite its leaders and residents through political events in 2023 on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army (in February), the 70th anniversary of the conclusion of the Korean War Armistice Agreement (in July), and the 75th founding anniversary of the regime (in September).


COLUMN 1

North Korea's publicly announced "fevered persons"

On May 12, North Korea announced an outbreak of new coronavirus cases, but since then, North Korean authorities have announced only the number of "fevered persons" (see Note). North Korea has not clarified the definition of "fevered persons," but this is a new term that has been used since May, and given the limited PCR testing capabilities, it is believed to have been a concept used to widely include as a subject for quarantine not only those with high fevers, so-called persons with a fever, but also those with slight fevers or other symptoms, as a means to control the spread of infection. The North Korean media reported that they were differentiating between "general fevered persons" and "persons infected with the malignant virus (novel coronavirus)," suggesting that not all "fevered persons" are infected.

However, just prior to the declaration of the "extermination" of the virus (in August), the North Korean authorities changed their announcement from the number of "fevered persons" to the number of "fevered persons due to malignant infectious diseases" and then to the number of "persons infected with malignant viruses" (with the number of persons being zero). This may have been done in order to make the final announcement of "zero infections."

The fact that North Korea announced the number of "fevered persons," whose definition has not been



Number of "fevered persons" per day as announced by North Korea (Based on North Korea's announcement)

clarified, rather than the number of infected persons, does not rule out the possibility that the rapid increase and rapid decrease in the number of "fevered persons" was aimed at creating the impression that the country was overcoming the crisis and that this was the political achievement of General Secretary Kim Jong Un.

(Note: In Japan, the term is generally translated as "persons with a fever.")

COLUMN 2

North Korea unveiled General Secretary Kim Jong Un's daughter for the first time

North Korean media reports revealed that General Secretary Kim Jong Un visited the site of the November test-fire of the new-type intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) "Hwasongpho-17" accompanied by a young girl believed to be his daughter, drawing attention to the girl. North Korea has referred to her as General Secretary Kim's "daughter" (Rodong Sinmun, November 19, etc.) and

has not revealed her name or identity, but she is believed to be "Ju Ae," the second of General Secretary Kim's three children.

This was the first time that North Korea disclosed General Secretary Kim's child, and her future moves will be closely watched, as well as the purpose and background of the disclosure.

Russia and China vetoed a proposal to tighten UN sanctions against North Korea in response to North Korea's missile launch

North Korea resumed launching intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for the first time in nearly four years since November 2017, as Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine (in February). At the UN Security Council meeting held in response, the United States and others proposed a new resolution to renew and strengthen sanctions, but Russia and China vetoed it for the first time on the North Korean

nuclear and missile issues, forcing the council to abandon the proposal (May). Russia and China continued to insist that the United States' refusal to ease sanctions against North Korea was problematic, and when North Korea launched a ballistic missile that passed over Japan, they defended North Korea and prevented a united UN Security Council response (in October).

Stressed close Russian-North Korean relations, including defending Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Over Russia's invasion of Ukraine, North Korea stuck to its stance of defending Russia by consistently voting against a UN resolution calling for Russia's immediate withdrawal (in March), a resolution suspending Russia's membership in the Human Rights Council (in April), and a resolution condemning Russia's "annexation" of four regions in eastern and southern Ukraine (in October). General Secretary Kim Jong Un sent congratulatory telegrams to President Putin on the occasion of various anniversaries in Russia and between Russia and North Korea, stressing that the cooperation between Russia and North Korea has reached a high level (in August) and praising President Putin's leadership (in October), thereby demonstrating the close relationship between Russia and North Korea. Amid such circumstances, there was a report (in November) that freight train traffic between Russia

and North Korea, which had been suspended since 2020, started to move again.

In addition, North Korea recognized the "independence" of the pro-Russian "Donetsk People's Republic" and "Luhansk People's Republic" in eastern Ukraine (in July) and expressed support for the "annexation" of four regions by Russia (in October). Against this backdrop, there were reports mainly from the Russian side (in July and August) that North Korea and Russia and the two "People's Republics" were discussing a plan to send North Korean workers to "reconstruction" in the two "People's Republics."

On the other hand, while the US pointed out the possibility of arms deals between Russia and North Korea, both Russia and North Korea denied this (in September and November).

Amid US-China confrontation, they took a clear pro-China stance

As the conflict between the US and China gradually comes to the surface and China is increasingly criticized on the international stage, North Korea has made its support for China clear. In 2022, during the Beijing 2022 Olympic Winter Games, which were held amid a diplomatic boycott by Western countries, General Secretary Kim sent congratulatory telegrams and personal letters to General Secretary Xi Jinping (President of China) on the occasion of the opening and closing ceremonies (in February), emphasizing the close relationship with China. Also, when US House Speaker Pelosi

visited Taiwan and tensions between the US and China escalated, the Workers' Party of Korea sent a letter of solidarity to the Communist Party of China, expressing its full support for China's position on the Taiwan issue (in August).

Furthermore, when the Xi leadership entered its third term following the 20th Party Congress, the official newspaper of the WPK widely reported the congratulatory telegram sent by General Secretary Kim to General Secretary Xi and his report to the Congress (in October).

Focusing on strengthening relations with both Russia and China while keeping a close eye on international developments

North Korea, mindful of the deepening US-Russia and US-China confrontation and the prospect of a prolonged confrontation with the US, is expected to continue to maintain its supportive stance toward Russia and China and hope to bargain for the backing

from both countries in political and diplomatic fields, including the use of their veto powers in the UN Security Council, seeking to extract real economic and military benefits from both countries.

3

North Korea refused to respond to Japan-US-South Korea calls for dialogue and focused on strengthening its military power

After signaling the abandonment of the "moratorium" on nuclear weapons and ICBMs, the country resumed ICBM launches and also moved toward a nuclear test

North Korea did not respond to the call for dialogue by the US Biden administration, but rather, assessing that the "hostile policy" by the US against the North had reached a danger line that could not be overlooked any more, announced (in January) that it would reconsider the suspension (moratorium) of its nuclear test and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch tests decided before the 2018 summit between the US and North Korea. North Korea subsequently resumed ICBM launches (in February)

and launched an ICBM-class ballistic missile called the "new-type ICBM 'Hwasongpho-17'" at a high angle and dropped it in Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) west of Hokkaido (in March and November). In addition, at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in the northeastern part of the country, the restoration of the tunnel that was blown up prior to the same US-North Korea summit proceeded, and the site is believed to have been restored to a state in which nuclear tests could be carried out by June.

Under these circumstances, General Secretary Kim Jong Un declared his readiness to deal with a military conflict with the US (in July), refused to allow North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons or denuclearize first and would not accept negotiations to that end (in

September), and asserted one after another that he did not feel the need to talk with "the enemy" (in October), emphasizing his confrontational stance against the US.

Numerous missiles and artillery shells fired in response to joint US-South Korea military exercises

When Yoon Suk Yeol, the candidate of the largest conservative opposition party, People Power Party, won the presidential election in South Korea (in March), North Korea became increasingly alarmed at the Yoon administration's pledges to strengthen the US-South Korea alliance and to rebuild a defense and counterattack system (a South Korean-style "three-axis system") that includes a preemptive strike against the North, prompting Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong, to denounce a preemptive strike against a nuclear weapons state as fantastic daydream (in April) and General Secretary Kim to threaten the use of nuclear weapons, stating that the South Korean regime and military would be annihilated if South Korea attempted a preemptive strike against the nuclear state (in July). In addition, North Korea established a law stipulating that North Korea may use nuclear weapons at the option of North Korea (in September), appealing for a stance of preemptive use of nuclear weapons.

Under these circumstances, North Korea is said to have fired more than 50 missiles, including possible ICBMs, and more than 1,000 artillery shells into the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea in response to joint military exercises by the US and South Korea, as well as by the US, Japan and South Korea, since late September, and also conducted demonstration flights by military aircraft, which it later revealed were military exercises by troops operating tactical nuclear weapons (in October) and military operations in response to the exercises (in November). Among these, North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japan and dropped it over the Pacific Ocean for the first time in about five years (in October), and also fired a missile into the waters near the South Korean mainland (in November) in a dangerous manner.

As described above, in 2022, North Korea launched missiles into the Sea of Japan and other waters with unprecedented frequency, posing a serious threat to Japan's security.

Alerted to developments surrounding Japan's "counterstrike capabilities" and other issues

North Korea continues to insist that the issue of the abductions of Japanese citizens has been resolved and has not responded to Japan's call for dialogue. Song Il Ho, the Ambassador of the Foreign Ministry in charge of Japan, issued a press statement on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, in which he condemned Japan's measures against North Korea and only asserted that the course of Japan-North Korea relations depended on the attitude of the

Japanese government (in September). North Korea did not express its attitude toward the passing of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who led the resolution of the abductions issue, or the holding of a state funeral for him.

On the other hand, North Korea has repeatedly criticized Japan's possession of "counterstrike capabilities," claiming (in September) that its "counterstrike capabilities" targets North Korea and China, and expressing alarm.

Focus on further strengthening military capabilities in anticipation of moves to strengthen the US-South Korea alliance

North Korea's series of military actions suggest that it aims to promote the development of ballistic missiles, etc. and improve their operational capabilities, as well as to restrain and deter South Korea, which is strengthening its alliance with the United States. It is also believed that North Korea is also aiming to entice the United States, which has concerns such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and

the US-China confrontation, to take action that North Korea wants to see. North Korea is expected to continue to step up its military activities in response to the large-scale joint US-South Korean military exercises, etc. and, in the process, the possibility of North Korea launching more ballistic missiles over the Pacific Ocean or conducting its seventh nuclear test cannot be ruled out.

COLUMN

Ballistic missile development for tactical nuclear operations

At the 8th Party Congress in 2021, North Korea presented its goals for the development of various weapons as part of its agenda for strengthening its national defense capabilities over the next five years, and these goals included the development of tactical nuclear weapons as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (See table below).

In 2022, North Korea launched ballistic missiles at an unprecedented frequency, and conducted ballistic missile development and launch drills for the operation of tactical nuclear weapons. In April, it conducted a test launch of a "new-type tactical guided weapon," and revealed that it was a weapon for the operation of tactical nuclear weapons and that it had been "developed under special attention of the Party Central Committee" (Rodong Sinmun, April 17).

In addition, from late September to early October, as part of military drills for the "tactical nuclear operation units," it successively launched various ballistic missiles that are believed to be capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads, and demonstrated that it could carry out nuclear attacks from various times and places, such as neutralizing airfields in South Korea and hypothetically attacking major "enemy" military command facilities and ports (in October). Also, regarding the "long-range strategic cruise missile" that was test-fired subsequently, North Korea claimed that it was deployed to its "tactical nuclear operation units" (in October).

Thus, North Korea is steadily working to develop tactical nuclear weapons.

Status of weapons development as presented at the 8th Party Congress

Names of strategic weapons, etc.	Implementation status in 2022 (at the end of November)
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) (15,000 km range)	"New-type ICBM 'Hwasongpho-17'" (March 24, November 18)
Tactical nuclear weapons	"New-type tactical guided weapon" (April 16) "Tactical ballistic missile" (September 25, 28, 29, October 1, 6, November 2, 3, 5) "New-type ground-to-ground intermediate-range ballistic missile" (October 4) "Super-large multiple rocket launchers" (October 6, 9, November 3, 5) "Long-range (strategic) cruise missiles" (January 25, October 12, November 2)
Hypersonic gliding flight warheads	"Hypersonic missile" (January 5, 11)
New nuclear-powered submarine	-
Underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapon	-
ICMB with the use of Solid-fuel engine (Ground and underwater)	-

(Based on reports by the "Korean Central News Agency")

Chongryon held its 25th Congress and North Korea sent a lengthy "letter" from Kim Jong Un

The General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) held its quadrennial congress (25th Congress) (in May) and re-elected Chairman Ho Jong Man. This marked the continuation of the Ho Jong Man regime that has been in place since 2012.

On the occasion of this Congress, North Korea sent a "letter" in the name of Kim Jong Un. In the past, North Korea has sent a "greeting telegram" or "congratulatory message" of about 1,000 to 2,000 characters to the Chongryon Congress, but this was the first time that a "letter" was sent. The "letter" was

approximately 10,000 characters long, and consisted of "four major tasks" (1) defending the rights and interests of compatriots in Japan, (2) strengthening ethnic education, (3) preserving national identity, and (4) contributing to North Korea, and "ways" to carry out the "four major tasks," including ideological education and organizational consolidation, that specifically proposed the content of the initiatives to be taken (see table). The "letter" was a presentation of the "ideal image" that North Korea wanted for Chongryon, and in effect, it replaced the policy of activities that Chongryon presented at its Congress.

The "four major tasks" and "ways" presented in Kim Jong Un's "letter"

"Four major tasks"	"Ways" to carry out the "four major tasks"
<p>1. Defending the rights and interests of compatriots in Japan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▽ Struggle to have Japan withdraw its measures against North Korea ▽ Service and welfare activities for compatriots in Japan <p>2. Strengthening ethnic education</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▽ Training of educationists (teachers) ▽ Increase in the number of students <p>3. Preserving national identity</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▽ Encouraging the use of Korean language ▽ Wearing of women's ethnic clothing, chima and jogori <p>4. Contributing to North Korea</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▽ Strengthen activities with compatriots in Japan outside of the organization, such as Mindan ▽ Contribution to the "building a powerful country" of North Korea ▽ Outreach to various strata of Japan 	<p>1. Ideological education</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▽ Intensify education on the ideology and history of President Kim Il Sung and General Secretary Kim Jong Il ▽ Conducting flag-raising ceremonies on North Korean holidays and commemorative days ▽ Singing of the "national anthem" and raising of the "national flag" at entrance and graduation ceremonies of Korean schools <p>2. Consolidating the organization</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▽ Strengthening the leadership functions of the central and regional headquarters ▽ Strengthening the base organization (chapters and branches) <p>3. Transformation of activity methods</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▽ Maintaining an activity stance of "selfless devotion" for compatriots in Japan

(Based on a report by the "Choson Sinbo")

Organization-wide efforts to put Kim Jong Un's "letter" into practice

Chongryon took seriously the fact that North Korea sent a "letter" covering detailed issues, and its central leaders, including Chairman Ho Jong Man and the First Vice Chairman Pak Ku Ho, attended the regular congresses and general meetings of regional headquarters and affiliated organizations that were held sequentially after the convention, and instructed the entire organization to put the "letter" into

practice. In addition, a study and discussion meeting for central activists and a workshop for regional headquarters chairpersons on the "letter" were held (in July and August, respectively) to familiarize senior activists with the contents of the "letter" and the importance of its implementation.

Based on this, Chongryon held a meeting of regional headquarters chairpersons (in September)

and proposed the implementation of a "campaign for the creation of a model" by May 2023, one year after the receipt of the "letter," in order to accomplish the tasks presented in the "letter," and instructed each regional headquarters to select and start planning "model" projects. In response to this, each regional headquarters set up themes such as life counseling activities for compatriots in Japan, support for Korean schools, and outreach to compatriots in Japan outside the organization, such as Mindan (Korean Residents Union in Japan), and began efforts to create model projects accordingly (in October).

Under the Ho Jong Man regime, the First Vice Chairman Pak Ku Ho's activities became more active

As mentioned above, the 25th Congress decided to continue the Ho Jong Man regime and elected the First Vice Chair Pak Ku Ho and other central leaders, and at the same Congress and at the regional headquarters chairpersons' meetings, the First Vice Chairman Pak replaced the aging Chairman Ho Jong Man and gave lengthy activity reports, indicating that the practical work of organizational leadership was gradually being entrusted to the First Vice Chairman Pak. Also, the First Vice Chairman Pak

On the other hand, some activists expressed concern that the "letter's" call for more North Korean colors, such as the display of the North Korean "national flag," the singing of the North Korean "national anthem," and the wearing of chima and jogori, the ethnic dress of women, was inconsistent with the "gentle on the outside but firm on the inside" line (📖 See p. 30, "COLUMN: The 'gentle on the outside but firm on the inside' line and Kim Jong Un's 'letter'") that had already taken root among them.

made his presence felt both inside and outside the organization by representing Chongryon at events and gatherings previously attended by other executives, such as the graduation (in March) and entrance (in April) ceremonies of the Chosun University, rallies organized by pro-North Korean organizations in Japan (in April), and the regular conventions and general meetings of major affiliates and regional headquarters (in June and July).

Focusing on rebuilding the organization and its activities while struggling with the ideal image presented by North Korea

Chongryon, under the direction and guidance of North Korea, is expected to work to encourage regional headquarters to engage in the "campaign for the creation of a model" and to rebuild its organization and activities.

In addition, having received the "letter," it is possible that Chongryon may engage in outreach to various sectors of Japan to gain support for North

Korea and Chongryon, as well as in activities to contribute to North Korea.

However, it is also anticipated that the gap between the ideal image presented by North Korea and the reality of the organization and its activities, and the discomfort of activists and members who have become accustomed to being "gentle on the outside" may make it difficult to implement these initiatives.

COLUMN

The "gentle on the outside but firm on the inside" line and Kim Jong Un's "letter"

The "gentle on the outside but firm on the inside" line means, as for compatriots in Japan, to improve the organization's image and win support by providing life consultation and welfare services for the elderly, etc., while reducing the North Korean flavor ("gentle on the outside"), and on the other hand, as for activists, to continue and strengthen ideological education and maintain the character as a "revolutionary organization" aiming for Korean reunification along with North Korea ("firm on the inside"). This line was initiated in response to the late General Secretary Kim Jong III's instruction to then First Vice Chairman So Man Sul, who visited North Korea in 1999, to review the organization's activities in line with the actual conditions of the organization, and behind this move was believed to be a desire to halt the downward trend in the organization's strength by improving Chongryon's image, as well as to create an environment in the Korean community in Japan in

anticipation of the improvement of inter-Korean relations with the new Kim Dae Jung administration in South Korea, which took office in 1998. Thereafter, in response to North Korea's 2002 admission that it had abducted Japanese citizens, the "gentle on the outside" part of Chongryon has become more entrenched within the organization as a means of avoiding bashing of the organization.

Under these circumstances, Chongryon, through the "letter," was presented with the task of strengthening the North Korean flavor, such as the raising of the "national flag" and the singing of the "national anthem." It is drawing attention how Chongryon, which has adhered to the line of "gentle on the outside but firm on the inside," will deal with these issues between North Korea, which seeks to put the "letter" into practice, and its activists and members, who feel uncomfortable about strengthening the North Korean flavor.

1

General Secretary Xi Jinping is now in his third term, and while he has established "one-man rule" and has a policy of aiming to become a "leading country," there are many challenges ahead

The Party Congress was held and the third term of Xi Jinping's leadership was inaugurated, breaking with the Party's "conventions"

The Communist Party of China (CPC) held its National Congress of the Communist Party of China (20th Party Congress) for the first time in five years (October 16-22), elected 205 new Central Committee members, and elected Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee (General Secretary) at the first plenary session of the 20th Central Committee held the day after the Party Congress concluded. While former General Secretary Hu Jintao retired after two terms of ten years and the "convention" had been established that no party member reaching the age of 68 could be elected to members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee (members of Standing Committee), the fact that General Secretary Xi has now established a third term of leadership is seen as a sign that he has absolute power, unrestrained by party "conventions." Also, at the First Plenum, they decided on the members of the Central Military Commission, and General Secretary Xi remained as its chairman. As for the President of the People's Republic of China, which General Secretary Xi has held since 2013, an amendment to the "Constitution of the People's Republic of China" at the 2018 National People's Congress eliminated the term limit provision, allowing him to continue to serve for a third and subsequent terms, according to regulations.

In addition, the four newly promoted members of the Standing Committee are subordinates of General Secretary Xi from his regional service period and are considered to have close relationships with him, and it is expected that General Secretary Xi will be able to exercise even stronger control over all policy decisions and implementation during the 20th Standing Committee.

Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee

19 th		20 th	
Name	Age	Name	Age
Xi Jinping	64	Xi Jinping	69
Li Keqiang	62	Li Qiang	63
Li Zhanshu	67	Zhao Leji	65
Wang Yang	62	Wang Huning	67
Wang Huning	62	Cai Qi	66
Zhao Leji	60	Ding Xuexiang	60
Han Zheng	63	Li Xi	66

New members in red and retired members in blue. Ages are as of the end of the month in which the First Plenum of the Central Committee of each term was held (Based on reports by "Xinhua News Agency").

Presenting a "leading country" policy based on China's unique development model

At the 20th Party Congress, the Central Committee Report ("Political Report") was adopted, outlining Xi's administrative policies, and setting forth the basic policy aimed at "the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" through "Chinese modernization," a development model unique to China. This policy was also clearly stated in the Party Constitution, which was revised at the Party Congress.


The "Political Report" also presented China's long-term development strategy, which is divided into two phases through mid-21st century. In the first stage of the strategy, which ends in 2035, the government aims to raise per capita GDP to the level of mid-level developed countries and to achieve "common prosperity" by correcting disparities and enriching society as a whole, thereby achieving the basic goal of "socialist modernization." Furthermore, in the second stage, which will last until the middle of the 21st century, the plan is to develop China into a "great modern socialist country" with world-class national power and international influence. Based on this, the next five years of General Secretary Xi's third term are positioned as a "critical time" for the full launch of efforts to realize a "great modern socialist country," and the government has clearly

The concept of "Chinese modernization"



(Based on a report by "People's Daily")

The concept of China's development strategy



(Based on a report by "Xinhua News Agency")

indicated its commitment to improving scientific and technological capabilities focusing on innovation and ensuring national security, including in the economic field.

Striving to improve the Party's centripetal force and making the utmost appeal for "achievements" in realizing "stability" by General Secretary Xi

For the 20th Party Congress, the Xi administration worked hard to improve the party's centripetal appeal and made the most of its "achievements" in realizing political and social "stability" both inside and outside the Party.

Within the Party, they engaged in activities to learn about General Secretary Xi's political philosophy, including the anti-corruption campaign, and reiterated his "achievements," saying that he had

"won a high degree of unity and solidarity in the entire Party." Also, the Beijing 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (Beijing Winter Games) were held (in February and March) under the "zero-Covid" policy, which was designed to thoroughly control the spread of new coronavirus infections, and the superiority of this Party-led policy was trumpeted as "targeted and effective" (Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics and Paralympics review and awards

ceremony, in April). As for the new coronavirus infection, the Shanghai authorities implemented strict measures, including a lockdown, in response to the spread of the disease in Shanghai from late March onward. The Xi administration positioned the "zero-Covid" policy as "a decision by the Party's nature and mission" (meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, in May), and insisted that the relaxation of quarantine measures would have a serious impact on economic and social development and the lives and safety of the people, and General Secretary Xi expressed his determination to uphold this policy even after the lockdown in Shanghai.

Also, Secretary General Xi personally attended the "meeting celebrating the 25th anniversary of Hong Kong's return to the motherland" (in July), where he stated that the "one country, two systems" had the full support of the 1.4 billion people of the


motherland, and repeatedly stressed the "success" of the systems in Hong Kong, and with regard to the policy of ethnic minorities, he repeatedly called for the fostering of "sense of community for the Chinese nation" toward national unity, and also made his first visit to the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in eight years (in July), emphasizing the scene where he received hospitality from the Uyghurs who welcomed him, visited Uyghurs' houses and had a dialogue with them, thereby highlighted the realization of "stability" under General Secretary Xi's leadership as his "achievement."

In addition, regarding the control of information in society, for three months from September 2, the government implemented a crackdown on Internet insults related to "important meetings, important activities, and important policies" in an effort to achieve "stability" in the Internet space as well.

The Party and the government worked "as one" to deal with negative economic factors such as the new coronavirus infection

In the "Report on the Work of the Government" of the 5th Session of the 13th National People's Congress (in March), the Xi administration positioned 2022 as "a year of great significance in the cause of the Party and the country as the CPC will hold its 20th National Congress" and set a GDP growth rate target of "around 5.5%" for the full year, keeping in mind the stability of people's lives and medium- to long-term economic development. On the other hand, they acknowledged that achieving this goal "will require arduous efforts."

While acknowledging the difficulties in achieving the goals from the outset of their announcement, Xi's leadership stressed at a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee (in April) that "we will ensure economic stabilization and make every effort to realize the economic and social development goals for the full year." In response, the State Council recognized the "rising risks caused by the COVID-19 and the Ukraine crisis," and it issued a comprehensive economic support package (in May) to ensure stability in



(Based on the release of the National Bureau of Statistics)

investment, consumption, and other sectors that the government considers important, in an effort to prop up the economy. However, according to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics (in July), three provinces and two municipalities directly under the Central Government (Beijing, Jilin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Hainan) reported year-on-year negative growth in their gross regional product in the second quarter. In particular, Shanghai was the only city to

record double-digit negative growth (-13.7%), highlighting the impact of the "zero-Covid" policy lockdown. While the realization of the full-year GDP growth rate target still remained difficult, Premier Li Keqiang showed some signs of not necessarily being concerned about achieving the full-year target, such as his recognition (in July) that "we will not introduce super large-scale stimulus measures, implement excessive money supply, or sacrifice future interests for the sake of excessive growth targets." In this context, the third quarter statistics released (in October) showed an upward trend in the GDP growth

rate, with a 3.9% increase over the same period last year. However, the release of the third quarter statistics, which was originally scheduled to coincide with the 20th Party Congress, was postponed and released after the Congress. In addition, the regular press conference, which is held on the same day as the release of the statistics, was not held. Behind this, there are indications that consideration was given to the ongoing Party Congress, and also the National Bureau of Statistics seemed to recognize that the Chinese economy had not fully recovered and that there was no reason to be optimistic about the future.

Addressing unresolved issues and formulating effective economic policies would be key to securing legitimacy for a third term in office

General Secretary Xi further enhanced his own authority through the 20th Party Congress, inaugurating the leadership for a third term. On the other hand, the "Political Report" of the 20th Party Congress revealed the existence of unresolved issues that had been pointed out at the 19th Party Congress. Since reform and opening up, the Communist Party of China has made sustainable economic development the cornerstone of its legitimacy of governance by the Party. However, in addition to economic instability caused by the new coronavirus infection and other factors, there were also financial problems that could lead to social unrest, such as declining land revenues and rising debt for local governments, and outbreaks of protests at small and medium-sized financial institutions in Henan Province due to a prolonged freeze on deposits, which, if not properly addressed, could lead to public discontent and affect not only the stability of the Xi leadership but also the legitimacy of the Party. In fact, in November, there were reports of protests over the "zero-Covid" policy in several areas, including Shanghai. While General Secretary Xi, who broke with "convention" and inaugurated the leadership for his third term, aims to establish his own authority and a "one-man rule," the key to securing the legitimacy of his rule will be to formulate effective economic policies in the face of the expected slowdown in economic growth over the medium to long term. In

Major Issues raised by the "Political Report" of the 20th Party Congress	
Unresolved	Many bottlenecks hindering high-quality development and inadequate capacity for scientific and technological innovation
New	Issues in areas such as food, energy, industrial and supply chains security and financial risk prevention
Unresolved	Facing quite a few challenges in the ideological domain
Unresolved	Wide gaps in development and income distribution between urban and rural areas and between regions
Unresolved	Many difficulties in areas such as employment and education
Unresolved	Environmental protection remains a formidable task
Unresolved	Lack or deficiency in the awareness of some Party members and officials to carry out their duties, etc.
Unresolved	Eradicating breeding grounds for corruption is still an arduous task
New	Items marked with "new" are those newly presented in the "Political Report" of the 20th Party Congress.
Unresolved	Items marked "unresolved" are generally the same as in the "Political Report" of the 19th Party Congress and are unresolved.

(Based on the "Political Report" of the 20th Party Congress)

the next five years, Xi's leadership is likely to continue to face the difficult task of managing the administration to cope with a mountain of challenges and to achieve a certain degree of sustained economic growth.

Loyalty could be more important than age in appointing the Party's central leadership cadre

Among the four retiring members of the Standing Committee, Premier Li and Wang Yang, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, were both 67 years old. Meanwhile, Zhang Youxia (age 72), vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and a member of the Political Bureau of the 19th CPC Central Committee, remained a member of the Political Bureau, and Wang Yi (age 69), Foreign Minister and a member of the 19th CPC Central Committee, was promoted to a member of the Political Bureau of the 20th CPC Central Committee. Since the 16th CPC (November 2002 to October 2007), there has been no resignation of a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau under the age of 68, nor has a party member of 68 and over been elected as a member of the Political Bureau, so both of these appointments were a break with "conventional practice."

After the closing of the last Party Congress (2017), Xi Jinping's leadership explained that the election of central leadership cadres for the 19th term "will not be a natural continuation of appointments if their age matches" (in October 2017, "The Birth of the Party's New Central Leadership Structure"), but now, in electing central leadership cadres for the 20th term, they strongly reiterated the Party's stance of not being

bound by conventional personnel policies by stating that "there should be no such things as taking seats in order, taking (promotion) for granted, or relying on convention" (in October 2022, "The Birth of the New Central Committee and the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection"). Also, in September, prior to the holding of the current Party Congress, it was announced that the Party had revised its internal regulations regarding the appointment of leadership cadres, and it became clear that the provision stipulating compliance with the retirement age had been removed. On the other hand, the Party's explanation for the election of the central leadership cadres for the 20th term (in October 2022, "The Birth of the Party's New Central Leadership Structure") listed as conditions for becoming a cadre candidate the need to uphold General Secretary Xi's position and to be in line with his thinking and behavior, indicating that loyalty to General Secretary Xi was a major prerequisite for becoming a central leadership cadre.

This trend suggests General Secretary Xi's desire to actively promote cadres who are loyal to him, regardless of age, and it is expected that the future appointment of central leadership will be based on the more ambiguous criterion of loyalty, making the process even more uncertain than before.

Despite hopes for an improved external environment in preparation for the Party Congress, the situation in Ukraine and other issues remained a variable

China positioned the "main focus" of Chinese diplomacy in 2022 as "making every effort to create a favorable external environment for the CPC's 20th National Congress" (Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in December 2021) and stepped up efforts to foster a "secure and stable external environment." At the Beijing 2022 Olympic Winter Games, held in Beijing and positioned as an "important landmark event at a crucial moment," while some Western countries indicated that they would not send government officials, citing the human rights situation and other issues in China as the reason, China demonstrated the international community's support for China through active summit diplomacy with visiting dignitaries from other countries and organizations, and propagated the diplomatic achievements of the current leadership at home and abroad, saying that the participation of foreign dignitaries "embodied President Xi Jinping's charm and charisma as a leader" (Ma Zhaoxu, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, in February).

However, when Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine (in February), Western countries, led by the

United States, which took a clear stance against "despotic states" such as China and Russia over sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine, became more united, and the United States and the European Union expressed concern about the possibility of support for Russia by China, which had been demonstrating its close relationship with Russia at home and abroad. Furthermore, as the United States released its "National Security Strategy" (in October), positioning China as "the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective," and reiterating its policy of countering China by strengthening cooperation with allies and like-minded countries, China's diplomacy that aimed to break through the prolonged US-China confrontation and other increasingly difficult diplomatic situations, in the run-up to the 20th Party Congress, continued to face a challenging external environment in the face of the situation in Ukraine and the accompanying changes in the international situation.

While maintaining a measured distance from Russia, it intended to continue to maintain "close China-Russian relations"

At the China-Russia summit meeting held (in February) on the occasion of the Beijing Winter Olympics, China confirmed that "friendship between the two States has no limits, and there are no 'forbidden' areas of cooperation" (the China-Russia Joint Statement), and showed both at home and abroad that the strategic coordination of mutual support between the two countries "has never and will never waver" in the future (President Xi). Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China has sought to maintain and strengthen its strategic coordination with Russia, while making certain adjustments to its

previous stance toward Russia to avoid being subject to criticism and sanctions from Western countries, with a view to leading the international order and protecting its "core interests" in the future.

Regarding the situation in Ukraine, China consistently maintained its position of "compliance" with the United Nations Charter and other international rules, such as "respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, including Ukraine" (Foreign Minister Wang, in March), and also denied support for or involvement in a series of actions by Russia, asserting that "China

is not a party to the crisis," but it also showed its de facto defense of Russia, such as its "understanding" of Russia's concerns about the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Regarding economic cooperation, China asserted that "sanctions are never the fundamental or effective way to solve problems," (in March, Chinese Foreign Ministry), and stressed its willingness to continue to engage in "normal trade cooperation" with Russia. On the other hand, amid indications from the US and other countries of sanctions against Chinese companies that violate sanctions against Russia, some Chinese companies announced that they would suspend their Russian-related business and transactions, and other moves were observed in China that appeared to be aimed at avoiding risks associated with economic cooperation with Russia.

In the area of cooperation in the international

Seeking to expand multilateral cooperation frameworks "without the US"

While the United States and other Western countries sought to strengthen unity based on common values in response to the situation in Ukraine, China sought to strengthen and expand its multilateral cooperation frameworks consisting of countries that do not necessarily share the strategy and values of the United States, in order to expand international support and understanding for its position.

The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), of which China held the presidency in 2022, expressed its willingness to expand its membership and strengthen the cooperative framework between the BRICS and "developing countries," and held its first foreign ministers' meeting (online in May) with non-BRICS "developing countries," such as Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, and Argentina. At the BRICS Summit (in June, online), President Xi implicitly criticized the US, saying, "Some countries attempt to expand military alliances to seek absolute security, stoke bloc-based confrontation, and pursue unilateral dominance at the expense of others' rights and interests," and called for the early expansion of membership, saying, "It is important to advance the process of BRICS membership expansion to allow

arena, President Xi himself stated that "China is willing to work with Russia to push for the development of the international order and global governance towards a more just and reasonable direction" (in June), clearly indicating that the two countries would continue to work together to reform the international order led by Western countries. At the first face-to-face meeting between the leaders of China and Russia since the Russian invasion of Ukraine (in September), President Xi made no specific reference to the situation in Ukraine, but expressed his willingness to further strengthen ties with Russia, saying that China would "work with Russia to extend strong mutual support on issues concerning each other's core interests," against a background of rising tension between the United States and China over the Taiwan issue.

like-minded partners to become part of the BRICS family at an early date."

At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which China describes as "a major force for defending international equity and justice," China called on its member states to "oppose peddling the false narrative of 'democracy against authoritarianism' and creating confrontation in the international community" (Foreign Minister Wang, in July) and called for further solidarity and cooperation. While the procedure for Iran to newly join SCO and other agendas were proceeding, China expressed its intention to expand the SCO over the medium to long term based on the country's vision of "equity and justice," saying, "The SCO should step up its work to expand the ranks of cooperation and augment the effective force for international equity and justice (President Xi, in September).

China also called for joint advocacy to protect the interests of "developing countries" in the frameworks of cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Pacific island nations, African nations, and other regions, and, from the standpoint of the "world's largest developing country," sought to expand support and cooperation among countries and regions.

New "Global Security Initiative" designed to bring together the broad international community


Regarding the US adoption of the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" and the establishment of the Japan-Australia-India-US (QUAD) framework and the "Australia-UK-US Partnership" (AUKUS) in recent years, China has criticized them as "spurring regional arms race, aggravating tension, and undermining regional unity and cooperation" (Chinese Foreign Ministry, in October 2021). After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the US sought to strengthen ties with allies and like-minded countries, including those in the Asia-Pacific region, while China became increasingly wary of the expansion of US influence in its own neighborhood, as evidenced by its recognition that "the US is trying to open a 'second front' and bring war to the Asia-Pacific region" (Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng, in May).

Under these circumstances, China, at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2022 hosted by China (in April, Hainan Province), implicitly criticized the US, saying that "bloc confrontation would only exacerbate security challenges in the 21st century" (President Xi), and proposed a new "Global Security Initiative" that encompasses China's traditional arguments on international security, such as opposition to "interference in internal affairs," "Cold War mentality," and "confrontation along ideological lines." China positioned the Initiative as "a new global public good offered by China and a vivid illustration of the vision of a community with a shared future for mankind in the security field" (Chinese Foreign Ministry, in April), emphasizing that it is widely open to the international community. On this basis, China widely communicated this Initiative to the international community through a variety of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic opportunities, along with the "Global Development Initiative" proposed in 2021, which places "development" at the top of the agenda for the international community.

At the 20th Party Congress (in October), President Xi expressed his determination to work with the international community to implement the "Global Development Initiative" and the "Global Security Initiative" with the aim of realizing a "community with a shared future for mankind." At the US-China Summit (in November), the first face-to-face

meeting since the inauguration of the Biden administration, held on the occasion of the G20 Bali Summit, China stressed that "China has no intention to challenge or displace the United States" and sought to control the confrontation with the US, while "advocating resolving disputes peacefully through dialogue and consultation, and deepening and expanding global partnerships," and "participating in and contributing to global development and pursuing common development with countries across the world," thereby expressing its intention to actively work for the realization of global security and development.

China is likely to continue to work under its own initiative to rally the international community at large in an increasingly complex international situation, in order to guide the Western-dominated international order in a "just and reasonable" direction and realize the "community with a shared future for mankind" that it has advocated.



It is supposed to refer to a world characterized by "lasting peace," "universal security," "common prosperity," "openness and inclusion," and "cleanliness and beauty."

(Based on the announcement of China's Foreign Ministry, etc.)

The "Belt and Road Initiative" at the crossroads of its 10th anniversary

In 2023, it will be 10 years since President Xi proposed the "Belt and Road Initiative" (the "Silk Road Economic Belt" and the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road"), an economic zone concept led by China to promote infrastructure construction and enhance interconnectivity in Eurasia and the South China Sea and Indian Ocean regions. President Xi stipulated the concept in the Party Constitution at the 19th Party Congress (in 2017), positioning it as "an important practical platform for promoting the building of a community with a shared future for humanity" (in May 2018, First Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee), and actively promoted it as the core of his foreign policy strategy.

The "line" of the initiative has been extended from the initial Eurasia to Pacific island countries, Africa, and Latin America, and the number of "partner countries" that have signed the cooperation document is 149. As of July, the scale of investment had reached approximately US\$1 trillion, and the areas of cooperation have expanded to include digital, health, environment, and many other areas. Foreign Minister Wang made his intention to use the initiative to shape the international order in his country's favor clear, saying that the initiative "began in the economic sector, but it does not end there, and it is becoming a new platform for better global governance" (in June 2021).

On the other hand, the external environment surrounding the "Belt and Road Initiative" is becoming increasingly severe.

Many projects are said to have been affected by local opposition to the environmental problems associated with development by Chinese companies, economic unprofitability, and terrorism by opposition forces that view China's economic expansion as an "occupation." AidData research lab in the US notes that 35% of the "Belt and Road Initiative" projects surveyed faced "implementation problems" such as corruption, labor problems, environmental problems, and protest demonstrations, and by September 2021, about 1% had stalled and about 7% had been cancelled.

Furthermore, in 2017, when Sri Lanka, strapped to repay its debt on the Hambantota Port and other facilities built with Chinese loans, leased the right to

operate the port to a Chinese company for 99 years, the United States and the European Union (EU) stepped up criticism of China's "debt traps" that increase influence over recipient countries in exchange for loans, and of Chinese lending practices that are "opaque and predatory" (former US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, in March 2018). And, in response to the "Belt and Road Initiative," they launched a series of infrastructure support measures for emerging countries, including the "Built Back Better World (B3W)" (in June 2021) and the "Global Gateway" (in December 2021). In addition, the spread of the new coronavirus has worsened the financial situation of many emerging economies, causing their debt repayments to China to fall into arrears. The World Bank report notes that China restructured at least 33 debts in the two years between 2020 and 2021.

Against this backdrop, Chinese investment changed. In 2021, the amount of investment and construction contracts for the "Belt and Road Initiative" was 48% less than in 2019, the year before the expansion of the infection (Green Finance and Development Center, Fudan University, in February). It appeared that the slowdown in the economy has led to an aversion to high-risk investments, and even in Sri Lanka, which had "flagship projects" (in January, Foreign Minister Wang) such as the aforementioned Hambantota Port and the Colombo Port City projects, no new investments were made in the first half of the year.

With no V-shaped recovery in the economy in sight, the possibility of a return to previous levels of investment is uncertain. In response, President Xi emphasized strengthening cooperation in cost-effective areas such as health, green, digital, and innovation, which tend to increase dependence on China, and proposed a new "Global Development Initiative" (UN General Assembly, in September 2021), advocating cooperation in soft areas such as sharing China's development experience. As a shift to this Initiative from the "Belt and Road Initiative" has been noted in the frequency of references in President Xi's speeches, it is drawing attention whether China will be able to maintain its appeal to emerging economies by such a "change of signboards."

China threatened to "have no choice but to fight" against any attempt to "separate Taiwan from China," and stepped up pressure of all kinds

China further intensified its pressure on Taiwan toward cross-Strait (China-Taiwan) "reunification," and frequently showed threatening postures. With Taiwan's authorities refusing to accept cross-Strait "reunification" and the US promoting involvement in Taiwan in mind, Defense Minister Wei Fenghe said that "if anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no choice but to fight at all costs" (in June), suggesting to use force against Taiwan, and Foreign Minister Wang Yi also reiterated his stance of no concessions on the "Taiwan question," saying, "The Taiwan question is at the very core of China's core interests" (in July).

Amid these events, following US House Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan and her meeting with President Tsai Ing-wen and others (in August), China established a no-sail/no-fly zone around the main island of Taiwan and conducted military exercises, as "a stern deterrent against the US and a serious warning against separatist activities seeking 'Taiwan independence'" (Chinese People's Liberation Army Eastern Theater Command spokesperson, in August). During the exercise, China also launched ballistic missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan for the first time in 26 years, and some of them fell into

Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In addition, warships and military aircraft crossed the "median line" of the Taiwan Strait, and unmanned aircraft flew over remote Taiwanese islands. Even after the Chinese People's Liberation Army announced the end of the exercise (August 10), it continued to operate and fly warships and warplanes in the sea and airspace around Taiwan.

Furthermore, China also exerted economic and social pressure, placing an embargo on some Taiwanese food products prior to and after US Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, and detaining a Taiwanese resident in China for "engaging in 'Taiwan independence' secessionist activities" (CCTV on August 3).

China released its third white paper on Taiwan policy in 22 years (in August), in which it reiterated the possibility of the use of force, saying, "We will only be forced to take drastic measures to respond to the provocation of separatist elements or external forces should they ever cross our red lines." Furthermore, at the 20th Party Congress (in October), the use of force was clearly stated as an option for the first time in the "Political Report" under the Xi Jinping administration.

With the international community taking an interest in the situation in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan developed security arrangements in various fields

Amid rising tensions across the Taiwan Strait, the US Biden administration notified Congress of its decision to sell arms to Taiwan, including anti-ship missiles (in February, April, June, July, and September), and launched a new economic framework with Taiwan, the "US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st-Century Trade" (in June), to strengthen cooperation with Taiwan in security, economic, and other areas.

Also, there was a growing movement to show solidarity with Taiwan in the international

community, with a succession of visits to Taiwan by dignitaries from Western countries and countries with which Taiwan has "diplomatic" relations.

Against this backdrop, Taiwan strengthened its security system in various areas. On the military front, President Tsai ordered an increase in the capabilities of reserve officers (in March), and the Executive Yuan's proposed budget for FY2023 includes a 14% increase in the national defense budget compared to FY2022. Also, at the civilian level, some private-sector organizations gave lectures

to citizens on how to respond to disinformation and how to rescue people, indicating the growing momentum to strengthen self-defense capabilities.

Furthermore, Taiwan tightened regulations on economic security with China in mind, and conducted investigations into companies that were believed to be extracting personnel with cutting-edge technologies (in March and May). Also, the "National Security Act," which stipulates penalties for acts which benefit the enemy, and the "Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area," which stipulates basic policies for human and economic exchange between China and Taiwan, were amended (in May) to establish penalties for leaking trade secrets related to "national core technologies" outside of Taiwan and for using such secrets outside of Taiwan, as well as to establish a system for regulating the leak of technologies to China, such as requiring persons engaged in work related to such technologies to report before and after their activities when they visit China.

Amid these circumstances, President Tsai announced her resignation as President of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party in response to the results of the local elections in Taiwan (in November), claiming that the elections "did not produce the desired results." China commented on the election results, saying that they "revealed that the mainstream public opinion in the island (Taiwan)" (spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, in November).

With an eye on 2027, the final year of the Xi administration's third term, China is expected to step up its various forms of pressure on Taiwan and its efforts to deter the United States and other countries, while also working to create public opinion in the international community favorable to China's claim on Taiwan. At the same time, it is believed that China will seek to create momentum for cross-strait "reunification" in preparation for the next presidential election (in 2024).

Dignitaries from Western countries and other countries that have "diplomatic" relations with Taiwan who visited Taiwan	
February	Prime Minister Briceño (Belize)
March	Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen, et al. (US) Former Secretary of State Pompeo (US)
April	Senator Menendez, et al. (US) Member of the Parliament Aberg, et al. (Sweden)
May	Deputy Minister of Development and Technology Piechowiak (Poland) Senator Duckworth (US)
June	Deputy Speaker of the Parliament Laurencik, et al. (Slovakia) Senator Guerriau, et al. (France) Vice Minister of Economy and Innovation Neliupsienė (Lithuania) Deputy Minister of Agriculture Giedraitis (Lithuania)
July	Senator Scott, et al. (US) Former Secretary of Defense Esper (US) European Parliament Vice President Beer (EU)
August	House Speaker Pelosi, et al. (US) Senator Markey, et al. (US) Senator Blackburn, et al. (US) Deputy Minister of Transport and Communications Vaiciukeviute (Lithuania) Foreign Minister Bucaro (Guatemala) Vice President Sengebau (Palau)
September	Prime Minister Natano (Tuvalu) Senator Pellevat, et al. (France) Representative Murphy, et al. (US) Vice-Minister of Economy and Innovation Zemaitis (Lithuania) Senator Drahoš, et al. (Czech Republic) Former Secretary of State Pompeo (US)
October	Member of Bundestag Willsch, et al. (Germany) Member of the Council of States Kumar, et al. (India) Representative Johnson, et al. (US) Member of the House of Commons Sgro, et al. (Canada) President Whipps (Palau) King Mswati III (Eswatini) Member of Bundestag Heidt (Germany) Member of Parliament Rudik, et al. (Ukraine) Member of Parliament Pavilionis, et al. (Lithuania) Member of Parliament Mardani, et al. (Indonesia)
November	Member of the European Parliament Bütikofer, et al. (Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China) Commissioner of Federal Communications Commission Carr (US) Prime Minister Drew (St. Christopher and Nevis) Minister of State at the Department for International Trade Hands (UK) President Kun (Nauru) Member of Bundestag Faber, et al. (Germany) Prime Minister Pierre (Saint Lucia) Member of the House of Commons Kearns, et al. (UK)

*Titles are as of the time of the visit

COLUMN

Measures against disinformation in Taiwan

In December 2018, Taiwan's Executive Yuan announced "measures to counter misinformation and to counter the harms of misinformation" in response to a strong sense of crisis over the proliferation of disinformation, in which it stated that the basic policy includes prompt dissemination of fact-checking information by authorities, promotion of citizens' ability to read and use media information, cooperation with private sector fact-checking organizations, emphasis on freedom of speech, and improvement of legal systems, etc. Furthermore, in the "2021 QDR (Quadrennial Defense Review)" issued by the Ministry of National Defense in March 2021, the disinformation dissemination by China was called "cognitive warfare" (the Taiwanese authorities defined it as "the manipulation of the enemy's emotions and values to influence their decision-making in order to make them accept political demands"), and expressed further alarm as the "threats to the national security."

When China conducted large-scale military

exercises around Taiwan in August, Taiwanese authorities also sent out fact-check information against disinformation allegedly disseminated by China. For example, on August 6, when the official Chinese government media, such as the "Xinhua News Agency," distributed photos that appeared to show a Chinese warship approaching Taiwan's coastline at a visible distance, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense sent out fact-check information to the effect that the photos were composite via SNS within 24 hours after the Chinese report.

Likewise, in Taiwan, concerted government and private sector efforts are carried on; for example, private sector fact-checking organizations are using SNS to collect information of questionable authenticity and announce the results of their analysis, and are providing citizens with education to improve their ability to read and utilize media information.

( See p. 16, "Disinformation continued to spread through cyberspace")

4

China sought to improve relations with Japan amid rising tensions over the Taiwan Strait**Strong opposition to Japan's moves on Taiwan and multilateral cooperation frameworks**

Throughout 2022, the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, China called on Japan to improve its relations with China, while at the same time taking a strong stance toward Japan on the "Taiwan question," which it positioned as its own "internal matter," and strongly opposed Japan's moves.

China strongly criticized Japan's announcement in the joint statement at the Japan-US Summit (in May) that Japan "reiterated the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues," along with its concern about the human rights situation in Hong Kong and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, saying that such statement "interfered in China's internal affairs, violated international law, and undermined China's sovereignty, security and development interests" (Foreign Ministry

spokesperson, in May).

Furthermore, in response to the statement of concern issued by the G7 foreign ministers, including Japan, on the occasion of the live-fire exercise conducted by China (in August) immediately after US House Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, China strongly opposed it, saying, "We firmly oppose it. The statement is nothing but a piece of paper" (Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in August) and expressed dissatisfaction that "Japan joined other members of G7 and the EU in issuing a joint statement which tries to justify the US's infringement on China's sovereignty" (Foreign Ministry spokesperson, in August), etc., and proposed cancellation of the scheduled Japan-China foreign ministerial meeting (Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in August).

In addition, China criticized the "Japan-Australia-

India-US (QUAD) Leaders' Meeting" (in May) and the "summit-level meeting on the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF)" (in May) held in Japan, saying that they were "in

essence a strategy that creates divisions and aims at containing China" (Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in May), regarding them as an expansion of the "encirclement network against China."

Maintaining its stance of restraining Japan over maritime interests, historical awareness, and other issues

Over maritime rights and interests, China obstinately allowed vessels belonging to the China Coast Guard to approach the Senkaku Islands, and unilaterally established a new maritime platform west of the geographical median line between Japan and China (in June), without responding to an early resumption of negotiations based on an agreement on resource development in the East China Sea (in June 2008), where the boundary between Japan and China has not yet been delineated. Also, just prior to the aforementioned Japan-US Summit, carrier-based aircrafts from the Chinese Navy's aircraft carrier "the Liaoning" conducted a demonstration in the Pacific Ocean south of Japan, repeatedly landing on and taking off from the carrier over a total of 12 days (in May).

With regard to historical awareness, China "lodged solemn *démarches* to the Japanese side" to "face squarely and reflect on its history of aggression" (Foreign Ministry spokesperson, in April, August, and October) when Prime Minister Fumio Kishida offered *masakaki* at Yasukuni Shrine and other occasions.

Furthermore, at a ceremony held to commemorate the 85th anniversary of the "Marco Polo Bridge Incident" (in July), Wang Huning, a member of the

Party's top leadership and a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau, emphasized the "war responsibility" of Japan, saying, "85 years ago today, the Japanese invaders caused the Marco Polo Bridge Incident to achieve their criminal ambition of annexing all of China by force."

In addition, China has repeatedly criticized Japan's policy of discharging treated water from TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station into the ocean (in April 2021), stating that "China firmly opposes" (Foreign Ministry spokesperson, in April), and in response to the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) foreign ministers' expression of concern about ocean discharges (in July, Suva, Fiji), China stated, "their statement reflects the world's grave concern, and this is not Japan's own matter" (in July, Foreign Ministry spokesperson), to contain Japan, and furthermore, at the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (in August, New York, USA), China asserted that "Japan should seriously respond to the concerns of the international community, and stop pushing through the sea discharge plan," indicating its continued efforts to make it an international issue (in August, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs).

With Japan-China relations stagnant, it sought to avoid worsening relations with Japan

Based on the "building of China-Japan relationship that meets the requirements of the new era" that China called for in the telephone conversation between the leaders of the two countries immediately after the Kishida administration took office (in October 2021), Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi mentioned "three pieces of advice" at a press

conference (in March) on the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China ((1) to keep the development of the bilateral relations in the direction of peace and friendship, (2) to honor the series of solemn commitments regarding Taiwan and history, and (3) to contribute to regional peace without forming Cold

War alliances) and expressed dissatisfaction with Japan's attitude toward China and called for efforts to improve relations. Also at the Japan-China Foreign Ministers' TV conference (in May), China again urged such efforts, as well as the need to strengthen economic and trade cooperation.

On the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China (on September 29), which came amid no signs of improvement in relations, President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese president to send a message of congratulations, showing some consideration for

relations with Japan. As President Xi began his third term in office in earnest immediately after the 20th Party Congress (in October), he attended the first Japan-China Summit meeting in about three years during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit (in November, Bangkok, Thailand), and, while asserting his previous position on Taiwan, historical awareness and other issues, told Prime Minister Kishida that "the importance of China-Japan relationship has not changed and will not change," to express his commitment to improving relations.

Continued to reach out to Japan, backed by close economic relations

While wary of Japan's moves to strengthen ties with the US to realize the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP), China, on the occasion of Prime Minister Kishida's second cabinet reshuffle, stated that it "hopes that the new Japanese cabinet can work with the Chinese side in the same direction, and advance the bilateral relations along the right track for steady development" (Foreign Ministry spokesperson, in August), and also on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, President Xi stressed the need of "the building of a China-Japan relationship that meets the requirements of the new era," indicating China's desire to improve its relations with Japan.

Meanwhile, total trade between Japan and China in 2021 reached a record high for the first time in 10 years, and in the first half of 2022, Japan's imports from China also reached a record high. In Japan, since April, Chinese Ambassador to Japan Kong Xuanyou held a series of meetings with Japanese business executives, with participation in an exchange event hosted by an economic organization (in April) to begin with, and Premier Li Keqiang held a "high-level

video dialogue" (in September) with representatives of Japanese business community, including the Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), and expressed his expectations for further strengthening economic ties, saying, "Recent years have seen consecutive new highs in bilateral trade volume, and China is ready to work with Japan to upgrade the multi-tier cooperation between the two countries and to make good use of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)." Also, at the aforementioned Japan-China summit meeting (in November), President Xi stated, "With their economies highly interdependent, the two countries need to step up dialogue and cooperation in keeping supply chains stable, so as to realize complementarity and mutual benefits at a higher level." China expanded practical cooperation with Japan in the economic field through the framework of international economic partnerships, and while pursuing pragmatic interests by building a strong economic relationship, it is believed that China aimed to check the hardening of public opinion in Japan toward China and to drive a wedge in the "encirclement network against China" initiated by the United States.

1

As the conflict with the West deepened due to the invasion of Ukraine, Putin's administration struggled to avoid international isolation and maintain domestic stability

Focusing on strengthening relations with countries that do not participate in sanctions to improve the external environment

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February (👉 See p. 6, "Special Feature 1: The World Shaken by Russia's Invasion of Ukraine") led to a variety of sanctions from Western countries, including those in the financial sector, such as the freezing of foreign currency reserves and the exclusion of major banks from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). In response, President Putin signed an Executive Order designating countries and regions that participated in sanctions against Russia as "unfriendly countries," and imposed restrictions on natural gas exports, demonstrating Russia's opposition to the sanctions.

On the other hand, in its relations with China, Russia was all about showing off the partnership between the two countries externally. In February, President Putin visited China for the Beijing 2022 Olympic Winter Games, and at a meeting with President Xi Jinping, they issued a joint statement calling for "no limits, no forbidden areas of cooperation." Also, after the invasion of Ukraine began, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited China in March as his first overseas trip, and a video message from President Xi criticizing sanctions against Russia was shown at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June. On the military front, 2,000 Chinese troops participated in "Vostok-2022," a large-scale military exercise in the Russian Far East (in September).

As for relations with India, Foreign Minister Lavrov visited India in April, following his visit to China, and met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other leaders, and at the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Summit held online

Major financial sanctions against Russia by the US and the EU

- Freezing of funds for individuals and organizations
- Prohibition of trading in government bonds
- Freezing of foreign currency reserves
- Exclusion of major banks from SWIFT
- Regulation of trading of crypto assets
- Prohibition of transactions with major banks

(Based on various sources)

in June, President Vladimir Putin called for unity within the framework, while expressing his opposition to the West.

In relations with former Soviet republics, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) dispatched peacekeeping forces under Russia's leadership during the January uprising in Kazakhstan, and after the invasion of Ukraine began, President Putin appealed for deeper alliance relations at the CSTO Summit in Moscow in May.

Despite these efforts, however, Russia's relations with China, India, and other countries began to show signs of breakdown as its aggression against Ukraine dragged on. During the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit held in Uzbekistan in September, China and Russia held one-on-one meeting in which Russia praised China's "balanced" response to the Ukrainian issue, but failed to issue a joint statement. Moreover, at a separate meeting between the Russian and Indian leaders, Prime Minister Modi complained to President Putin that "today's era is not an era of war." Furthermore, the situation in the former Soviet republics became increasingly unstable, as evidenced by the recurrence of armed clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed territory between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and in the border region between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

1

2

3

4

5

Internal Situation

1

2

3

4

While Russia has been at odds with the West over its invasion of Ukraine, it is not necessarily in step with China and India, and its external options, such as rallying countries that do not participate in

sanctions, have been narrowed, so it is likely to find itself in an even more difficult diplomatic position in the future.

Increased repression of anti-war movements and independent media to justify invasion

Within Russia, following the start of the invasion of Ukraine (in February), which was called a "special military operation," there were protests in various parts of the country, as well as media coverage, especially in the independent media, criticizing the invasion. In response, the Putin administration sought to suppress this anti-war public opinion by drastically restricting freedom of the press and speech.

The authorities strictly regulated street protests as unauthorized demonstrations and revised the criminal code and other laws (in March) to crack down on those who protested on charges of "dissemination of false information" about Russian military activities and "defamation." Independent media outlets were also subject to this law and were forced to refrain from anti-war reporting or suspend their activities, resulting in a marked decline in coverage of the invasion within Russia.

In parallel with these restrictions on the press and speech, the administration also focused on disseminating propaganda to bolster the "patriotic" mood in order to increase President Putin's centripetal force. The "special military operation" was positioned as a "liberation operation" against Nazism and genocide, and propaganda was repeatedly disseminated to portray the soldiers participating in the operation as heroes and to stir up the threat of the Western countries. As a result, a "patriotic" mood grew in Russia, and according to a survey by the Levada Center, an independent public opinion research organization, President Putin's approval rating rose to 83% in March, shortly after the invasion began, and remained high thereafter.

In the nationwide local elections (in September),

the first major elections since the invasion, the administration (the ruling party) won a landslide victory backed by the authorities' repression of anti-regime factions and President Putin's high approval rating. Of the 83 federal constituent entities (Russia claimed 85, including the Crimean peninsula, at the time of the elections), all of the heads of government or acting heads of government won in the elections for the 15 federal constituent entities, and in the parliamentary elections for the 6 federal constituent entities, the ruling party "United Russia" won more than two-thirds of the seats in all 6 parliaments.

However, after the elections, when President Putin signed an Executive Order (in September) on partial mobilization to call up citizens for military service, which he had avoided in order to maintain domestic stability, against the backdrop of the deteriorating war situation, public unrest and discontent surfaced in Russian society, as protests flared up in various parts of the country, and people fled the country on a large scale to avoid mobilization. On the other hand, President Putin's approval rating was 77% even in September, immediately after the signing of the Executive Order, and remained high thereafter (Levada Center, an independent public opinion research organization).

The Putin administration is expected to continue restricting speech and disseminating propaganda in an effort to maintain its centripetal power, but if the war becomes more protracted, it would be difficult to suppress growing dissatisfaction with the regime even with these methods, and a prolonged invasion of Ukraine is likely to cause a decline in the Putin administration's centripetal power and weaken its base of power.

Accelerating de-dollarization of Russia


The Russian economy has traditionally relied heavily on the SWIFT remittance system, with the majority of its core oil and gas exports settled in dollars. However, as US sanctions against Russia were strengthened following the 2014 Ukraine crisis, the Putin administration made it a priority to break away from this situation and actively promoted efforts to shift away from the dollar.

Specifically, through agreements with foreign countries and decisions by state-owned enterprises, the dollar's share of Russia's import and export settlement currency was gradually reduced, the dollar's share of the central bank's foreign exchange reserves was lowered, and the creation of its own remittance system, SPFS (Russian abbreviation for "financial messages transfer system"), to replace SWIFT, was promoted.

Under such circumstances, Western countries decided to freeze Russia's foreign currency reserves in response to Russia's current aggression against Ukraine. In March, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov announced that "about \$300 billion of the total of \$640 billion in foreign exchange reserves is not available" due to blocked access to reserves. As a result, it became difficult for the central bank to intervene in the exchange rate to support the ruble, and the value of the currency plunged from the 70 ruble per dollar level to the 120 ruble per dollar level at one point. Prices in Russia also rose, and people rushed to withdraw their deposits at commercial banks. Since April, however, the ruble has recovered, thanks in part to emergency measures taken by the Russian government, such as raising the policy

interest rate from 9.5% to 20%. The prior shift away from the dollar was also successful, as Chinese yuan and gold constituted a large portion of the still available foreign exchange reserves.

The Russian government is likely to further strengthen its de-dollarization policy in response to the new sanctions against Russia, which have once again highlighted the risks of dependence on the dollar and the euro. However, the feasibility of this policy would depend on the response of China and India, which are purchasing larger amounts of Russian oil than before, and the relative influence of the Chinese yuan on the Russian economy is likely to increase.



Composition of Russia's foreign exchange reserves (as of the end of each year, based on the announcement of the Central Bank of Russia (<https://cbr.ru>))

Putin's regime to strengthen "patriotism" education

In Russia, so-called "patriotism" education was strengthened against the backdrop of the invasion of Ukraine.

In March, shortly after the invasion began, the Russian Ministry of Education, as part of its pre-existing "Russian Federation National Patriotic Development Program," produced a video for schoolchildren titled "Defenders of Peace" to propagandize the invasion of Ukraine as a peace effort to help the people of Donbass.

In September of the new school year, new educational standards were introduced that clearly stated the educational policies such as "nurturing civics," "nurturing patriotism," "nurturing spiritual and moral development," etc., and new classes "Talking about Important Things" were started aimed at raising the national flag and singing the national anthem and "building pride in Russia" in schools. In the relevant

document that outlined the aforementioned policy of "nurturing" education, it was indicated that the goal was to nurture "those who are prepared to defend the motherland," etc., and the materials for third- and fourth-grade elementary school teachers for the class "Talking about Important Things" initially included the phrases "The happiness of the motherland is more precious than life" and "It is not scary to die for the motherland." These phrases caused controversy in Russia, and there was some confusion as they were removed just before the class was to begin.

In addition, the establishment of new government-run youth organizations based in schools was promoted, and a related law was passed in July. According to the law, the new government-run youth organizations aimed to nurture young people with "traditional Russian spiritual and moral values" and "love for the motherland," and according to local

reports, up to 18 million children and students were expected to join.

These moves to strengthen "patriotism" education were seen as an attempt to stabilize the base of Putin's government by expanding the conservative

base of his administration to include younger generations, and to create a social environment that will allow the line he has pursued to continue into the future, with a view to a post-Putin era.

2

With Japan-Russia relations at a total standstill due to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia increased its military activities in the Northern Territories and surrounding areas

Reacting to Japan's response to the invasion, a series of "countermeasures" were announced

In Japan-Russia relations, although a telephone summit between Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and President Putin (in February) agreed to continue dialogue, including the negotiations toward the conclusion of a peace treaty, the start of Russian invasion of Ukraine (in February) affected various areas, including political dialogue and personal exchanges.

Russia took a series of hard-line measures against Japan, including positioning Japan as an "unfriendly country" (in March, Russian government), which condemned for its aggression against Ukraine, and announcing that it would not continue negotiations toward the conclusion of a peace treaty, calling this a "countermeasure" (in March, Russian Foreign Ministry statement) to Japan's policy toward Russia.

In addition, the Russian military conducted demonstration activities in cooperation with China in the vicinity of Japan, including joint flights by Chinese and Russian bombers (in May and November) and joint navigation by Chinese and Russian naval vessels over a period of about a month (in September).

Furthermore, on the economic front, President Putin signed an Executive Order (in June and October) to change the project ownership of the "Sakhalin 2" and "Sakhalin 1" oil and natural gas projects in Sakhalin, in which Japanese companies are also participating, with an eye to deterring unfriendly countries, and he has made it clear that the government's involvement in these projects will be strengthened.

Major hard-line measures taken by Russia against Japan

- Approved a list including Japan as an "unfriendly country" (in March)
- Announced measures including not continuing the negotiations toward the conclusion of a peace treaty (in March)
- Announced the expulsion of 8 Japanese diplomats working in Russia (in April)
- Announced ban on 63 Japanese nationals, including Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, from entering Russia (in May)
- Announced suspension of implementation of the framework agreement concerning "safe operations" in the waters around the Four Northern Islands (in June)
- Announced ban on 384 members of Japan's House of Representatives from entering Russia (in July)
- Signed a government decree terminating the validity of agreements such as the "Visa Free Exchange" (in September)
- Announced the expulsion of one member of the Consulate General in Vladivostok (in September)

(Based on various media reports)

Started applying tax exemption system in the Northern Territories to attract investment, and continued active military activities

With regard to the development of the Northern Territories, President Putin signed a bill (in March) to amend the tax code to introduce a tax exemption system for the "Kurile Islands" (the Kurile Islands and the Northern Territories), showing an aggressive attitude toward attracting private investment, including foreign capital. Also, the Russian government amended (in June) the Federal Target Program "Socio-economic Development of the Kurile Islands for 2016-2025," significantly reducing expenditures from the federal budget from approximately 28.9 billion rubles to approximately 6.7 billion rubles, resulting in an increased reliance on private investment for the development of the Northern Territories. At the "7th Eastern Economic Forum" held in this context (in September, Vladivostok), a session on the investment potential of the "Kurile Islands" was held for the first time, and business negotiations, mainly by the private sector, were very active, with several agreements related to the Northern Territories concluded, including the construction of a hotel on Etorofu

Island.

In the Northern Territories, even after the invasion of Ukraine began, the Russian military demonstrated its "rock solid" defense posture in the Eastern Area by conducting military exercises, such as landing interdiction training (in March), which mobilized about 3,000 military personnel, and air defense drills (in September) using the "S-300V4" surface-to-air missile, while its military resources were concentrated in Ukraine. In addition, during the large-scale military exercise "Vostok-2022" held in the Russian Far East (in September), exercises were also conducted in the Northern Territories, which had been excluded from the exercise area in the previous Vostok exercise (in 2018).

Since these series of military exercises in the Northern Territories are seen as a demonstration against Japan, which accuses aggression against Ukraine, there is concern that Russia will continue its active military activities in and around the Northern Territories in the future, thereby strengthening its deterrence against Japan.

COLUMN

Information dissemination by the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Japan

The Russian Embassy in Japan has been active in sending out messages via SNS, including introductions of statements by Russian government officials and posts aimed at propagating Russia's claims while criticizing Japan's response to the situation in Ukraine, such as a post (in February) in response to Japan's condemnation of Russian aggression in Ukraine, which stated, "Japan has twice supported the Nazi regime in less than 100 years."

The Russian Embassy in Japan temporarily increased the number of posts on SNS significantly after Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, and in March, the average number of posts on Twitter increased by about 70% from the average in January and February. In addition to the existing SNS, it opened a new account on Telegram (in February) to spread the country's claims about the legitimacy of its invasion of Ukraine and other issues.

The Russian Embassy in Japan is expected to



Changes in the number of posts on the Twitter account of the Embassy of Russia in Japan in 2022

continue to actively disseminate information, including through SNS, in order to spread the Russian government's claims in Japan.

1

Concerns about international terrorism originating in Afghanistan and continuing threat of international terrorism in Africa and other parts of the world

The year 2022 was marked by continued concern that Afghanistan would become a launching point for international terrorism. It was pointed out that even after the "Taliban" seized power in August 2021, various international terrorist organizations continued to operate in the country. In particular, the "Taliban," which is said to be cooperating with "Al-Qaeda," is said to be providing "Al-Qaeda" with an environment in which it can operate freely. In addition, the possibility was pointed out that "Khorasan Province," an organization affiliated with the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL), which is also conducting terrorism based in Afghanistan, may improve its ability to carry out international terrorism. Thus, the country was seen to be in a situation where international terrorist organizations could be active, and there was a risk of international terrorism

originating from the country.

Terrorist attacks by ISIL, its affiliates, and "Al-Qaeda" affiliates continued to occur in Africa and other parts of the world. In the Sahel countries and Somalia, in particular, these organizations frequently carried out terrorist attacks, raising fears of a further deterioration in security. In Syria and Iraq, ISIL continued to carry out terrorist attacks against security forces and civilians. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, the "Khorasan Province" carried out high-profile attacks. In Southeast Asia, ISIL affiliates continued to operate in their traditional strongholds, particularly in the southern Philippines, despite a crackdown. Also in Europe, a terrorist attack in Oslo, the capital of Norway, was reportedly carried out by a radical Islamist (in June). Thus, the threat of international terrorism continued in many parts of the world.

COLUMN

International terrorist organizations continued to operate in Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, where the "Taliban" seized control in August 2021, the activities of various international terrorist organizations were pointed out, although the "Taliban" denied the existence of "Al-Qaeda" and foreign fighters (non-Afghans) in the country (in July, UN Security Council report, see Note).

"Al-Qaeda" is said to be enjoying freedom of movement under the "rule" of the "Taliban," and the number of statements in which its supreme leader Zawahiri appears on film increased compared to before the "Taliban" seized control of Afghanistan. Also, the "Al-Qaeda"-affiliated "Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent" (AQIS) has fighters in Afghanistan who are mainly from Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, and Pakistan, as well as some who are reportedly active in "Taliban" units.

In addition, the "Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan" (TTP) reportedly has 3,000 to 4,000 foreign fighters in

Afghanistan, and the "Jamaat Ansarullah" mainly composed of Tajiks is also reported to have foreign fighters deployed along the Tajikistan border with "Taliban" units.

Meanwhile, "Khorasan Province," an affiliate of the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) based in Afghanistan and hostile to the "Taliban," continued to carry out terrorist attacks against Shia residents and Sikhs, in addition to attacks against the "Taliban," and was also active in Pakistan, carrying out suicide bombings in a Shia mosque in the northwest of Pakistan in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (in March). Some have pointed out that "Khorasan Province" could be "positioned to develop a global threat capability from Afghanistan" (in July, UN Security Council report).

There is concern that these international terrorist organizations will continue to operate from their bases in Afghanistan.

(Note) All of the UN Security Council reports stated in "4 International Terrorism" mean "Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the UN Security Council ISIL and 'Al-Qaeda' Sanctions Committee."

Demanding new allegiance to the new supreme leaders

The "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) announced the appointment of new supreme leaders without revealing their identities following the deaths of its supreme leaders in February and October, respectively, and called for new pledges of allegiance as a sign of submission to the new supreme leaders (in March, November). In response to this demand,

fighters from ISIL and its affiliates in various regions successively pledged their allegiance (in March, December). ISIL demonstrated that it maintained its cohesion by reiterating the allegiance of its fighters and releasing images purportedly showing them pledging allegiance after either of its supreme leaders took office.

Continued terrorism in Syria and Iraq despite cleanup operations by security forces and others

The number of ISIL terrorist attacks has been on a long-term downward trend due to repeated cleanup operations by security forces and the coalition of the willing against ISIL.

However, ISIL, which still has 6,000 to 10,000 fighters in Syria and Iraq and \$25 million to \$50

million in funding (UN Security Council report, in July), repeatedly carried out terrorist attacks in Syria and Iraq, using small arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to ambush security forces and kill civilians who cooperate with them.

Calls for retaliation for the death of the supreme leader and migration to Africa

ISIL called for the execution of terrorist attacks through statements by its spokesperson and the Arabic-language weekly "Al-Nabaa," and continuously reported the number of casualties and destroyed vehicles as a result of terrorist attacks by its own organization and affiliated organizations in various regions. Among these, the April statement by the spokesperson called for retaliation for the death of the supreme leader in February, which was responded to by a temporary increase in terrorist attacks in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and other countries by the organization and its affiliates in various regions.

In addition, since around 2020, ISIL has frequently highlighted and praised the activities of its African affiliates, such as the "Central Africa Province" and

the "West Africa Province," in its propaganda activities in order to support the expansion of its power in Africa. Furthermore, in June, in "Al-Nabaa," it called on Muslims for the first time to "emigrate to the land of Africa," saying "Africa is the land of Jihad."

ISIL is expected to continue to carry out terrorist attacks against security forces and other targets in Syria and Iraq, the centers of its activities, even though its power is being reduced, and to continue to demonstrate that it is alive and well by emphasizing its influence beyond Syria and Iraq through propaganda activities focused on its increasingly active affiliated organizations in Africa.

COLUMN

A series of attacks on prisons and other facilities called for by the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL)

Since losing all of its territory in March 2019, the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) has made releasing its own fighters through prison raids a top priority in statements by its supreme leader and spokespersons, and has frequently called for this to be done. The background to this is pointed out that ISIL sees the release of its fighters as a means of regaining power (in July, UN Security Council report). In fact, in Syria, an attack on a facility housing fighters of their own organization led to the escape of hundreds of fighters (in January), and it was pointed out that the then supreme leader was leading the attack (in February, announced by the White House). The facilities housing ISIL fighters in northeastern Syria, including the facility in question, are university facilities, etc., whose primary purpose is not to house them, and are inadequately guarded, and counterterrorism experts have pointed out the fragility of the management system.

In Nigeria, the ISIL-affiliated "West Africa Province" attacked a prison near the capital Abuja and 879 people, including fighters of its own organization, escaped (in July).

Also in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the ISIL-affiliated "Central Africa Province" attacked a prison in the eastern province of North Kivu (in August), leading to the escape of more than 800 people, including fighters of its own organization. In October 2020, the group also attacked a prison, causing more than 1,300 people to escape.

It has been pointed out that ISIL and its affiliates are likely to continue to attempt to free their own fighters by attacking prisons and other facilities as a means of regaining power (in July, UN Security Council report), and there is concern that similar incidents may continue to occur.

3

"Al-Qaeda" closely watched after US announcement of killing of its supreme leader

US announced the killing of its supreme leader


While the US has been conducting counterterrorism operations around the world, President Biden announced in August that "Al-Qaeda" supreme leader Ayman Zawahiri had been killed in an airstrike in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. Also, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken issued a press statement criticizing the "Taliban," stating that "the 'Taliban' hosted and sheltered the supreme leader of 'Al-Qaeda' in Kabul," and pointing out that Zawahiri was under the shelter of the "Taliban" (in August).

The "Taliban," on the other hand, initially denied that an airstrike had occurred in Kabul when the Afghan media reported it (in July), but later admitted that a US drone strike had been conducted and criticized the US. The "Taliban" claimed at a press conference in August that "no investigation has been completed" regarding the US announcement of killing Zawahiri, and did not disclose whether he was in Kabul or whether he was dead or alive.

The future of promotional activities and organizational management

Even before the announcement of the US killing of Zawahiri, "Al-Qaeda" had been advocating the need to attack the US and Israeli interests, as well as the unity of the Islamic community and mujahidin (jihadists), and especially after the seizure of Afghanistan by the "Taliban" (in August 2021), "Al-Qaeda" became more active in its propaganda activities, such as increasing the number of statements issued, including the number of Zawahiri appearances in videos (📺 See graph at right).

Even after the US announcement of Zawahiri's killing, "Al-Qaeda" continued to issue statements, etc., beginning with its criticism of the US, Saudi Arabia, and others (in August) in response to President Biden's participation in the "Jeddah Security and Development Summit" (in July) held in Jeddah, western Saudi Arabia. On the 21st anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the US, which they consider to be the greatest achievement of their organization, although it was not a statement in Zawahiri's name as they had been doing since 2018, they praised the execution of the attacks again in their organ-magazine "One Ummah" (No. 4 in the English edition), and published articles related to Somalia, which showed their interest in Somalia (in September). Also, after the announcement of Zawahiri's killing, the first statement in which Zawahiri appeared was issued, stressing the need for the Islamic community to unite for the liberation of



Islamic lands (in September). However, in none of these statements did Zawahiri's life or death come to light.

Thus, "Al-Qaeda" is expected to continue to issue statements and other materials after the US announcement of Zawahiri's killing to demonstrate its legitimacy and presence and to continue to operate its organization, and the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center in the US, Christine Abizaid, stated that the threat of terrorism from "Al-Qaeda" remains a concern (in September), and the future management of the organization and its impact on the international terrorism situation will be a focus of attention.

4

Terrorism continued to occur in many parts of the world, especially frequently in Africa


In the Middle East and Africa, terrorist attacks by the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL), its affiliates, and "Al-Qaeda" affiliates, etc. continued

In Syria and Iraq, the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) repeatedly conducted terrorist attacks targeting security forces and other targets, and attacked facilities housing ISIL fighters, causing several hundred fighters to escape (in January) (📺 See p. 52, "COLUMN: A series of attacks on prisons and other facilities called for by the 'Islamic

State of Iraq and the Levant' (ISIL)").

In Iran, armed men attacked a Shiite religious site in the southern province of Fars, the first time in nearly four years that ISIL claimed responsibility in the country (in October).

In Turkey, a bomb exploded in western Istanbul, killing six civilians. The Turkish government



Map of the Middle East and Africa (Countries in yellow are those described in the text)

announced that the attack was perpetrated by the "Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan" (PKK) (in November).

Tensions rose in Israel in March and April, with a series of terrorist attacks targeting civilians and police officers in various locations. Some of these attacks were believed to have been spontaneously conducted by ISIL supporters, and it was pointed out that a certain number of ISIL supporters may exist in the country.

In Yemen, the ISIL-affiliated "Province of Yemen" claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing attack on a convoy of "Houthi" Shiite militants in the southern province of Al-Bayda for the first time in nearly two years (in July). Also, "Al-Qaeda"-affiliated "Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula" (AQAP) conducted terrorist attacks against Yemeni government forces and other targets in the central province of Shabwah, the southern province of Abyan, and the province of Al-Bayda.

In Egypt, the ISIL-affiliated "Sinai Province" continued to conduct terrorist attacks in the northeastern province of North Sinai, including repeated bombings against security officials and attacks on pro-Israel tribespeople.


In the Sahel, "Al-Qaeda" affiliates and ISIL affiliates frequently conducted terrorist attacks. The "Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims" (JNIM), which has ties to the "Al-Qaeda"-affiliated "Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb" (AQIM), conducted a suicide bombing against the Kati base, the largest in the country's military, on the outskirts

of Bamako, the capital of Mali (in July), and also in Burkina Faso, JNIM repeatedly attacked security forces in the northern province of Yatenga and other areas. Also, the ISIL-affiliated "Sahel Province" attacked a military base in Gao Province in eastern Mali (in March). ISIL had previously claimed battle results in the region under the name of the ISIL-affiliated "West Africa Province," but for unknown reasons, since the attack on the military base, they have started claiming under the name of the "Sahel Province." In Nigeria, the "West Africa Province" expanded its area of operations from northeast to central Nigeria by attacking a prison near the capital, Abuja, and causing 879 people to escape (in July).

In Somalia, "Al-Qaeda"-affiliated "Al-Shabaab" conducted a car bomb attack in front of the Ministry of Education building in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia (in October), and the first attack from Somali territory against Ethiopian territory (in July) and other frequent terrorist attacks.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the ISIL-affiliated "Central Africa Province" repeatedly attacked villages in the northeastern province of Ituri (in March) and a prison in the eastern province of North Kivu, from which more than 800 people escaped (in August).

In Mozambique, the ISIL-affiliated "Mozambique Province" claimed the killing of three soldiers in the country's northern province of Cabo Delgado (in May). ISIL had previously claimed the results of the battle in the country under the name of "Central Africa Province," but as in the case of "Sahel Province," it has claimed the results under the name



of "Mozambique Province" since the soldier's killing.

The number of terrorist attacks in Africa claimed by ISIL exceeded the number of attacks in Syria and Iraq for the first time in 2022 (📊). See chart on page

54). In particular, ISIL-affiliated organizations and "Al-Qaeda"-affiliated organizations are expected to continue to conduct terrorist attacks in various parts of Africa in the future.

In Southwest and South Asia, terrorist attacks by organizations affiliated with the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) and others continued to occur in order to assert their presence

In Afghanistan, the ISIL-affiliated "Khorasan Province" conducted a terrorist attack on a Sikh temple in the capital Kabul (in June) and a suicide bombing near the Russian Embassy (in September), while continuing attacks against the "Taliban," who have seized control of the country. In addition, the group repeatedly attacked Shiite residents in the northern province of Balkh, the western province of Herat, and other areas. In Pakistan, the "Khorasan Province" executed a suicide bombing in a Shiite mosque in the northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (in March), and the ISIL-affiliated "Pakistan Province" executed a suicide bombing in the southwestern province of Balochistan, targeting security authorities (in March). Also, the "Balochistan Liberation Army" (BLA), a separatist and pro-independence group, positioned China

expanding into Pakistan as an "occupier" and carried out a suicide bombing near the "Confucius Institute" in the southern province of Sindh, killing four people, including three Chinese nationals (in April). Furthermore, the "Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan" (TTP), which seeks to enforce Islamic law in the areas it controls, repeatedly clashed with the security authorities.

In India, the ISIL-affiliated "Hind Province" claimed to conduct shootings against security officials in the northern part of the country's administered Kashmir region (in July).

In the Southwest and South Asia region, the ISIL-affiliated organizations have demonstrated their presence by carrying out high-profile terrorist attacks, and there is concern that such attacks will continue to occur in the future.

In Southeast Asia, the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL)-related organizations continued terrorist activities despite crackdowns

In the Philippines, ISIL affiliates such as the "Abu Sayyaf Group" (ASG), some groups of the "Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters" (BIFF), and the "Maute Group" continued to be exposed and their members surrendered as the security authorities conducted cleanup operations. However, these ISIL affiliates continued to operate in their traditional strongholds in the south, where the ASG attacked a national army unit in Sulu, killing a soldier (in January), and an armed group suspected of BIFF ties attacked the convoy of a police chief in Maguindanao, killing him and another (in August).

In Indonesia, more than 50 members of ISIL-

affiliated organizations, including the "Jamaah Ansharut Daulah" (JAD) and the "Mujahidin Indonesia Timur" (MIT), were arrested between January and July amid ongoing crackdowns by the security authorities. Also, a series of terrorist plots against police authorities were exposed (in February and May).

In the Southeast Asia region, ISIL-affiliated organizations are expected to maintain their strongholds and continue to engage in terrorist activities, despite continued sweeps and crackdowns by the security authorities.

In Europe, terrorist attacks by those believed to be inspired by Islamic extremism continued to occur

In Europe, two people were killed and 21 others were injured when a man opened fire in downtown Oslo, the capital of Norway (in June). The man reportedly was a radical Islamist and belonged to a network of radical Islamist groups in Norway.

There was also a string of ISIL and "Al-Qaeda" related arrests. In Spain, three people were arrested for abusing nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to finance the activities of "Al-Qaeda" fighters (in March). In Germany, an ISIL supporter was arrested for allegedly translating and distributing documents and videos issued by ISIL into German (in June). In

Italy, a man and a woman who wanted to join ISIL were arrested for allegedly planning bombings (in June).

In recent years, there have been no confirmed terrorist attacks in Western countries directly perpetrated by ISIL or "Al-Qaeda." However, ISIL and others are continuing to call for terrorist attacks against Western countries on the Internet, and there is concern that terrorist attacks will continue to be conducted by those who are inspired by Islamist extremism and have no ties to terrorist organizations.

COLUMN

Radical Islamist organizations around the world protested over "blasphemous" statements in India about the Islamic Prophet Muhammad

In late May, a statement made by an official of India's ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), on a TV program about the Islamic Prophet Muhammad was widely viewed as "blasphemy" against Islam in the Middle East and other Asian countries, prompting boycotts of Indian products and protests calling for severe punishment of the BJP official who made the statement. Against this backdrop, radical Islamist organizations in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa (👉 See table below) also reacted, continuing to issue statements and other actions.

Specifically, an "Al-Qaeda"-affiliated "Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent" (AQIS) that intends to expand its activities in India and other countries, issued a statement positioning terrorism as a duty of Muslims (in June), and "Al-Azaim," a media outlet affiliated with "Khorasan Province," an affiliate of the "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) in Afghanistan, issued an online magazine and claimed that "Jihad is the only way to protect the honor of the Prophet" (in June).

Amid a flurry of such statements and online

publications, in Kabul, the Afghan capital, the "Khorasan Province" attacked a Sikh temple, killing and wounding a number of Hindus and Sikhs (in June). Also, in the western Indian state of Rajasthan, two Muslim men killed a Hindu man with a knife, claiming that they had "decapitated a man who blasphemed against the Prophet" (in June).

Following this, the reactionary stance of radical Islamist organizations continued, such as "Al-Qaeda" calling for a boycott of Indian goods in its organ-magazine "One Ummah" (No. 7 in Arabic edition) (in August), and ISIL claiming in a statement, "Why are you Muslims silent? Hindus insulted the Prophet because they saw your silence" (in September).

As described above, radical Islamist organizations in various regions showed strong interest in "blasphemous" statements about the Islamic Prophet Muhammad, and there is concern that similar incidents in the future may result not only in the issuing of statements, but also in the occurrence of terrorist attacks in various regions.

Major radical Islamist organizations that showed opposition to the "blasphemy" statement in India	
Asia	
"Al-Qaeda"	"Ansar al-Islam" (AAI)
"Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent" (AQIS)	"Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) "Khorasan Province"
"Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan" (TTP)	"Mujahideen Ghazwat-ul-Hind" (MGH)
Middle East	
ISIL	"Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula" (AQAP)
Africa	
"Al-Shabaab"	

Activities aimed at acquiring materials and technologies, etc. that can be diverted to military purposes

Iran continued to produce highly enriched uranium, pursued missile development activities, and its activities of procurement and proliferation of related materials require vigilance

Over the nuclear issue, Iran, as a countermeasure to the US withdrawal from the "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" (JCPOA) (May 2018) and the subsequent re-imposition of economic sanctions against Iran, announced a gradual suspension of some measures to fulfill its obligations under the JCPOA from May 2019, and began production of uranium enriched to 60% (in April 2021), far above the limit (3.67%) set in the JCPOA. Although Iran emphasized the peaceful use of nuclear energy, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its 60% enriched uranium stockpile continued to increase (Report by the Director General of the IAEA, in September), and Western think tanks and others indicated that Iran would approach the nuclear weapons grade of 90% enrichment if it continued enriching its uranium.

Indirect talks between the US and Iran to rebuild the nuclear agreement, which began in April 2021 through the mediation of the JCPOA parties (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia, and China) and the European Union (EU), were suspended after mid-March, but have since been held intermittently (in June and August), and although there were moves toward a conclusion, including the presentation of the "final text" by the EU (in August), the talks remain stalled. Regarding the restructuring of the nuclear agreement, Iran stated "we have a strong will to reach a fair solution" to express its willingness to continue negotiations (in September), while consistently demanding assurances from the US that it would not withdraw from the JCPOA.

Iran also showed its commitment to ballistic missile development by unveiling its newly developed ballistic missile "Kheibarshekan" (in February), conducting a test launch of a satellite-carrying rocket "Zuljanah" (in June), and announcing the

development of a hypersonic missile (in November).

In addition, Iran publicized its own unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related bases (in March, May, and September) and announced that it conducted a large-scale UAV exercise, thus demonstrating progress in the development of its own UAVs.

Iran continued to strengthen its relations with Russia in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, including through a series of bilateral summit meetings (in June and July), in which Iran referred to expanding cooperation with Russia in trade and other areas. Under these circumstances, the US, the UK, and the EU pointed out that Iran was providing Russia with its own UAVs in connection with the invasion of Ukraine, and imposed sanctions on Iranian firms involved in the development and supply of UAVs (in September, October, and November). On the other hand, Iran stated that it had provided UAVs to Russia prior to its invasion of Ukraine (in November).

Iran has been illegally procuring materials and technology for its weapons of mass destruction program from outside the country by using front companies and other means when it is unable to secure such materials and technology on its own, and the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution has noted a significant increase in Iran's attempts to procure supplies of surrounding materials and other commodities for its nuclear program ("Annual Report," in June).

Continued vigilance is needed regarding Iran's procurement and proliferation of materials and technology that can be used for weapons of mass destruction and other purposes.

Special Feature

External Situation

1

2

3

4

5

Internal Situation

1

2

3

4

North Korea continued procurement and proliferation activities of related materials, etc., as it sought to improve its missile technology

In 2022, North Korea launched a record number of ballistic missiles, etc. Of these, the ballistic missile launched on October 4 passed over Japan, recording the longest flight distance to date. The North Korean media highlighted the progress in the sophistication and diversification of missile technology, emphasizing the irregular trajectories of some missiles, as well as their extended flight range and flight time.

The IAEA reported on moves toward nuclear testing at North Korea's Punggye-ri nuclear test site (in June and September), and North Korea enacted its "policy on the nuclear forces" into law (in September), indicating that it would continue its nuclear development program.

Meanwhile, in response to a series of ballistic missile launches, countries including Japan added North Korean and Russian entities and individuals involved in the procurement of weapons of mass destruction-related materials to the list of sanctions. Of these, several organizations were said to be involved in procurement through Russian companies, and it is believed that North Korea is building a procurement network in Russia.

Furthermore, these groups attempted to procure various materials, such as aramid fiber, stainless steel, and electronic parts that can be used in the

manufacture of ballistic missiles, as well as advanced technologies, such as solid fuel for missiles and production methods for alloy steel (in March, Report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea), suggesting that North Korea is attempting to "domestically produce" key materials that it relies on overseas, given the difficulty in procuring related materials due to the UN and other countries' sanctions.

In addition, while there were moves to deepen cooperative relations between Russia and North Korea since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it was pointed out that North Korea was planning to sell rockets and other items to Russia for use in Ukraine (in September, US State Department; in November, US National Security Council).

In addition, there were reports of cooperation with other countries in the military field, including sales of military equipment to Nigeria (in October, Report of the Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea) and military and technical cooperation with Venezuela (in March, Report of the same panel), and there is concern that this may lead to proliferation of materials related to weapons of mass destruction, etc.

*INTERNAL
SITUATION of
2022*

1

Aum Shinrikyo sought to defend its organization while maintaining its dangerous nature

Aum Shinrikyo still under the influence of Asahara

The so-called Aum Shinrikyo (Organization) continues its activities centering on "Aleph," which explicitly emphasizes absolute devotion to Chizuo Matsumoto, a.k.a. Shoko Asahara, the mastermind of the sarin gas attacks on the subway (in March 1995), the "group led by Yamada" (see note), which maintains absolute devotion to Asahara while keeping a certain distance from "Aleph" (herein both groups together are referred to as the mainstream group), and "Hikari-no-Wa," which pretends to cast aside Asahara's influence in order to avoid the surveillance disposition (represented by Fumihiro Joyu and known as the Joyu group).


No changes have been seen in the actual state where they remain under the influence of Asahara, such as the mainstream group posting Asahara's photographic portrait on the altar in the facility, and the Joyu group posting a Buddhist painting that projects Asahara in the facility. And, Aum Shinrikyo still now maintains its dangerous nature, as seen in that the majority of live-in members of the mainstream group and all of the live-in members of the Joyu group are those who were the members even before the sarin gas attacks on the subway, and they continued to maintain dangerous "doctrines" that included content recommending murder and a closed society of superior orders and subjugation that enabled them to plan and prepare for the sarin gas

attacks on the subway in an organized and secretive manner.

In addition, no major shifts in the number of members of Aum Shinrikyo have been seen in recent years, and as of 2022, the organization still had about 1,650 members in Japan.

Note: The "group led by Yamada" does not use any specific name of its own, so it is referred to by the name of its senior member.

Changes in the number of members in Japan



Aum Shinrikyo increased resistance to surveillance disposition

Although Aum Shinrikyo was obligated to report the current status of its organization and activities to the Director-General of the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) every three months based on the Act on the Control of Organizations Which have Committed Acts of Indiscriminate Mass Murder

(Act on the Control of Organizations), both the mainstream group and the Joyu group were found to have problems such as failing to report on matters that should have been reported or reporting inaccurate information.

In particular, in 2022, "Aleph" did not report any

matters that should have been reported since May and did not respond to correction instructions, and on October 25, the Director-General of the PSIA requested the Public Security Examination Commission to take a recurrence prevention disposition against "Aleph" in accordance with the Act on the Control of Organizations. Subsequently, the PSIA withdrew the request on November 19, 2021, after "Aleph" filed a report. However, "Aleph" continued to fail to report some of the matters that should have been reported, and furthermore, repeated claims to justify its failure to do so (👉 See below, "COLUMN: Current status of 'Aleph' after withdrawal of request for recurrence prevention disposition").

Also, on the on-site inspection based on the Act on the Control of Organizations, during 2021, members of both the mainstream group and the Joyu group showed the same uncooperative attitude as before,

ignoring the questions of the inspectors, or answering "I will not answer your questions," "I am not obliged to answer your questions," or "As you can see." In particular, "Aleph" did not respond promptly to the inspector's announcement of the inspection by using a loudspeaker as well as pushing the intercom, and even after responding, delayed the start of the inspection by not immediately opening the entrance to the facility. Also, uncooperative attitude was evident during the inspection, such as using multiple video cameras to film the inspectors throughout the inspection, including their appearance, and resisting the inspectors' actions by claiming, "This is a sacred place and we don't want ordinary people to enter."

Despite such resistance, the PSIA conducted the on-site inspections properly and rigorously, and confirmed the fact that both the mainstream and the Joyu groups were under the influence of Asahara.


COLUMN

Current status of "Aleph" after withdrawal of request for recurrence prevention disposition

Even after the Public Security Intelligence Agency withdrew its request for recurrence prevention disposition (in November 2021), "Aleph" displayed a conspicuous hostile attitude, failing to report some of the matters that should have been reported, though it did file the report itself (partial non-reporting), and refusing to respond to repeated correction instructions from the PSIA.

Some of the items not reported by "Aleph" included the names and addresses of some of its members, some of the land and buildings used for its activities, and most of its assets.

In particular, with regard to the assets of several profit-making businesses that are effectively operated by "Aleph" (businesses that are integrated with "Aleph" in which live-in members are engaged in activities such as providing guidance and selling goods to lay members), "Aleph" has not reported some of the assets, justifying its non-reporting by repeating unilateral claims that "these profit-making businesses are unrelated to "Aleph" and therefore cannot be reported as a legal obligation." Furthermore, not only did "Aleph" stop reporting the assets of these profit-making businesses after February 2020, but it also transferred the assets it had reported as "Aleph's" assets to these profit-making businesses one after another, and as a result, the assets reported by "Aleph" declined from approximately 1.3 billion yen in 2019 to approximately 75 million yen at the end of July 2022 (👉 See figure above).



As a background to this move, in addition to its desire not to have its assets known, "Aleph" owes approximately 1 billion yen in damages to the "Aum Shinrikyo Crime Victims Support Organization," which was established to provide support to the victims and bereaved families of the sarin gas attacks on the subway and other crimes (judgment finalized in November 2020), but it has not made any payment, and it is believed that "Aleph" is trying to "hide its assets" in order to avoid paying the amount.

The PSIA will continue to instruct "Aleph" to correct the partial failure to report, and if the report is not corrected, the Agency will take appropriate action with a view to requesting a new recurrence prevention disposition against the partial failure to report.

Inspected Facilities of Aum Shinrikyo

(January – November 2022)

Legend

Name of facility	Date of inspection
------------------	--------------------

Saitama Prefecture

Omiya facility	Jan. 6
Kita-Koshigaya facility	June 15
Yashio Oze facility	Sept. 6
Yashio Ise no facility	Sept. 6

Ishikawa Prefecture

Kanazawa facility	June 18
-------------------	---------

Shiga Prefecture

Koga Shigaraki facility	Apr. 21
Minakuchi facility	Apr. 21

Kyoto Prefecture

Kyoto facility	Jan. 18
----------------	---------

Osaka Prefecture

Ikuno facility	Feb. 9 Nov. 8
Higashi-Osaka facility	Feb. 25

Tokushima Prefecture

Tokushima facility	Jan. 19
--------------------	---------

Fukuoka Prefecture

Fukuoka facility	Oct. 5
------------------	--------

Aichi Prefecture

Iwakura facility	May 31
Nagoya facility	July 27

Hokkaido

Sapporo facility	Oct. 19
Sapporo Shiroishi facility	May 19 Oct. 19

Miyagi Prefecture

Sendai facility	Feb. 2
-----------------	--------

Ibaraki Prefecture

Mito facility	Jan. 9
---------------	--------

Chiba Prefecture

Noda facility	Oct. 11
---------------	---------

Tokyo


Adachi Iriya facility	Jan. 26 Aug. 5
Musashino facility	Mar. 6
Shin-Hokima facility	Apr. 14
Nishiogi facility	Aug. 24
Minami-Karasuyama facility	Aug. 31
Hokima facility	Nov. 1

Kanagawa Prefecture

Yokohama facility	Nov. 16
-------------------	---------

Nagano Prefecture

Komoro facility	Feb. 17 Oct. 25
-----------------	--------------------



"Aleph" ensured instruction to inculcate absolute faith in Asahara

"Aleph" continued to display Asahara's photographic portrait on the altar in its facilities, as it has in the past, and has also gathered lay members at its facilities around the country for instruction and other efforts to inculcate absolute faith in Asahara.

As in 2021, they decided not to hold the "intensive seminars" held three times a year (in January, May, and September) as a part of the guidance for lay members in the form of gathering participants from all over the country in a large-scale facility, in order to combat the new coronavirus infection, and instead held them separately at each facility in each region. At the seminar, instructions were provided not only in the facility, but also in the homes of lay members' own homes, using a web conferencing system, etc. to broadcast video recordings of Asahara's statements, as well as statements by senior members praising Asahara. Also, in the "birthday celebration" where they celebrated Asahara's birthday (in March), they had the participants watch a video of Asahara, and

held a ceremony for the purpose of securing the worship on the anniversary of Asahara's death on July 6, which they designated as the "martyrdom day," in order to provide thorough guidance for inculcating absolute faith in Asahara.

As for Asahara's second son, whom Asahara had nominated as his successor, the senior members repeatedly emphasized his "legitimacy" and "greatness" as the successor at events, etc., and instructed the lay members to wish for his return to the organization, and also holding a "birthday festival" (in March) to celebrate the second son's birthday and other efforts were made to create momentum for the return of the second son to the organization, but no concrete steps were seen to realize this goal.

"Aleph" also conducted systematic nationwide recruiting activities to attract new members, especially among the younger generation, during the year 2022 (See p. 65, "COLUMN: The reality of 'Aleph's recruiting activities").

Minors indoctrinated by "Aleph"

At the "Aleph" facilities, preschoolers and elementary school students are routinely accompanied by their parents, who are lay members, to participate in various events. There are also teenage minors who frequently go to the facilities alone and engage in the same practices as the adult members.

"Aleph" has been trying to imprint the teachings of Asahara on these minors from an early age through

the use of "materials for minors" featuring illustrations of Asahara's teachings and the importance of ascetic practices.

This may cause conflict and friction with society and isolation from society, as minors may believe that Asahara's teachings are correct, and thus require close attention.

The "group led by Yamada" was active upholding the "absolute faith in Asahara"

The "group led by Yamada," which operated at a certain distance from "Aleph," is smaller in size than "Aleph," but like Aleph, maintained activities upholding absolute faith in Asahara by posting photographic portrait of Asahara and documents that demanded devotion to Asahara in its facilities, and by storing many teaching materials containing Asahara's statements.

In a lawsuit filed by senior members of the "group led

by Yamada" against the government, seeking the revocation of the sixth renewal of the period of surveillance disposition (in January 2018), both the Tokyo District Court in the first instance and the Tokyo High Court in the second instance turned down the claim, and subsequently the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, confirming the defeat of the senior members (in May).

The reality of "Aleph's" recruiting activities

"Aleph" is operating a systematic nationwide recruiting campaign, with the name of the organization concealed, targeting especially the younger generation.

First step

Leading from a fake circle to a study session

- Advertise on a website that recruits people to join a club or participate in an event that "teaches yoga, psychology, mental health, etc." while keeping the name of the organization secret.
- Recruitment is mainly targeted at people under the age of 30, with the younger generation, who have little knowledge about Aum Shinrikyo, being the main target of recruitment.
- Provide explanations to those who apply or inquire through a web conference system, etc., and encourage them to participate in the study session.

<Free> Mental Health Courses

Venue *** Cafe in the city

Age 18 to 30 years old

Members wanted!

Why not change who you are now?

(Based on a real recruiting notice of a fake circle)

Member: Thank you for your inquiry. I understand your concern for the future. If you would like, we can hold an information session about the Circle online. Is there a date that is convenient for you?

Target of invitation: I am available on Saturdays and Sundays.


Member: Then, how about ** o'clock on ** day? I will send you the ID and password for the meeting on that day. Let me hear a lot of your stories. I am looking forward to it.

(Based on actual interaction)

Second step

Building relationships through a series of study sessions

- At the study sessions, the members appear as instructors, their assistants, or members of the circle, keeping the name of the organization secret, and through lectures on yoga and psychology, question-and-answer sessions, and chatting, they get closer to the targets of their recruitment. The members also listen to the problems of the target and offer advice to help build relationships with the target.
- The content of the study sessions gradually shifts to those related to religion and the spiritual world, and, without mentioning Asahara's name, the content of his teachings is explained in general terms. When the relationship has reached a certain level of maturity, they explain that the sarin gas attacks on the subway was a conspiracy by someone other than Aum Shinrikyo, and so on, in order to induce the target to have no resistance to the organization.
- In some cases, they repeatedly ask the question, "Can you trust **** (name)?" by naming famous people in various fields, both domestic and foreign, and then ask, "Can you trust Shoko Asahara?" by mentioning Asahara's name, to check the recruitment targets' resistance to Asahara.



Materials that appear to be solicitation materials identified during on-site inspection of "Aleph's" facility

Third step

Encouraging and forcing to join upon revealing the name of the organization

- Once relationships have been established and there is no apparent resistance to the organization, and it is determined that the target will be receptive to membership, the name of the organization is revealed to the person being solicited and he or she is encouraged to join.
- At this point, if the target is upset and does not express his or her intention to join, they will force him or her into a mental state or environment that makes it difficult for him or her to refuse, by saying in a strong tone such as, "Everything you have learned up to now will be wasted."

3

The Joyu group continued to "conceal Asahara," but remained under Asahara's influence

The Joyu group emphasized that it had casted aside Asahara, with Fumihiro Joyu saying through talk events, etc. that "we are now operating study classes on psychology and Buddhist philosophy, as 'Hikari-no-Wa' and not as a religion" (in January), and "we withdrew from the religious order and became independent so as to break away from Asahara" (in September).

On the other hand, they continued to display a Buddhist painting and other images projecting Asahara in their facilities, and at "intensive seminars" held three times a year (in January, May, and August), they performed yoga exercises that Asahara

claimed were important, and Joyu made comments about his ascetic practice experience before the sarin gas attacks on the subway. Furthermore, they repeatedly conducted "tour of sacred sites" to visit shrines and temples that the Joyu group had once positioned as "places associated with Asahara" and that seemed to have a close relationship with Asahara.

In light of these activities, it is recognized that the Joyu group is continuing its efforts to "conceal Asahara" by pretending that Asahara's influence has been eradicated, and that the fact that they are still under Asahara's influence has not changed.

Radical leftist groups conducted various activities in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the state funeral for the late former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

They developed criticism of governments of various countries and others over Russia's invasion of Ukraine

In response to Russia's launching of an invasion of Ukraine (in February), the radical leftist groups held protest actions against Russian diplomatic missions in Japan, as well as rallies, demonstrations, and propaganda activities in the streets calling for "anti-war" actions, such as "Impeach Russia's military aggression against Ukraine! All the peoples of the world must rise up in anti-war struggle!" (extra issue of the organ paper "Kaiho" of Kakumaru-ha (Revolutionary Marxist Faction of the Revolutionary Communist League), dated February 27), and "Let's stop the massacre of Ukrainian people with international solidarity of workers" (Kakurokyo Kaiho-ha Shuryu-ha (Mainstream Faction of the Liberation Faction of the Revolutionary Workers' Association), organ paper "Kaiho," dated March 1).

They also criticized the government's provision of equipment of the Self-Defense Forces to the Ukrainian government and economic sanctions

against Russia, saying, "The US, Europe, Japan, and other countries are further intensifying and expanding the war with economic sanctions against Russia and massive arms supplies to Ukraine" (Chukaku-ha (Middle Core Faction of the Revolutionary Communist League), its organ paper "Zenshin," dated March 28).

In response to the Japan-Australia-India-US (QUAD) Leaders' Meeting (in May, Tokyo), they staged protests against the Prime Minister's Office and US diplomatic missions in Japan, calling for "opposition to the Japan-US summit meeting" and "crushing the Japan-US global alliance against China and Russia."

In addition, on May Day (in May), at an "anti-nuclear" rally (in August), and at various other occasions, they repeatedly criticized Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the responses of governments around the world.

Focusing on activities to protest the state funeral for the late Shinzo Abe

Regarding the attack in which former Prime Minister Abe was killed (in July), the radical leftist groups claimed that "the July 8 Abe shooting was precisely caused by Abe himself" (Chukaku-ha, its organ paper "Zenshin," dated July 18) and that "it is clear that it was a 'shooting drama' that could be called 'self-inflicted'" (Kakurokyo Kaiho-ha Hanshuryu-ha (Anti-mainstream Faction of the Liberation Faction of the Revolutionary Workers' Association), its organ paper "Kaiho," dated July 28).

Also, when the government made a cabinet decision (in July) to hold a state funeral for the late Shinzo Abe, they repeatedly held rallies, demonstrations, and

propaganda activities in the streets throughout Japan, criticizing that "the state funeral glorifies the Abe politics that led to the security war law and an increase in the number of non-regular workers." In addition, Chukaku-ha, claiming that "the government is also aiming to force schools to fly the flag at half-staff and to extend condolence" (organ paper "Zenshin," dated August 22), put forward its own labor union exchange organizations and organizations advocating "anti-war" activities and asked local boards of education not to fly the flag at half-staff at public schools and other places.

On the day of the state funeral (in September),

activists from all over Japan were mobilized to stage a demonstration at the Nippon Budokan, where the funeral was to take place, calling for "Stop Abe's State Funeral" and other such actions, while also

conducting propaganda activities in the streets in downtown areas and around train stations in various locations to appeal for "opposition to the state funeral."

Continued efforts to maintain and expand the organizations through labor movements, etc.

Kakumaru-ha focused on attracting trade unionists to their own faction, claiming that they would "systematically engage in the trade union movement and do their utmost to advance the movement and organization-building" (its organ paper "Kaiho," dated January 1). They appealed to the workers with their own arguments to win them over by distributing leaflets appealing "Stop revision of the Constitution for the worse! Oppose the strengthening of the Japan-US Security Treaty! Victory in the 2022 spring wage offensive! Defeat the storm of layoffs and wage cuts!" around the venues of May Day (in April and May) throughout Japan, and at the national convention of the Japan Postal Group Labor Union (in June), distributing leaflets calling for "no job cuts" to post offices in each region.

Chukaku-ha stated its policy for organizational expansion as "placing more overwhelming emphasis on young workers and students in our struggle to build the party" (organ paper "Zenshin," dated January 1), and throughout the year, it sought to attract supporters by urging young workers to join labor unions of its own faction, saying "people have begun to rally to labor unions in the hope of changing society," and by calling on students to participate in

the activities of organizations of its faction that advocate "anti-war," saying "let's join the anti-war demonstrations and defeat the Kishida administration." Furthermore, through SNS, they publicized their activities by sending out coverage of protests against the Japan-Australia-India-US (QUAD) Leaders' Meeting (in May) and the state funeral for the late Shinzo Abe (in September), and also invited the general viewers of videos posted on video-sharing sites that introduced the contents of their organ paper to join their "off-line meeting."

Kakurokyo Kaiho-ha Hanshuryu-ha held rallies and demonstrations to secure employment for day laborers, claiming that "the movement to eliminate yoseba (gathering place for day laborers) and day laborers is intensifying" (organ paper "Kaiho," dated July 21), and encouraged participating day laborers to continue participating in their faction's activities. In addition, Kakurokyo Kaiho-ha Shuryu-ha conducted propaganda activities in the streets near the university entrance ceremony sites, calling on new students to join their faction's student movement under the slogan, "Let's win the advance of the revolutionary student movement to overthrow the state power" (organ paper "Kaiho," dated January 1).

Fusako Shigenobu, the top leader of the Japanese Red Army, who was released from prison

Fusako Shigenobu, the top leader of the Japanese Red Army (JRA), was sentenced to 20 years in prison for her arrest, confinement, and attempted murder in the Hague Incident (1974), in which the JRA occupied the French Embassy in The Hague, the Netherlands, and had been detained in a penal institution, but she was released in May. It was the 50th anniversary of the Tel Aviv airport shooting incident (in May 1972), which were carried out by the JRA.

In a letter distributed to the press at the time of her release, Shigenobu insisted that the "wanted list" for Kozo Okamoto, the perpetrator of the shooting incident and an internationally wanted member, "should be dropped," and that she hoped the six members wanted for other crimes would "live out their lives where they are needed."

Thereafter, Shigenobu sent a message of solidarity to

a rally held by Okamoto's support organization in May and participated in a welcome party held by her supporters (in June), as well as posting her views on domestic and international situation on her website several times, such as "I fear that the death of former Prime Minister Abe will lead to further continuation of the Abe line, which will lead to constitutional reform for the worse, militarization of the country, favoritism toward monopolies, and further dependence on the US," and "The invasion of Ukraine by Russia is an opportunity for structural changes in the world under the initiative of the Biden administration." Furthermore, when she participated in an anti-war rally held in Kyoto in October, she said, "Politics must be changed, the Liberal Democratic Party must be changed, and I want to be a part of that change," and close attention should be paid to her activities.

JCP backpedaled in the Upper House Election, despite emphasizing its confrontational stance with the Kishida administration

Criticizing the government's economic and defense policies through National Diet deliberations

As the Party celebrated the 100th anniversary of its founding, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) made "victory and breakthrough" in the Upper House Election (in July) its most important issue, emphasizing its confrontation with the Kishida administration in the Diet debate and making efforts to promote the party's presence.

In the area of economic policy, JCP focused particularly on the issue of soaring prices and held Prime Minister Kishida responsible, claiming that "Abenomics' unprecedented monetary easing has caused the yen to depreciate abnormally and prices to soar" (in May). They also criticized the government's first supplementary budget for the fiscal year 2022 as it was "limited to only a few areas, such as gasoline," and called for its withdrawal, saying that it was "too inadequate to

protect people's lives from soaring prices."

In the area of defense policy, they criticized the so-called "counterstrike capability," saying that "it is nothing more than an attempt to turn the Self-Defense Forces into a war-making force" (in March). In response to Prime Minister Kishida's announcement of an increase in defense spending in the Japan-US Joint Leaders' Statement issued in May, JCP repeatedly criticized the "vicious cycle of military-versus-military" and the "destruction of people's livelihoods through the arms race."

In addition, JCP continued to pursue such issues as the state funeral for the late Shinzo Abe and the relationship between the Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (formerly the Unification Church) and the Kishida administration's ministers.

In the Upper House Election, the number and percentage of votes received both decreased, and two seats were lost

In the Upper House Election held in July, JCP, aiming to absolutely secure the five seats for proportional representation and to maintain the seats it currently held in the Tokyo electoral district, made a number of pledges, including opposition to increased defense spending, a reduction in the consumption tax rate to 5%, and an increase in the minimum wage to 1,500 yen, and conducted political propaganda and activities to increase its supporters. However, although the Party won a seat in the Tokyo electoral district, both the number and percentage of votes cast in the proportional representation system were lower than in the previous Upper House Election (in July 2019), and the number of seats

dropped from the pre-election level of five to three.

At the 6th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee held in August, Chairman Kazuo Shii stated, "I feel deeply responsible for the setback in the Upper House Election," but asserted that, at the time of the election, there was a "double strong headwind" of attacks on opposition parties' joint struggle and attacks on JCP in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

He also summarized that the root of the decline in the number of seats was the decrease in the number of Party members and readers of its organ paper "Shimbun Akahata."

Encouraging stronger efforts to expand the Party's strength in the run-up to the unified local elections

In addition, at the 6th Plenary Meeting, JCP decided to position the 2023 unified local elections as an important political battle leading up to the next General Election and the Upper House Election, with the aim of absolutely securing the seats currently held by the Party. On that basis, in order to drastically overcome the current delay in the expansion of the Party's strength, they set up a "Special Period to Commemorate the 100th Anniversary of the Founding of the Party, Win Unified Local Elections, and Expand the Party's Strength," which was to last until December, and called on the entire party to work to gain at least 1,000 new Party members every month and to increase the number of readers of the

"Shimbun Akahata" to the level at the time of the 28th Party Congress (in January 2020). Later, at the "Lecture Commemorating the 100th Anniversary of the Party's Founding" held in September, Chairman Shii reiterated the importance of party building, saying, "Building a strong and large party will be the greatest power for the Party to make a breakthrough."

In response to this, JCP worked to expand the Party's strength by holding "gatherings" in various locations to view the commemorative speech by Chairman Shii and call on "Shimbun Akahata" readers and supporters to join the Party, and distributing samples of "Shimbun Akahata" in street advertisements to encourage people to subscribe.

COLUMN

Minsei and JCP seeking to attract young people by taking advantage of the Corona disaster

The Democratic Youth League of Japan (Minsei) is a youth organization that "works under the auspices of and with the support of the Japanese Communist Party" and was founded in April 1923 as the Japanese Communist Youth League (Kyosei), and will celebrate its 100th anniversary in 2023.

Since May 2020, Minsei has made contacts with many students through its "food aid activities" (more than 130,000 students in 47 prefectures have reportedly used the activities so far) to distribute food and daily necessities to students in dire need due to the Corona disaster and has promoted dialogue and recruitment, resulting in an increase in its membership, and at the 45th National Convention (on December 11 and 12, 2021), the organization reported that it had

made "the most significant progress since 2002."

Under such circumstances, JCP provided support for Minsei's "food aid activities" also in 2022, including participation of assembly members of the Party as counselors in the life counseling sessions held at the venue of the meeting, as well as calling within the Party for "assisting the expansion of Minsei League members" and "making further progress in the expansion of Minsei, while at the same time focusing on welcoming youth and student Party members and building Party branches." Then, at the 6th Plenary Meeting in August, JCP reported that the expansion of the Minsei League members in 2022 was progressing at a faster pace than in 2021.

Right-wing groups and other organizations that were active in addressing the problems of Russia's invasion of Ukraine and other issues with neighboring countries**Right-wing groups conducted activities that capture the issues of Russian invasion of Ukraine, territorial disputes, etc.**

Many right-wing groups continued to conduct propaganda activities in the streets even during the resurgence of the new coronavirus infection, and they took up such issues as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and territorial disputes with neighboring countries.

With regard to Russia, they conducted propaganda activities in the streets in the vicinity of Russian diplomatic missions in various parts of Japan to criticize Russia's invasion of Ukraine, as well as on "February 7th Northern Territories Day" (the day the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and Russia was signed) and "August 9th Anti-Russia Day" (the day the Soviet Union abrogated the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact and invaded Manchuria and other areas) to appeal for the "recapture of the Northern Territories."

With regard to China, in response to the holding of the Beijing 2022 Olympic and Paralympic Winter Games (Winter Games in Beijing)(in February) and the intrusions into Japan's territorial waters by vessels belonging to the China Coast Guard in the Senkaku Islands area, right-wing groups conducted propaganda

activities in the streets around Chinese diplomatic missions in Japan and elsewhere, calling for "boycotting the Beijing Olympics," "protecting the Senkaku Islands from China's evil hands," "severing diplomatic relations with China," and so on.

Regarding North Korea, in response to the issue of the abductions of Japanese citizens and a series of missile launches, they held propaganda activities in the streets around the central headquarters of Chongryon, calling for the "return of all abductees" and "stop missile launches."

Regarding South Korea, on the occasion of "February 22nd Takeshima Day" (established as "Takeshima Day" by Shimane Prefecture ordinance) and "October 28th Takeshima Recapture Day" (the day South Korea refused to refer the issue of Takeshima's territorial ownership to the International Court of Justice), they conducted propaganda activities in the streets in Shimane Prefecture and around South Korean diplomatic missions in Japan, calling for the "recapture of Takeshima."

Right-wing affiliated groups also held propaganda activities in the streets in various locations

Right-wing affiliated groups, seizing on the domestic and international situation, including the Russian invasion of Ukraine, engaged in propaganda activities in the streets and other activities in various regions.

Regarding Russia, the groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets around the Russian embassy and other locations in response to the invasion of Ukraine, and appealed to "immediately end the invasion of Ukraine and return the Northern Territories."

With regard to South Korea, they took up the issue of the 2018 decision by the South Korean Supreme Court that approved compensation payments to former civilian workers from the Korean Peninsula, as well as the Takeshima issue, and conducted propaganda activities in the streets around South Korean diplomatic missions in Japan and in downtown areas, appealing "Do not give in to South

Korean blackmail" and "Do not allow the illegal occupation of Takeshima."

With regard to China, with the Beijing Winter Games coming up, the groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets in downtown areas, calling for "opposition to the Winter Olympics in Beijing by China, a country that oppresses human rights."

In addition, they engaged in propaganda activities in the streets criticizing the Japanese government's "acceptance of new foreign human resources" and other measures, as well as protests against citizen movements they deemed "anti-Japanese," calling for "firm opposition to immigration policy," "stop hate against the Japanese," and "kick out the radical extreme leftists."

Those who criticized these right-wing affiliated groups as "racists" engaged in protests against the group's activities.

Appendix

(Major domestic and international public security trends from Jan. to Nov.)

January

1st (Sat)

- The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo ("Aleph") held intensive year-end and new year seminars (Dec. 24, 2021 - Jan. 10, 2022 in Aichi, etc.).
- The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo ("Hikari-no-Wa") held intensive year-end and new year seminars (Dec. 29, 2021 - Jan. 9, 2022 in Tokyo, etc.).

5th (Wed)

- North Korea launched a ballistic missile (announced as a "test-fire of a hypersonic missile").

6th (Thu)

- The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) dispatched peacekeeping forces in response to disturbances in Kazakhstan.

11th (Tue)

- North Korea launched a ballistic missile (announced as a "test-fire of a hypersonic missile").

13th (Thu)

- Website tampering and malware infection in Ukrainian government agencies caused website connection failures, etc.

14th (Fri)

- North Korea launched ballistic missiles, which landed near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula.
- Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov held a New Year's press conference to review Russian diplomacy in 2021, and expressed his view that Russia's relations with Japan "are in a rather confrontational atmosphere."

17th (Mon)

- North Korea launched ballistic missiles, which landed near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula.

20th (Thu)

- The "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" (ISIL) attacked a detention center housing ISIL fighters in Hasakah, Hasakah Province, northeastern Syria, and hundreds of fighters escaped.

25th (Tue)

- The "Abu Sayyaf Group" attacked a national army unit in the province of Sulu, southern Philippines, killing one soldier and wounding two others.

27th (Thu)

- North Korea launched ballistic missiles (announced as a "test-fire of surface-to-surface tactical guided missiles").

28th (Fri)

- Right-wing groups held propaganda activities in the streets calling for "smashing the Japan Teachers' Union" in response to the "71st National Conference for Educational Research" (until 30, Tokyo).

30th (Sun)

- North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which fell into the Sea of Japan (announced as a "test-fire of 'Hwasong [Mars] 12'-type").

February

1st (Tue)

- President Vladimir Putin met with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban in Moscow and agreed to expand natural gas supplies to Hungary.

3rd (Thu)

- President Biden announced that ISIL supreme leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi blew himself up in Idlib province, northwest Syria, during a US military raid operation.

4th (Fri)

- The Beijing 2022 Olympic Winter Games were held in Beijing and other cities in China (until 20th). President Xi Jinping met with President Vladimir Putin, who attended the opening ceremony, and stated that the strategic partnership between the two countries "has never and will never waver" in the future. The two countries issued a joint statement calling for "no limits friendship."

6th (Sun)

- North Korea held the 6th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (until 7th), and enacted the "law on the protection of the overseas compatriots' rights and interests."

7th (Mon)

- Right-wing groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets in various parts of the country on the occasion of the Northern Territories Day, calling for the "recapture of the Northern Territories" (all over Japan).

10th (Thu)

- Russia and Belarus launched the joint military exercise "Allied Resolve 2022" in Belarus.

11th (Fri)

- Right-wing groups carried out shrine worship and held "Kigensetsu" celebration activities on the occasion of the National Foundation Day (all over Japan).
- In response to Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen's phone call with former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in which she expressed gratitude for his support for Taiwan, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said, "China firmly opposes official interaction in any form between countries having ties with China and Taiwan."

15th (Tue)

- North Korea held a national meeting on the occasion of the 80th birth anniversary of the late Chairman Kim Jong Il.
- DDoS attacks on financial institutions in Ukraine caused website connection failures.

17th (Thu)

- Prime Minister Fumio Kishida held a summit telephone talk with President Vladimir Putin and stressed the need to resolve the situation in Ukraine through diplomatic efforts.

19th (Sat)

- Right-wing groups held propaganda activities in the streets calling for the "crushing of Zenkyo (All Japan Teachers and Staff Union)," against the "39th Regular Convention of Zenkyo" (until 20th, in Tokyo).

21st (Mon)

- President Putin signed the Executive Orders recognizing the "Donetsk People's Republic" and the "Luhansk People's Republic," two separatist republics in eastern Ukraine that have declared independence, and signed "Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance" with the two "People's Republics."
- China announced that it would impose sanctions on two US companies under the "Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law" in response to the US approval of arms sales to Taiwan.

22nd (Tue)

- Right-wing groups held propaganda activities in the streets on the occasion of Takeshima Day (designated under a Shimane Prefecture ordinance), calling for the "recapture of Takeshima" (all over Japan).

23rd (Wed)

- Right-wing groups carried out "Tenchosetsu" celebration activities on the occasion of the Emperor's birthday (all over Japan).

24th (Thu)

- In a video message, President Putin announced the execution of the invasion of Ukraine as a "special military operation" in response to a request for assistance from the "Donetsk People's Republic" and the "Luhansk People's Republic."
- Just prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, a cyberattack occurred on the satellite communications network operated by the US telecommunications company "Viasat." Thousands of customers in Ukraine and tens of thousands of customers across Europe were without telecommunications service.
- In response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kakumaru-ha (Revolutionary Marxist Faction of the Revolutionary Communist League) held protests against Russian diplomatic missions in Japan, calling for "impeachment of military aggression" and other actions (until 26th and 28th, all over Japan).

26th (Sat)

- Right-wing groups held memorial services, calling it "February 26th Incident Day" (Tokyo, Miyagi, etc.).
- The Russian Embassy in Japan posted on Twitter to participants in a protest rally against Russian aggression in Ukraine in Shibuya, Tokyo, "Please do not fall for the false propaganda of the Kyiv regime."
- A Japanese auto parts manufacturer suffered a ransomware attack, resulting in a system failure. All plants in Japan to which the company delivers products suspended operations for one day.

27th (Sun)

- North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which fell near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula.

28th (Mon)

- First round of ceasefire talks between Russian and Ukrainian delegations was held in Gomel, southeastern Belarus.

March

2nd (Wed)

- At an emergency special session of the UN General Assembly, a resolution condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine was adopted (141 in favor, 5 opposed, 35 abstentions, 12 absent). Russia, Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria opposed the resolution, while China, India, Iran, and others abstained.

4th (Fri)

- Beijing 2022 Paralympic Winter Games were held in Beijing, China and other cities (until 13th).
- Russia passed an amended law allowing criminal and administrative penalties for "dissemination of false information" and "defamation" regarding the activities of the Russian Armed Forces.
- At least 62 people were killed and about 200 injured when the ISIL-affiliated "Khorasan Province" carried out a suicide bombing inside a Shiite mosque in Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan's northwestern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

5th (Sat)

- North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which landed near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula.
- The 5th Session of the 13th National People's Congress was held in Beijing, China (until 11th).

7th (Mon)

- The Russian government designated 48 countries and regions as "unfriendly countries" for their "unfriendly actions" toward Russia and Russian organizations and individuals.

8th (Tue)

- At least four people were killed when the ISIL-affiliated "Pakistan Province" conducted a suicide bombing targeting Pakistani security authorities in the southwestern Pakistani province of Baluchistan.

9th (Wed)

- President Putin signed a bill to amend the tax code to introduce a tax exemption system for the "Kurile Islands" (the Kurile Islands and the Northern Territories).

10th (Thu)

- ISIL announced the appointment of Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi as its new supreme leader.

14th (Mon)

- On the occasion of the "89th Convention of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan," right-wing groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets calling for the "enactment of an independent constitution" (Tokyo).
- The ISIL-affiliated "Central Africa Province" attacked several villages in Ituri Province, northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, killing at least 50 residents.

16h (Wed)

- North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which did not fly properly.

21st (Mon)

- The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement criticizing Japan's sanctions against Russia in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine as "clearly of an unfriendly nature" and stating that it has no intention of continuing the negotiations toward the conclusion of a Japan-Russia peace treaty.
- The ISIL-affiliated "Sahel Province" attacked a military base in Gao Province, northern Mali, killing 3 soldiers and wounding 8 others.

22nd (Tue)

- In Beersheba, southern Israel, an alleged ISIL supporter attacked passersby with a car and a knife, killing four people.

24th (Thu)

- North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which fell into the Sea of Japan about 150 km west of the Oshima Peninsula in Hokkaido (announced as a "test launch of a new type ICBM 'Hwasongpho-17'").

25th (Fri)

- The Russian Defense Ministry announced the end of the first phase of "special military operation." Russian troops withdrew from the Kyiv area.
- Russia's Eastern Military District announced that it had mobilized more than 3,000 soldiers from its machine gun and artillery units in the "Kurile Islands" (the Kurile Islands and the Northern Territories) and conducted training to repel landing forces.

27th (Sun)

- Right-wing groups held a demonstration "against the invasion and massacre" of Ukraine by Russia in response to the Russian's invasion of Ukraine (Tokyo).
- In Hadera, northern Israel, two alleged ISIL supporters opened fire on Israeli border police officers, killing two officers; ISIL made a claim of responsibility under the name "Palestine."

April

1st (Fri)

- In light of North Korea's launch of ballistic missiles, etc., the Japanese government designated four organizations (Russia) and nine individuals (six North Koreans and three Russians) as additional targets for measures against North Korea.
- The Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea released its final report. The Panel noted that North Korea continued to procure materials and technologies under its nuclear and ballistic missile development program, and that it had conducted cyberattacks in an attempt to obtain sensitive technologies and illicit money, and had stolen approximately \$400 million worth of cryptographic assets.

7th (Thu)

- At an emergency special session of the UN General Assembly, a resolution on the suspension of Russia's rights of membership in the UN Human Rights Council was adopted by a majority vote (93 in favor, 24 opposed, 58 abstentions). Russia, China, North Korea, and other countries opposed the resolution, while India, Brazil, and other countries abstained. Russia announced its withdrawal from the Council.

8th (Fri)

- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan announced the expulsion of eight diplomats and officials from the Embassy of Russia and the Trade Representation of Russia in Japan.

12th (Tue)

- Ukraine's computer emergency response team prevented malware from shutting down the control system of a high-voltage substation, announcing the likely involvement of a cyber threat actor with ties to Russian military intelligence.

14th (Thu)

- The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) announced that it believes the theft of approximately \$600 million worth of crypto assets uncovered in March was carried out by a North Korean cyber threat actor.

15th (Fri)

- North Korea held a national meeting and a public procession on the occasion of the 110th birth anniversary of the late Kim Il Sung.

16th (Sat)

- North Korea launched a missile (announced as a "test-fire of a new-type tactical guided weapon").

19th (Tue)

- Chinese Foreign Ministry announced that "China and Solomon Islands have officially signed the inter-governmental framework agreement on security cooperation."

20th (Wed)

- The Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2022 was held (until 22nd, Hainan Province, China).

21st (Thu)

- Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's offer of *masakaki* at Yasukuni Shrine "reflects the erroneous attitude toward the history of aggression."

22nd (Fri)

- The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo ("Aleph") held Golden Week intensive seminars (until May 15, Hokkaido, etc.).

25th (Mon)

- North Korea held a military review ceremony on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. The new-type ICBM "Hwasongpho-17" and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) are unveiled.

26th (Tue)

- The "Balochistan Liberation Army" (BLA) carried out a suicide bombing near the "Confucius Institute" in Karachi, the capital of Sindh Province in southern Pakistan, targeting a vehicle carrying institute staff, killing four people, including three Chinese, and injuring at least four others.

27th (Wed)

- The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs posted an announcement on its website titled "Countermeasures against the expulsion of Russian diplomats from Japan" and demanded that eight Japanese diplomats stationed in Russia leave the country by May 10.
- Russian state-owned gas company "Gazprom" announced that it has completely stopped supplying natural gas through pipelines to Poland and Bulgaria.

29th (Fri)

- Right-wing groups visited Musashino-ryo Imperial Mausoleums and shrines on the occasion of Showa Day, and conducted propaganda activities in the streets to honor the legacy of Emperor Showa (all over Japan).

30th (Sat)

- The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo ("Hikari-no-Wa") held Golden Week intensive seminars (until May 16, Aichi, etc.).

May

3rd (Tue)

- Right-wing groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets calling for the "enactment of an independent constitution" on the occasion of Constitution Memorial Day (all over Japan).
- The aircraft carrier "Liaoning" of the Chinese Navy sailed in the southern sea area of Japan. Carrier-based aircraft repeatedly landed and departed from the 3rd to the 12th and from the 14th to the 15th.

4th (Wed)

- North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which fell into the Sea of Japan.

■ : International incidents

■ : Domestic incidents

· Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that a total of 63 Japanese nationals, including Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, government officials, Diet members, press, academics, and those involved in the movement to demand the return of the Northern Territories, were banned from entering Russia.

7th (Sat)

· North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which fell into the Sea of Japan.

9th (Mon)

· The ISIL-affiliated "Mozambique Province" killed three soldiers in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, Mozambique.

11th (Wed)

· The Act for the Promotion of Ensuring National Security through Integrated Implementation of Economic Measures ("Economic Security Promotion Act") was enacted.

12th (Thu)

· North Korea disclosed outbreak of new coronavirus cases and announced that it would conduct tests and quarantine of all residents and implement a nationwide regional blockade.

· North Korea launched ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan.

19th (Thu)

· BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) held an online meeting of foreign ministers. President Xi Jinping called for "opposing hegemonism and power politics, rejecting Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation, and working together to build a global community of security for all," and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov explained the "special military operation."

· Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited seven Pacific island countries (until June 4) and presided over the "second China-Pacific Island Countries Foreign Ministers' Meeting" in Fiji (June 30).

20th (Fri)

· Taiwan's Legislative Yuan passed amendments to the "National Security Act" and the "Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area."

22nd (Sun)

· Radical leftist groups held rallies and demonstrations to call for "smashing the Japan-US talks and the QUAD" against the Japan-Australia-India-US Leaders' Meeting (Tokyo).

· Right-wing groups seized the opportunity of President Biden's visit to Japan to hold propaganda activities in the streets criticizing the atomic bombings (Tokyo).

23rd (Mon)

· Japan-US summit meeting was held (Tokyo).

· President Biden announced the launch of the "Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity" (IPEF), a new economic zone initiative.

24th (Tue)

· Japan-Australia-India-US Leaders' Meeting was held (Tokyo).

· Right-wing groups held propaganda activities in the streets calling for the formation of a "China encirclement network" on the occasion of the Japan-Australia-India-US Leaders' Meeting (Tokyo, Osaka).

· Two Chinese aircraft joined two Russian aircraft in the Sea of Japan and flew together to the East China Sea. After that, the two Chinese aircraft were replaced by two presumed new Chinese aircraft and two Russian aircraft, for a total of four aircraft, flying together from the East China Sea to the Pacific Ocean.

25th (Wed)

· North Korea launched ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan.

26th (Thu)

· In a lawsuit filed by senior members of the mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo (the "group led by Yamada") seeking the revocation of the decision to renew the period of surveillance disposition (2018, the sixth time), the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the senior members.

28th (Sat)

· Fusako Shigenobu, the top leader of the Japanese Red Army, was released from the East Japan Adult Correctional Medical Center after serving a 20-year prison sentence (Tokyo).

· General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon) held its 25th Congress and re-elected Chairman Ho Jong Man (until 29th).

30th (Mon)

· Supporters of Japanese Red Army members held a meeting to commemorate the Tel Aviv airport shooting incident (occurred on May 30, 1972) (Tokyo).

June

1st (Wed)

· The Russian government amended the Federal Target Program "Socio-economic Development of the Kurile Islands for 2016-2025." The total amount of the plan was reduced from about 80.5 billion rubles to 59.4 billion rubles, and federal budget expenditures were reduced from about 28.9 billion rubles to about 6.7 billion rubles.

· The ISIL-affiliated "Sinai Province" attacked pro-Israeli tribespeople with an improvised explosive device (IED) in North Sinai Province, Northern Egypt, killing one person and wounding eight others.

3rd (Fri)

· The Japanese Communist Party held its 5th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee and unanimously decided to strengthen its efforts for the Upper House Election (Tokyo).

5th (Sun)

· North Korea launched ballistic missiles, which fell near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula and into the Sea of Japan.

7th (Tue)

· Russian Foreign Ministry announced a comment by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zakharova that the framework agreement with Japan concerning "safe operations" in the waters around the Four Northern Islands would be suspended.

8th (Wed)

· International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors adopted a resolution expressing concern over Iran's uncooperative response.

12th (Sun)

· Wei Fenghe, China's Defense Minister, stated at the "Shangri-La Dialogue (Asian Security Summit)" (10-12, Singapore), "If anyone dares to split Taiwan from China, the Chinese military has no choice but to fight at all costs."

14th (Tue)

· Russian state-owned gas company "Gazprom" announced a 40% cut in supply due to delays caused by sanctions against Russia in returning a gas transmission system (turbine) for the "Nord Stream" gas pipeline that was being repaired in Canada.

17th (Fri)

· The "St. Petersburg International Economic Forum" was held with the participation of President Vladimir Putin, and a video message from President Xi Jinping was shown.

18th (Sat)

· The ISIL-affiliated "Khorasan Province" detonated a bomb and opened fire on a Sikh temple in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, killing one person and wounding seven others.

21st (Tue)

· The "Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act," which prohibits the importation of products produced by forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China, was enforced in the US.

22nd (Wed)

· The "Al-Qaeda"-affiliated "Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula" (AQAP) attacked a military checkpoint in Ataq, Shabwah Province, central Yemen, killing five people.

23rd (Thu)

· The 14th BRICS Summit (online) was held (until 24th). President Xi Jinping insisted that the process of expanding the number of BRICS members should be promoted. President Vladimir Putin blamed the West for "the critical situation has emerged in the world economy because of the selfish actions of certain states."

25th (Sat)

· A man opened fire in downtown Oslo, the capital of Norway, killing two people and wounding 21 others.

26th (Sun)

· G7 Elmau Summit was held (until 28th, Germany).

28th (Tue)

· Two Islamist men killed a Hindu man in the western Indian state of Rajasthan and claimed to have "decapitated a prophet blasphemer."

30th (Thu)

· President Putin signed an Executive Order to change the project ownership of the "Sakhalin 2," an oil and natural gas development project in Sakhalin Oblast, Russia, from "Sakhalin Energy" to a company established by the Russian government.

July

1st (Fri)

· The 25th anniversary of the restoration of Hong Kong to the motherland was celebrated in Hong Kong, China, in the attendance of President Xi Jinping.

2nd (Sat)

· In Yatenga province, northern Burkina Faso, the "Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims" (JNIM) attacked the "Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland" (VDP), killing 8 militiamen.

5th (Tue)

· The ISIL-affiliated "West Africa Province" attacked a prison near the Nigerian capital, Abuja, and 879 people escaped.

6th (Wed)

· The directors of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the UK Security Service (MI5) held a joint press conference to warn of the dangers of technology theft and to point out the large scale and sophisticated activities of cyber threat actors backed by the Chinese government.

7th (Thu)

· The "85th anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident" was held in Beijing, China, and Wang Huning, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC, delivered a speech.

9th (Sat)

· Right-wing groups held demonstrations calling for the "overthrow of Putin" in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine (Tokyo).

· President Xi Jinping sent a telegram of condolence to Prime Minister Fumio Kishida following the death of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

· Someone detonated a suicide bomb on "Houthi" convoy in Al-Maragim district, Al-Bayda governorate in southern Yemen, killing and wounding many. The ISIL-affiliated "Yemen Province" issued a claim of responsibility.

11th (Mon)

· Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in Indonesia, where he was visiting, that "the Taiwan question is at the very core of China's core interests."

12th (Tue)

· In Indian-administered northern Kashmir, an unknown assailant killed one person and wounded several others in an attack on security officials in the state. The ISIL-affiliated "Hind Province" issued a claim of responsibility.

13th (Wed)

· North Korea recognized the "independence" of the pro-Russian "Donetsk People's Republic" and "Luhansk People's Republic" in the Donbass region of eastern Ukraine.

15th (Fri)

· Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that 384 members of the House of Representatives of Japan are banned from entering Russia.

19th (Tue)

· Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that the concerns expressed by the foreign ministers of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) about the discharge of treated water from TEPCO's Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station into the ocean "reflects the world's grave concern."

· The US hosted the Supply Chain Ministerial Forum (until 20th, online). In a joint statement, ministers from 19 countries and regions in attendance affirmed the importance of building long-term resilient supply chains in accordance with the four principles of transparency, diversification, security, and sustainability.

20th (Wed)

· The "Al-Qaeda"-affiliated "Al-Shabaab" carried out a cross-border attack into Ethiopia in the Bakool region of southern Somalia, killing 17 Ethiopian police officers.

22nd (Fri)

· Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, and the United Nations held talks and agreed to establish a "corridor" to transport Ukrainian grain to the Black Sea. A "Joint Coordination Centre" was established in Istanbul, and grain exports from Ukraine resumed on August 1.

■ : International incidents

■ : Domestic incidents

· JNIM attacked a military base in the suburbs of Bamako, the capital of Mali, injuring six soldiers.

23rd (Sat)

· The ISIL-affiliated "Sinai Province" carried out a suicide bombing targeting police officers in North Sinai Province, northeastern Egypt, injuring at least three people.

28th (Thu)

· US and Chinese leaders held a telephone conference.

29th (Fri)

· The Japan-US Economic Policy Consultative Committee Meeting (the Economic "2+2") convened in Washington, D.C. The four participating US and Japanese cabinet ministers shared their views on the importance of strengthening supply chains and promoting and protecting key emerging technologies.

August

1st (Mon)

· The Japanese Communist Party held the 6th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee (until 2nd, Tokyo) to review the Upper House Election and proposed a "Special Period to Commemorate the 100th Anniversary of the Founding of the Party, Win Unified Local Elections, and Expand the Party's Strength" (until the end of December).

· The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference was held (until 26th, New York, US). On the final day, the conference adjourned without adopting a final document due to opposition from Russia.

· President Biden announced that an airstrike killed "Al-Qaeda" leader Zawahiri in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan.

3rd (Wed)

· US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan and met with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen and others.

4th (Thu)

· China established a no-fly/no-sail zone around the main island of Taiwan and conducted military exercises (until 10th).

· Japan's Ministry of Defense announced that some of the ballistic missiles fired by China during the aforementioned exercise were presumed to have fallen within Japan's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

· Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said, "We no longer plan to schedule the meeting between the Chinese and Japanese foreign ministers."

6th (Sat)

· The Joyu group of Aum Shinrikyo ("Hikari-no-Wa") held intensive summer seminars (until 14th, Osaka, etc.).

· Right-wing groups conducted propaganda activities in the streets criticizing the US atomic bombings on the occasion of A-Bomb Day (and on the 9th, in Tokyo, Hiroshima, and other cities).

8th (Mon)

· Li Song, China's Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, stated at the "10th Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference" regarding the discharge of treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station into the ocean: "We advise Japan to ensure that it disposes in a scientific and safe manner and to accept strict supervision by the IAEA."

9th (Tue)

· Right-wing groups held street propaganda activities in the streets calling for the "recapture of the Northern Territories" and "opposition to the invasion of Ukraine" under the name of "Anti-Russia Day" (all over Japan).

· President Biden signed the "CHIPS and Science Act" to support domestic production of semiconductors.

10th (Wed)

· North Korea announced that it has "exterminated" an influx of new coronaviruses.

· China released a white paper, "The Taiwan Question and China's Reunification in the New Era."

· Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said of Japan's cabinet reshuffle, "We hope the new cabinet can work with the Chinese side in the same direction, and advance the bilateral relations along the right track for steady development."

· In Butembo, North Kivu Province in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the ISIL-affiliated "Central Africa Province" attacked the Kakwangura Central Prison and over 800 prisoners escaped.

15th (Mon)

· Right-wing groups visited Yasukuni Shrine and Gokoku Shrines on the day of the end of WWII, and participated in memorial services for the war dead (all over Japan).

17th (Wed)

· Yang Jiechi, a member of the Political Bureau and director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee, met with Takeo Akiba, Secretary-General of the National Security Secretariat in Tianjin, China, and said, "Two countries should eliminate internal and external interference and work together to build a China-Japan relation that meets the requirements of the new era."

18th (Thu)

· Right-wing groups held propaganda activities in the streets calling for "smashing All Japan Teachers and Staff Union (Zenkyo)" in response to the "Zenkyo Education Research National Meeting 2022" organized by ZENKYO and others (until 21st, Tokyo, Kochi).

19th (Fri)

· "Al-Shabaab" attacked a hotel in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, killing at least 21 people and injuring 117 others.

23rd (Tue)

· US Department of Commerce added seven China-related entities, primarily those involved in aerospace, to the "Entity List" for "acquiring and attempting to acquire US-origin items in support of China's military modernization efforts."

27th (Sat)

· China's National Development and Reform Commission and South Korea's Ministry of Economy and Finance agreed to strengthen cooperation on supply chain at the 17th South Korea-China Economic Cooperation (online).

30th (Tue)

· In Maguindanao Province, southern Philippines, a group of armed men suspected to be affiliated with the "Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters" (BIFF) attacked the convoy of a police chief, killing the chief and a police officer.

September

1st (Thu)

· "Vostok-2022," a large-scale military exercise was held in the Russian Far East (until 7th). More than 50,000 soldiers are said to have participated in the exercise, and 14 countries, including China and India, dispatched troops or observers.

2nd (Fri)

· Russian Ministry of Defense announced that the "S-300V4" surface-to-air missile unit deployed in the "Kurile Islands" (Kurile Islands and the Northern Territories) would conduct an overhead target detection, identification, and destruction drill.

3rd (Sat)

· Russian Ministry of Defense announced that it conducted landing blocking exercises on Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands within the framework of the military exercise "Vostok-2022."

4th (Sun)

· The Ministry of Defense of Japan announced that three Chinese naval vessels and three Russian naval vessels conducted machine gun fire in the waters around Cape Kamui.

5th (Mon)

· The "7th Eastern Economic Forum" was held in Vladivostok, Russia (until 8th), and within the framework of the forum, an agreement was reached on the construction of a hotel on Etorofu Island. A breakout session on "Unique Kurile: Investment Potential" was held on the 8th.

· The Russian government issued a government decree suspending the validity of the 1991 agreement on the "four-island exchange program" and the 1999 agreement on "free visits" to the Northern Territories.

· The ISIL-affiliated "Khorasan Province" carried out a suicide bombing near the Russian Embassy in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, killing at least six people, including two Embassy employees, and wounding several others.

6th (Tue)

· AQAP attacked an army checkpoint in Abyan Province in southern Yemen, killing 21 soldiers.

· Cyberattacks on Japanese government agencies, e-Gov, a portal site for administrative information, more than 20 websites of railroad companies, and eLTAX, a local tax portal system, caused connection failures. "Killnet," a pro-Russian hacker group, admitted to being involved in some of the attacks.

7th (Wed)

· North Korea held the 7th Session of the 14th Supreme People's Assembly (until 8th) and enacted the law "on the state policy on the nuclear forces".

· Albanian Prime Minister Rama announced immediate severance of diplomatic relations with Iran, citing evidence of involvement of groups orchestrated and sponsored by Iran in cyberattacks on government institutions in Albania.

9th (Fri)

· The mainstream group of Aum Shinrikyo ("Aleph") held intensive autumn seminars (until October 2nd, in Tokyo, etc.).

11th (Sun)

· Unified regional elections were held in Russia, with all incumbent and acting heads of government supported by the Putin administration winning in head of government elections in 15 federal constituent entities, and the ruling party "United Russia" winning more than two-thirds of all parliamentary seats in parliamentary elections in 6 federal constituent entities.

12th (Mon)

· At the "Symposium Marking the 50th Anniversary of the Normalization of Diplomatic Relations between Japan and China," Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated in a video format, "On major issues of principle essential to the very foundation of China-Japan relations, such as history and Taiwan, there must be no ambiguity, still less any wavering or backpedaling."

15th (Thu)

· North Korea released a message from Ambassador Song Il Ho on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration.

· President Xi Jinping and President Putin met in Uzbekistan. President Xi expressed his intention to work with Russia to stabilize the international situation. President Putin praised China's response to the invasion of Ukraine, saying that "our Chinese friends are taking a balanced position."

· Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit was held (until 16th, in Samarkand, Uzbekistan).

16th (Fri)

· At the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, President Xi Jinping proposed "strengthening mutual support," "expanding security cooperation," and "adhering to multilateralism," and also announced that China would host a supply chain-related conference under its leadership in 2023.

17th (Sat)

· The Japanese Communist Party held a lecture meeting to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Party's founding (Tokyo).

21st (Wed)

· President Putin signed an Executive Order to "partially mobilize" reserve forces and delivered a televised address.

22nd (Thu)

· Chinese Premier Li Keqiang held a "high-level video dialogue" with representatives of Japan's business community, including the Keidanren (Japan Business Federation).

23rd (Fri)

· "Referenda" were held by the pro-Russian parties on 23rd-27th in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya regions, in the south and east of Ukraine, respectively, where the Russian military and pro-Russian parties control territory, to determine whether they would be incorporated into Russia.

25th (Sun)

· North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which landed near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula.

26th (Mon)

· Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that a member of the Consulate-General of Japan in Vladivostok was deported from the country as a "persona non grata."

27th (Tue)

· Radical leftist groups held rallies and demonstrations in various parts of the country calling for the "blocking of the state funeral" for the late Shinzo Abe (all over Japan).

28th (Wed)

· North Korea launched ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan.

29th (Thu)

· North Korea launched ballistic missiles, which landed near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula.

· President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang sent a message to Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China.

· Right-wing groups held propaganda activities in the streets calling to "defend the Senkaku Islands to the death" on the so-called "Anti-Communist China Day" (all over Japan).

October

1st (Sat)

· North Korea launched ballistic missiles, which landed near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula.

3rd (Mon)

· Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the Maritime Self-Defense Force had confirmed that "flares were rising from an offshore platform that China had set up in June on the west side of the geographical median line between Japan and China in the East China Sea."

4th (Tue)

· North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which passed over Aomori Prefecture and landed in the Pacific Ocean about 3,200 km east of Japan.

· The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan announced that a consul at the Russian Consulate-General in Sapporo was notified of the "persona non grata" and asked to leave the country by October 10.

6th (Thu)

· North Korea launched ballistic missiles, which fell near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula and into the Sea of Japan.

7th (Fri)

· President Putin signed a presidential decree to change the ownership of "Sakhalin 1," an oil and natural gas development project in Sakhalin Oblast, Russia, to a company established by the Russian government.

· The Panel of Experts of the UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea released its interim report. Regarding North Korea's nuclear and missile development, member states assessed that North Korea was in the "final stage" of preparations for a nuclear test, and noted that it had achieved technological results through a series of ballistic missile tests. They also noted that North Korea's cyber threat actors stole hundreds of millions of dollars worth of cryptographic assets during 2022 and that they continue to conduct cyber activities for the purpose of intelligence gathering.

· The US Department of Commerce announced new export control measures to restrict the acquisition of advanced computing chips and the manufacture of advanced semiconductors with China in mind.

9th (Sun)

· North Korea launched ballistic missiles, which fell into the Sea of Japan.

12th (Wed)

· Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that it would "take appropriate countermeasures" against Japan in relation to the joint Japan-US drills in Hokkaido.

· US Government released "National Security Strategy."

14th (Fri)

· North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which fell into the Sea of Japan.

· Japan's Financial Services Agency, National Police Agency, and National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity issued an alert regarding an attack targeting crypto-asset-related businesses by a cyberattack group believed to be under the control of North Korean authorities.

16th (Sun)

· The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Party Congress) was held in Beijing, China (until 22nd). The 19th Central Committee's "Report (Political Report)" titled "Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects" and "Proposed Amendments to the Party Constitution" were discussed and adopted.

17th (Mon)

· Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said on Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's offer *masakaki* at Yasukuni Shrine, "We urge the Japanese side to face squarely and reflect on its history of aggression, make a clean break with militarism, and win the trust of its Asian neighbors and the larger international community through concrete actions."

18th (Tue)

· In light of North Korea's ballistic missile launches, etc., the Japanese government additionally designated five entities (North Korea) as sanctions targets.

23rd (Sun)

· The First Plenary Session of the 20th Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee was held in Beijing, China. Twenty-four members of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and seven members of the Standing Committee were elected, and Xi Jinping was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee. Members of the Central Military Commission were also elected.

24th (Mon)

· The US Department of Justice announced the prosecution of 13 Chinese intelligence officers and others for their involvement in a malicious scheme in the United States on behalf of the Chinese government. Two of the 13 were charged with attempting to obstruct a criminal investigation by US authorities into a major Chinese telecommunications company, the DOJ said.

26th (Wed)

· Armed men attacked a Shiite place of worship in the southern Iranian province of Fars, killing 13 people and wounding 19. On the same day, ISIL issued a claim of responsibility.

28th (Fri)

· Right-wing groups held propaganda activities in the streets calling for the "recapture of Takeshima" on the "Day of the Recapture of Takeshima" (all over Japan).

29th (Sat)

· At least 100 people were killed and more than 300 injured when two car bombs exploded in succession in front of the Ministry of Education building in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. On the same day, "Al-Shabaab" issued a claim of responsibility.

November

2nd (Wed)

· North Korea launched ballistic missiles, which fell near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula.

3rd (Thu)

· North Korea launched ballistic missiles, which fell near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula and into the Sea of Japan.

9th (Wed)

· North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which fell near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula.

13th (Sun)

· A bomb exploded in downtown Istanbul, western Turkey, killing six civilians and wounding 81. The government of Turkey announced that the "Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan" (PKK) was responsible for the blast, which the PKK denied.

14th (Mon)

· President Xi Jinping visited Bali, Indonesia, to attend the G20 Bali Summit and held talks with President Biden.

 : International incidents

 : Domestic incidents

17th (Thu)

· President Xi Jinping held the first Japan-China summit meeting in about three years with Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on the occasion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Leaders' Meeting (Bangkok, Thailand).

· North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which fell near the east coast of the Korean Peninsula.

18th (Fri)

· North Korea launched a ballistic missile, which fell into the Sea of Japan about 200 km west of Oshima in Hokkaido (announced as a "test-fire of a new-type ICBM 'Hwasongpho-17'").

19th (Sat)

· North Korea released a photo of a girl believed to be Kim Jong Un's daughter.

30th (Wed)

· Chinese and Russian aircraft conducted joint flights in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea, etc.

· US announced that ISIL supreme leader Abu al-Hassan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi was killed in mid-October during fighting with rebels in Syria's southern province of Dar'a.

Information Dissemination

The Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) prepares a variety of publications and disseminates information through its website and SNS in order to widely inform the public about international terrorism, cyberattacks, and other internal and external situations of interest to Japan.

PSIA Website

The website of the PSIA introduces related laws and regulations under its jurisdiction, its history and tasks, and disseminates various information on domestic and international situations, such as **"Recent Domestic and International Situations," "Situations occurring tied to terrorism and relevant affairs in the world,"** and **"Trends surrounding Economic Security."**



<https://www.moj.go.jp/psia/>



PSIA Website

Publication

In addition to the "Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations," the PSIA also publishes the following publications. **All of these publications are also available on its website.**




Publications

Handbook of International Terrorism



This handbook summarizes the trends in international terrorism, the profiles and moves of international terrorist organizations, and the terrorism situation in each region, etc.

Ensuring Economic Security



This leaflet summarizes the current situation that should be noted from the perspective of economic security, including the channels of leak of technologies, data, products, etc., and cases of leak of products that can be diverted to military use.

Overview of Threats in Cyberspace



This report summarizes the threat types, threat actors, and their methods and countermeasures of cyberattacks in recent years.

PSIA SNS Accounts

The PSIA's official Twitter and YouTube channel provide various awareness-raising videos, event information, and other information that the PSIA wants to announce.

●Official Twitter Account



@MOJ_PSIA



●Official YouTube channel



PSIAchannel



Awareness-raising Videos


The PSIA produces awareness-raising videos on the issue of "Aum Shinrikyo," "International Terrorism Situation," and "Economic Security," and releases them on its website and SNS. The videos on the issue of "Aum Shinrikyo" and "Economic Security" are shown on large screens around the country and distributed via YouTube in-stream advertisements as needed.



Awareness-raising video on the issue of "Aum Shinrikyo"



Awareness-raising video on the "International Terrorism Situation"



Awareness-raising video on "Economic Security"



Large-screen television broadcasting in Sapporo, Hokkaido



Large-screen television broadcasting in Shinbashi, Minato-ku, Tokyo

●Awareness-raising Videos



Review and Prospects of Internal and External Situations

January 2023

