| (1) Progress and uncertainty in the North Korean nuclear issue ]Considering that the United States had changed its stance toward Pyongyang, North Korea started to move toward “denuclearization,” although the country took a stance of shelving the issue of uranium enrichment. ]China highly evaluated the outcome of the “Feb. 13 agreement,” but at the same time worried that the six-party talks might become an empty framework as the U.S. and North Korea move toward rapprochement. |
North Korea had informal talks with the United States in Berlin attended by the representatives of the six-party talks from both sides (January 16 to 18). Following the talks, North Korea announced that “a certain level of agreement was reached. We respect the United States for having a direct dialogue with North Korea.” Considering that the United States had changed its attitude toward Pyongyang, North Korea showed a positive response toward the United States. During the Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks (February 8 to 13, Beijing), North Korea agreed to initiate the denuclearization process, starting with “initial-phase actions” including the shutdown and sealing of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, in exchange for the supply of heavy fuel oil (February 13 agreement).
Later, North Korea hardened its stance, demanding the return of its funds in the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA) account, which was frozen by the U.S.’s financial sanctions against North Korea, by remittance via financial institutions rather than by direct withdrawal, and did not accept the implementation of the aforementioned “initial-phase actions,” which was required to be done within 60 days of the agreement.
However, when the United States accepted North Korea’s demand for the aforementioned remittance through the use of the U.S. central bank, and the funds were transferred to Pyongyang via Russia (June), North Korea started to move toward implementing the “initial-phase actions.” By mid July, it had carried out the shutdown of the 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon, and also accepted inspections of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
During the Second Session of the Sixth Round of the Six-Party Talks (September 27 to 30, Beijing), North Korea agreed to the joint statement for the implementation of “second-phase actions” included in the “February 13 Agreement.” The actions included “disablement” of three nuclear facilities, consisting of the five-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon, the reprocessing plant for spent fuels (plutonium extraction), and the fuel rod fabrication facility, and the implementation of a “full and accurate declaration of all nuclear programs” by December 31, on the condition that the U.S. would, in parallel, make a move toward removing North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Based on this agreement, North Korea accepted a group of U.S. specialists in November, and operations for disablement of the aforementioned nuclear facilities were started.
In the meanwhile, following informal talks in Berlin, North Korea tried to impress the world with the progress in its relationship with the United States. For instance, North Korea sent a working group to New York (March) and Geneva (September) to attend meetings for the normalization of DPRK-U.S. diplomatic relations, and Kim Kye Gwan, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited the United States (March) to join the working group’s meetings. Also, Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Department of State, visited Pyongyang (June).
As the chair of the six-party talks, China highly evaluated the adoption of the February 13 Agreement agreed during the Third Session of the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks, saying “the six-party talks have proved to constitute a realistic and effective way of solving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula” (February 13, Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan). Afterwards, however, the six-party talks went into long-term recess without any significant progress, until the solution of the issue of transfer of North Korean funds from BDA. Even after the resumption of the six-party talks, they were always preceded by the U.S. and DPRK’s bilateral dialogue and a certain level of agreement between them.
It has been pointed out that China is on strong alert to moves toward rapprochement between North Korea and the United States and between North and South Korea, as represented by the visits to Pyongyang of Assistant Secretary Hill of the U.S. Department of State (June) and South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun (October), considering that such moves could possibly lead to the emasculation of the framework of the six-party talks and, accordingly, the reduction of China’s influence. Under these circumstances, China sent Foreign Affairs Minister Yang Jiechi to Pyongyang (July), to prod General Secretary Kim Jong Il to pledge to implement the “initial-phase actions.” China publicized, inside and outside the country, the success in winning Kim Jong Il’s pledge, with the intention of displaying China’s influential power over North Korea. After the issuance of the North-South Joint Declaration (October), various conjectures were heard with regard to who would participate in talks for the establishment of the peace regime in the Korean Peninsula, in response to the description of “three or four parties” in the Declaration. Responding to the speculation that “the three parties” might indicate “the United States, North Korea and South Korea, without China,” China reacted by announcing a comment titled “the role of China should not be underestimated” (overseas edition of People’s Daily, issued on October 10).
North Korea considers the U.S. change of policy toward the DPRK as a good opportunity to acquire material gains, and is expected to make efforts to maximize such gains by showing off “progress in the nuclear issue” through the fulfillment of the pledge to disable its nuclear facilities, while taking into consideration the expiration of the Bush administration@(January 2009).
However, there exist many issues yet to be solved, including the problems of dismantlement or removal of nuclear facilities, nuclear substances and nuclear weapons. It is also pointed out that North Korea actually desires to remain a “nuclear power state.” Therefore, a considerable number of twists and turns are expected before the complete denuclearization of North Korea.
China is expected to continue to make efforts, as the chair of the six-party talks, to maintain the framework of the six-party talks, aiming to solve the North Korean nuclear issue under this framework.
| (2) North Korea made efforts to strengthen internal control while setting out the policy to “focus on the economy.”
]Although the policy to “focus on the economy” was spelled out at the beginning of the year, economic sluggishness continued and economic conditions were aggravated by flood damage. |
In the New Year’s joint editorial (of the three major papers issued at the beginning of every year), North Korea stated that “the retention of a nuclear deterrent is a cause for celebration in the nation’s history,” referring to its nuclear experiment in 2006, and at the same time declared that it would now “concentrate the state power on the economy.” As part of the actions to be taken under this policy, North Korea increased production of food and energy, promoted the renewal of decrepit production facilities, encouraged factories and firms to observe production plans and budgets, and enhanced the restrictions already in place on individual commercial activities, with the aim of restoring the functions of planned economic systems. In addition, the government increased media reports on on-site supervision of economic sectors by General Secretary Kim Jong Il (14 times during 2006 and 22 times during the Jan.-Nov. period of 2007), with the intention of impressing the world with North Korea’s efforts toward economic development. Furthermore, North Korea approached various countries to ask for enhanced economic assistance, through sending or inviting delegations, such as the round of visits by Premier Kim Yong Il to Southeast Asian countries (October to November).
As a result of these efforts, North Korea achieved a certain amount of progress, including the launch of the operation of a new production line at the Hungnam Chemical Fertilizer Complex (August), as well as the renewal of some production facilities of key factories in the heavy and chemical industries, recovering from reported long-term stagnation. However, as a whole, domestic economic activities still suffered from a vicious spiral attributed to the shortage of electricity, raw materials and foreign currencies, and failed to get out of the overall slump.
In addition, two localized downpours in August and September, hitting granaries, resulted in serious flood damage. It was reported that the floods submerged or washed away more than 200,000 hectares of farmland, accounting for at least about ten percent of total agricultural land, blocked roads and railways, and inundated factories and power plants with water.
Along with the restrictions enforced over sectors of the economy, North Korea enhanced social control as well. For example, the National Meeting of Secretaries of Cells of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) was held for the first time in thirteen years (October), where the WPK advocated tightening restrictions on the people and strengthening ideological education. Accordingly, controls over defectors, private meetings and possession of foreign CDs and videos have been strengthened. Also, discipline over executive members of the WPK, the government and the military has been enforced to control their wrongdoing and corruption. In addition, North Korea announced that it had uncovered an espionage attempt by a foreign intelligence agency (September). Thus, control over the outflow of internal information to foreign countries has been enforced as part of efforts to strengthen the regime, and such tough stance to enhance controls was publicly demonstrated both inside and outside the country.
This set of enhanced control measures introduced by North Korea seems to imply the regime’s strong sense of crisis regarding the recent trend of increasing instability factors affecting it, such as expanding wealth disparity, spreading mammonism, inflow of external information and outflow of confidential information.
While showing an attitude of emphasizing the economy, North Korea also continued to hold fast to the “military-first policy.” At the celebration of the 75th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) (April), a parade of military forces including ballistic missiles was carried out as part of internal and external publicity to display its military power. Also, test-firings of short-range missiles were conducted repeatedly.
At the same time, the function of the National Defense Commission, which is considered to be a symbolic representation of military strength, seems to have been strengthened through personnel shuffling and structural enhancement, including the exclusive appointment of Kim Yong Chun, Chief of the General Staff of KPA, to the post of Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission, and successive transfers to the National Defense Commission of high-ranking officials of the KPA, who are considered to be close to Kim Jong Il, including General Ri Myong Su.
The aforementioned series of movements by North Korea seem to imply the country’s intention to restore the social control systems that used to support the regime’s stability.
It is expected that North Korea will continue to make efforts to introduce public and private assistance and investment from a diverse range of foreign countries, including China and South Korea, while seeking advantages obtainable from progress in the nuclear issue and the improvement of foreign relations for the purpose of maintaining the regime.
However, the loosening of tension toward the outside world and increase of personnel exchanges stemming from such improvement and revitalization in relations with foreign countries could make it all the more difficult for North Korea to secure internal control. Also, the effects that can be expected from these stopgap-type restrictions and control measures are considered to be quite limited and temporary, under the current situation where the government is incapable of recovering supplies including food. Moreover, any excessive restrictions or controls to be introduced in disregard of actual economic difficulties could possibly arouse a lot of bad feeling among the general public. Thus, it is necessary to continue to pay close attention to the stability of the North Korean regime.
| (3) North Korea sought a change in Japan’s policy toward Pyongyang, while maintaining its hard-line stance.
]North Korea maintained an inflexible attitude toward Japan, insisting that “the issue of abduction has already been settled.” |
Regarding the issue of abduction, North Korea’s attitude toward Japan has stiffened, defiantly labeling Japan’s actions as “manipulation of the issue for political purposes.” In 2007, North Korea continued to maintain an inflexible attitude, and with signs of progress in the six-party talks as well as in U.S.-DPRK relations, even strengthened pressure on Japan, protesting that “Japan would be isolated and digging its own grave if it brought the issue of abduction to the six-party talks, only to disturb their progress, disregarding the topic’s relevance to the six-party talks.”
During the first meeting of the working groups for the Japan-DPRK normalization talks held under these circumstances (March, Hanoi), North Korea adhered to the assertion that “the abduction issue has already been settled” and maintained its hard-line stance. North Korea walked out in the middle of the meeting on the first day of the talks, saying that “the gap between the two countries’ positions is so big that there is nothing to be discussed any more.”
North Korea criticized Japan for its actions including the decision to prolong sanctions (April), a series of domiciliary searches conducted at the facilities of Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan), and the process taken for the auction of Chongryon’s Central Hall, saying that “Japan violates the sovereignty of North Korea” and that “necessary counteractions will be taken by the sections in charge.” (statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, announced on July 1). Also, a succession of protest rallies against Japan were held in Pyongyang and other cities with the participation of workers and students (July). In addition, during the Ministerial Meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (August, Manila), North Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Pak Ui Chun said “Japan’s behavior is inhuman,” insisting that Japan’s treatment of Chongryon was “oppression.” Thus, North Korea repeated criticism of Japan, both inside and outside the country.
At the same time, when Japan asked for the international community’s cooperation in solving the abduction issue during a session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (March, Geneva), North Korea reacted defiantly, saying that “the abduction issue has already come to a complete settlement, and the only outstanding issue yet to be addressed is Japan’s liquidation of its wartime past.” Also, during the “Eighth Asian Solidarity Conference for the Women Drafted as Military Sexual Slaves by Japan,” (May, Seoul), North Korea called for the enhancement of international cooperation against Japan to demand its early “liquidation of its wartime past.” Thus, North Korea has been aggressive in appealing to the world for drawing attention to the issue of Japan’s “liquidation of its wartime past.”
North Korea’s attitude during the second meeting of the working groups for DPRK-Japan normalization (September, Ulan Bator) was different from that in the previous meeting, and it did not repeat its withdrawal halfway through the meeting. However, with regard to the abduction issue, North Korea’s comments were limited to the simple assertion that “the maximum efforts have been made, including the return of victims and their family members to Japan.” Also, North Korea once again demanded “compensation for personnel, material and mental damage caused by Japan during the colonial period,” as mentioned in the previous meeting, in addition to the economic assistance specified in the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration as part of the conditions for normalization. In addition, after the meeting, North Korea insisted that “the initial step for the smooth progress of Japan-DPRK relations should be the removal of Japan’s sanctions.”
Later, in response to the inauguration of the Fukuda administration in Japan (September), North Korea said that “the present impasse in Japan-DPRK relations could be reversed if Japan shows a sincere attitude,” but again criticized Japan for its decision on further extending sanctions against North Korea (October), saying that “Japan did not change its hostile policy toward North Korea even after the inauguration of the new administration. Now, the Japanese government should stop sanctions.” North Korea continued to urge Japan to move first by saying that “Japan should make a political decision to reverse its hostile policy toward North Korea” and that “the immediate action of Japan to liquidate its wartime past is required by the times, and Japan should not postpone it any more.”
North Korea adamantly insisted that Japan’s sanctions constituted an “obstacle to DPRK-Japan dialogue,” and it is therefore expected that North Korea will take various measures to make Japan reduce or stop the sanctions.
North Korea will probably increase its approaches to various circles in Japan, through Chongryon and other channels, with the aim of softening Japanese public opinion toward North Korea, particularly calming public opinion over the abduction issue to get the issue shelved.
In addition to the abduction issue, regarding personnel exchanges and trade between the two countries, it is necessary to stay alert to adverse activities against Japan, including North Koreans’ activities to violate trade rules in an attempt to illegally acquire foreign currencies or state-of-the-art/general-purpose materials.
| (4) China-DPRK relations move toward restoration while the two countries continue to be distrustful of each other after North Korea’s nuclear test.
]With the progress of the six-party talks, personnel exchanges between China and North Korea have been revitalized, allowing them to emphasize a friendly relationship. |
With the progress of the six-party talks, North Korea and China have revitalized their bilateral personnel exchanges and sought to restore their relationship, which had been deteriorating since North Korea conducted a nuclear test (October 2006).
North Koreans who made contact with China included General Secretary Kim Jong Il, who visited the Chinese Embassy on March 4 to have a conversation with the Chinese ambassador, a Korean People’s Army (KPA) delegation of activists for external relations (March), a goodwill delegation of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) (August), a delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (September), and various other delegations. A succession of Chinese leaders also made contact with North Korea, including a delegation of the International Liaison Department, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (April), a goodwill delegation of the CPC (June), Yang Jiechi, Minister of Foreign Affairs (July), a goodwill delegation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (August), a cultural delegation of the government (September), and Liu Yunshan, member of the Political Bureau, Central Committee of the CPC (October).
When Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi visited Pyongyang, in particular, Kim Jong Il expressed his intention “to continue to promote mutual understanding and a cooperative relationship with China,” publicizing internally and externally the restoration of bilateral relations. Also, at the time of the visit to North Korea by Liu Yunshan, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC, Kim Jong Il once again emphasized a “friendly relationship between China and North Korea.”
Behind the movement of restoration of China-DPRK relations, there is the necessity of North Korea to stabilize political and economic relations with China for the purpose of promoting negotiations with the United States, as well as the desire of China to avoid the decrease of its influence on North Korea, which could otherwise be relatively weakened as Pyongyang continued to move toward rapprochement with Washington and Seoul.
On the economic front, the recent upward trend in trade activity between China and North Korea was maintained, registering a 16.6% increase, in terms of value, during the January-October term when compared to the same period during 2006 that had marked the record high. Due to higher demand from the Chinese side, in particular, exports from North Korea to China have increased sharply, including the export of minerals such as anthracite coal (up 29.7% from the same period in the previous year). At the same time, Chinese exports of crude oil to North Korea remained at the same level as usual (annual amount of about 500,000 tons) (China Monthly Exports & Imports Statistics).
On the other hand, North Korea actively approached Chinese corporations to induce direct investment. For example, North Korea invited quite a few Chinese corporations to the International Commodity Exhibitions held in Pyongyang (May and October) and also sent a delegation of economic, trade and corporate representatives to the “Third China Jilin Northeast Asia Investment and Trade Expo” held in China (September). Under these circumstances, some Chinese commitments to North Korean mines and ironworks were reported, but China adopted an overall cautious attitude toward large-scale investment in North Korea. Behind such a cautious attitude is the frequent occurrence of troubles related to trade with North Korea, in parallel with the recent rapid expansion of China-DPRK transactions, which still gives Chinese investors a strong skeptical view of the investment environment in North Korea.
Although it was reported that North Korea would establish a new special economic zone at an area close to the China-DPRK border, no specific movements have been seen yet. Also, the “redevelopment project on the road between Hunchun (China) and Rajin (North Korea) and the port of Rajin,” on which the two countries reportedly reached an agreement in 2005, has yet to be launched.
It is expected that North Korea will make efforts to establish and maintain a good and stable relationship with China, through exchanges between high-ranking officials, for example, taking the opportunity of the inauguration of new members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC. North Korea believes that it is necessary to improve the foreign relations environment for the purpose of promoting U.S.-DPRK relations, and that it is essential to maintain economic relations with China in order to manage internal economic activities. At the same time, North Korea is also expected to continue to introduce various surveillance measures or restrictions over personnel exchanges and trade with China, due to deep-rooted cautiousness about a possible increase in China’s influence on North Korea and the inflow of information from China.
On the other hand, China is expected to seek maintenance and expansion of its influence on North Korea through food and energy assistance, while carrying a feeling of distrust for the country, as it forced through a nuclear test, and paying close attention to movements in U.S.-DPRK and inter-Korean relations.
| (5) North Korea sought the continuation of South Korea’s appeasement policy toward Pyongyang.
]Backed by the progress in the six-party talks, North Korea strengthened its cooperative relationship with South Korea. Pyongyang agreed to hold an inter-Korean Summit for the first time in seven years, and as a result, made achievements in many fields. |
With the progress in the six-party talks, North Korea changed its attitude and came to be positive toward the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue, which had been interrupted since July 2006 when North Korea launched missiles. Accordingly, North Korea agreed to hold the 20th inter-Korean ministerial meeting (February, Pyongyang), the 13th meeting of the committee for the promotion of inter-Korean economic cooperation (April, Pyongyang), and the fifth inter-Korean general-level military meeting (May, Panmunjom). Through this series of meetings, the North agreed to resume inter-Korean family reunion programs as well as the test operation of the Trans-Korean Railway (Gyeongui Line and Donghae Line) (realized on May 17), and requested that the South resume assistance in rice and fertilizers and provide light industrial materials equivalent to about 80 million dollars. In response to this request, South Korea provided 300,000 tons of fertilizers (March to June), then sent 400,000 tons of rice in June and light industrial materials in July, following uninterrupted development in the shutdown process of North Korea’s nuclear facilities.
Since June 2000, when General Secretary Kim Jong Il gave his word that he “will visit Seoul at an appropriate time” to then-President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea during his visit to Pyongyang, the question of when such an “appropriate time” will come has drawn much attention. The two countries made an announcement in August that South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun would be visiting Pyongyang at the end of that month to hold the second inter-Korean summit. Although this was postponed because of flooding in North Korea, President Roh Moo Hyun eventually made it to Pyongyang from the 2nd to 4th of October.
During the Summit, which was held for the first time in seven years, President Roh Moo Hyun and General Secretary Kim Jong Il reached mutual consent and signed the “declaration for the development, peace and prosperity of inter-Korean relations.” The declaration included “emphasis on the interests of the Korean people,” “mutual respect,” “nonintervention in internal affairs” and “proportional development of the Korean economy.” The declaration also referred to various large-scale economic assistance projects, such as the “West Sea special economic zone for peace and cooperation,” as well as a summit meeting by “three or four parties” for the declaration of the end of the Korean War and joint efforts for “the protection of the rights and interests of Korean people living overseas.” However, the declaration contained only a brief reference to the nuclear issue, which was limited to “fulfillment of the pledges agreed upon in the six-party talks.”
Since the summit, the two countries have revitalized discussions to effect the declaration, through the meetings of Prime Ministers (November 14 to 16, Seoul) and Defense Ministers (November 27 to 29, Pyongyang), as well as the visit to Seoul by Director of the United Front Department of the WPK Kim Yang Gon (November 29 to December 1).
From the beginning of the year, North Korea, taking into consideration that South Korea was having its presidential election in December, repeated severe criticism and promoted active propaganda against the Grand National Party, the South Korean opposition party, with the aim of creating an advantageous atmosphere for the presidential candidate from the ruling party, which would inherit a policy of an appeasement toward North Korea. North Korea called for the formation of an “anti-conservatism grand coalition” to prevent the Grand National Party from seizing power, and also labeled the party’s presidential candidate a “dirty sycophant and pro-U.S. betrayer.” On the other hand, North Korea demonstrated its friendly relationship with the ruling Uri Party by inviting assembly members of the party, including former Prime Minister Lee Hae Chan, to exchanges with North Korean unification-related groups (March, April and May).
It is assessed that the aforementioned approaches by North Korea imply its desire not only to take advantage of South Korea’s appeasement policy to the maximum degree during the term of President Roh Moo Hyun, but also to make it establish firmly that the policy would be maintained by the next administration without drastic changes.
It is expected that North Korea will take hard and soft approaches toward the new administration of South Korea, depending on the direction of its North Korea policy, while pressing for the materialization of economic assistance projects agreed upon during the second summit meeting.
| (6) Facing difficulties, Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) worked hard to restore its organizational strength.
]Chongryon held the 21st Congress and promoted the “Compatriot Reintegration Campaign” in an effort to put the brakes on the weakening of organizational strength. Protests denouncing Japan’s “oppression and sanctions” became more active. |
During 2006, Chongryon saw its organizational strength and activities adversely affected by North Korea’s nuclear test, as well as by domiciliary searches on its affiliated facilities and individuals. The domiciliary searches continued even after January 2007, giving Chongryon “the worst ordeal since its foundation” (April, So Man Sul, Chairman of the Central Standing Committee of Chongryon).
Under these severe circumstances, Chongryon tried hard to revitalize its overall activities by carrying out a mass campaign called the “six-month campaign,” which went on during the period from November 2006 until the 21st Congress in May 2007. During the 21st Congress, priority actions to be introduced over the next three years were clarified, including the “Compatriot Reintegration Campaign” with the principal aim of bringing breakaway members and unorganized Korean residents to the organization, as well as enhanced protest activities to demand Japan’s withdrawal of its sanctions against North Korea and domiciliary searches of facilities affiliated with Chongryon. At the same time, in order to promote these activities, three new units were established within the Central Headquarters: the “Ethnic Community Committee,” “Rights and Welfare Committee” and “Public Relations and Propaganda Bureau.” Furthermore, two new members were appointed as Vice Chairmen of the Central Standing Committee, with all the existing senior members higher than vice chairmen level remaining in office, to strengthen the leadership of the organization.
In June, shortly after the Congress, the issue of the “sale” of Chongryon’s Central Hall was revealed. This triggered disturbances among Chongryon activists and members, and some senior activists distributed a written protest against Ho Jong Man, who was allegedly responsible for the “sale,” demanding the resignation of the Chief Vice Chairman. The Chongryon Central Headquarters tried hard to prevent weakening of organizational solidarity, through making efforts to convince local headquarters that “the sale is legitimate and reasonable,” and repeatedly giving directions to “crack down on any attacks against the Central Headquarters by dissident elements and denounce them.”
Chongryon also strongly opposed the action of the Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) to initiate auction procedures for the Chongryon Central Hall, alleging that “the auction constitutes an improper political suppression of Chongryon.” In response to the lawsuit instituted by the RCC against the “Korean Central Hall Management Group” holding the proprietary rights to Chongryon’s Central Hall (registered owner of the Central Hall), to claim the issuance of an execution order, Chongryon expressed its attitude to contest the suit fiercely, insisting that “Chongryon is a separate entity from the Management Group.”
In response to the domiciliary searches on a local commerce and industry association under Chongryon on suspicion of violation of the Certified Public Accountants Act (January and February), as well as searches of the Korean Student League in Japan and the Institute of Korean Affairs on suspicion of the abduction of two children of a Japanese woman, Hideko Watanabe (April), and Japan’s decision to extend its sanctions against North Korea (April and October), Chongryon accused Japan by labeling the said actions as “high-handed political oppression” and “immoral behavior.” On March 3, Chongryon held large-scale protest rallies and demonstration marches simultaneously in four locations, including Tokyo and Hyogo Prefecture, and also distributed propaganda handouts on the street and contacted pro-DPRK organizations to ask for their support. In September, when the Cabinet Office of Japan rejected Chongryon’s request to allow the entry of a North Korean vessel to a Japanese port, for which Chongryon had asked under the pretext of transporting aid supplies to its fatherland that had suffered flood damage, Chongryon issued a statement accusing Japan of an “inhuman stance.” Furthermore, Chongryon held a rally and demonstration march in October in Tokyo to protest against Japan’s decision to further extend sanctions against North Korea, and visited the Cabinet Office again to deliver a letter of request to Prime Minister Fukuda, demanding the withdrawal of the decision to prolong the sanctions, as well as early materialization of the normalization of Japan-DPRK relations and the cancellation of the auction process of the Chongryon Central Hall.
In addition, Chongryon appealed to the international community, by sending delegations to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) (March and September), alleging that “the Japanese government oppresses Chongryon and Korean people residing in Japan, in violation of human rights.”
It is expected that Chongryon will further revitalize its approaches to various organizations, under the direction of North Korea, to persuade Japan to change its stance on North Korea and remove sanctions, while paying attention to developments in the Japanese political situation. Also, Chongryon is expected to make much effort to maintain the right to use the Chongryon Central Hall, by continuing to seek “settlement” even if a petition for the auction is filed.
| (1) The second-term Hu Jintao administration was inaugurated, and worked hard to strengthen its power base.
]The 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) was held, where the guiding principles of Hu Jintao, emphasizing harmony and stability, were established. |
China held the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (hereinafter referred to as the “17th CPC Congress”) (October 15 to 21). The 17th CPC Congress was followed by the First Plenary Session of the 17th CPC Central Committee (October 22), where the second-term Hu Jintao administration was inaugurated. General Secretary Hu Jintao shuffled executive members of the Central Committee, replacing about half of the members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee with executives from his parent organization, the Communist Youth League of China, with the aim of strengthening his power base. A change of members was also made at the highest level of the CPC, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, with four members, including Zeng Qinghong, being replaced with new leaders in their fifties, who are called “the fifth generation,” thus exhibiting generation change. At the same time, however, Jia Qinglin remained in office, which implies that the executive members are well balanced between new leaders and those who are close to former Secretary General Jiang Zemin.
During the 17th CPC Congress, the CPC Constitution was revised to introduce a “scientific concept of development” proposed by General Secretary Hu Jintao. The “scientific concept of development” is an idea of emphasizing balanced growth/development in all spheres: urban areas and rural agricultural areas, society and the economy. The goal is to build a “harmonious society.” In the past, the introduction of leaders’ principles into the Constitution usually took place after or at the time of the leaders’ retirements. The recent introduction of Hu Jintao’s principles in the Constitution in the middle of his term implies that the “scientific concept of development” is widely accepted within the Party as a guiding principle for addressing the various difficulties that the current administration faces, including the income disparity generated in the course of the country’s economic growth, and the issues of official bribery and corruption and the environment. It indicates that the power base of the Hu Jintao administration has been strengthened.
In a report issued during the 17th CPC Congress, the CPC positioned the “scientific concept of development” as an “important guiding principle for national defense and military construction,” and announced its intention to continue to strengthen and expand military power, mainly by introducing advanced technologies related to armament and troop composition. China has announced that its budget for national defense is about 5,334 billion yen, up 17.8% from the previous year, registering another two-digit growth-a trend that has been maintained for 19 consecutive years. In January, China conducted a ballistic missile test, successfully destroying a satellite in orbit. In March, the media reported a statement made by a lieutenant general of the People’s Liberation Army of China, which suggested the possibility of “building and introducing a China-made aircraft carrier by 2010.” This report aroused concern from the United States and other countries.
In response to such concerns, China expressed its willingness to participate in the UN military transparency system to ensure transparency in its armament process (August). China also expressed at the CPC Congress that “China would not become a military menace to any country,” in a vain attempt to wipe out international concerns about the “China threat.”
In a political report at the 17th CPC Congress, General Secretary Hu Jintao used the term “democracy” many times, showing his policy to seek the “development of a socialism-based democratic form of government,” and also clarified his stance of holding fast to the “Four Cardinal Principles” (1. the socialist road, 2. the people’s democratic dictatorship, 3. the leadership of the Communist Party of China, and 4. Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought), with the aim of confirming the policy of maintaining the one-party system of control by the Communist Party of China
China’s GDP growth rate during the January-September term reached 11.5%, well exceeding the target of 8% set during the National People’s Congress (NPC) held in March. Aggressive real estate investment activity and construction of social infrastructure invited as much as a 25.7% increase in the value of investments in fixed properties for the January-September term when compared to the same period during the previous year. In addition, an inflow of large amounts of funds into the stock market led to a threefold rise in stock prices since the beginning of the year. Thus, it seems that the Chinese economy has overheated. In response to this situation, the People’s Bank of China introduced a tight monetary policy, raising interest rates five times and increasing the official discount rate nine times, in order to stabilize economy.
Under such circumstances, it was reported that the urban-rural income disparity in China presented about a threefold difference, and that the income disparity between rich and poor within urban cities presented a difference of more than ten times, as of the end of September. Thus, the problem of income disparity is still being taken seriously. In addition, official bribery and corruption, which is considered to be a factor promoting income disparity, remains a serious problem, and scandals relating to the economic sector were reported frequently.
Along with economic growth, prices that had previously been controlled have started to rise. Consumer prices as of September showed a 6.2% increase from the same month of the previous year. In particular, prices of foods such as meats, cooking oils and eggs soared, significantly affecting the daily lives of low-income earners.
In addition, since March, when incidents of pet deaths occurred in the United States and Canada that were attributed to bad Chinese wheat contained in pet foods, the issue of the safety of China-made products has started to draw much attention in various countries. This issue caused a spread of concern domestically as well, forcing Chinese authorities to take actions to address the issue.
China’s environmental problems also drew much attention. During the National People’s Congress (NPC), it was revealed (March) that the targets set by the Chinese government for energy-saving and reduction of pollutant emissions had not been met in 2006. Executive leaders of the Hu Jintao administration raised the matter of failure to meet targets during the NPC and the 17th CPC Congress, to show a strong sense of crisis and the necessity of strengthening countermeasures.
Furthermore, people’s protest actions attributed to the environment issue occurred frequently in multiple locations in China, including attacks on corporations by thousands of neighboring citizens who suffered health damage allegedly caused by effluents from the corporations’ plants. Some of these incidents developed into large-scale protest groups or sometimes even mobs.
As the 2008 Beijing Olympics approaches, the second-term Hu Jintao administration is prioritizing efforts to secure social stability. In a political report to the 17th CPC Congress, the administration clarified its attitude to make the maximum effort toward solution of the issues of environment, income disparity and official bribery and corruption, which are, according to the administration, a “trade-off for economic growth.” However, some are skeptical about the government’s ability to implement effective countermeasures against the aforementioned issues while simultaneously avoiding a slowdown in economic growth. In addition, the Hu Jintao administration has been urged to take appropriate actions against incidents of group protest, their radicalization and organization, which frequently occur along with increasing public dissatisfaction over the issue of “social welfare.” It is necessary to observe China’s future actions toward the issues of information disclosure and treatment of human rights, as the world pays close attention to these issues.
| (2) China actively develops omnidirectional cooperative diplomacy, with the aim of improving its status in international society
]China has softened its tone toward the United States, and instead enhanced efforts to wipe out international concerns about the “China threat.” |
China positioned the first twenty years of this century as a “period of opportunity for strategic development,” hoping to take advantage of the 2008 Beijing Olympics to improve comprehensive state power. Accordingly, China has been developing omnidirectional cooperative diplomacy with a focus on its relations with the United States, aiming to create stable foreign relations beneficial to the security of energy resources and its own economic development.
Regarding China’s relationship with the United States, its previous tone has softened, although it is still wary of possible unipolar dominance of the world by the United States, China seeks to be a “responsible stakeholder,” as demanded by the Bush administration, and is basically maintaining its cooperative relationship with the United States and displaying its stance of emphasizing the relationship’s stability. During the second meeting of the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) (May, Washington), which is positioned as “the highest-level framework for U.S.-China conference,” China made a concession toward the liberalization of its financial market, while insisting at the same time on “independence” in the issue of yuan reform. On the military front, China’s satellite destruction test (January) created security concern in the United States, but China also promoted military exchanges with the U.S. by carrying out a joint drill of naval forces (May, off the coast of Qingdao). In addition, during U.S. State Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ visit to Beijing, China and the United States agreed to open a hotline between the two countries’ military authorities. Thus, China has been making efforts to promote a relationship of trust with the United States.
China calls itself a “responsible stakeholder,” as well as “the largest developing country.” In its involvement in international issues, China varies its stance according to what issue it faces, with the aim of increasing its influence in the international community.
In response to the issue of the Darfur conflict in Sudan, which triggered protest activities in the United States and European countries calling for people to boycott the Beijing Olympics, President Hu Jintao visited Sudan as part of a round of visits to African countries and persuaded Sudan President Omar al-Bashir to order a ceasefire as soon as possible (February). Thus, China showed the attitude of paying attention to the voices of the international community by using its influential power.
Also, in the midst of increased criticism in the international community of the military regime in Myanmar, which cracked down on civilian demonstrations (September), China maintained its stance of opposing sanctions against the Myanmar government, despite the U.S. and Europe’s insistence in the United Nations Security Council on sanctions. At the same time, China showed independent diplomacy by immediately sending a delegate to Myanmar to calm the situation, taking advantage of its connection with the military of Myanmar. This action implies that China tried to prevent international criticism from being directed at China.
Regarding the issue of global warming, at the Summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) (September) China called for Asian developing countries to oppose the establishment of numerical targets on greenhouse gas emissions, insisting that the responsibility of particular countries should be determined depending on the status of their respective development. At the same time, China acted in concert with the United States, adhering to a voluntary “goal to strive for,” instead of obligatory numerical targets, as both countries share concern about the adverse impact of target setting on their own economic growth.
For the purpose of expanding supply routes and distribution networks for the resources it needs for its economic development, China tried to strengthen cooperation with surrounding foreign countries.
With Russia and Central Asian countries, China promoted large-scale projects to improve roads crossing the Eurasian Continent and internationalize air routes. Also, within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, consisting of China, Russia and four Central Asian countries), China participated in the first joint military drill to be carried out with the participation of all SCO member states (August), with the aim of strengthening cooperation in counter-terrorism. In addition, during the SCO summit meeting (August), President Hu Jintao expressed his intention to continue to invest in bilateral or multilateral key projects in the fields of transport, telecommunication, energy, etc.
As for China’s relations with Southeast Asian countries, it agreed on the construction and promotion of the railway networks connecting it with ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) countries (November), and also signed a maritime transport agreement between China and ASEAN (November). Thus, China moved toward the promotion of trade activities through the improvement of regional transport networks.
During the 17th CPC Congress (October), the Hu Jintao administration raised the diplomatic goal of building a “harmonized world” seeking “long-term peace” and “common prosperity,” by explaining the necessity of cooperation between domestic administration and foreign diplomacy, given the progress of economic globalization. As part of the measures for achieving this goal, the administration suggested “maintaining a cooperative attitude toward the international community” and “promoting open-door strategies for mutual benefits and joint victory.”
As the Beijing Olympics approaches, China is concerned about the unfavorable impressions that the world has toward the country because of its environmental pollution, the issue of the safety of Chinese products, etc. China is expected to make efforts to recover trust and enhance its international influence by actively participating in international frameworks for multilateral cooperation and strengthening countermeasures against these adverse impressions.
| (3) While seeking the establishment of “a strategic reciprocal relationship” with Japan, China strongly asserted its position in the discussion of outstanding issues.
]Premier Wen Jiabao visited Japan and emphasized its stance toward the “improvement of the China-Japan relationship.” Internally, the government restricted anti-Japan criticism. |
Following the so-called “ice-breaking” visit by former Prime Minister Abe to Beijing (October 2006), China sent Premier Wen Jiabao, for the first time in six and a half years, to Tokyo on an “ice-breaking journey” (April 11 to 13). Premier Wen Jiabao had a meeting with Prime Minister Abe, and announced a “Japan-China Joint Press Statement” that confirmed the two countries’ “efforts to establish a strategic reciprocal relationship.” Premier Wen Jiabao signed joint statements on cooperation in environmental protection and energy assistance, and also agreed on the establishment of “Japan-China High Level Economic Dialogue.” In addition, Premier Wen Jiabao made a speech at the National Diet of Japan, the first time in history as a Chinese prime minister. This speech was broadcast live in China, impressing Chinese people with the “improvement of the China-Japan relationship.” Premier Wen Jiabao evaluated his visit as “successful” when returning home.
China also sent Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan to Japan (August 29 to September 2). The Chinese Minister of National Defense’s visit was the first in nine and a half years, and led to the resumption of Japan-China exchanges by national defense officials. The two countries agreed on the bilateral exchange of high-level national defense personnel, as well as on allowing a Chinese naval vessel to stop at a Japanese port (November 28 to December 1, Harumi, Tokyo). In addition, China sent Jia Qinglin, the fourth ranking member of the Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference, to Japan (September 12 to 17).
The inauguration of the new Japanese administration led by Prime Minister Fukuda did not change China’s stance of establishing a “strategic reciprocal relationship” with Japan. In fact, Premier Wen Jiabao expressed the intention to “maintain friendly China-Japan relations” during his talks with Prime Minister Fukuda in Singapore (November 20). China also mentioned that it would be important for the two countries to focus on preparations for an early visit by Prime Minister Fukuda to Beijing, as well as a visit by President Hu Jintao to Tokyo during 2008, as “the priority task at this moment.”
Under the circumstances described above, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman made some critical comments about Japan, in response to reports by the Japanese media (May), that “Prime Minister Abe made an offering at Yasukuni Shrine in April,” and the visit of former Taiwanese President Li Denghui to Japan (May 30 to June 9). The comments were: “Japan should sincerely respect the common understanding of China and Japan to overcome political difficulties that could affect China-Japan relationships, and promote sound development of the two countries’ friendly, cooperative relations,” and “China is strongly dissatisfied with the Japanese government’s acceptance of the visit by Li Denghui.” However, China refrained from taking any “countermeasures” and did not interrupt the exchanges of executives, thus maintaining a restrained reaction overall.
China held a ceremony to mark the 70th anniversary of the Lugouqiao Incident on July 7, but the content of the ceremony displayed a “future-oriented” attitude. Chinese media reported that “many Japanese people have a correct understanding of the history” and did not show strong anti-Japan sentiments, although it was also reported that the CPC Central Committee had instructed the media to be moderate.
With the August 2008 Beijing Olympics in mind, the Hu Jintao administration is expected to promote approaches toward Japan with an emphasis on the establishment of a “strategic reciprocal relationship” between the two countries, with the aim of stabilizing the political climate between them and benefiting from Japan’s economic and technological strengths, which China needs in order to achieve the economic development that is its highest priority goal.
Also, the Hu Jintao administration seems to be concerned about any protest movements, such as the large-scale anti-Japan demonstrations in the spring of 2005, could adversely affect its image and also trigger anti-government demonstrations. Thus, the Chinese government is expected to continue to curb anti-Japan media reports and movements within the country.
As for the issue of resources exploration in the East China Sea, the two countries have reached an agreement on the joint development of a gas field. However, discussions between the two countries with regard to the exploration area did not make any progress, since the differences in opinion between the two are still large as far as the land/ocean territory issue is concerned. From the standpoint of energy security and national security, China is expected to strengthen its stance of “protecting the rights and interests to oceanic territories” in the East China Sea.
With regard to the Taiwan issue, China designates the issue as “affecting a crucial part of China’s interests” and repeatedly requested Japan to “oppose any statements or actions promoting ‘Taiwan’s move to independence.’” China talked more about the Taiwan issue recently while downplaying the issue of Japan’s perception of history, including the Yasukuni issue. It can be expected that China will continue to increase diplomatic approaches to Japan, with the March 2008 Taiwanese presidential election in mind.
| (4) With the Taiwan presidential election and the Beijing Olympics imminent, the Taiwan-China relationship has destabilizing factors.
]Chen Shui-bian promoted various measures to inspire people to feel “self-consciousness as a Taiwanese national” toward the expiration of his term. |
President Chen Shui-bian, whose term will expire in May 2008, has been promoting various measures to inspire people to have “self-consciousness as a Taiwanese national.” For instance, the government introduced a “name change” campaign, by which the names of state-owned companies, if they contained the word “China” or “Chinese,” were altered to replace such words with “Taiwan” or “Taiwanese” (February). In addition, the President declared Taiwan’s application for membership of the United Nations under the name of “Taiwan” (May), and proposed to hold a referendum on the question of UN membership concurrently with the presidential election in March 2008 (June). Taiwan’s application for U.N. membership was ultimately rejected by the United Nations General Committee (September), but prior to the rejection, a demonstration was carried out by 300,000 people (according to organizers), calling for a referendum and UN membership (September). Furthermore, during the ceremony at the Double-Tenth festival (October), which celebrates the Chinese Revolution (1911), a military parade was carried out for the first time in sixteen years, to impress people with Taiwan’s strengthened “self defense” ability.
Behind this series of measures taken by President Chen Shui-bian is his enthusiasm to provide a satisfactory conclusion to his 8-year administration, as well as his thought that the stimulation of “self-consciousness as a Taiwanese national” will help the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) win the election. In addition, the President seems to consider it necessary to emphasize once again, internally and externally, that “Taiwan is a sovereign state,” given that China is strengthening its influence in the international community, making it difficult for Taiwan to promote its own diplomatic activities.
From the beginning of the year, China positioned “the year 2007 as a key year to oppose ‘Taiwan’s move toward independence’,” and strengthened its diplomatic approach toward the United States. Behind this approach is Chen Shui-bian’s judgment that “it should be difficult for China to mount strong protest actions against Taiwan when the Beijing Olympics is approaching” (overseas edition of People’s Daily, dated July 20th), as well as its caution against Taiwan’s move toward “legal justification of independence” through application for UN membership under the name of “Taiwan” and the referendum on membership, in addition to the “revision of the Constitution” advocated by the Chen Shui-bian administration.
During the U.S.-China Summit held in September, President Hu Jintao mentioned that “the two years, 2007 and 2008, represent a time of increasing difficulties in the Taiwan Strait situation” and that “we need to strictly warn the Taiwanese administration again that it is impossible for ‘Taiwan’s move toward independence’ to succeed.” In response to these statements, President Bush reportedly said that “as a representative of the U.S. government, Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte expressed promptly and clearly our stance against the Taiwanese administration’s move toward a ‘referendum on UN membership’” (People’s Daily, dated September 7).
Under the aforementioned circumstances, China strengthened its approaches toward various sectors in Taiwan, with the aim of winning them over. During the New Year’s tea party of the People's Political Consultative Conference on January 1, President Hu Jintao emphasized China’s stance by saying, “it is necessary to expand cross-straits personnel, economic, trade and cultural exchanges based on the substantial understanding of the principal objective of promoting the peaceful development of cross-straits relations.” In April, when a Taiwanese company entered the Chinese market and established its nationwide organization in China, the position of Honorary Chairman of the company was taken by an executive from a Chinese public organization engaged in the promotion of Taiwan relations. Thus, China has promoted its “assistance system” for Taiwanese companies. In addition, China held an economic forum jointly with the Kuo Min Tang (KMT) of Taiwan, and announced a preferential policy toward the Taiwanese financial sector.
Furthermore, in a report at the 17th CPC Congress (October), President Hu Jintao did not adopt the previously used expression, “China does not accept abandonment of the use of armed forces,” and called for various Taiwanese sectors to promote bilateral dialogue toward a “peace agreement” and the “peaceful development” of China-Taiwan relations.
In Taiwan, the presidential race has started for the March 2008 election. In May, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party officially nominated its candidate, Hsieh Chang-ting, former Premier of Taiwan, while KMT, the largest opposition party, in June nominated Ma Ying-jeou, former chairman of the party.
In an attempt to win over public sentiment in Taiwan, China showed “goodwill” toward Taiwan, but at the same time demonstrated a firm determination to prevent “Taiwan independence” by saying, for instance, in a report at the CPC Congress, “China will never allow anyone to separate Taiwan from its homeland by any means or under any name.”
In particular, China regards Taiwan’s move toward a “referendum on UN membership under the name of ‘Taiwan’” as a “crucial step toward the legal justification of Taiwan’s independence.” In addition, there is a view that the referendum could be regarded as corresponding to the “case of a crucial event which could lead Taiwan to secede from China,” pursuant to the “Anti-Secession Law” that prescribes “non-peaceful means or other necessary measures” as a countermeasure against Taiwan. China is expected to continue to use a mixture of hard and soft approaches toward Taiwan to prevent its “independence,” while paying close attention to Taiwan’s movements, including the referendum that could directly lead to its independence.
| (1) Russia shifting to post-Putin administration
]Moves to establish a post-Putin administration without undermining the influence of the president began in earnest. |
Russia has maintained favorable economic conditions, backed by higher crude oil prices on the international market. Against this background, the Russian government promoted the strengthening of state control by establishing state-run unified business entities in key industries, such as nuclear power. In the meanwhile, President Vladimir Putin showed off his political clout by appointing Victor Zubkov as Russian’s new Prime Minister and having him reshuffle the cabinet (September) and putting his name at the top of the list of candidates for the United Russia party in the State Duma elections (October).
President Putin is expected to establish a stable power base in the Federal Assembly and continue to exert influence over his successors after his retirement (May 2008).
While such a strong power base is being established, there are some people who have pointed out that the country’s democratization has regressed due to implementation of tough gag rules, such as a strict crackdown on anti-government demonstrations organized by an alliance of opposition parties (March, April). Moreover, destabilizing factors have yet to be wiped out, such as the situation in the Republic of Chechnya, and suspected terror acts of train bombing (August) and bus bombing (October). There may be more conflicts between the government, which has been increasing its hard-line stance, and opponents to such a move.
While maintaining cooperative relationships with the United States and European countries in such fields as antiterrorism measures, Russia adopted more confrontational stances on energy policy and security issues. In particular, with regard to the U.S. concept of deploying a missile defense (MD) system in Eastern Europe, President Putin flaunted Russia’s status as “Great Russia,” criticizing the U.S. concept as “unipolar domination” in his speech at an international conference on security in Munich (February) and notifying the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of Russia’s decision to suspend its implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (CFE) (July).
Meanwhile, Russia has been striving to strengthen its ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), China and India, and reached agreements to construct nuclear power plants with Myanmar and to establish an “international enriched uranium center” with Kazakhstan. Russia has also exported arms to Venezuela and Syria. These moves suggest that Russia intends to further promote the establishment of a “multipolar” world.
| (2) Russia has launched programs to develop the four northern islands
]While territorial issues remained in deadlock, Russia launched infrastructure improvement on the four northern islands. |
With regard to the conclusion of a peace treaty, President Putin sounded positive when he said (June), “I would like to give instructions again to promote the negotiation process without delay.” At the same time, however, he also said (June), “This is fixed in international law and international documents. This is one of the results of World War II.” Regarding the 1956 Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, he said (June) that it is “a legal document ratified by the legislative bodies of the two countries.” These remarks suggest that there is no change in the basic Russian position of refusing the return of all four islands.
On the other hand, under the “special federal program for social and economic development of the Kuril islands” that started in 2007, Russia carried out improvement work on Mendeleev airport on the island of Kunashiri, construction or improvement of port and electricity facilities, and road construction on the islands. Russia also launched infrastructure improvement to construct a new airport on the island of Etorofu. The Russian government dispatched First Deputy Premier Sergey Ivanov and some other cabinet ministers to the island to inspect the progress of the project in a move to demonstrate the country’s all-out efforts in the development project, and thereby assert as a fait accompli that the islands belong to Russia. As a result, it was reported (September) that islanders’ expectations of an improved living environment have increased and that changes have begun to appear in the attitudes toward Japan among some islanders, who had previously been positive about the islands’ return to Japan.
New frameworks for dialogue and negotiations have been set up between Japan and Russia, including the “Japan-Russia Strategic Dialogue” (January, June), a forum to discuss pressing international issues, and negotiations to conclude a Japan-Russia Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy under an agreement reached when Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov visited Japan (February). On the economic front, the total trade value between Japan and Russian posted an all-time high for four consecutive years and Russia moved to further expand bilateral relations by, for instance, expressing expectations for and referring to the need for consultations to realize the “Initiative for the Strengthening Japan-Russia Cooperation in the Far East Russia and Eastern Siberia,” an idea that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed to President Putin when they attended the Heiligendamm Summit (June).
On the other hand, Russia, with the aim of tightening the state control of marine resources, has strengthened controls by the border patrol service against fish poaching and revitalized the government-ruled State Fisheries Commission (September). These moves raise concerns that the fishing quota on Japan and sea patrol around the Northern Territories may be adversely affected in the future.
| (1) The situation in the Middle East remains chaotic
]The security situation in Iraq showed some signs of improvement, but no progress has been made in efforts to resolve important political issues. |
The United States announced a new policy focused on restoring law and order in Iraq (January) and sweeping operations were conducted against armed rebels from February onwards. The international community supported the move to restore law and order. For instance, the United States and other concerned countries repeatedly convened an “International Conference on Iraq Stabilization” (March, May, September, November), and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki remarked that “the sectarian conflict in Baghdad has almost come to an end” (November), indicating some signs of improvement in law and order.
Meanwhile, in northern Iraq, the Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds intensified their conflicts over the control of Kirkuk and in southern Iraq, there were frequent conflicts among the Shiites over leadership (August). However, movements for reconciliation were also seen, such as the order of suspension of intra-group conflicts by anti-U.S. group leader Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr (August), and the signing of an agreement to call for suspension of clashes between al-Sadr and Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) leader Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim (October).
Under these circumstances, the Sadr group, irritated by the government’s failure to set a deadline for the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from the country, had its members in the Maliki administration cabinet resign from their posts (April), and subsequently broke away from the coalition government (September), while the Sunnis and secular Iraqis, dissatisfied with Prime Minister Maliki’s handling of the government, announced the resignation of their cabinet members and abandonment of their duties (August), leaving about half of the cabinet posts vacant. As a result, important political issues, such as the fair distribution of oil interests and constitutional amendment, were left unresolved. In Iraq and the United States, a storm of criticism of the Maliki administration’s ability to hold the reins of government erupted.
The situation in Iraq may remain chaotic due to terrorist attacks on the multinational forces and Iraqi security forces and fighting among the factions over the control of Kirkuk, in addition to the difficulty of resolving important political issues under the Maliki administration.
The Japanese government enacted a bill to extend the Special Measures Law for Support of Iraq Reconstruction by two years (June) and decided at a cabinet meeting (July) to extend by one year the support operations of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) troops, based on the law. As a result, the ASDF mission of transporting personnel and goods will be continued until the end of July 2008.
In Palestine, a national unity government was established by Hamas and Fatah (March). However, the United States and European countries, which designate Hamas as a terrorist organization, suspended aid, putting the Palestinian Authority in a serious financial squeeze. In this situation, armed conflicts between Hamas and Fatah intensified from mid-May onwards and Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in mid-June, prompting President Mahmoud Abbas to dismiss Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh and inaugurate an emergency cabinet in the West Bank. As a result, the national unity government collapsed and Palestine was plunged into a de facto divide and rule situation.
Israel, the United States and European countries supported President Abbas and provided assistance to the emergency cabinet. On the other hand, Hamas, which has been increasingly isolated, has been insisting on the continued existence of the national unity government and called for reconciliation talks with Fatah. However, President Abbas has rejected the call.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Abbas, viewing the “separation of Fatah and Hamas” as a good opportunity to resume peace talks, began preparing a joint statement on the peace process. President Abbas called to include in the proposed joint statement a road map to resolve problems concerning the final status of Israel and Palestine, such as the status of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugee repatriation and border demarcation. On the other hand, Prime Minister Olmert, out of consideration to the rightist party with which he forms a coalition government, wanted to limit the statement to show only a peacemaking guideline for the future. As a result, the Middle East Peace Conference led by the United States (November), which was attended by about 50 countries and organizations, left the problems regarding the final status to further negotiations, although the participants agreed to strive to conclude a peace treaty by the end of 2008.
The peace negotiations between Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas seem set to continue by mediation of the United States and other countries. However, the peace process may face rough going given the fact that there is a wide difference between the policies of Israel and Palestine, and that many neighboring Arab countries are against any peace negotiation that leaves the issue of the Gaza Strip unsolved.
| 2) Iran’s nuclear development and pressure from international community
]U.S. and UN Security Council called for stricter sanctions against Iran. |
In December 2006, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1737, setting out sanctions against Iran, but the country refused to accept it. In response, the UN Security Council in March adopted Resolution 1747, adding further sanction items to Resolution 1737. UN member states increased pressure on Iran by establishing domestic systems to implement the resolution. However, Iran adamantly refused to accept the resolution and expanded its uranium enrichment activities by increasing the number of centrifugal machines.
In late May, after the deadline for the implementation of Resolution 1747 passed, Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) exchanged views. In August, Iran agreed to an “action plan” calling on the country to provide relevant materials in stages, including full disclosure of centrifugal machine development. In response to the agreement, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany decided to postpone the adoption of a new UN resolution.
While continuing to criticize the United States and European countries, which are strengthening their hard-line stances, Iran conducted direct dialogue with the United States on the security situation in Iraq, and secured a route for regular consultation with the European Union. Iran also made diplomatic endeavors which combined a hard and a soft approach, maintaining friendly relations with China and Russia.
In tandem with the sanctions based on the UN Security Council resolutions, the United States strengthened its pressure on Iran by employing domestic laws. In January, the Treasury Department banned transactions with Iran’s state-owned Bank Sepah; in July, the Commerce Department strengthened export bans on Iran’s Nuclear Power Agency and four other bodies; in September, the State Department banned imports from two Iranian bodies, including the Aerospace Industries Organization; and in October, the Treasury and State departments banned transactions with entities such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard and Bank Melli, the largest bank in Iran. Incidentally, a National Intellience Estimate (NIE) released on December 3 said that Iran has halted its nuclear weapons program since the fall of 2003, but Iran still has the option of nuclear weapon development.
Russia, for its part, has remained cautious about imposing more sanctions against Iran because of its close relations with the country, including the support for the construction of Iran’s Busher nuclear plant, nuclear fuel supplies and weapon exports. Under these circumstances, senior Russian and Iranian government officials’ meetings were held frequently, and in October, President Putin visited Iran to attend the Caspian Sea littoral states summit.
China has also been striving to strengthen its economic ties with Iran in recent years from the perspective of its strategy toward the Middle East region. As to the issue of nuclear development, China has been insisting that the nuclear issue should be resolved through dialogue. Although China voted for the adoption of Resolution 1747 in March, the country paid due consideration to its relations with Iran, stressing the importance of “pursuing diplomatic efforts to make Iran return to the negotiating table, rather than punishment.”
Although President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is trying to gain public support for his nuclear development program, people’s support of the government appears to have been decreasing due to domestic economic dislocation, such as gasoline rationing and higher prices. Meanwhile, in the political leadership, there were successive resignations by cabinet ministers and vice ministers, including Secretary General of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani.
While international pressure on Iran is expected to increase, the country is likely to continue its nuclear development program. However, because of the possibility of Iran’s slight change of negotiating tactics depending on developments in internal politics, it is necessary to keep a close watch on the issue of nuclear development in Iran.
| Concern over leakage of advanced dual-use technologies from Japan ]Successive cases of illegal export/transfer to China, Russia and North Korea were detected. ]PSI maritime interdiction exercise held with 40 countries participating. |
In its “political report” at the 17th Party Congress in October, the Communist Party of China called for “enhancing self-innovative capability and quality/efficiency in the areas of research and development of weapons and equipment.” Russia also attached importance to modernizing its domestic industries in the field of science and technology, as was described in the annual state-of-the-nation address in April, calling for “building scientific and technological potential capable of challenging world-class technology development.” Also, North Korea, which is pursuing a “military-first policy,” and some Middle Eastern countries that are promoting nuclear development, tried to illegally obtain advanced technology that can be diverted to military use.
In particular, in the field related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD), there were many cases of equipment and materials that can be diverted to the development and manufacturing of WMD being illegally transferred out of Japan in the past. These incidents suggest that Japan is one of the important supply sources of goods that can be diverted to the development and manufacture of WMD.
In recent years, there were many cases of illegal export or transfer of Japanese advanced technology to China, Russia and North Korea. Regarding China, it was revealed that a military intelligence agency tried to obtain defense information which could fall under the “Special Defense Secrets” stipulated in the “Law Concerning the Protection of Secrets for the Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Treaty,” via a Japanese national who was the president of a trading firm. There were also cases such as: a major Japanese manufacturer’s dual-use technology for unmanned helicopters was leaked to a Chinese military firm; a former Chinese military firm official working at a Japanese company took a computer containing corporate secrets out of the company without permission.
Regarding Russia, a case was revealed in which a member of the Russian Trade Representation in Japan, who belonged to the GRU, asked an employee of a major Japanese precision equipment manufacturer to provide a “variable attenuator (VOA) device” that can be used in missile-related technology.
As for North Korea, a Taiwanese trading company illegally exported components of computer-numerically-controlled (CNC) machine tools to two North Korean firms under the guise of export to China. Computer parts manufactured by Japanese firms are said to have been among the illegally exported products.
With regard to WMD proliferation, Japan has strengthened measures designed to prevent proliferation of WMD-related materials from Japan. For instance, Japan revised the Customs Law to toughen penalties for export/import without authorization, exports and imports based on false declarations, and refusal of customs examination (March). Against Iran, Japan froze assets of organizations and individuals involved in nuclear and missile development, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1747 (May). Against North Korea, Japan continued to implement export control measures, in place since 2006, aimed at preventing supply of WMD-related materials to the country.
In addition to these efforts, Japan hosted a maritime interdiction exercise as a participating country in the “Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),” a global initiative aimed at stopping proliferation of WMD and related materials (October). The United States, Britain and four other countries dispatched their vessels to participate in the exercise and 34 other countries from Asia and Europe sent observers. The exercise, which took place in training zones set in the eastern sea off Izuoshima Island and other places, consisted of onboard and search training, on-the-spot inspection and cargo inspection.
Since some countries are still highly interested in various advanced technologies of Japanese government institutions and private corporations, particularly in WMD-related materials, they may try to acquire such technologies and materials through personnel and technology exchanges in corporations, and even by using students studying in Japan. They are also expected to be making all-out efforts to collect classified information on Japanese national security, such as defense-related information.
| (1) Increasing threat of terror attacks by Islamic extremists ]Al-Qaeda regenerates infrastructure for its activities. ]The threat of “home-grown terrorists” becomes clearer in Western countries. |
It is said that the Al-Qaeda leadership including Osama bin Laden have secured a “safe haven” in the sparsely governed Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) in northwestern Pakistan and, while regenerating infrastructure for their activities, they are also involved in educating and training jihadists.
Under these circumstances, the United States and European countries are on alert. The U.S. government estimated that “al-Qaeda has been recovering its capabilities to attack the U.S. homeland” (July, “National Intelligence Estimate” (NIE) report).
Al-Qaeda called for intensified “global jihad” attacking the United States and its major allies in the world mainly by issuing statements, including one with a video image of what seems to be bin Laden, for the first time in 2 years and 10 months (September 8). While praising the perpetrators of the multiple terrorist attacks of September 2001, in the statements, Al-Qaeda repeatedly called for intensifying attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, which al-Qaeda regards as the “key battlegrounds,” to repulse foreign troops stationed in the two countries. They also called for attacks on U.S. and European interests as well as pro-Western regimes in Islamic countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, Algeria and Libya.
In January, a group claiming to be “al-Qaeda” and to have adopted tactics of suicide bombing and attacks on Western interests emerged in Algeria (“Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb”), indicating the growing influence of “al-Qaeda.”
In Britain, two explosives-filled cars were found in central London on June 29. On the following day, a vehicle rammed into Glasgow International Airport’s terminal building and burst into flames. The main culprits of the incidents were foreign Muslims staying in Britain, some of whom had licenses to practice medicine, and who are believed to have turned into extremists within their groups based on job and blood relationship. The incidents are drawing attention as a new case of foreign workers, who entered the country as qualified technical personnel, turning into extremists.
In Germany, a terrorist bomb plot targeting a U.S. military base in the country was uncovered and massive amounts of ingredients of explosives were found on September 4. The members disclosed in connection with the incident were led by a German who converted to Islam, reportedly belonged to the Islamic Jihad Union (the group issued a statement admitting its involvement in the plot), a radical Islamist group said to be related to al-Qaeda, and went through training at a camp in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). On the same day, a terrorist bomb plot by immigrants from Islamic countries was uncovered in Denmark.
The two incidents have common characteristics, in that the perpetrators used hydrogen peroxide as explosives and went through training in Pakistan, revealing that radical Islamist groups operating in Pakistan are involved in planning attacks by “home-grown terrorists” in European countries.
In the United States, a plot to attack a U.S. army base in New Jersey was uncovered and several individuals, including an American of Jordanian descent, were arrested in May, suggesting that the threat of “home-grown terrorists” has been increasing in Western countries.
An enhanced alertness is required, as radical Islamist groups are expected to increase their involvement in “home-grown terrorism” by recruiting Muslim immigrants and converts in Western countries and providing training and manuals on terrorist skills, such as bomb-making techniques
<Impacts of the Internet in the process of radicalization> “Home-grown terrorists” tend to turn into extremists through contact with media that propagate the radical beliefs of al-Qaeda, etc. In particular, the Internet, due to its convenience and anonymity, is actively used for propagation of radical beliefs, collection of information on bomb-making techniques and targets of terrorist attacks, and inter-group communication. As-Sahab, al-Qaeda’s media arm, has used many video pictures in its propaganda. For this reason, Europe is studying restricting the use of the Internet for terrorist activity. |
| (2) Threat of anti-U.S. militants’ terrorism and its spread ]Although the reinforcement of U.S. forces achieved some positive results, terrorism by al-Qaeda-affiliated militia groups did not subside. |
Joint U.S.-Iraq armed forces carried out sweeping operations against anti-U.S. Sunni militants, such as radical Islamist groups, in central and western regions from February onwards, following the reinforcement of U.S. forces in Iraq on the basis of new policies (January) focused on the restoration of security. Although the operations produced some improvement in the security situation in Baghdad and Al Anbar Province, terrorism against U.S. forces and Iraqi security forces did not subside. Furthermore, it seemed that the threat of terrorism spread, mainly to the northern region, with suicide bombings taking place in the Kurdish autonomous region (May), whose security situation had been relatively stable.
In the midst of these circumstances, conflicts within Sunni groups intensified, namely between an al-Qaeda-affiliated group that claims to be the “Islamic State of Iraq” and other militia groups opposed to the former’s indiscriminate terrorism, while anti-al-Qaeda tribal forces strengthened their support for the U.S.-led sweeping operations. As a result, the “Islamic State of Iraq” was isolated and its organizational strength weakened.
The “Islamic State of Iraq” tried to restore its influence by repeatedly issuing statements to expand its support base and strengthen “jihad,” while increasing terrorist attacks against multinational forces, Iraqi forces, the Shiites and opposing Sunnis by carrying out massive terrorism, such as the case in the suburbs of Mosul that left more than 400 dead (August), the highest number since the start of the Iraq war, and assassinating a leader of anti-al-Qaeda tribal forces (September).
There is a concern that the threat of terrorism by Islamic extremists may further spread from Iraq to neighboring countries, as it is reported that many foreign terrorists, who infiltrated into Iraq from Syria and other neighboring countries, are returning to their home countries or neighboring countries after acquiring combat experience in Iraq.
| (3) Spate of terrorist attacks in Asian countries. Attack techniques diversifying in some regions ]In Afghanistan, as foreign forces stationed in the country conducted sweeping operations, the Taliban expanded its operational theater, resulting in frequent suicide bombings and kidnappings of foreigners. ]Jemaah Islamiya (JI) strived to maintain its influence in Indonesia while its terrorist leaders remained in hiding in neighboring countries. |
In Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intensified sweeping operations against the Taliban. However, attacks by the Taliban increased throughout the country, with the southern and eastern areas along the border with Pakistan coming under frequent attack, and a series of suicide bombings occurring in the Afghan capital of Kabul and the western provinces, where the security situation had previously been relatively stable.
Having lost many senior members and combatants by the ISAF’s sweep operations, the Taliban began to diversify its attack techniques. In addition to conventional attacks, the Taliban resorted to suicide bombings and the use of improvised explosive devices (IED), which are frequently used in Iraq, and the kidnappings of foreigners, for instance South Koreans (July). The Taliban in effect rejected the peace talks called for by the Karzai government by making unacceptable demands on the government, such as the pullout of foreign military forces. It may be difficult to expect a significant improvement in the security situation in the country for some time to come.
In Pakistan, following the seizure of a mosque in Islamabad by radicalized students (July), the government, which had been strengthening anti-terrorism measures, intensified its crackdown on Taliban supporters in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), where the influence of the Taliban had been expanding. In response, the Taliban supporters annulled the peace agreement that they had concluded with the government in autumn 2006 and conducted frequent terrorist attacks against military forces and security authorities in the FATA.
In urban areas, such as the capital city, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi, suicide bombings targeting military forces also occurred frequently from July onwards, and in October one of the largest suicide bombings in the country’s history (death toll of more than 140) occurred in Karachi.
On November 3, President Pervez Musharraf declared a state of emergency, citing a series of attacks including suicide bombings by radicals. Although the government is expected to further strengthen measures against radicals, there are concerns that terrorist attacks may intensify in the future, as eradicating support for the Taliban is seen as difficult.
In Sri Lanka, peace negotiations between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), which had begun following a ceasefire agreement in 2002 and had been supported by Japan and the international community, hit a snag and fighting resumed in 2005. The LTTE conducted an air raid on an air base using light aircraft for the first time (March) and, in another raid on an air base in October, it destroyed eight aircraft, causing extensive damage to the government forces. The LTTE also carried out a series of terrorist bombing attacks targeting private buses. Meanwhile, government forces took control of the eastern part of the LTTE-controlled northeastern area in July, killed LTTE’s Number 2 man, SP Thamilselvan, the political head of the Tamil Tigers, in an air strike (November), and intensified attacks in the northern part of the area. Depending on future military developments, the LTTE may strengthen its resistance and conduct indiscriminate terrorism in urban areas.
In India, there was a series of terrorist attacks believed to have been carried out by Islamic extremists to spark conflict between Muslims and Hindus, including a terrorist bombing in Hyderabad in May and a series of terrorist bombings in August that left 43 people dead. Large-scale terrorist attacks have occurred one after another in the country in recent years, raising concerns about the infiltration of Islamic extremists. Also, terrorism by Maoist armed groups occurred frequently, mainly in the northeastern and central regions of the country.
In Bangladesh, it has been pointed out that Islamic extremists from Pakistan have been building bases in the country. Under these circumstances, the possibility of terrorism occurring in South Asia is expected to remain high.
In Indonesia, following a raid in Poso on Sulawesi island, where terrorist attacks targeting Christians continue, the top members of JI were taken into custody (June). It was also revealed that JI had been conducting terrorist attacks by recruiting Poso residents, who regard the government and different religions with hostility. After the arrest of its top members, JI is said to be lacking in key leaders. It is pointed out that JI’s ability to implement a large-scale terrorist attack has decreased, as it has not carried out any attacks targeting U.S. or European interests since October 2005. However, given the fact that JI is trying to rebuild its organization, not only through covert terrorist activities but also through overt activities like recruitment, fund-raising and voluntary activities, and that Noordin Mohammed Top, the mastermind of large-scale terrorist attacks, is still at large, the threat of terrorist attacks on U.S. and European interests still remains.
In the southwestern Philippines, sweeping operations by government forces have made some progress, including the confirmed death of the top leader of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which is believed to be collaborating with JI (January), the killing of several ASG leaders and the arrests of many members of the ASG and JI. However, there are concerns that retaliatory acts of terrorism may be carried out, as key JI members-including Dulmatin, who is believed to be acting with the ASG-are still at large, and the two groups are expected to maintain their collaborative relationship. Moreover, since there are still incidences of left-wing extremists attacking foreign companies in the country, an alertness to possible terrorist attacks by these groups must be maintained.
In the southern part of Thailand, bombings and other attacks on government officials and others were repeatedly carried out by armed Islamic separatist groups, with the monthly number of people killed exceeding 100 for the first time (May). Furthermore, the groups have come to carry out terrorist attacks in a more indiscriminate and atrocious manner, such as beheading and burning dead bodies, raising concerns that the groups may become more radical.
<Counter-terrorism measures by Japan and other developed nations> 1. Japan is steadily implementing the “Action Plan for Prevention of Terrorism” Japan has steadily implemented the “Action Plan for Prevention of Terrorism” by enacting the Law for Prevention of Transfer of Criminal Proceeds in order to choke off funds to terrorists and revising the Infectious Disease Law in order to safeguard against bio-terrorism, in addition to obliging foreign nationals to provide fingerprints and facial portraits on entering the country so as to prevent terrorists from entering Japan (November 20). Based on the action plan, the Public Security Intelligence Agency, while enhancing cooperation with foreign agencies, is further enhancing and strengthening the collection and analysis of information concerning terrorism and, as and when necessary, providing the information thus collected and analyzed to organizations concerned. The agency established the International Subversive Activities Countermeasure Office in order to fulfill its responsibility to provide opinions necessary for the designation of persons as terrorists, who would be deported, under the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (April). 2. U.S. and European countries strengthening anti-terrorism measures In the United States, an anti-terrorist law calling for concentrated budget allocation and improvement of aircraft and ship cargo inspection systems was enacted and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which allows interception of terrorists’ communications in foreign countries without a warrant, was revised in August. Since the revised law is temporary legislation, the big challenge will be to make it a permanent law. In Britain, the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism was established as part of the reorganization of the Home Office. The British government also established a system to require all foreign nationals applying for visas to provide fingerprints, and is deliberating extending the detention period for terrorism suspects prior to indictment. In Germany, the government commenced operation in March of an anti-terror information database shared by the police and intelligence organizations. Calls for stronger measures are increasing following the revelation of a terrorist bombing plot in September, including a proposal to consider preparation for terrorist attacks, such as participation in training in terrorist tactics, as a crime. |
(C)Copyright 1998-2006 Ministry of Justice.